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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Roadmap for Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cybersecurity: A vision for improving cyber maturity of distributed and utility-scale solar energy installations

As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.

14 - SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Navigating United States Standards and Regulation for Digital Energy Systems

This report provides an analysis of the U.S. standards and regulatory landscape for digital energy systems, focusing on cybersecurity, safety, and reliability requirements. It examines the interplay between federal mandates, state regulations, voluntary industry standards, and utility-specific policies, highlighting critical gaps between compliance and real-world risk mitigation. While NERC CIP standards enforce cybersecurity for Bulk Electric System assets, distribution-level infrastructure and emerging technologies often fall outside mandatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities. The report identifies systemic challenges such as reliance on self-attestation, uneven state adoption of safety codes, and lagging standards for advanced technologies like battery energy storage and inverter-based resources. Through a detailed gap analysis, it underscores the urgency of proactive risk-based approaches, independent verification, and strategic engagement with state and federal entities. Recommendations include adopting tiered security frameworks, strengthening procurement practices, and addressing emerging technology risks to ensure resilient and secure digital energy infrastructure. This guidance is intended for utilities, regulators, and stakeholders navigating compliance obligations and seeking to enhance cybersecurity and safety beyond minimum standards.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Digital Assurance for Grid Reliability in the Era of Large Load Growth

The rapid expansion of large electric loads is reshaping the operational and regulatory landscape of the U.S. electric grid. These facilities are reaching new scales of expansion, now exceeding a gigawatt per site, and their highly sensitive, digitally driven behaviors introduce new reliability risks. Recent grid events, including large load losses following routine transmission disturbances, highlight the consequences of limited ride-through capability, inconsistent protection settings, inadequate modeling, and lack of behind-the-meter visibility. Parallels to earlier integration challenges of new grid technologies suggest that the grid’s existing processes, standards, and interconnection frameworks are no longer adequate for emerging large loads. This brief synthesizes lessons from the evolution of inverter-based resource regulation and applies them to large-load integration. It identifies critical gaps in modeling accuracy, interconnection processes, performance standards, and compliance mechanisms. Technical recommendations emphasize advanced monitoring, improved modeling, coordinated communication protocols, modernized substations, and structured behind-the-meter control schemes. Collectively, these measures provide a roadmap to maintain bulk power system reliability while enabling the continued growth of large, electrified digital infrastructure.

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DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 2 – Prioritizing Digital Assurance Challenges, Session 2

The second session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 10, 2025, focused on prioritizing digital assurance challenges at the intersection of data centers and the electric grid. Building on the foundational concepts introduced in Workshop 1, this session deepened the application of the Threat–Vulnerability–Consequence (TVC) framework and emphasized the urgency of addressing cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and operational reliability. Participants explored the growing convergence of digital and physical systems, the expanding attack surface due to global supply chain dependencies, and the implications of AI-driven load behavior. Real-world incidents—including the Volt Typhoon campaign and vulnerabilities in Solarman and Deye platforms—were analyzed to illustrate the risks of unpatched systems, insecure APIs, and inadequate vendor oversight. Key themes included architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and human and procedural shortcomings. The workshop also examined the evolving regulatory landscape, highlighting new federal mandates around Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) compliance and large-load reliability standards. Through interactive exercises, stakeholders ranked and mapped digital assurance risks from their respective perspectives—utilities, operators, and vendors—laying the groundwork for mitigation strategies and shared accountability models to be developed in Workshop 3. Session 2 of 3.

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DOE OSTI2025

Securing Flexible Demand [Slides]

This briefing presents some prior work on security needs for virtual power plants (VPPs). This presentation introduces virtual power plants (VPPs) and discusses why they are an emerging participant in our power grid. We will look at several examples where they have been critical for grid reliability. We will then take a dive into some of the risks associated with wide-area digital coordination of VPP assets, and finally conclude with an outlook on what's next.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

BESSIE: Battery & Energy Storage Supply Chain Analysis, Mitigation Deployment, and Tools

Battery energy storage systems (BESS) and their associated power electronic interfaces are key components to delivering clean and more resilient energy, providing much-needed fast-ramping, emergency discharge, generation, and operations support to the electric grid. These services have grown to be invaluable over the past ten years and will soon be an irreplaceable element of energy delivery. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) strives to address these challenges through a strategic approach to supply chain risk assessment and mitigation for BESS and related digital energy equipment through the BESSIE project under the Center for Securing Digital Energy Technology. Recognizing that decreasing dependence on a foreign supply chain will take significant time and investment, BESSIE’s focus is strategically addressing battery supply chain risks by pairing short-term steps to operate securely through today’s risks with long-term steps to shape the supply chain over the coming years.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cybersecurity Risk Profiles for Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems

Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Qualitative Risk Assessment of Legacy Wells within the Estimated Prairie State Generating Company Area of Review

This report details the digitization of a legacy wellbore database, including data processing assumptions, parameter estimation, and risk assessment methodology. The database, comprising 6,454 documents, was provided by ISGS. It includes valuable data from the Prairie State Generating Company (PSGC) and One Earth Energy (OEE) sites of the CarbonSAFE Phase III – Illinois Storage Corridor project. The report focuses on wells within a 15-mile radius from the Lively Grove #1 (LG#1) well at PSGC site, evaluating subsurface conditions and potential risks. A total of 4,386 wellbores within 15 miles of the LG#1 well were filtered based on depth and formation codes. LG#1 is the stratigraphic well at the PSGC site drilled in 2021. Ninety-four (94) wells penetrating the Maquoketa Shale Group (the primary confining unit) within the estimated area-of-review (AoR) for the PSGC site were evaluated using a qualitative risk assessment (QRA) methodology. The QRA developed by Arbad et al. 2022 focuses on legacy wells within the AoR and categorizes them based on well construction details. The QRA identifies wells that need immediate attention by categorizing them based on penetration depth and protection. Wells within the AoR were categorized into nine groups based on penetrations and protections. These categories range from Type 1 wells, with no documentation, to Type 9 wells, which do not penetrate the primary confining unit or storage reservoir (unit). Well accessibility within the AoR varies based on well status, including Dry & Abandoned (DA), Plugged & Abandoned (PA), Injection (INJ), Oil/Gas Producing (PROD), and Observation (Obs) wells. Accessibility levels were determined by well construction, with DA wells being the least accessible and Observation wells the most accessible, impacting gas leakage detection possibilities. Remedial action priority of wells decreases from Type 1 to Type 9 wells. Type 1 to Type 6 wells with status DA and PA require immediate attention, while Type 7 and Type 8 wells are low priority. A risk matrix used to prioritize corrective actions for legacy wells is proposed to categorize wells within an AoR based on penetrations, protections, and accessibility. The methodology involves data acquisition, well categorization into nine types, and determining CO 2 leakage pathways using well schematics and geospatial mapping. This approach is particularly useful for managing the integrity of legacy wells throughout the lifecycle of a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) project. A qualitative risk assessment of 94 wells within the AoR of the PSGC site identified 54 wells with high priority for corrective action due to penetration of the primary containment seal. The assessment utilizes color-coded maps to categorize well types and prioritize corrective actions, providing a comprehensive analysis. Schematics of wells penetrating the primary confining unit were drawn, and leakage pathways were identified. Details of all wells penetrating the confining zone are provided in the appendix, including information on well types, plugging, and casing status.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2025

Field Insights: Strengthening Digital Assurance Through On-Site Network Monitoring

The accelerating deployment of digital energy infrastructure, ranging from inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), to advanced grid control platforms, has brought unprecedented visibility, flexibility, and efficiency to the electric grid. However, this digital transformation also introduces new cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the form of supply chain risks and operational blind spots at the grid edge. Over the past year, the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through its Rapid Risk Assessment initiative, along with the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), through its Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, have supported a series of on-site network engagements led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These engagements, conducted in partnership with asset owners across the country, have focused on identifying real-world vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in operational environments, many of which are not detectable through remote assessments or traditional compliance audits. The goal of this report is to distill key findings and lessons learned during network hunt engagements from INL’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 - 2025. It is intended to help asset owners—regardless of their participation in the program—better understand the evolving threat landscape and adopt practical measures to secure their digital energy infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

DeepLynx Ecosystem 2025

Poor data integration and governance continue to plague complex engineering projects, resulting in missed cost, schedule, and performance targets. Departments operate in isolated systems with manual data exchange, creating fragmented information that compounds errors and leads to significant delays and cost overruns. The DeepLynx ecosystem addresses these challenges through an open-source, modular data management platform that transforms fragmented project data into an integrated digital thread. Built on a federated microservice architecture, the ecosystem comprises seven specialized tools centered around DeepLynx Nexus, a unified data catalog with hierarchical organization and graph-based navigation capabilities. The ecosystem includes: DeepLynx Stream for real-time timeseries data ingestion from industrial sources; DeepLynx Ingest for governed data uploads with formal review workflows; DeepLynx Lattice for ontology-based entity and relationship extraction; DeepLynx Run for workflow orchestration and secure AI/ML compute; DeepLynx Visualize for 3D digital twin visualization; and DeepLynx Insight for AI-assisted document analysis with traceable, grounded responses. Deployable in cloud, on-premise, or hybrid environments using containerized Docker applications and Helm charts, the DeepLynx ecosystem provides flexible infrastructure that adapts to organizational requirements. By consolidating project data into a unified data lake with role-based access controls and OAuth2 authentication, DeepLynx enables digital thread and digital twin capabilities that improve decision-making, reduce risk, and support complex engineering workflows throughout the project lifecycle.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Efficient Extraction Of Building Elevation Attributes For Flood Risk Management Using Airborne LiDAR Data

In this paper, we address the need for extracting two key building elevation attributes—Lowest Adjacent Grade (LAG) and Highest Adjacent Grade (HAG)—which are crucial for effective flood risk management. Conventional methods, involving onsite surveying or the use of optical imagery-derived building footprints combined with Digital Elevation Models (DEMs), often face misalignment and time discrepancy issues due to varied remote sensing sources. We introduce a new, scalable method that exclusively relies on airborne LiDAR data to overcome these challenges. Our approach employs an object-based ground filtering technique, and the results were evaluated using two different DEMs and building footprint sets. The findings demonstrate that our single-source method, utilizing only airborne LiDAR data, significantly improves the accuracy of LAG and HAG calculations compared to traditional methods that use hand-digitized building footprints. The proposed approach offers a solution for comprehensive flood risk management endeavors.

Song, Hunsoo↗
DOE OSTI2026

Data Management for Digital Twin Implementation: Enhancing Existing SCADA Architecture for INL's CITRC Test Distribution System

The United States power grid will continue to experience stress from aging infrastructure, extreme weather, and increasing loads. In order to strengthen resiliency, researchers need to run tests and simulations that model real-life infrastructure. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is creating a digital twin of its Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex (CITRC). CITRC is an at-scale grid testbed which can be configured in utility-realistic distribution scenarios for a variety of tests, such as advanced grid protection and control. A digital twin of this infrastructure would support in-depth tests/simulations without risking physical consequences, before trialing devices under test at-scale. This project focuses on the data acquisition part of constructing a digital twin. It investigates the Supervisory Data Acquisition and Control (SCADA) system of CITRC and explores ways to utilize this system for the twin. Future “ideal” at-scale implementations such as upgraded equipment, modern communication protocols, and automation applications are also explored.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

4th Big Data for Nuclear Power Plants Workshop 2023

The Ohio State University and Idaho National Laboratory organized the 4 th Big Data for Nuclear Power Plants Workshop in November, 2023 in Columbus, Ohio. Workshop topics were chosen to understand the challenges and gaps that need to be addressed to maximize the impact of data on the nuclear industry, as well as the associated applications and risks. Discussions were focused around six specific application areas: Operation and Maintenance; Machine Learning in Nuclear Materials and Advanced Manufacturing; Cybersecurity; High-Performance Computing and Massive Computation; Big Data and Digital Twins; and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The opportunities, challenges, and risks identified in the six focus areas explored in this workshop are diverse, but some common themes emerge, such as the importance of data integrity, quality, coverage, privacy, and traceability. Big data and AI/ML tools can be leveraged to reduce costs, optimize human tasking, and reduce human error across various application areas. In order for the nuclear industry to benefit from big data and advanced analytic capabilities, it is essential to address challenges and risks, such as data privacy, model reliability, and computational resource availability. Learning from other industries that have successfully implemented big data and AI/ML technologies, like the aerospace industry, can help the nuclear industry successfully integrate these technologies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

pnnl/LL-risk-assessment (33525-E)

A suite of scripts that helps evaluate and visualize the grid reliability risk due to events introduced by large dynamic digital loads (LDDLs) at the planning stage.

Biswas, Shuchismita [Pacific Northwest National La↗
DOE OSTI2024

Application Guide for the Cyber-Resilient Design Framework for Hybrid Systems

As the energy landscape evolves, hybrid power plants—integrating multiple renewable energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, and battery storage) with the bulk power electric system—play a crucial role in meeting growing energy demands. However, with a hybrid power plant’s increased number of components, complex network connectivity and digitization of controls, these systems face growing cybersecurity risks. To help mitigate these risks, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) presents this application guide specifically designed for operators and systems engineers to evaluate the cybersecurity resilience of their hybrid power plant’s design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Data Center Cybersecurity, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Cohort Summary: Takeaways and Action Plans

This report summarizes the outcomes of the Data Center Cohort under the Department of Energy’s Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, aimed at enhancing grid resilience through cybersecurity, supply chain risk management (SCRM), and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). The cohort engaged 17 organizations across utilities, data center operators, vendors, and technology providers in three sessions combining presentations, discussions, and exercises. Key topics included AI-driven load behavior, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in UPS/BESS and cooling systems, governance gaps at utility–data center boundaries, and supply chain integrity. Five cross-cutting themes emerged: interconnection architecture vulnerabilities, fragmented governance, AI-driven stability risks, lack of regulatory frameworks, and long-term supply chain concerns. Actionable recommendations were developed, including implementing DMZ segmentation, formalizing vendor access agreements, designing AI workload limits, and advancing standards through NERC and state-level programs. These strategies aim to strengthen resilience, clarify responsibilities, and ensure secure integration of data centers into the grid.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

ARIES Annual Report FY25

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) is the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) test bed for energy system demonstration and de-risking. ARIES comprises the largest collection of physical and digital assets in the DOE laboratory complex, supporting flexible configuration across a broad range of energy scenarios. In Fiscal Year 2025, ARIES provided a platform for system-level research to anticipate and address future energy needs in energy security, system reliability, and technology deployment.

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