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Requirements for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) requirements must be developed in order to establish a CNS architecture supporting Unmanned Air Systems integration in the National Air Space (UAS in the NAS). These requirements must address cybersecurity, future communications, satellite-based navigation and APNT, and scalable surveillance and situational awareness. CNS integration, consolidation and miniaturization requirements are also important to support the explosive growth in small UAS deployment. Air Traffic Management (ATM) must also be accommodated to support critical Command and Control (C2) for Air Traffic Controllers (ATC). This document therefore presents UAS CNS requirements that will guide the architecture.

Templin, Fred L.↗

Architecture Design for Remote Operation of Microreactors: Poster

The nuclear sector is pursuing a number of advanced reactor concepts, one of which is the microreactor, an advanced reactor characterized by a power output of less than 20 MWth. These reactors are intended for use in applications where traditional power solutions are economically or logistically impractical. One key feature required for the successful deployment of microreactors is a remote operation capability, which can dramatically cut staffing expenses by eliminating the need for licensed operators to be present at the site of each reactor and instead concentrate in a centrally located operations center. In moving to a remote operations framework for nuclear reactors, the number of potential attack surfaces for a cyber adversary looking to cause harm or disruption increases. Therefore, a robust cybersecurity architecture is required to mitigate these potential vulnerabilities. This paper explores the functional infrastructure, security, and communication requirements to adapt remote operations to nuclear applications. It then presents a reference architecture for remote operations of microreactors that applies best practices in cybersecurity and remote communications in the context of a digital twin remote operation system.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Assessing C2 Communications for UAS Traffic Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.

air traffic control↗

Assessing C2 Communications

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.

aircraft communications↗

eGridGPT: Trustworthy AI in the Control Room

This report outlines the synergy between human decision making and generative artificial intelligence (GenAI), where GenAI supports power system operators by analyzing procedures, suggesting actions, simulating scenarios with physics-based digital twins, and recommending optimal decisions. This report is the first research effort to apply large language models (LLMs), a type of GenAI, in the power grid control room. The authors describe the Electric Grid Generative Pretrained Transformer (eGridGPT), an LLM that virtually assists system operators. Developed with cybersecurity and regulatory requirements in mind, eGridGPT represents an opportunity to responsibly evolve control room technologies to meet the needs of a rapidly changing grid. As an innovative concept, eGridGPT seeks to spearhead productive discussions about the advanced technologies in the control room of the future amid the transition to clean energy.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Clustering Graph Generator

In very simple terms a network can be de ned as a collection of points joined together by lines. Thus, networks can be used to represent connections between entities in a wide variety of elds including engi- neering, science, medicine, and sociology. Many large real-world networks share a surprising number of properties, leading to a strong interest in model development research and techniques for building synthetic networks have been developed, that capture these similarities and replicate real-world graphs. Modeling these real-world networks serves two purposes. First, building models that mimic the patterns and prop- erties of real networks helps to understand the implications of these patterns and helps determine which patterns are important. If we develop a generative process to synthesize real networks we can also examine which growth processes are plausible and which are not. Secondly, high-quality, large-scale network data is often not available, because of economic, legal, technological, or other obstacles [7]. Thus, there are many instances where the systems of interest cannot be represented by a single exemplar network. As one example, consider the eld of cybersecurity, where systems require testing across diverse threat scenarios and validation across diverse network structures. In these cases, where there is no single exemplar network, the systems must instead be modeled as a collection of networks in which the variation among them may be just as important as their common features. By developing processes to build synthetic models, so-called graph generators, we can build synthetic networks that capture both the essential features of a system and realistic variability. Then we can use such synthetic graphs to perform tasks such as simulations, analysis, and decision making. We can also use synthetic graphs to performance test graph analysis algorithms, including clustering algorithms and anomaly detection algorithms.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

American Made Energy Infrastructure - Evolution of Federal Incentives and Requirements

This presentation, "Evolution of Federal Incentives and Requirements," explores the development and impact of federal cybersecurity regulations, tax credits, and domestic content requirements on the energy sector. It covers key legislation such as the ARRA of 2009, IIJA, and IRA, and their implications for grid modernization, manufacturing, and deployment of energy technologies. The presentation also addresses definitions and restrictions related to Foreign Entities of Concern (FEOC) and their impact on federal procurement. Additionally, it introduces the DOE's cybersecurity framework for energy supply chains and practical actions for compliance planning.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

A Multidimensional Holistic Framework for the Security of Distributed Energy and Control Systems

The digitization of smart grid distributed generation and industrial control systems has prompted utilities to deploy tools with ubiquitous communications that potentially widen the attack surface. The utilities still continue to rely on the traditional cybersecurity technologies, such as firewalls, anti-malware tools, and passwords that do not ensure security across all dimensions of the information assurance model required for a strong cybersecurity business process. This paper proposes a multidimensional holistic framework that addresses this gap through advanced technologies, intelligent algorithms, and continued assessments. To show proof, the layered defense model, a solution dimension of the framework, is integrated into the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Security and Resilience Testbed to replicate a utility's enterprise and substation networks. The model is used to evaluate the security and resilience of microgrid control systems, and, based on the insights gathered, recommend best practices for utility cybersecurity analysts for a strong business process. Here, with this baseline, the paper conceptually introduces intelligence-driven solutions comprising contextual data analysis and machine learning to respond to advanced persistent threats sponsored by campaign efforts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

User-Focused Tools to Enhance IT/OT Cyber Resilience within the Power Grid

The power grid is undergoing several changes that are increasing its complexity as nexuses between electric-gas, transmission-distribution, and energy-communications continue to become increasingly critical. This system is heavily dependent on communication infrastructure and controls, and it relies on humans in operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) roles to manage the increasing breadth, depth, and speed of data. Many technical challenges have presented themselves and will need to be addressed to provide reliable grid operations. With increased reliance on distributed controls and communication infrastructure, cybersecurity becomes an inherent requirement. When considering current cyber-physical security solutions for the power grid, one can notice a clear divide between information technology and operation technology networks. However, in real-life applications, these networks are interdependent. This work presents results of interviews with key utility cybersecurity personnel, analyzes the results, and makes recommendations towards solution of existing technical and operational challenges realized. Existing workflows are presented, wireframe interviews are discussed, and tool requirements are described. The existence of easy-to-implement solutions, based on existing energy management systems, highlight the potential for real-life applications.

cybersecurity, resilience, user-centered design, p↗

Navigating United States Standards and Regulation for Digital Energy Systems

This report provides an analysis of the U.S. standards and regulatory landscape for digital energy systems, focusing on cybersecurity, safety, and reliability requirements. It examines the interplay between federal mandates, state regulations, voluntary industry standards, and utility-specific policies, highlighting critical gaps between compliance and real-world risk mitigation. While NERC CIP standards enforce cybersecurity for Bulk Electric System assets, distribution-level infrastructure and emerging technologies often fall outside mandatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities. The report identifies systemic challenges such as reliance on self-attestation, uneven state adoption of safety codes, and lagging standards for advanced technologies like battery energy storage and inverter-based resources. Through a detailed gap analysis, it underscores the urgency of proactive risk-based approaches, independent verification, and strategic engagement with state and federal entities. Recommendations include adopting tiered security frameworks, strengthening procurement practices, and addressing emerging technology risks to ensure resilient and secure digital energy infrastructure. This guidance is intended for utilities, regulators, and stakeholders navigating compliance obligations and seeking to enhance cybersecurity and safety beyond minimum standards.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Large Load Integration - Task List and Overview

Large Load Integration Tasks: Task 1 – Workshops Support stakeholder engagement across industry to promote collaboration and identify solutions to challenges that will guide other work Task 2 – Ancillary Services Characterize different types of large loads to assess under what conditions they may be utilized to provide grid stability services Task 3 – Communications Explore the cybersecurity and communications infrastructure required to enable large loads to interface with grid operations to provide ancillary services Task 4 – Nuclear Integration Explore risks and methods for supporting large load energy needs with SMRs and incorporating them into the wider power system Task 5 – Decision Support and TA Provide support to stakeholders through the creation of planning tools and direct technical assistance.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Securing Grid Communications Infrastructure: Addressing Gaps Beyond NERC CIP Facility Perimeters

The North American electric grid relies on a complex communications infrastructure that extends beyond facility perimeters traditionally covered by NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. While CIP requirements have significantly strengthened cybersecurity within Electronic Security Perimeters, many operational communications—such as those between control centers, substations, and third-party networks—fall outside current regulatory scope. As grid modernization introduces new technologies and connectivity models, these external pathways present evolving security challenges. This brief explores the nature of these challenges, including emerging attack vectors and supply chain considerations, and highlights how ongoing grid transformation increases exposure to sophisticated threats. It outlines practical strategies and policy options to complement existing standards, such as expanding secure communications practices, enhancing supply chain transparency, and fostering collaboration among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. Near-term actions like encryption, authentication, and contractual safeguards can help reduce risk while longer-term frameworks are developed to ensure resilient and secure grid operations.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Application of Rank-Weight Methods to Blockchain Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Framework

Cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools, frameworks, and methodologies are used to understand the cybersecurity maturity of a system or a facility. However, these tools are strictly developed based on standards defined by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Department of Energy; the majority of these tools and frameworks do not provide a platform to prioritize the requirements to reach a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we have been developing a framework and software application called cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). CyFEr treats the problem at hand as a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) problem, which requires that various criteria be weighed relatively. Defining those weights is non-trivial and often leads to subjective decisions leading to undesired complications. To facilitate such a weighting system in CyFEr, we evaluated the application of various rank-weight methods (such as rank sum, reciprocal rank, rank exponent, and rank order centroid). The efficacy of those rank-weight methods was evaluated by applying them and testing against the blockchain cybersecurity framework (BC2F). BC2F was developed using the NIST cybersecurity framework to evaluate the cybersecurity posture of the blockchain nodes and networks in a given blockchain application or use-case. This paper provides 1) technical insights on the application of rank-weight methods to cybersecurity vulnerability assessments, 2) an overview of BC2F, 3) the application of rank-weight methods to BC2F, and 4) a depiction of the integration of the discussed rank-weight methods in CyFEr.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Cybersecurity Governance

Cybersecurity governance helps an organization detect, prevent, and respond to cyber incidents by establishing cybersecurity policies and procedures for use across the enterprise. As modern energy systems become increasingly reliant on smaller and decentralized generation sources-equipped with complex, data-driven communications-governance will be of growing importance for the continued protection of the electric grid. This presentation sheds light on the important aspects of cybersecurity governance, best practices to ensure a culture of cybersecurity, and approaches to frequent monitoring and assessment of an organization's cybersecurity posture.

business requirements↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm (CyFEr): Prioritized Gap Analysis

Cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools, frameworks, methodologies, and processes are commonly used to understand the cybersecurity maturity and posture of a system or a facility. Although, those tools are strictly developed based on standards defined by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Department of Energy, the majority of these tools and frameworks do not provide a platform to prioritize the requirements to reach a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we have been developing a framework and a software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). The efficacy of CyFEr was evaluated by implementing it on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). This paper provides a detailed architecture of CyFEr and demonstrates its application to CSF by testing against a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems in a critical infrastructure facility.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Improving the Cyber and Physical Security Posture of the Electric Sector (Final Report)

Cooperative electric utilities represent an integral part of the larger electric grid and are part of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) has a unique relationship with approximately 900 cooperatively owned and operated electric utilities and engaged in a program with the Department of Energy (DOE) to promote a culture of cybersecurity and resiliency within the electric cooperative community. The Rural Cooperative Cybersecurity Capabilities (RC3) Program, funded under a Cooperative Agreement with DOE (Project DE-OE-0000807), focused on improving the cybersecurity and resiliency capabilities of small and mid-sized electric distribution cooperatives. This segment of electric utilities faces many challenges, but also embraces a culture of cooperation that presents opportunities. A customized approach is needed to reach these utilities – one that emphasizes collaboration, more focused and personalized training, use of trusted and familiar experts that can be deployed as needed, software security services that require limited in-house cybersecurity expertise, and shared resource models that enable access to more expensive cybersecurity options.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗