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At least 55 records · Page 3

Adaptive anomaly detection for identifying attacks in cyber-physical systems: A systematic literature review

Modern cyberattacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) rapidly evolve and cannot be deterred effectively with most current methods, which focus on characterizing past threats. Adaptive anomaly detection (AAD) is among the most promising techniques to detect evolving cyberattacks, with an emphasis on fast data processing and model adaptation. AAD has been researched extensively; however, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic literature review (SLR) on current research in this field. We present a comprehensive SLR, gathering 397 relevant papers and systematically analyzing 65 of them (47 research and 18 survey papers) on AAD in CPS from 2013 to November 2023. We introduce a novel taxonomy considering attack types, CPS application, learning paradigm, data management, and algorithms. Our findings show that most studies addressed either model adaptation or data processing, but rarely both simultaneously. This indicates a research gap in fully adaptive solutions. We also categorize algorithms, datasets, and attack characteristics, and summarize strengths and weaknesses across the literature. Our review provides a structured and accessible reference for researchers and practitioners, offering insights into key trends and highlighting limitations in current approaches. Finally, we outline several future research directions, including the need for integrated real-time processing and adaptive learning, explainability, and uncertainty quantification in AAD for CPS.

Adaptation↗

Assessing the Impact of Cybersecurity Attacks on Energy Systems

This paper investigates the cyber resiliency of future power systems with high penetration of distributed energy resources using advanced distributed and (or) hierarchical control architectures. Specifically, we simulate cyberattacks on three prototypical use cases, and we identify attack scenarios that are the most damaging to the overall system performance. We show that these attacks can have a significant impact on grid operation. Results provide additional insights into the robustness of the system to the most common cyberattacks.

buildings↗

Survey of Space Professionals’ Perception of Satellite Cybersecurity from 2012 to 2022: Decision-Makers’ Thoughts on Satellite Cybersecurity Evolving

Cyberattacks on space assets are often portrayed in vague terms of doubt and mystery. Several claims depict satellites being compromised or attacked, but little corroboration has been published or made publicly available. As the commercial space industry is growing, commercial satellite decision makers will need to analyze the unacknowledged risk of cyberattacks against satellites. This paper identifies and characterizes what a cybersecurity risk to a space asset could look like and why space professionals might not prioritize cybersecurity. Additional information was captured from a decadal survey of space professionals in 2012 and 2022. Comparing the decadal results shows a rise in the perceived risk of satellites to cybersecurity threats from a sample of space professionals. This growing notable shift of perspective is not fully defined or agreed upon.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Fast-Charging Infrastructure

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A Trilevel Model for Segmentation of the Power Transmission Grid Cyber Network

Network segmentation of a power grid's communication system can make the grid more resilient to cyberattacks. Here we develop a novel trilevel programming model to optimally segment a grid communication system, taking into account the actions of an information technology (IT) administrator, attacker, and grid operator. The IT administrator is allowed to segment existing networks, and the attacker is given a budget to inflict damage on the grid by attacking the segmented communication system. Finally, the grid operator can redispatch the grid after the attack to minimize damage. The resulting problem is a trilevel interdiction problem that we solve using a branch and bound algorithm for bilevel problems. We demonstrate the benefits of optimal network segmentation through case studies on the 9-bus Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) system and the 30-bus IEEE system. These examples illustrate that network segmentation can significantly reduce the threat posed by a cyberattacker.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Impact of Blockchain Delay on Grid-Tied Solar Inverter Performance

This paper investigates the impact of the delay resulting from a blockchain, a promising security measure, for a hierarchical control system of inverters connected to the grid. The blockchain communication network is designed at the secondary control layer for resilience against cyberattacks. To represent the latency in the communication channel, a model is developed based on the complexity of the blockchain framework. Taking this model into account, this work evaluates the plant’s performance subject to communication delays, introduced by the blockchain, among the hierarchical control agents. In addition, this article considers an optimal model-based control strategy that performs the system’s internal control loop. The work shows that the blockchain’s delay size influences the convergence of the power supplied by the inverter to the reference at the point of common coupling. In the results section, real-time simulations on OPAL-RT are performed to test the resilience of two parallel inverters with increasing blockchain complexity.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗

CPS Testbed Architectures for WAMPAC using Industrial Substation and Control Center Platforms and Attack-Defense Evaluation

Advanced persistent threats and cyberattacks can impact wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) system operation. Many cyber-physical system (CPS) testbeds have been developed for attack-defense experimentation and attack-resiliency tools evaluation for WAMPAC, but they are limited to a simulation-and-emulation based environment. This paper presents a quasi-realistic CPS attack-defense testbed-based framework for WAMPAC applications using the industrial substation and control center platforms such as eTerra integrated with the hardware-in-the-loop CPS smart grid testbed available at Iowa State University. The proposed framework includes various combinations of industry-grade substation and control center platforms, communication topologies, real-time digital simulators, and a novel cyber-physical distributed intrusion-and-anomaly detection system (D-IADS) for WAMPAC applications. The D-IADS includes a master at the control center and geographically distributed sensor devices at each substation. Each D-IADS sensor deployed at a substation or control center network monitors ingress and egress traffic, detect intrusions, and dispatch alerts to the D-IADS master. The D-IADS master centrally monitors and analyze the alerts and controls D-IADS sensors. We considered an EMP60 synthetic CPS grid as a case study to demonstrate the framework and proposed D-IADS for WAMPAC applications against cyberattack vectors such as Man-in-the-Middle DNP3 attack, denial-of-service, and data-integrity attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Performance Evaluation of Vertical Federated Machine Learning Against Adversarial Threats on Wide-Area Control System: Preprint

Federated machine learning (FL) is gaining significant popularity to develop cybersecurity solutions in power grids because of its advanced capability to support decentralized data handing at local devices, its privacy preservation, and its low-bandwidth requirement. However, the evolving adversarial machine learning (AML) threats raise significant concerns for the cybersecurity of FL architectures. The FL-based split neural network (SplitNN) achieves high performance through the decentralized training of local neural network models while preserving data privacy across multiple entities. In this paper, we propose a methodology for evaluating the performance of a vertical FLbased anomaly detector against different types of AML attacks, including denial-of-service attacks, adversarial data injection attacks, and replay attacks on the trained local models deployed in the grid network. For a case study, we consider the modified IEEE 13-bus system, and we develop SplitNN-based binary and multiclass classification models to detect, locate, and identify different types of data integrity attacks on the volt-watt control with two pooling layers: maximum pooling and AvgPool. Our experimental results, computed through performance metrics, reveal that the severity of these AML attacks varies with the integrated pooling mechanism, the type of classification model, and the nature of the cyberattack. Further, the AML attacks negatively impacted the prediction time per sample for the pretrained SplitNN during the online testing.

adversarial threats↗

Network Defense Workforce Development System

The software implements the methodology of cybersecurity training architecture and is leveraged to build a turn-key based simulated cyberattack game in which the player assumes the facility manager's role and must defend the OT network from adaptive cyberattacks by directly configuring the physical network environment and implementing security policies.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil Gupta↗

FLC Award: QED: Quantum Ensured Defense of the Smart Electric Grid

A reliable electric power supply is crucial for modern day life as well as national security, economic productivity, and life-and-death essentials. During the COVID pandemic, internet and cell communications became a “must-have” for government and business operations, education, and communicating COVID testing for vaccine information. Loss of electric power quickly leads to human health and national security emergencies. When a major winter storm hit Texas in mid-February 2021, the system was overwhelmed and over 4M people lost power. Although this crisis arose from an unprecedented weather event - not a cyberattack - it serves as a vivid illustration of the impact power disruption can have on our American way of life. The recent cyberattack on the Colonial Oil Pipeline also provides a stark reminder that infrastructure supporting our daily lives has vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Design Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Honeypots and Canaries

There are now over 2.5 million Distributed Energy Resource (DER) installations connected to the U.S. power system. These installations represent a major portion of American electricity critical infrastructure and a cyberattack on these assets in aggregate would significantly affect grid operations. Virtualized Operational Technology (OT) equipment has been shown to provide practitioners with situational awareness and better understanding of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Deploying synthetic DER devices as honeypots and canaries would open new avenues of operational defense, threat intelligence gathering, and empower DER owners and operators with new cyber-defense mechanisms against the growing intensity and sophistication of cyberattacks on OT systems. Well-designed DER canary field deployments would deceive adversaries and provide early-warning notifications of adversary presence and malicious activities on OT networks. In this report, we present progress to design a high-fidelity DER honeypot/canary prototype in a late-start Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Identification and Testing of Electric Vehicle Fast Charger Cybersecurity Mitigations

Fast-charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is needed to enable and achieve the national goals of transitioning the vehicle fleet toward more electrification. Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) have jointly worked to identify, evaluate, and mitigate potential cyber-related consequences associated with fast charger systems. NREL contributed by considering cyberattack scenarios and consequences associated with integrating distributed energy resources (DERs) at fast-charging stations. The dynamic nature of fast-charger load profiles would encourage site operators to incorporate solar for energy cost reduction and energy storage for peak demand cost management at future charging facilities with multiple fast chargers at a site. These energy resources would be monitored and coordinated via a site energy management controller with data exchange between devices and local power metering infrastructure; thus, networking between devices and the design of the system becomes important in the overall cybersecurity posture. In addition, component vendors and system operators might have remote interfaces to any of these systems. It is therefore important to understand the breadth of the cyberattack surface and potential strategies to mitigate impacts. This project has focused on components and protocols expected to be found within a local charging site that includes multiple chargers and DER resources. Our methods and results are summarized in this final report.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the U.S. electrifies the transportation sector, cyberattacks targeting vehicle charging could impact several critical infrastructure sectors including power systems, manufacturing, medical services, and agriculture. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery capabilities and must communicate to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid operator communication systems could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks — or public perception of such — would ripple across the industry and produce lasting effects. Unfortunately, there is currently no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured inter faces. Comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project provided the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team created a cybersecurity threat model and performed a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets across multiple manufacturers and vendors, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders could better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Resilient Energy Delivery and Control Systems (REDCS) (Final Technical Report)

US critical infrastructure is increasingly the target of cyberattacks, where disturbances could cause considerable damage and disruption. To help provide a new layer of cyber-physical protection for one key energy delivery system, natural gas pipelines, GE Vernova Advanced Research along with partners Florida State University and Intel Corporation created an innovative technology called "Resilient Energy Delivery and Control Systems" (REDCS). This cybersecurity package helps detect anomalies caused by cyberattacks, isolate the subsystem being impacted by the attack, and provide functions that can allow for resiliency – giving better situational awareness to the operators and cybersecurity specialists or in the future perform closed loop control for continued operation while compromised.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations

The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Investigating the Vulnerabilities of the Direct Transfer Trip Scheme for Network Protector Units in the Secondary Networks of Electric Power Distribution Grids

Network protector units (NPUs) are crucial parts of the protection of secondary networks to effectively isolate faults occurring on the primary feeders. When a fault occurs on the primary feeder, there is a path of the fault current going through the service transformers that causes a negative flow of current on the NPU connected to the faulted feeder. Conventionally, NPUs rely on the direction of current with respect to the voltage to detect faults and make a correct trip decision. However, the conventional NPU logic does not allow the reverse power flow caused by distributed energy resources installed on secondary networks. The communication-assisted direct transfer trip logic for NPUs can be used to address this challenge. However, the communication-assisted scheme is exposed to some vulnerabilities arising from the disruption or corruption of the communicated data that can endanger the reliable operation of NPUs. This paper evaluates the impact of the malfunction of the communication system on the operation of communication-assisted NPU logic. To this end, the impact of packet modification and denial-of-service cyberattacks on the communication-assisted scheme are evaluated. The evaluation was performed using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) co-simulation testbed that includes both real-time power system and communication network digital simulators. This paper evaluates the impact of the cyberattacks for different fault scenarios and provides a list of recommendations to improve the reliability of communication-assisted NPU protection.

direct transfer trip↗

Cybersecurity for Electric Vehicle Fast-Charging Infrastructure: Preprint

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Cybersecurity for Fast Charging EV Infrastructure

The integration of electric vehicles (EVs) into electric grid operations can potentially leave the grid vulnerable to cyberattacks from both legacy and new equipment and protocols, including extreme fast-charging infrastructure. This paper introduces a co-simulation platform to perform cyber vulnerability analysis of EV charging infrastructure and its dependencies on communications and control systems. Grid impact scenarios through linkages to power system simulation tools such as OpenDSS and vehicle infrastructure-specific attack paths are discussed. An adaptive platform that assists with predicting and solving evolving cybersecurity challenges is demonstrated with a cyber-energy emulation that accelerates the analysis of cyberattacks and system behavior.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,POWER TRANSMISSION AND↗