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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Bioeconomic benefits of managing fishing effort in a coexisting small- and large-scale fishery game

Abstract Fishing systems provide employment, income generation, poverty alleviation, and food security. The coexistence of small-scale fisheries (SSFs) and large-scale fisheries (LSFs) increases management complexity. Management actions have ecological and social implications that must be addressed carefully. We applied a bioeconomic game-theoretical model to the four-gear mullet fishery in southern Brazil—one industrial LSF (purse seine) and three artisanal SSFs (gillnet, beach seine, and drift net). All fishing gears target adult individuals during mullet's reproductive migration. First, we explored whether the current fishing efforts of all fishing gears could persist over time. Second, we investigated their interactions through a non-cooperative game. Finally, we studied the response of these interactions when fishing effort was restricted. We found that when the current fishing effort was maintained, the stock reduced to 26.4% of its capacity in 25 years. In addition, under non-cooperation, the traditional beach seine fleet exited the fishery. Interestingly, the constrained scenario had a coexistence output with increasing values for the final stock size and the per capita labour income, suggesting that limiting fishing effort can maintain all fishing gears in the fishery with social and ecological benefits.

de Azevedo, Eric Zettermann Dias (ORCID:0000000323↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Cooperative Game Theory-based Secondary Frequency Regulation in Distribution Systems

Participation of distribution systems in frequency regulation has become an important factor for grid operation after the integration of distributed energy resources (DERs). While available reserves from a single distribution system may not be sufficient for frequency regulation, aggregated reserves from several distribution systems can provide frequency regulation at grid-scale. This paper proposes a cooperative game theory-based approach for secondary frequency regulation in distribution systems consisting of distributed energy resources (DERs). A two-stage strategy is proposed to effectively and precisely determine a change in active power set points of DERs following a command from system operators. In the first stage, the value or worth of each DER and their coalitions are determined using initial rates of change of frequency (ROCOF) for each DER/coalition. In the second stage, the Shapley value, one of the solution concepts of cooperative game theory, is used to determine changes in active power set points of DERs. The proposed method is implemented on several distribution systems including a modified IEEE 13-node system and modified 33-node distribution system.

Gautam, Mukesh↗
DOE OSTI2023

Fuel-Based Nash Bargaining Approach for Adaptive Signal Control in an N -Player Cooperative Game

This paper presents a fuel-based game-theoretic approach for adaptive signal control. Our controller applies Nash bargaining (NB) in an n-player cooperative game to identify optimal phasing splits considering future traffic demands. The fuel-based NB controller utilizes an objective function that combines operational measures (delays and stops) with fuel consumption measures at intersections. The proposed controller was encoded in Python and then implemented and evaluated in a VISSIM microscopic traffic simulation model in an intersection with increasing volumes. The performance of the NB controller was compared to a traditional actuated control as the baseline. The results show that the NB controller was able to achieve superior environmental gains with a 17% saving in fuel consumption and a 17% reduction in CO emissions. In addition, the proposed controller was capable of maintaining acceptable operational conditions as it achieved a 20% reduction in delay, 8% reduction in the number of stops, and 8% reduction in queue lengths compared to the actuated controller. Compared to similar studies that applied NB for adaptive signal control, our fuel-based NB controller stands out as a promising approach to significantly improve fuel consumption at signalized intersections.

Engineering↗
DOE OSTI2025

Quantum Advantage in Trading: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Quantum games, like quantum algorithms, exploit quantum entanglement to establish strong correlations between strategic player actions. This paper introduces quantum game-theoretic models applied to trading and demonstrates their implementation on an ion-trap quantum computer. The results showcase a quantum advantage, previously known only theoretically, realized as higher-paying market Nash equilibria. This advantage could help uncover alpha in trading strategies, defined as excess returns compared to established benchmarks. These findings suggest that quantum computing could significantly influence the development of financial strategies.

Khan, Faisal Shah [Taqtics LLC, USA, Rethinc. Labs↗
DOE OSTI2021

Game-Theoretic Approach for Grace-Period Policy in Supercomputers

Job scheduling at supercomputing facilities is important for achieving high utilization of these valuable resources while ensuring effective execution of jobs submitted by users. The jobs are scheduled according to their specified resource demands such as expected job completion times, and the available resources based on allocations. Jobs that overrun their allocated times are terminated, for example, after a grace-period. It is non-trivial and often very complex for users to accurately estimate the completion times of their jobs, and consequently they face a dilemma: underestimate the job time to have a higher priority and risk job termination due to overrun, or overestimate it to ensure its completion and risk its delayed execution. In this paper, we investigate whether providing grace-period can benefit facility performance by developing a game- theoretic model between a facility provider and multiple users for a simplified scheduling scenario based on job execution times. We present closed-form expressions for the provider’s and user’s best-response strategies to maximize their respective utility functions. We describe conditions under which offering a grace-period is advantageous to both facility provider and users by deriving the Nash equilibrium of the game.

He, Fei↗
DOE OSTI2025

Game theoretic modeling and optimization of competition and collaboration in dual channel electronic waste supply chains

The rapid growth of electronic waste (e-waste) presents critical challenges for sustainable resource recovery and environmental protection. This study develops a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model formulated as a hierarchical Stackelberg game, that integrates dynamic pricing and cost-sharing mechanisms to optimize both economic and environmental outcomes. The model explicitly captures strategic interactions between manufacturer-led and third-party recycling channels, accounting for consumer behavior, regulatory incentives, and market competition. Numerical simulations conducted (implemented over a four-iteration horizon using a commercial optimization solver) show that, relative to the baseline equilibrium, manufacturer profit increases from 11.6 thousand USD to 37.9 thousand USD (+226.8%), total recycled volume rises from 7,848 to 7,942 units (+1.2%), and collector profit nearly doubles under cost-sharing, enabling more equitable profit distribution. Furthermore, scenario-based simulations across Sub-Saharan Africa, high-income economies, and emerging Asian industrial countries reveal that infrastructure quality, policy intensity, and labor costs critically shape recycling efficiency and profit allocation. These findings demonstrate that subsidies alone are insufficient to ensure system efficiency. Instead, coordinated strategies that integrate internal incentive alignment with context-sensitive policy support are required. Overall, this study offers a robust framework for designing resilient, efficient, and regionally adaptable e-waste management systems.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Solving the duck curve in a smart grid environment using a non-cooperative game theory and dynamic pricing profiles

With the intermittency that comes with electricity generation from renewables, utilizing dynamic pricing will encourage the demand-side to respond in a smart way that would minimize the electricity costs and flatten the net electricity demand curve. Determining the optimal dynamic pricing profile that would leverage distributed storage to flatten the curve is a novel idea that needs to be studied. Moreover, the economic feasibility of utilizing distributed electrical energy storage is still not given in the literature. Therefore, in this paper, a novel way of solving a citywide dynamic model using a bilevel programming algorithm is introduced. The problem is developed as a novel non-cooperative Stackelberg game that utilizes air-conditioning systems and electrical storage through the end-users to determine the optimal dynamic pricing profile. The results show that the combined effect of utilizing demand-side air-conditioning systems and distributed storage together can flatten the curve while employing the optimal dynamic pricing profile. An economic study is performed to determine the economic feasibility of 20 different cases with different battery designs and the level of solar penetration. Three metrics were used to evaluate the economic performance of each case: the levelized cost of storage, the levelized cost of energy, and the simple payback period. Most cases had levelized cost of storage values lower than 0.457 $/kWh, which is the lower bound available in the literature. Seven out of 16 cases have a simple payback period shorter than the lifetime of the system (25 years). The case with a 100 MW PV power plant and a battery storage of size 597 MWh, was found to be the most promising case with a simple payback period of 12.71 years for the photovoltaic plant and 19.86 years for the demand-side investments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Optimal CO 2 storage management considering safety constraints in multi-stakeholder multi-site GCS projects: A Markov game perspective

Geological carbon storage (GCS) projects could involve a diverse array of stakeholders or players from public, private, and regulatory sectors, each with different objectives and responsibilities. Given the complexity, scale, and long-term nature of GCS operations, determining whether individual stakeholders can independently optimize their interests — or whether collaborative coalition agreements are needed — remains a central question for effective GCS project planning and management. To access large, high-quality storage resources, future GCS deployment may increasingly occur in geologically connected sites, where shared geological features such as pressure space and reservoir pore capacity can lead to competitive behavior among stakeholders. In this work, we propose a paradigm based on Markov games to quantitatively investigate how different coalition structures affect the goals of stakeholders. We frame this multi-stakeholder multi-site problem as a multi-agent reinforcement learning problem with safety constraints. Our approach enables agents to learn optimal strategies while complying with safety regulations. We present an example where multiple operators are injecting CO 2 into their respective project areas in a geologically connected basin. To address the high computational cost of repeated simulations of high fidelity models, a previously developed surrogate model based on the Embed-to-Control (E2C) framework is employed. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in addressing optimal management of CO 2 storage when multiple stakeholders with different objectives and goals are involved.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Simulating policy interventions in the interfirm diffusion of low-carbon technologies: An agent-based evolutionary game model

Policy interventions are frequently used by authorities around the world to mitigate carbon emissions. However, economic systems are essentially complex adaptive systems, which often exhibit unexpected responses to exogenous interventions and leave intervenors in a dilemma, even if the interventions are elaborately designed. To explore the behaviors of the diffusion system regarding low-carbon technologies, this study builds an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate enterprises' reactions to multiple policy interventions aimed at spurring low-carbon technology diffusion. The simulated enterprises are in a complex network where they play evolutionary games with their neighbors, which enables the model to possess two critical features of economic systems: adaptiveness and equilibrium. The model reveals a dilemma of policy interventions: intuitively, carbon taxes, asymmetric penalties (only imposed on un-low-carbon enterprises) and subsidies can improve the diffusion, which is consistent with previous research; counter-intuitively, all these policies turn out to be inefficient or even harmful to low-carbon enterprises because of the diffusion system's high adaptiveness. Specifically, when carbon taxes and penalties increase, both the low-carbon and un-low-carbon enterprises end up with the equilibrium of equivalent but lower profits. In contrast, all the enterprises earn equivalent but more profits even though subsidies are only given to the low-carbon enterprises, which implies that the un-low-carbon enterprises (indirectly) grab a portion of the subsidies and accordingly weaken the incentive effect of subsidies. These system behaviors are summarized as "equalizing effect" because the system tends to equalize the impact of both positive and negative interventions among all enterprises even though the policy interventions are asymmetrically imposed on one type of the enterprises. The findings also indicate that policies implemented to enlarge green market sizes can help policymakers bypass the dilemma.

Agent-based modeling↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Non-cooperative Game-based Approach to Distributed Beam Scheduling in Millimeter-Wave Networks

We consider the distributed beam scheduling problem in mm-Wave networks where the base stations may belong to different operators and there is no centralized coordination among them. Our goal is to design distributed beam scheduling algorithms such that the network utility, which is defined as a logarithm function of the average throughput of the user equipment, can be maximized. We propose a non-cooperative game-based scheduling approach where the base stations are modeled as players that greedily maximize their own utilities. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) then provides a distributed solution to the network utility maximization problem. By employing the Lyapunov optimization, the asymptotic optimality of the proposed scheduling can be guaranteed. We prove the existence and provide sufficient conditions which guarantee the uniqueness of the NE by establishing an equivalence to the Variational Inequality (VI) problem. We also propose a parallel power adaptation algorithm which is proved to converge to the NE. Numerical results show the superiority of the proposed scheduling over several distributed baseline schemes.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Stochastic Pricing Game for Aggregated Demand Response Considering Comfort Level

In recent years, demand response (DR) has been explored as a fundamental strategy for demand-side management due to its advantages in mediating intermittency of renewable energy generation, load shifting, etc. To engage customers in DR programs, several deterministic price-based DR strategies have been developed and implemented. However, the stochastic weather conditions and occupants' consumption behaviors often make the deterministic solution less robust to uncertainties. In this paper, with the consideration of the uncertainties, a stochastic Stackelberg game is proposed to model the price-demand negotiation between a distributed system operator and load aggregators, where the virtual battery constraints are extracted from the building thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs)‘ characteristics to guarantee comfortable TCLs' levels. Following the negotiation, a priority-based control method is used to allocate the optimal aggregated power DR profile at the building level and track the power signal. Several groups of experiments have demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the stochastic solutions.

Chen, Yang↗
DOE OSTI2020

Distributed Solution Approach for a Stackelberg Pricing Game of Aggregated Demand Response

Demand-side management is a fundamental up-to-date strategy that transforms the traditional power grid to a modern smart grid where the flexible pricing mechanisms play a critical role in its successful implementation. In this paper, the pricing-demand response between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the DSO is the price maker that adjusts its strategy based on observed responses from LAs. With the concerns of computational cost and privacy protection, two distributed solution approaches, particle swarm optimization and pattern search algorithm, are conducted and compared with the classical centralized backward induction approach. Numerical results on a small case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed distributed solution approaches in leveraging flexible demand response potential.

Chen, Yang↗
DOE OSTI2022

Robust Solution Approach for Bilevel Demand Response Game at Distribution Level

In this paper, a bilevel electricity pricing and demand response game between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is considered, and a robust decision model is proposed for the DSO to deal with the uncertainties from the wholesale market prices and demand consumptions of LAs. With the max-min objective at the upper level, the robust bilevel model is converted into a single level model by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and prime-dual transformation. Several groups of experiments have been conducted based on different preferences on uncertainty gaps and peak load reductions to show its effectiveness. After-the-fact scenario analysis has indicated that the robust solution is more beneficial in reducing the risk of inaccurate predictions as compared to the risk neutral strategy.

Chen, Yang↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Research of Blockchain-Based Co-Governance of Emergency Supply Allocation

Recently, with the spread of COVID-19 pandemic, emergency supply allocation system is drawing more and more social attention. Emergency supply allocation system is an important part of emergency governance system. It reflects social organizations’ credibility, public safety, and the modernization level of social governance. However, emergency supply allocation system still has some problems, such as information asymmetry, different desires of participants, unreasonable allocation, and so on. At present, it is widely accepted that the advantage of blockchain in co-governance could be of great help in solving above problems. And in order to distinguish the effect of blockchain to the emergency supply allocation, the paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, social organizations, and the public to analyse the impact of blockchain platform on emergency supply allocation. The simulation analysis shows the following: (1) The strategy choices of the government have a crucial impact on the evolution and stability of social organizations’ strategies. It needs a long-term process to guide social organizations practicing active allocation, and the government should accelerate to build the blockchain platform to promote this process. (2) With the help of blockchain platform, the increment of penalty intensity of the government is conductive to increasing the probabilities that social organizations practice active allocation and the government practices strict supervision. (3) Blockchain platform has a significant impact on social organizations’ choice for active allocation in many aspects, such as the positive and negative effects of social organizations, effect’s increasing multiple, and the cost of the public informing. In the end, some suggestions are presented to improve the co-governance of emergency supply allocation.

Zhao, Huawei↗
DOE OSTI2025

Simple Low-process Radiation Simulation For Unity Game Engine

This is a set of Unity components that use the Unity game engine's transform and collision systems to provide a reasonably representative approximation of any number of unique radiation sources and the collective dose they deliver to a user.

Dunker, Jack [Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Ida↗
DOE OSTI2020

SWESST Jeopardy Game [Slides]

SWESST Jeopardy is a trivia game with topics like safety, security, the environment, and LOSA, with the goal of providing activity-based learning for students and staff alike.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Electricity Market Dynamics as Smooth Games: Organizing Gradient-Based Learners and Identifying Instabilities

Wide-spread adoption of machine learning and distributed energy production has the potential to fundamentally change behaviours of energy markets. In practice, along with the benefits, previously unseen instabilities have begun emerging in markets currently embracing these technologies. In this report we study electricity markets as dynamical systems arising in smooth games, where energy consumers are modelled as gradient-based learners who interact on a graph through distributed energy producers. We give simple examples of how instabilities can arise even when the consumers’ local objectives seem reasonable and how these instabilities can be remedied. Drawing insights from these examples, we begin developing a general model of optimization-driven electricity market dynamics and give conditions for ensuring local Nash equilibria of the system are stable fixed points of the dynamics. Our results demonstrate how models of electricity market dynamics might be used for deriving formal guarantees in order to stabilize markets and enact regulatory policies in the face of market shocks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗