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Fifty-Five Gallon Drum Standard Study

Fifty-five gallon drums are routinely used within the U.S. for the storage and eventual disposal of fissionable materials as Transuranic or low-level waste. To support these operations, criticality safety evaluations are required. A questionnaire was developed and sent to selected Endusers at Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge and the Savannah River Site to solicit current practices. This questionnaire was used to gather information on the kinds of fissionable materials packaged into drums, the models used in performing criticality safety evaluations in support of operations involving these drums, and the limits and controls established for the handling and storage of these drums. The completed questionnaires were reviewed and clarifications solicited through individual communications with each Enduser to obtain more complete and consistent responses. All five sites have similar drum operations involving thousands to tens of thousands of fissionable material waste drums. The primary sources for these drums are legacy (prior operations) and decontamination and decommissioning wastes at all sites except Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The results from this survey and our review are discussed in this paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Establishing no credible risk of inadvertent criticality for the K-25 demolition project - 14310

Demolition of the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant required establishing a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality because a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) could not be reliably maintained operable as the building was being torn down. Preparation for, and demolition of, the facility was a multi-year long effort with significant changes in approach. The most significant change was to demolish the facility with as much of the process gas equipment and piping left in the facility as possible, rather than removing all process gas equipment and piping from the facility prior to demolishing the building structure only. The contractor had to adapt their approach to accommodate these changes. The normal approach to demolition was to remove all process gas equipment and piping prior to demolition, using Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls based on the double contingency principle, while CAAS coverage was intact. Then, the building structure was demolished with no requirement for a CAAS. This was the method used to demolish the K-33 Building, for example. In the case of K-25 demolition, all equipment and piping that met the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) disposal cell Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) was left in the building and removed as part of the building demolition process. This resulted in significant quantities of fissionable material remaining in the building and being handled during demolition. The NCS Organization worked closely with several groups during preparation activities. A Data Management organization was established to specifically identify every piece of process gas equipment and piping in the facility so that it could be accounted for and characterized. Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) personnel conducted internal visual inspections, by remote camera, of all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3' diameter, to reveal any large deposits that would require removal. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) of the vast majority of equipment and piping was required to quantify the amount of fissionable material remaining. Finally, all process gas equipment and piping larger than 3'' diameter was internally filled with foam, which was credited by NCS with immobilizing the remaining fissionable material such that large migration and accumulation could not occur during demolition activities. NCS personnel worked closely with all of these groups in order to acquire the data and information needed to establish a non-credible risk of inadvertent criticality during building demolition. Good communication and a close working relationship between NCS, the various D and D/characterization personnel, and the Department of Energy (DOE) ensured the success of the modified approach to building demolition. The same successful approach is currently underway in the K-27 Building as well. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Identifying Nuclear Material via Prompt Photo-Neutron Multiplicity Measurements

Proof-of-principle measurements are reported demonstrating that multiplicity techniques can be used to identify prompt fission neutrons from photonuclear interrogation under circumstances where the fission neutrons may be accompanied by photodissociated neutrons of an identical energy spectrum, and where the emitted neutrons are naturally bunched in time by the pulsed nature of the interrogating photon beam. The technique shows promise as a method for the detection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) compared to techniques based on delayed neutrons because prompt neutrons are orders of magnitude more abundant, and compared to passive multiplicity techniques because actively induced fission rates are orders of magnitude higher than spontaneous fission rates in HEU. The technique also shows promise in that multiplicity signatures can be used to distinguish HEU from other fissionable material.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Experimental Fuels Facility Re-categorization Based on Facility Segmentation

The Experimental Fuels Facility (EFF) (MFC-794) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) located on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site was originally constructed to provide controlled-access, indoor storage for radiological contaminated equipment. Use of the facility was expanded to provide a controlled environment for repairing contaminated equipment and characterizing, repackaging, and treating waste. The EFF facility is also used for research and development services, including fuel fabrication. EFF was originally categorized as a LTHC-3 radiological facility based on facility operations and facility radiological inventories. Newly planned program activities identified the need to receive quantities of fissionable materials in excess of the single parameter subcritical limit in ANSI/ANS-8.1, “Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors” (identified as “criticality list” quantities in DOE-STD-1027-92, “Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,” Attachment 1, Table A.1). Since the proposed inventory of fissionable materials inside EFF may be greater than the single parameter sub-critical limit of 700 g of U-235 equivalent, the initial re-categorization is Hazard Category (HC) 2 based upon a potential criticality hazard. This paper details the facility hazard categorization performed for the EFF. The categorization was necessary to determine (a) the need for further safety analysis in accordance with LWP-10802, “INL Facility Categorization,” and (b) compliance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements.” Based on the segmentation argument presented in this paper, the final hazard categorization for the facility is LTHC-3. Department of Energy Idaho (DOE-ID) approval of the final hazard categorization determined by this hazard assessment document (HAD) was required per the DOE-ID Supplemental Guidance for DOE-STD-1027-92 based on the proposed downgrade of the initial facility categorization of Hazard Category 2.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Detection of special nuclear material from delayed neutron emission induced by a dual-particle monoenergetic source

Detection of unique signatures of special nuclear materials is critical for their interdiction in a variety of nuclear security and nonproliferation scenarios. We report on the observation of delayed neutrons from fission of uranium induced in dual-particle active interrogation based on the {sup 11}B(d,n γ){sup 12}C nuclear reaction. Majority of the fissions are attributed to fast fission induced by the incident quasi-monoenergetic neutrons. A Li-doped glass–polymer composite scintillation neutron detector, which displays excellent neutron/γ discrimination at low energies, was used in the measurements, along with a recoil-based liquid scintillation detector. Time-dependent buildup and decay of delayed neutron emission from {sup 238}U were measured between the interrogating beam pulses and after the interrogating beam was turned off, respectively. Characteristic buildup and decay time profiles were compared to the common parametrization into six delayed neutron groups, finding a good agreement between the measurement and nuclear data. This method is promising for detecting fissile and fissionable materials in cargo scanning applications and can be readily integrated with transmission radiography using low-energy nuclear reaction sources.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Multiscale Simulation of Thermo-Mechanical Processes in Irradiated Fission-Reactor Materials

This research characterized, by atomic level molecular dynamics (MD) simulations, the early stage aggregation of the fission product xenon in a model uranium oxide nuclear fuel matrix that contributes to the long term bubble formation mechanisms that compromise the efficiency and lifetime of nuclear fuels. These atomic level computer simulations disclosed a previously unknown pre-coarsening phenomenon in which the clustering of xenon is driven by vacancy diffusion. These key findings are to be included in higher level simulations of nuclear fuel thermo-mechanical processes that model irradiation effects within nuclear fuels. Previous multiscale models did not include these early time pre-coarsened clusters that occur in the nanosecond regime and therefore will lead to a better understanding of bubble formation in nuclear fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Improved Fission Neutron Data Base for Active Interrogation of Actinides

This project will develop an innovative neutron detection system for active interrogation measurements. Many active interrogation methods to detect fissionable material are based on the detection of neutrons from fission induced by fast neutrons or high-energy gamma rays. The energy spectrum of the fission neutrons provides data to identify the fissionable isotopes and materials such as shielding between the fissionable material and the detector. The proposed path for the project is as follows. First, the team will develop new neutron detection systems and algorithms by Monte Carlo simulations and bench-top experiments. Next, they will characterize and calibrate detection systems both with monoenergetic and white neutron sources. Finally, high-fidelity measurements of neutron emission from fissions induced by fast neutrons will be performed. Several existing fission chambers containing U-235, Pu-239, U-238, or Th-232 will be used to measure the neutron-induced fission neutron emission spectra. The challenge for making confident measurements is the detection of neutrons in the energy ranges of 0.01 – 1 MeV and above 8 MeV, regions where the basic data on the neutron energy spectrum emitted from fission is least well known. In addition, improvements in the specificity of neutron detectors are required throughout the complete energy range: they must be able to clearly distinguish neutrons from other radiations, in particular gamma rays and cosmic rays. The team believes that all of these challenges can be addressed successfully with emerging technologies under development by this collaboration. In particular, the collaboration will address the area of fission neutron emission spectra for isotopes of interest in the advanced fuel cycle initiative (AFCI).

Pozzi, Sara A.↗

Uncovering Special Nuclear Materials by Low-energy Nuclear Reaction Imaging

Weapons-grade uranium and plutonium could be used as nuclear explosives with extreme destructive potential. The problem of their detection, especially in standard cargo containers during transit, has been described as “searching for a needle in a haystack” because of the inherently low rate of spontaneous emission of characteristic penetrating radiation and the ease of its shielding. Currently, the only practical approach for uncovering well-shielded special nuclear materials is by use of active interrogation using an external radiation source. However, the similarity of these materials to shielding and the required radiation doses that may exceed regulatory limits prevent this method from being widely used in practice. We introduce a low-dose active detection technique, referred to as low-energy nuclear reaction imaging, which exploits the physics of interactions of multi-MeV monoenergetic photons and neutrons to simultaneously measure the material’s areal density and effective atomic number, while confirming the presence of fissionable materials by observing the beta-delayed neutron emission. For the first time, we demonstrate identification and imaging of uranium with this novel technique using a simple yet robust source, setting the stage for its wide adoption in security applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Detection of Delayed Neutrons from Fissionable Samples: Monte Carlo Modelling and Physical Assumptions for a Design of the DET-12 Device

An activation of fissionable materials with neutrons has been considered as a possible neutron diagnostic of D–D and D–T fusion plasma. Fission reaction caused by fusion neutrons leads up to emission of secondary neutrons: prompt and delayed. Physical assumptions have been outlined to design a new device (DET-12) for measurements of delayed neutrons emitted from samples of fissionable materials activated with neutrons at big fusion-plasma devices. The aim is to support a classic neutron activation method used as one of plasma diagnostics at tokamaks or stellarators. An interpretation of the time decay of delayed neutrons enables an assessment of the primary neutron flux which induced fission reaction. Monte Carlo calculations have been carried out in order to elaborate the method considered. Nuclides like: pure {sup 235}U, {sup 238}U and {sup 232}Th, have been selected as possible materials to be irradiated. Physical fundamentals of generation of the delayed neutrons are mentioned and a resulting concept of the DET-12 device, built in the Institute of Nuclear Physics, Poland, is presented. A general size and dimensions of particular constituent material layers, and a number and placement of neutron detectors are optimized by means of Monte Carlo modelling. Recommendations for a technical design of the measuring chamber were formulated. Detection efficiency of DET-12 has been also estimated.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Technical Basis for the International Export of Handheld Spectroscopy Detectors

The international export of handheld spectroscopy detectors by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to partner states will provide state regulatory authorities and nuclear material owners a way to improve accountancy for accidental gains of nuclear material, including the provision of reports to the IAEA, in order to meet their safeguards agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements for non-nuclear weapons states requires accountancy for all nuclear material. As defined in Article XX of the IAEA statute, nuclear material includes source materials: "uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature," and special fissionable material: "plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233". For IAEA Member States to meet their requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA), safeguards are to be applied on "all source or special fissionable material," which "includes all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards". Therefore, accidental gains and losses of nuclear material must be reported to the IAEA. An accidental gain occurs when a state unexpectedly adds nuclear material to their inventory by various means such as seizing smuggled material or the discovery of legacy items previously unaccounted for. The material type and quantity must be added to the State's inventory by updating domestic records and then communicated to the IAEA.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Enterprise Science & Technology (NEST) [Slides]

The NEST Certificate Program is designed to provide students with the skills and experience to qualify for entry-level positions in nuclear facilities as Fissile Material Handler and/or Glovebox Operator. The program goal is to provide for a technically qualified workforce who can execute a variety of programmatic work in modern nuclear materials handling and processing facilities. The program is designed to be completed in a minimum of 1 year (2 semesters) of university level courses (30 credit hours). A certificate will be offered and awarded through the University of New Mexico – Los Alamos (UNM-LA). NEST is unique in that it is an immersive education program. The NNSA-required training for nuclear material handlers and fissionable material handlers has been cross-walked with the educational Core Curricula. Academic content will be delivered that provides background scientific and engineering understanding of the fundamental concepts behind this training. It will be offered as a Pilot Program to an incumbent cohort to ensure that the Certificate meets programmatic needs. NEST is modelled after a Wharton County Junior College (Texas) program to attract and produce nuclear reactor operators.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

System, algorithm, and method using short pulse interrogation with neutrons to detect and identify matter

A system, method, and algorithm for detecting and identifying special nuclear material (SNM) (including fissionable material), explosives, or drugs is disclosed. This material detection system relies on active interrogation of material using a short, intense neutron pulse, and characterization of the resulting prompt gamma response in two short time windows, the first concurrent with and the second immediately following the end of the neutron pulse, optionally subject to a total transit delay time of the neutrons from the neutron source to the target and from the target to the gamma detector. A high data rate analysis system implements data stream analysis and statistical correlations of the two short time window gamma responses to rapidly detect or identify SNM, explosives, or drugs. The duration of the neutron pulse is so short that minimal dose results. Various shields help to minimize the background signal falling on the gamma detector to improve sensitivity.

Derzon, Mark S.↗

Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logged 1562 incidents, of which only 18 include weapons grade nuclear materials. As much as 66% of the radioactive material involved in these incidents was not recovered. Since 2004, there has been a 75% increase in incidents of unrecoverable material, much of which is labeled dangerous with potential for deterministic health affects if misused. This makes clear that a black market of illicit trade in sources exists. The incidents reported to the IAEA's database rely only on voluntary state reporting; therefore, the number of lost or stolen sources is expected to be much higher.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Radiation Sources and Criticality Safety - 14392

This paper consists essentially of a two part discussion concerning the effects that extraneous radiation sources have on fissionable material systems with respect to criticality and criticality safety. The first part (sections 2 and 3) concentrates on a qualitative discussion about extraneous radiation sources and definitions associated with the criticality of neutron chain reacting systems. The second part (section 4), while it does not constitute a rigorous proof, focuses more on the mathematics governing neutron distribution in general and fissionable material systems. The goal of both parts is the same, i.e. to dispel the notion that a subcritical system can be driven critical by simply supplying a source of neutrons to make up losses. Either part, or both, can be relied on as references in situations in which a criticality safety concern is inappropriately raised for situations where extraneous radiation sources are utilized to perform measurements with subcritical configurations of special nuclear materials. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Fissile material detection using neutron time-correlations from photofission

The detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) in commercial cargoes is a major objective in the field of nuclear security. In this work we investigate the use of two-neutron time-correlations from photo-fission using the Prompt Neutrons from Photofission (PNPF) detectors in Passport Systems Inc.’s (PSI) Shielded Nuclear Alarm Resolution (SNAR) platform for the purpose of detecting ~5 kg quantities of fissionable materials in seconds. The goal of this effort was to extend the secondary scan mode of this system to differentiate fissile materials, such as highly enriched uranium, from fissionable materials, such as low enriched and depleted uranium (LEU and DU). Experiments were performed using a variety of material samples, and data were analyzed using the variance-over-mean technique referred to as Y 2F or Feynman-α. Results were compared to computational models to improve our ability to predict system performance for distinguishing fissile materials. Simulations were then combined with empirical formulas to generate receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves for a variety of shielding scenarios. We show that a 10 second screening with a 200 μA 9 MeV X-ray beam is sufficient to differentiate kilogram quantities of HEU from DU in various shielding scenarios in a standard cargo container.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Magnetic‐Field‐Switchable Laser via Optical Pumping of Rubrene

Abstract Volumetric optical imaging of magnetic fields is challenging with existing magneto‐optical materials, motivating the search for dyes with strong magnetic field interactions, distinct emission spectra, and an ability to withstand high photon flux and incorporation within samples. Here, the magnetic field effect on singlet‐exciton fission is exploited to demonstrate spatial imaging of magnetic fields in a thin film of rubrene. Doping rubrene with the high‐quantum yield dye dibenzotetraphenylperiflanthene (DBP) is shown to enable optically pumped, slab waveguide lasing. This laser is magnetic‐field‐switchable: when operated just below the lasing threshold, application of a 0.4 T magnetic field switches the device between nonlasing and lasing modes, accompanied by an intensity modulation of +360%. This is thought to be the first demonstration of a magnetically switchable laser, as well as the largest magnetically induced change in emission brightness in a singlet‐fission material to date. These results demonstrate that singlet‐fission materials are promising materials for magnetic sensing applications and could inspire a new class of magneto‐optical modulators.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A thrust-sheet propulsion concept using fissionable elements

A space propulsion concept is proposed and analyzed which consists of a thin sheet coated on one side with fissionable material, so that nuclear power is converted directly into propulsive power. Thrust is available both from ejected fission fragments and from thermal radiation. Optimum thicknesses are determined for the active and substrate layers. This concept is shown to have potential mission capability (in terms of velocity increments) superior to that of all other advanced propulsion concepts for which performance estimates are available. A suitable spontaneously fissioning material such as Cf254 could provide an extremely high-performance first stage beyond earth orbit. In contrast with some other advanced nuclear propulsion concepts, there is no minimum size below which this concept is infeasible.

Moeckel, W. E.↗

A thrust-sheet propulsion concept using fissionable elements

A space propulsion concept is proposed and analyzed which consists of a thin sheet coated on one side with fissionable material, so that nuclear power is converted directly into propulsive power. Thrust is available both from ejected fission fragments and from thermal radiation. Optimum thicknesses are determined for the active and substrate layers. This concept is shown to have potential mission capability (in terms of velocity increments) superior to that of all other advanced propulsion concepts for which performance estimates are available. A suitable spontaneously fissioning material such as Cf-254 could provide an extremely high-performance first stage beyond earth orbit. In contrast with some other advanced nuclear propulsion concepts, there is no minimum size below which this concept is infeasible.

Moeckel, W. E.↗