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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2016

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA IV&V's Cyber Range for Space Systems

A cyber range is a virtual environment that is used for cyberwarfare training and cyber technology development. It provides tools that help strengthen the stability, security and performance of cyber infrastructures and IT systems. NASA IV&V has created an adaptable virtual environment that is representative of a typical NASA mission system of systems environment that serves multiple purposes: Training of network defenders. Ability to perform simulated red vs blue training events. Ability to deploy mission specific technologies in a cyber contested environment. Ability to demonstrate vulnerabilities and their impact to ground and space systemsThe overall system is comprised of more than 70 virtual machines and physical infrastructure to demonstrate real-world cyber attacks against: email users, wireless networks, and physically implanted devices with command and control call-back. The cyber range was built to emulate a NASA precipitation satellite infrastructure.This presentation will give an overview of the virtual cyber range and how it was used to conduct a simulate red vs blue exercise with the goal of compromising the simulated spacecraft that utilizes real NASA flight software.

test and evaluation DT&E↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Survey of Cyber Threat

Multiple companies are competing to develop human-crewed and unmanned aerial vehicles to provide flight in urban environments. With the growth of aerial systems and future airborne vehicle networks and the need to enable secure data exchange and service interactions within Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environments, cybersecurity has come to the forefront as a topic, highlighting the need to protect these networks from cyber-attacks. This paper will identify potential threats, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses of UAM environments, that could lead to system compromises and disruptions.

Cyber Security↗

NASA NTRS2020

Partially Observable Games for Secure Autonomy

Technology development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other, over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a single framework. To this end, we propose the two-player partially observable stochastic game formalism to capture both high-level autonomous mission planning under uncertainty and adversarial decision making subject to imperfect information. We show that synthesizing sub-optimal strategies for such games is possible under finite-memory assumptions for both the autonomous decision maker and the cyber-adversary. We then describe an experimental testbed to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed framework.

Ames, Aaron D.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in urban air mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex infrastructures has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens’ safety and the efficiency of transportation networks. In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on implementing a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) tailored explicitly to urban mobility environments’ unique demands. This study explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the urban mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organization’s overall cybersecurity posture. In conclusion, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in urban mobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in Urban Air Mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex components has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens safety and the efficiency of transportation networks.In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on the need for cyber resilient techniques within future air traffic environments. It will pay specific attention to the implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) utilizing Atomic OSSEC software, tailored specifically to a NASA simulation of an UrbanAirMobility environments’ unique demands. Further, this study seeks to outline the rational for NASA’s recommendation for a HIDS in such environments. It explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the Urban Air Mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organizations overall cybersecurity posture. Finally, this study aims to provide recommendations and include learned takeaways that the Urban Air Mobility industry should consider. In brief, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in UrbanAirMobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

NASA NTRS2019

Software and System Health Management with R2U2

R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit) is a hardware-supported tool and framework for the real-time system and software health management of cyber-physical systems. R2U2 continuously monitors properties about safety, performance, and security of the vehicle and can perform diagnostic reasoning. Efficient observers for past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, reasoners for Bayesian Networks, and model-based prognostics algorithms are major components of R2U2. Their combination makes it possible to design powerful models for system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, prognostics, and security monitoring. The R2U2 monitoring engine is designed for minimal runtime overhead and is available as Simulink block or as a software component for integration into the flight software stack, and enables R2U2 to monitor complex cyber-physical systems without any instrumentation of the flight software. In this presentation, we give an overview of R2U2 architecture and reasoning algorithms, present its features, and give a life demo of the tool.

Schumann, Johann↗

NASA NTRS2014

Securing Ground Data System Applications for Space Operations

The increasing prevalence and sophistication of cyber attacks has prompted the Multimission Ground Systems and Services (MGSS) Program Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to initiate the Common Access Manager (CAM) effort to protect software applications used in Ground Data Systems (GDSs) at JPL and other NASA Centers. The CAM software provides centralized services and software components used by GDS subsystems to meet access control requirements and ensure data integrity, confidentiality, and availability. In this paper we describe the CAM software; examples of its integration with spacecraft commanding software applications and an information management service; and measurements of its performance and reliability.

Security↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Runtime Monitoring with R2U2 for Aircraft Systems with Neural Networks

R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit) is a hardware-supported tool and framework for real-time system monitoring and software health management of cyber-physical systems. During system operation, R2U2 continuously monitors properties about safety, performance, and security of the vehicle and its vital components and can perform diagnostic reasoning. Efficient observers for past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, fast reasoners for Bayesian Networks, and model-based prognostics algorithms are key components of R2U2 and designed for minimal computational footprint. R2U2 has been implemented in software supporting ROS, NASA's cFS/cFE, and Simulink and as an FPGA configuration. The synergistic combination of monitors and observers in R2U2 makes it possible to design powerful models for system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, prognostics, and security monitoring. In this presentation, I will give a detailed overview of the R2U2 architecture and its features and will discuss the application of R2U2 for safety-monitoring of a neural-network based autonomous centerline tracking system (ACT) for autonomous aircraft.

Runtime Monitoring↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cyber threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is one of the critical subsystems that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfill and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Svetlana Hanson↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Implementation of Cybersecurity Requirements

Cybersecurity threats are a constant present-day reality for any type of business -- Space exploration is not excluded from these threats either. The Gateway Program is one of NASA’s latest initiatives that extend space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Gateway allows for NASA to prove technologies and mature systems necessary to live and work on another celestial body before embarking on multi-year missions to Mars. The Gateway is a small, human-tended space station in orbit around the Moon. With the increased autonomy, distance and criticality of systems, cybersecurity is a critical discipline that touches and integrates with most if not all subsystems of the Gateway. Building a gateway to the lunar orbit is no simple task. In this presentation, we outline an approach that the Gateway team adopted in creating a cyber safe and robust vehicle to support operations and assure protection of the critical functions. Gateway Program is required to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines to adhere to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). NIST provides a framework for managing and controlling cybersecurity risks by defining cybersecurity controls and methodologies for implementation. The NIST framework is based upon the system, data within the system, integrations with external systems, and risk assessments to determine impacts for each of those systems. The goals and objectives are to identify appropriate security controls that fulfil and map to the NIST 800-53 framework. The implementation process involves developing an organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities. NIST Security controls are interpreted and defined within the Gateway vehicle requirements subsystems specifications. This paper details the approach, implementation, and challenges faced during the development and design phases to address cyber threats during the Gateway vehicle operations.

Cybersecurity↗

NASA NTRS2014

Modernization of the Cassini Ground System

The Cassini Spacecraft and its ground system have been operational for over 16 years. Modernization presents several challenges due to the personnel, processes, and tools already invested and embedded into the current ground system structure. Every mission's ground system has its own unique complexities and challenges, involving various organizational units. As any mission from its inception to its execution, schedules are always tight. This forces GDS engineers to implement a working ground system that is not necessarily fully optimized. Ground system challenges increase as technology evolves and cyber threats become more sophisticated. Cassini's main challenges were due to its ground system existing before many security requirements were levied on the multi-mission tools and networks. This caused a domino effect on Cassini GDS tools that relied on outdated technological features. In the aerospace industry reliable and established technology is preferred over innovative yet less proven technology. Loss of data for a spacecraft mission can be catastrophic; therefore, there is a reluctance to make changes and updates to the ground system. Nevertheless, all missions and associated teams face the need to modernize their processes and tools. Systems development methods from well-known system analysis and design principles can be applied to many missions' ground systems. Modernization should always be considered, but should be done in such a way that it does not affect flexibility nor interfere with established practices. Cassini has accomplished a secure and efficient ground data system through periodic updates. The obstacles faced while performing the modernization of the Cassini ground system will be outlined, as well as the advantages and challenges that were encountered.

Razo, Gus↗

NASA NTRS2014

Modernization of the Cassini Ground System

Razo, Gus↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Runtime Analysis with R2U2: A Tool Exhibition Report

We present R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit), a hardware- supported tool and framework for the continuous monitoring of safetycritical and embedded cyber-physical systems.With the widespread advent of autonomous systems such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), satellites, rovers, and cars, real-time, on-board decision making requires unobtrusive monitoring of properties for safety, performance, security, and system health. R2U2 models combine past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, “mission time” Linear Temporal Logic, probabilistic reasoning with Bayesian Networks, and modelbased prognostics. The R2U2 monitoring engine can be instantiated as a hardware solution, running on an FPGA, or as a software component. The FPGA realization enables R2U2 to monitor complex cyber-physical systems without any overhead or instrumentation of the flight software. In this tool exhibition report, we present R2U2 and demonstrate applications on system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, and security monitoring for a UAS. Our tool demonstration uses a hardware-based processor-in-the-loop “iron-bird” configuration.

Johann Martin Schumann↗

NASA NTRS2017

Detection, Localization, and Tracking of Unauthorized UAS and Jammers

Small unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) are expected to take major roles in future smart cities, for example, by delivering goods and merchandise, potentially serving as mobile hot spots for broadband wireless access, and maintaining surveillance and security. Although they can be used for the betterment of the society, they can also be used by malicious entities to conduct physical and cyber attacks to infrastructure, private/public property, and people. Even for legitimate use-cases of small UASs, air traffic management (ATM) for UASs becomes of critical importance for maintaining safe and collusion-free operation. Therefore, various ways to detect, track, and interdict potentially unauthorized drones carries critical importance for surveillance and ATM applications. In this paper, we will review techniques that rely on ambient radio frequency signals (emitted from UASs), radars, acoustic sensors, and computer vision techniques for detection of malicious UASs. We will present some early experimental and simulation results on radar-based range estimation of UASs, and receding horizon tracking of UASs. Subsequently, we will overview common techniques that are considered for interdiction of UASs.

surveillance↗

NASA NTRS2020

CyberGAN: Generating High-fidelity Cybersecurity Data With Generative Adversarial Networks

Machine learning for cyber defense offers the promise of detecting adversarial activity against the ground data systems managing critical space assets. A fundamental challenge facing machine learning research in cybersecurity is the lack of high-fidelity, shareable datasets for robust evaluation and testing of machine learning-based solutions. High-fidelity, real-world datasets are necessary for reliable benchmarking of nominal system behavior and malicious activity. Unfortunately, such realistic datasets of both nominal and adversarial activity are rarely shared publicly by data owners due to security and privacy concerns. Besides, the available adversarial data is sparse, which makes training models on malicious activity much harder. This situation has impeded and continues to impede the research and successful adoption of machine learning methods for cyber defense. Researchers have dealt with this problem by generating data within a low-fidelity lab environment, using classified and thus unshareable datasets, or downloading low-fidelity public datasets made available by others. We propose an innovative solution to the problem by employing machine learning methods to generate high-fidelity data. Specifically, we propose the use of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to generate high-fidelity data for cybersecurity purposes. GANs have found successful image processing and natural language applications, but have not yet been investigated for cyber data generation. Our proposed approach first involves training the `discriminator' network of the GAN with a sample of real-world data consisting of malicious and nominal samples. We then use the `generator' network to generate new high-fidelity data samples consisting of an appropriate mix of malicious and nominal activity. We demonstrate applications of our architecture by generating high-fidelity cybersecurity data containing both malicious and nominal samples. We thoroughly evaluate the fidelity of our generated data using heuristics and evaluate its usefulness for machine learning applications using three different datasets. Overall, our approach results in high-fidelity, shareable datasets.

Zhang, Yuening↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Secured Airspace for Urban Air Mobility (UAM)

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) architecture is leveraged from the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) concept of operations. Within the UAM environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within that environment. As a recognized need, various views of UAM flight information are provided to the public and public safety entities. To accomplish this, among other goals, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can coordinate flight information between the FAA controlled National Airspace System (NAS) and the UAM environments through the FAA-Industry Data Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). This concept of UAM proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) or short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. To garner the support of UAM and to realize its potential, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Understanding the various components communicating with one-another cybersecurity, like in other industries, has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. With the planned growth and reach of UAM systems, it’s clear that the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. Consequently, as these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well. While learning is always the goal, the overall intent of this workshop is to make recommendations on the following: (1) how future UAM environments can be protected against cyber-attacks, and (2) what mechanisms should be put in place to detect attacks against UAM environments.

UAM↗