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At least 55 records · Page 3

Evaluation of Centralized Model-Based FLISR in a Lab Setup: Preprint

Utilities are installing advanced distribution management systems (ADMS) around the globe to improve the sensing and control of distribution systems. ADMS is becoming a critical component to improve the resiliency and reliability of distribution systems. These management systems host a multitude of applications that can be used to sense, control, and operate distribution systems. Fault location, isolation, and service restoration (FLISR) is one of the ADMS applications that is critical to improving resilience during fault conditions. FLISR applications use smart, controllable devices that are installed in the distribution system for FLISR operation. These controllable devices include distributed energy resources (DER) and reclosers. Evaluating such ADMS applications before installation in the field can help de-risk the field implementation and avoid costly failures in the field. This paper presents a background on experimental setup that are typically used to evaluate ADMS applications. This is followed by briefly presenting the setup used to evaluate the FLISR application in an off-the-shelf ADMS tool. Finally, results from the evaluation experiments are presented.

94 GMLC - Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium↗

Securing the Modern Grid: Federal Investments, Digitization, and Supply Chain Strategy

Across the United States (U.S.) grid expansion and modernization is underway, paving the way for accelerated load growth and intelligent resource management. Digitization of the grid is supported by several state and federal programs, providing support for utilities installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), AI-powered analytics systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to transform the grid from a one-way power delivery system into an intelligent, responsive network that will enable faster load growth and power expansion of data centers for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digital transformation of America's grid presents opportunity for increased efficiency and resiliency but also introduces new digital risks that require careful management. Digital equipment often contains several vulnerabilities such as unencrypted communication protocols, and persistent remote access capabilities that could be exploited to manipulate device settings, coordinate service disruptions, or inject false data into grid operations. These digital risks become particularly important as the grid must rapidly scale to support AI-driven data centers, which the administration has identified as essential for maintaining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. These vulnerabilities are compounded by supply chain realities: Chinese manufacturers currently produce 70-90% of essential grid components including inverters, batteries, and control systems, with the U.S. lacking domestic manufacturing capacity for critical assets like extra-high voltage transformers. Recent federal legislation has established Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions to address these risks, requiring projects to achieve escalating thresholds of non-FEOC content to receive tax credits while utilities work to expand sourcing channels for their supply chains and strengthen security measures. These restrictions arrive precisely when utilities face unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by the rapid growth in data centers, creating a considerable challenge: rapidly expanding infrastructure while navigating complex compliance requirements while lacking viable alternatives for many critical components. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and its partners have developed practical approaches to help utilities navigate these intersecting challenges as they leverage federal investment to strengthen and grow the grid. These solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles that build resilience directly into systems, the Cirrus tool for secure cloud migration, and enhanced procurement guidance that embeds security requirements throughout equipment lifecycles. Federal initiatives, such as the Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) project, provide direct support to utilities implementing these approaches while facilitating knowledge sharing across the industry. While these tools and frameworks cannot eliminate all risks inherent in foreign supply chain dependencies, they offer pragmatic pathways for strengthening security posture without sacrificing the deployment momentum essential to meeting surging electricity demand. Ultimately, securing America's digital energy infrastructure demands dedicated coordination across multiple fronts: building domestic supply chains, implementing robust digital assurance practices, and maintaining the aggressive modernization timeline necessary for reliability, resilience, and energy independence.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Grid Resiliency with a 100% Renewable Microgrid

San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) installed America’s first and largest utility-scale microgrid in Borrego Springs in 2013. The first generation Borrego Springs Microgrid utilized diesel generators to form and stabilize the microgrid island, with support from grid-scale batteries and local solar photovoltaic (PV) generation. In this project, SDG&E in partnership with National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) demonstrated through modeling, simulation and utility field testing that blackstart and islanding of the microgrid can be led with 100% renewable, inverter based resources (IBRs), to help reduce community reliance on conventional generation resources. Through equipment upgrades, grid-forming island leader capability was transitioned to a battery IBR instead of the Borrego Springs Microgrid diesel generators. A new microgrid controller was integrated to the microgrid and programmed to control and manage multiple energy storage systems. Synchrophasor and other power quality data verified autonomous, high-speed response of the IBRs through blackstart, islanding, and load step testing. Results of project field evaluations provide distribution systems operators (DSO) with increased confidence that renewable, IBR can replace traditional generators to blackstart and island microgrids and rapidly establish stable island frequency with rapid changes in peak power demand. Importantly, the project validated the integration feasibility of a distributed energy resource management system (DERMS) controller that manages multiple grid-forming and grid-following IBRs, establishing a standard design interface to reduce the complexity of integrating new DERs in the future and supporting replication by the industry. As a result of learnings in this project, SDG&E has implemented the microgrid controller strategy at multiple other microgrid sites, thereby validating the replicability of the solution. Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulations including power and controller HIL hardware — along with electromagnetic transient (EMT) simulations of Borrego Springs Microgrid —informed adjustments to inverter parameters and were important to characterize the performance of the IBRs in relevant operating conditions before deployment. The EMT and HIL simulations of islanding the entire community are important contributions in providing confidence in IBR performance prior to future islanding of the community in the field. High-fidelity EMT and/or HIL simulation of IBRs can de-risk field operations, and its relevance and importance as a tool is increasing as distribution grids and microgrids become more complex and dynamic with an increasing proportion of renewable generation, distributed energy storage, and two-way power and energy flows.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: What Integrators Need to Know

Few resources exist to address a growing need to secure distributed wind systems. Idaho National Laboratory recently published the Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind, a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architecture, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights key actionable insights from the Guide that integrators can use to execute an effective cybersecurity strategy.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: What Manufacturers Need to Know

Few resources exist to address a growing need to secure distributed wind systems. Idaho National Laboratory recently published the Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind, a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architecture, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights key actionable insights from the Guide that manufacturers can use to execute an effective cybersecurity strategy.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: What Operators Need to Know

Few resources exist to address a growing need to secure distributed wind systems. Idaho National Laboratory recently published the Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind, a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architecture, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights key actionable insights from the Guide that operators can use to execute an effective cybersecurity strategy.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Netload Range Cost Curves for Coordinated Transmission-Distribution Planning Under DER Growth Uncertainty

The increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) requires better coordination between transmission and distribution (T&D) planning to ensure system security and cost efficiency. However, misaligned planning horizons, computational burdens, and privacy concerns hinder effective coordination, leading to either underutilized resources caused by overinvestments or reliability risks due to underinvestment. To address this challenge, we introduce netload range cost curves (NRCCs), a novel approach for managing long-term DER growth uncertainty through T&D coordination, while preserving existing data-sharing and regulatory structures. NRCCs provide pairs of (i) peak substation netload guarantees and (ii) corresponding distribution upgrade options and costs, enabling their seamless integration into transmission planning workflows. To compute NRCCs efficiently, we develop a transmission-aware distribution network planning (TADNP), which is subsequently integrated to an iterative computation procedure. These NRCCs are then embedded into an NRCC-informed transmission planning model to enable resource-efficient coordination. We illustrate our proposed approach with a case study based on realistic distribution and transmission systems in the San Francisco Bay Area, California. Our results indicate the possibility of dramatic savings in transmission investments by incorporating the proposed NRCC-integrated T&D coordination framework.

Li, Yujia↗

Active High Assurance Authentication Protocol (AHAAP)

The AHAAP Maturation Project involves maturation and evaluation of a patented zero-trust tamper-resistant high-assurance session-less dynamic and active device authentication protocol that simultaneously authenticates identity and provides integrity verification in a single step, substantially reducing the risk of cyberattack, and eliminating the need for costly and complex conventional communication security systems requirements (i.e., cryptography, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and key management). These cybersecurity attributes of the technology must be preserved when applying the technology to different cybersecurity solutions, including Command & Control (C&C), Over-the-Air (OTA) update, Common Access Card (CAC), and distributed energy resource (DER) implementations, among others. The technology research objective is to test and verify that the cybersecurity attributes of the technology are not degraded in different cybersecurity applications. The primary technology development objective is to build minimum viable products to demonstrate the technology addresses today’s cybersecurity threats so that prospective investors, strategic partners, regulatory agencies, and commercial customers can interact with and assess the protection assured by the technology. The AHAAP Maturation Project goal is to develop, test, and validate one or more AHAAP implementations. The AHAAP Maturation Project tasks are: (i) engineer AHAAP implementation software, (ii) build a functional prototype that implements the AHAAP software for demonstration, testing, analysis, and evaluation purposes, and (iii) generate a report detailing the results of the AHAAP C&C software and hardware implementation. The final project deliverables are: (i) AHAAP software implementation and prototype, (ii) a report from Sandia National Laboratories detailing the results of the AHAAP implementations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

EVSE Cybersecurity and Resilience

Consequence-driven Cybersecurity Analysis for Extreme Fast Charging Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Electric vehicle (EV) development and associated charging infrastructure are expected to advance rapidly. Thirty percent of all global vehicle sales may be EVs and hybrid EVs by 2025, and they will rely on increasingly sophisticated strategies for grid integration. Next-generation EV charging infrastructure is expected to include interconnected renewable resources, such as photovoltaic (PV) arrays and battery storage systems, along with grid-edge devices. Although distributed energy resources (DERs) are useful in several ways, such as peak shaving at high demand times and backup supply for added resilience, the integration of vehicle charging and DERs could create more avenues for cyberattack. Physical and/or remote access to EV charging station components, including charge ports, power electronics, controllers, and local generation (e.g., PV and energy storage) could be paths to cause power fluctuations, leading to altered operations at the charging station, escalated privileges to administrative systems, exfiltration of financial information (including personally identifiable information), and reduced grid stability. One compromised EV supply equipment component can open the door to a variety of exploitable vulnerabilities. Cloud computing and mobile application control have the potential to expand the threat surface to non-repudiation and firmware integrity challenges. Vendor clouds have access to hundreds of chargers, and if compromised, can scale the attack surface exponentially. The high power and voltage levels of xFC infrastructure (e.g., 400 kW at 1000- V DC) increase the hazards and ability to impact the grid and vehicles more than lower-power charging systems. Legacy communications systems and protocols could also put EV infrastructure at risk of cyberattacks requiring a robust patch management process. Communications networks link EVs and chargers to several stakeholders - including charging station operators, grid operators, vendors/manufacturers, and aggregators - who have both physical and network access to share information for control, monitoring, and analytics. Information in these networks that is vulnerable to compromise includes the state of charge, charging duration, payment information, electricity price, and load control. Analyzing and prioritizing these interconnections risks could help address cybersecurity related to data leakage and manipulation.

charging↗

Cyber100 Compass User Guide

This document provides an overview of the Cyber100 Compass tool and serves as a guide to users interested in understanding the cybersecurity risks facing their clean energy transition. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed the Cyber100 Compass tool for cyber risk assessment at the system-of-systems level for system planners trying to reach high levels of renewables. Two offices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) - the Office of Electricity and the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response-funded NREL to develop this framework that will enable grid system planners to understand and mitigate cybersecurity risk for grids transitioning to high levels of renewable generation, including 100%. Cyber100 Compass can help systems planners apply the principle of security-by-design at scale. Investing in an upfront understanding of system-of-systems (where the constituent systems are operating entities of the different renewable resources) risks from high-renewable grids will result in a more resilient grid at a lower long-term cost.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Space Radiation Risk Assessment for Future Lunar Missions

For lunar exploration mission design, radiation risk assessments require the understanding of future space radiation environments in support of resource management decisions, operational planning, and a go/no-go decision. The future GCR flux was estimated as a function of interplanetary deceleration potential, which was coupled with the estimated neutron monitor rate from the Climax monitor using a statistical model. A probability distribution function for solar particle event (SPE) occurrence was formed from proton fluence measurements of SPEs occurred during the past 5 solar cycles (19-23). Large proton SPEs identified from impulsive nitrate enhancements in polar ice for which the fluences are greater than 2 10(exp 9) protons/sq cm for energies greater than 30 MeV, were also combined to extend the probability calculation for high level of proton fluences. The probability with which any given proton fluence level of a SPE will be exceeded during a space mission of defined duration was then calculated. Analytic energy spectra of SPEs at different ranks of the integral fluences were constructed over broad energy ranges extending out to GeV, and representative exposure levels were analyzed at those fluences. For the development of an integrated strategy for radiation protection on lunar exploration missions, effective doses at various points inside a spacecraft were calculated with detailed geometry models representing proposed transfer vehicle and habitat concepts. Preliminary radiation risk assessments from SPE and GCR were compared for various configuration concepts of radiation shelter in exploratory-class spacecrafts.

Kim, Myung-Hee Y.↗

Mental Models for Managing Grid Cybersecurity Risk - ARC Industry Forum, Cybersecurity and Energy Transition

A proper mental model of the concepts of cyber risk and its components of threat and exploitability and consequence is necessary to allocate limited resources to different security activities, especially when considered alongside reliability and regulatory and economic risks. Understanding the consequence and frequency different risks are realized also helps align the right mitigations to the right risks. Cyber-informed engineering (CIE) is an emerging method to “engineer out” cyber risk across product and system lifecycles, and INL has a portfolio of programs operationalizing CIE’s principles for the energy sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Framework for Characterizing the Risk of Ice Fall and Ice Throw from Small Wind Turbines

Small wind turbines rated up through 100 kW in size are typically deployed as distributed energy resources. Their proximity to populations, buildings, and other infrastructure can generate safety concerns regarding ice throw (ice detaching from operational turbines) and ice fall (ice detaching from a turbine during standstill or idling) even when the turbines are not installed in cold climates. This paper presents a data-driven approach to characterize and mitigate the potential risk from icing on small wind turbines. By identifying how likely it is that an icing event will occur each year, estimating the distances at which ice could throw or fall from the turbine, defining the risk context, and establishing risk management practices, small wind turbine developers and installers can help address communities’ safety concerns around ice throw and ice fall.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Total Power Factor Smart Contract with Cyber Grid Guard Using Distributed Ledger Technology for Electrical Utility Grid with Customer-Owned Wind Farm

In modern electrical grids, the numbers of customer-owned distributed energy resources (DERs) have increased, and consequently, so have the numbers of points of common coupling (PCC) between the electrical grid and customer-owned DERs. The disruptive operation of and out-of-tolerance outputs from DERs, especially owned DERs, present a risk to power system operations. A common protective measure is to use relays located at the PCC to isolate poorly behaving or out-of-tolerance DERs from the grid. Ensuring the integrity of the data from these relays at the PCC is vital, and blockchain technology could enhance the security of modern electrical grids by providing an accurate means to translate operational constraints into actions/commands for relays. This study demonstrates an advanced power system application solution using distributed ledger technology (DLT) with smart contracts to manage the relay operation at the PCC. The smart contract defines the allowable total power factor (TPF) of the DER output, and the terms of the smart contract are implemented using DLT with a Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system for a customer-owned DER (wind farm). This article presents flowcharts for the TPF smart contract implemented by the CGG using DLT. The test scenarios were implemented using a real-time simulator containing a CGG system and relay in-the-loop. The data collected from the CGG system were used to execute the TPF smart contract. The desired TPF limits on the grid-side were between +0.9 and +1.0, and the operation of the breakers in the electrical grid and DER sides was controlled by the relay consistent with the provisions of the smart contract. The events from the real-time simulator, CGG, and relay showed a successful implementation of the TPF smart contract with CGG using DLT, proving the efficacy of this approach in general for implementing electrical grid applications for utilities with connections to customer-owned DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evaluating the Curtailment Risk of Non-Firm Utility-Scale Solar Photovoltaic Plants under a Novel Last-In First-Out Principle of Access Interconnection Agreement

With the increasing share of distributed energy resources on the electric grid, utility companies are facing significant decisions about infrastructure upgrades. An alternative to extensive and capital-intensive upgrades is to offer non-firm interconnection opportunities to distributed generators, via a coordinated operation of utility scale resources. This paper introduces a novel flexible interconnection option based on the last-in, first-out principles of access aimed at minimizing the unnecessary non-firm generation energy curtailment by balancing access rights and contribution to thermal overloads. Although we focus on solar photovoltaic (PV) plants in this work, the introduced flexible interconnection option applies to any distributed generation technology. The curtailment risk of individual non-firm PV units is evaluated across a range of PV penetration levels in a yearlong quasi-static time-series simulation on a real-world feeder. The results show the importance of the size of the curtailment zone in the curtailment risk distribution among flexible generation units as well as that of the “access right” defined by the order in which PV units connect to the grid. Case study results reveal that, with a proper selection of curtailment radius, utilities can reduce the total curtailment of flexible PV resources by up to more than 45%. Findings show that non-firm PV generators can effectively avoid all thermal limit-related upgrade costs.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Risk-informed Hierarchical Control of Behind-the-Meter DERs with AMI Data Integration (Final Technical Report)

This project addresses several key barriers to implement the next generation demand response applications and provides a clear understanding of implementing hierarchical and standalone control using AMI data. Through this program, Eaton has developed and tested a meter-as-a-controller prototype with the help of other partners--- National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Pecan St Inc. (PSI), and Delaware Electric Cooperative (DEC). The controller can utilize residential controllable loads such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioner (HVAC), electric water heater and distributed energy resources like solar PV and battery energy storage systems for off-setting the demand that is required from the grid, thus providing reliable grid-services for demand reduction or peak shaving. The controller is also capable of coordinating the resources of the premises for better management and energy efficiency while meeting the comfort bound of the premises owner as quality-of-service. The development has been demonstrated in a three virtual-home setup at system performance lab of NREL with real appliances (HVAC, electric water heater, solar PV, and battery). The technology has also been proved through laboratory and field demonstration with successful interconnectivity (e.g., end-to-end communication and data exchange) between the residential appliances and utility through the RF network at Delaware Electric Co-op (DEC) in Delaware.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

A review of privacy in energy applications

As the distribution system continues to experience an increase in distributed energy resource (DER) and electric vehicle (EV) penetration, so does the need for new solutions that can help grid operators manage and leverage their capabilities. This will undoubtedly lead to new operational schemes and business opportunities that will transform the traditional consumer into a prosumer who will be more actively engaged in grid operations. Although the field is still under active development, many of the potential use cases presented in literature or industry are built upon edge computing, two-way communications, and other innovative computational constructs to attain their goals. However, at their core, many use cases assume a great level of data access to aid with the decision-making process, an assumption that may need to be revised to ensure fair and equitable operational processes are maintained. This may be particularly true as edge resources are predicted to participate in retail-side, many-to-many, or peer-to-peer markets and thus may lead to financial impacts if data access considerations are ignored. The need to revise data access mechanisms can be further justified by the introduction of new participants into the operational process, who do not have the same level of trust, nor the incentives to focus on energy delivery as their primary objective. At the same time, more consumers are becoming aware of their own data, and the potential impacts of its abuse. To help solution developers better understand these risks, this report has been developed to offer an initial introduction to the topic of privacy. This is achieved by 1) Highlighting the need for privacy-aware solutions; 2) Encouraging system designers to be inquisitive about the status quo; 3) Documenting the existing threat space; 4) Presenting and evaluating tools that may be helpful towards enabling better privacy postures; and 5) Making recommendations to encourage the adoption of better practices. From a technical perspective, the report focuses on evaluating two potential techniques by applying them to the Transactive Energy Space. Based on the obtained results, it can be established that differential privacy (DP) methods may have limited applicability when highly correlated, time-series data records need to be protected. However, DP may be a powerful tool when it is used to aggregate and analyze mid-size and large-size data sets in a more traditional statistical environment. The second tool under evaluation is threshold cryptography, which can guarantee complete secrecy (and thus privacy) but requires the establishment of key management procedures and dedicated communication channels for key coordination. Therefore, due to its increased computational overhead, the use of threshold cryptography must be weighted using a cost/benefit analysis on a per-application basis.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗