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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Analysis of Traffic Conflicts in a Mixed-Airspace Evaluation of Airborne Separation Assurance

A pair of human-in-the-loop simulation evaluations of a distributed air/ground separation assurance system have been conducted to investigate the function allocation between humans and automation systems as well as ground-based and airborne agents in the Next Generation Air Transportation System and beyond. This paper focuses on an analysis of certain critical conflicts observed between self-separating aircraft and ground-managed traffic in the same airspace. The principal cause of each conflict is identified and potential mitigations are discussed, such as: the sharing of trajectory intent information between the ground and the air; more cautious trajectory planning by the self-separating aircraft; and more equitable rules-of-the-road between the self-separating aircraft and ground-managed aircraft. This analysis will inform the ongoing design of an airborne separation assurance automation tool.

Lewis, Timothy A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Technical Excellence and Communication: The Cornerstones for Successful Safety and Mission Assurance Programs

The paper describes the role of technical excellence and communication in the development and maintenance of safety and mission assurance programs. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organization is used to illustrate philosophies and techniques that strengthen safety and mission assurance efforts and that contribute to healthy and effective organizational cultures. The events and conditions leading to the development of the MSFC S&MA organization are reviewed. Historic issues and concerns are identified. The adverse effects of resource limitations and risk assessment roles are discussed. The structure and functions of the core safety, reliability, and quality assurance functions are presented. The current organization s mission and vision commitments serve as the starting points for the description of the current organization. The goals and objectives are presented that address the criticisms of the predecessor organizations. Additional improvements are presented that address the development of technical excellence and the steps taken to improve communication within the Center, with program customers, and with other Agency S&MA organizations.

Malone, Roy W.↗
DOE OSTI2015

R&D100: IC ID

Supply chain security to detect, deter, and prevent the counterfeiting of networked and stand-alone integrated circuits (ICs) is critical to cyber security. Sandia National Laboratory researchers have developed IC ID to leverage Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and strong cryptographic authentication to create a unique fingerprint for each integrated circuit. IC ID assures the authenticity of ICs to prevent tampering or malicious substitution.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
NASA NTRS2017

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project KDP-C Review

The topics discussed are the UAS-NAS project life-cycle and ARMD thrust flow down, as well as the UAS environments and how we operate in those environments. NASA's Armstrong Flight Research Center at Edwards, CA, is leading a project designed to help integrate unmanned air vehicles into the world around us. The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System project, or UAS in the NAS, will contribute capabilities designed to reduce technical barriers related to safety and operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS. The project falls under the Integrated Systems Research Program office managed at NASA Headquarters by the agency's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. NASA's four aeronautics research centers - Armstrong, Ames Research Center, Langley Research Center, and Glenn Research Center - are part of the technology development project. With the use and diversity of unmanned aircraft growing rapidly, new uses for these vehicles are constantly being considered. Unmanned aircraft promise new ways of increasing efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing safety and saving lives 460265main_ED10-0132-16_full.jpg Unmanned aircraft systems such as NASA's Global Hawks (above) and Predator B named Ikhana (below), along with numerous other unmanned aircraft systems large and small, are the prime focus of the UAS in the NAS effort to integrate them into the national airspace. Credits: NASA Photos 710580main_ED07-0243-37_full.jpg The UAS in the NAS project envisions performance-based routine access to all segments of the national airspace for all unmanned aircraft system classes, once all safety-related and technical barriers are overcome. The project will provide critical data to such key stakeholders and customers as the Federal Aviation Administration and RTCA Special Committee 203 (formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) by conducting integrated, relevant system-level tests to adequately address safety and operational challenges of national airspace access by unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS. In the process, the project will work with other key stakeholders to define necessary deliverables and products to help enable such access. Within the project, NASA is focusing on five sub-projects. These five focus areas include assurance of safe separation of unmanned aircraft from manned aircraft when flying in the national airspace; safety-critical command and control systems and radio frequencies to enable safe operation of UAS; human factors issues for ground control stations; airworthiness certification standards for UAS avionics and integrated tests and evaluation designed to determine the viability of emerging UAS technology. Five Focus Areas of the UAS Integration in the NAS Project Separation Assurance Provide an assessment of how planned Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) separation assurance systems, with different functional allocations, perform for UAS in mixed operations with manned aircraft Assess the applicability to UAS and the performance of NASA NextGen separation assurance systems in flight tests with realistic latencies and uncertain trajectories Assess functional allocations ranging from today's ground-based, controller-provided aircraft separation to fully autonomous airborne self-separation Communications Develop data and rationale to obtain appropriate frequency spectrum allocations to enable safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Develop and validate candidate secure safety-critical command and control system/subsystem test equipment for UAS that complies with UAS international/national frequency regulations, standards and recommended practices and minimum operational and aviation system performance standards for UAS Perform analysis to support recommendations for integration of safety-critical command and control systems and air traffic control communications to ensure safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Human Systems Integration Develop a research test bed and database to provide data and proof of concept for GCS - ground control station - operations in the NAS Coordinate with standards organizations to develop human-factors guidelines for GCS operation in the NAS Certification Define a UAS classification scheme and approach to determining Federal Aviation Regulation airworthiness requirements applicable to all UAS digital avionics Provide hazard and risk-related data to support development of type design criteria and best development practices Integrated Tests and Evaluation Integrate and test mature concepts from technical elements to demonstrate and test viability Evaluate the performance of technology development in a relevant environment (full-mission, human-in-the-loop simulations and flight tests)

outreach↗
NASA NTRS1990

Hubble Space Telescope: SRM/QA observations and lessons learned

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Optical Systems Board of Investigation was established on July 2, 1990 to review, analyze, and evaluate the facts and circumstances regarding the manufacture, development, and testing of the HST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA). Specifically, the board was tasked to ascertain what caused the spherical aberration and how it escaped notice until on-orbit operation. The error that caused the on-orbit spherical aberration in the primary mirror was traced to the assembly process of the Reflective Null Corrector, one of the three Null Correctors developed as special test equipment (STE) to measure and test the primary mirror. Therefore, the safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) investigation covers the events and the overall product assurance environment during the manufacturing phase of the primary mirror and Null Correctors (from 1978 through 1981). The SRM&QA issues that were identified during the HST investigation are summarized. The crucial product assurance requirements (including nonconformance processing) for the HST are examined. The history of Quality Assurance (QA) practices at Perkin-Elmer (P-E) for the period under investigation are reviewed. The importance of the information management function is discussed relative to data retention/control issues. Metrology and other critical technical issues also are discussed. The SRM&QA lessons learned from the investigation are presented along with specific recommendations. Appendix A provides the MSFC SRM&QA report. Appendix B provides supplemental reference materials. Appendix C presents the findings of the independent optical consultants, Optical Research Associates (ORA). Appendix D provides further details of the fault-tree analysis portion of the investigation process.

Rodney, George A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification and Validation of Safety-Critical Aircraft Systems Operating under Off-Nominal, Contingency, and Emergency Conditions

Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery and other aviation safety concerns pose significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the verification and validation of these technologies must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). V&V technologies must also enable the identification of system limitations and constraints, as well as enable the identification of safe and unsafe operating conditions (and their boundaries). Additionally, the V&V of complex, increasingly autonomous systems is a fundamental concern. Scalable, reproducible and cost-effective techniques for the assurance of safety critical systems during their design and operation is a key barrier to fielding new systems or updating current systems. Moreover, these techniques need to provide artifacts that enable a comprehensive evidence-based approach to certification. This briefing summarizes research performed under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and follow-on research for the V&V of safety-critical aircraft system technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery and increasingly autonomous systems, and for a broad assurance capability in both current and emerging aviation applications. Note that, in this briefing, the term “validation” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation (e.g., algorithms etc.) is performing the intended function(s), as well as an affirmation of effectiveness in these functions. “Verification” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation in the software and hardware meets its (hopefully validated) specifications (e.g., correctly executes algorithms as designed).

Validation↗
NASA NTRS1988

Service offerings and interfaces for the ACTS network of earth stations

The NASA Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS) will use a network of about 20 earth stations to operate as a Mode 1 network. This network will support two ACTS program objectives: to verify the technical performance of ACTS Mode 1 operation in GEO and to demonstrate the types and quality of services that can be provided by an ACTS Mode 1 communications system. The terrestrial interface design is a critical element in assuring that these network earth stations will meet the objectives. In this paper, the applicable terrestrial interface design requirements, the resulting interface specifications, and the associated terrestrial input/output hardware are discussed. A functional block diagram of a network earth station is shown.

Coney, T. A.↗
DOE OSTI2012

FY 2012 used fuel disposition campaign transportation task report on INL efforts supporting the moderator exclusion concept and standardized transportation

Following the defunding of the Yucca Mountain Project, it is reasonable to assume that commercial used fuel will remain in storage for a longer time period than initially assumed. Previous transportation task work in FY 2011, under the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Used Fuel Disposition Campaign, proposed an alternative for safely transporting used fuel regardless of the structural integrity of the used fuel, baskets, poisons, or storage canisters after an extended period of storage. This alternative assures criticality safety during transportation by implementing a concept that achieves moderator exclusion (no in-leakage of moderator into the used fuel cavity). By relying upon a component inside of the transportation cask that provides a watertight function, a strong argument can be made that moderator intrusion is not credible and should not be a required assumption for criticality evaluations during normal or hypothetical accident conditions of transportation. This Transportation Task report addresses the assigned FY 2012 work that supports the proposed moderator exclusion concept as well as a standardized transportation system. The two tasks assigned were to (1) promote the proposed moderator exclusion concept to both regulatory and nuclear industry audiences and (2) advance specific technical issues in order to improve American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 3 rules for storage and transportation containments. The common point behind both of the assigned tasks is to provide more options that can be used to resolve current issues being debated regarding the future transportation of used fuel after extended storage.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1976

Forecast of the general aviation air traffic control environment for the 1980's

The critical information required for the design of a reliable, low cost, advanced avionics system which would enhance the safety and utility of general aviation is stipulated. Sufficient data is accumulated upon which industry can base the design of a reasonably priced system having the capability required by general aviation in and beyond the 1980's. The key features of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system are: a discrete address beacon system, a separation assurance system, area navigation, a microwave landing system, upgraded ATC automation, airport surface traffic control, a wake vortex avoidance system, flight service stations, and aeronautical satellites. The critical parameters that are necessary for component design are identified. The four primary functions of ATC (control, surveillance, navigation, and communication) and their impact on the onboard avionics system design are assessed.

Hoffman, W. C.↗
DOE OSTI2020

DOE Hanford Tank Side Cesium Removal System (TSCR) Update: Fabrication and Factory Acceptance Testing - 20300

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) System is a modular, quickly-deployable, and passively safe system for efficiently removing solids and cesium from alkaline liquid waste raffinate created by fuel processing on the Hanford site. This paper provides an overview of the project with particular emphasis on completion of fabrication and factory acceptance testing (FAT). All TSCR System components are inside three enclosures known as the Process Enclosure, Ancillary Enclosure, and Control Enclosure. The Process Enclosure is seismic design category II (SDC-II) and built to withstand the rigors of transportation and lifting, high winds, volcanic ash fall, and heavy precipitation (snow) over a temperature range of -25 to 115 deg. F. The Process Enclosure and Control Enclosure were fabricated in AVANTech's Columbia, SC facility, while the Ancillary Enclosure was fabricated in AVANTech's Richland, WA facility. The design and preliminary documented safety analysis were completed in December 2019, with all work being performed in accordance with ASME NQA-1 quality assurance requirements. The Process Enclosure, Ion Exchange Columns (IXCs), and several other TSCR components have a nuclear safety function and are designated as safety significant structures, systems, and components (SS-SSCs). The NQA-1 Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) process was used to identify critical characteristics in order to accept materials and items used for fabrication of several safety significant TSCR components. This paper also addresses unique aspects and challenges of implementing CGD in DOE facilities and systems. After fabrication and preliminary testing, the Process and Control Enclosures were shipped to AVANTech's Richland facility where the complete TSCR System was setup and connected in a represented layout and configuration that will be used on the Hanford site. Test tanks and pumps were put in place and connected to the TSCR Process Enclosure in a manner that mimicked interfacing Double Shell Tanks in the 241-AP Tank Farm. The TSCR System was then tested/operated under conditions equivalent to those planned for onsite operation. Testing was separated into five separate phases as defined below: - Phase 1: Confirmation of TSCR System readiness for the FAT; - Phase 2: Verification of TSCR System operation under standard conditions; - Phase 3: Demonstration of TSCR System operation under non-standard conditions; - Phase 4: Demonstration of ion exchange media removal from an IXC; and - Phase 5: Completion of TSCR System lift plans and site mobilization. The Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), participated in all phases of testing. Testing at AVANTech's Richland Facility allowed WRPS personnel to familiarize themselves with TSCR operations in a radiologically clean facility prior to onsite mobilization. Engineering and operations personnel gained valuable experience that allowed them to better refine onsite operational protocols and procedures - including handling and movement of IXCs with a forklift. This paper describes the technologies used by the TSCR System as well as how these technologies are deployed and operated to advance the Hanford mission of safely, efficiently, and effectively treating tank waste. It also provides detailed information on fabrication and FAT, including operational data from simulated tank waste runs. A project schedule for WRPS' planned construction acceptance testing, operational acceptance testing, and actual tank waste treatment is provided. This presentation should be of great interest to parties responsible for the design, testing, and mobilization of modular NQA-1 technologies for the treatment of raffinate and similar liquid wastes containing high concentrations of radioactive cesium. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2017

Strategic Employee Development in The Government Sector

As with many other U.S. agencies, succession planning is becoming a critical need for NASA. The primary drivers include (a) NASA's higher-than-average aged workforce with approximately 50% of employees eligible for retirement within 5 years; and (b) employees who need better developmental conversations to increase morale and retention. This problem is particularly concerning for Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) organizations since they traditionally rely on more experienced engineers and specialists to perform their organizations' functions. In response to this challenge, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) S&MA organization created the Strategic Employee Development (SED) program. The SED program's goal is to provide a proactive method to counter the primary drivers by creating a deeper "bench strength" and providing a more comprehensive developmental feedback experience for the employee. The SED is a new succession planning framework that enables customization to any organization, and in this case, specifically for an S&MA organization. This is accomplished via the identification of key positions, the corresponding critical competencies, and a process to help managers have relevant and meaningful development conversations with the workforce. As a result of the SED, several tools and products were created that allows management to make better strategic workforce decisions. Although there are opportunities for improvement for the SED program, the most important impact has been on the quality of developmental discussions for employees.

Nguyen, Johnny↗
NASA NTRS1990

Validation of the F-18 high alpha research vehicle flight control and avionics systems modifications

The verification and validation process is a critical portion of the development of a flight system. Verification, the steps taken to assure the system meets the design specification, has become a reasonably understood and straightforward process. Validation is the method used to ensure that the system design meets the needs of the project. As systems become more integrated and more critical in their functions, the validation process becomes more complex and important. The tests, tools, and techniques which are being used for the validation of the high alpha research vehicle (HARV) turning vane control system (TVCS) are discussed and the problems and their solutions are documented. The emphasis of this paper is on the validation of integrated system.

Chacon, Vince↗
NASA NTRS1990

Validation of the F-18 high alpha research vehicle flight control and avionics systems modifications

The verification and validation process is a critical portion of the development of a flight system. Verification, the steps taken to assure the system meets the design specification, has become a reasonably understood and straightforward process. Validation is the method used to ensure that the system design meets the needs of the project. As systems become more integrated and more critical in their functions, the validation process becomes more complex and important. The tests, tools, and techniques which are being used for the validation of the high alpha research vehicle (HARV) turning valve control system (TVCS) are discussed, and their solutions are documented. The emphasis of this paper is on the validation of integrated systems.

Chacon, Vince↗
NASA NTRS2007

Gyro Evaluation for the Mission to Jupiter

As an important component in NASA's New Frontiers Program, the Jupiter Polar Orbiter (Juno) mission is designed to investigate in-depth physical properties of Jupiter. It will include the giant planet's ice-rock core and atmospheric studies as well as exploration of its polar magnetosphere. It will also provide the opportunity to understand the origin of the Jovian magnetic field. Due to severe radiation environment of the Jovian system, this mission inherently presents a significant technical challenge to Attitude Control System (ACS) design since the ACS sensors must survive and function properly to reliably maneuver the spacecraft throughout the mission. Different gyro technologies and their critical performance characteristics are discussed, compared and evaluated to facilitate a choice of appropriate gyro-based inertial measurement unit to operate in a harsh Jovian environment to assure mission success.

physical properties↗
NASA NTRS1972

Solar Electric Propulsion System Integration Technology (SEPSIT). Volume 1: Technical summary

The use of solar electric propulsion as a means of exploring space beyond the reach of ballistic missions was investigated. The method used was to study the application of this new propulsion technology to a future flight project. A 1980 Encke rendezvous mission was chosen because a design successful for Encke could be used for less difficult, but scientifically rewarding, missions. Design points for the mission and for the thrust subsystem were specified. The baseline-vehicle design was defined. A preliminary functional description document for the thrust subsystem was originated. Analyses were performed in support of the design point selection for the SEP-module thrust subsystem to specify parameters, to clarify and optimize the interface requirements, and to assure feasibility of some of the more critical technological aspects of SEP application.

Gardner, J. A.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Report on Alternative Devices to Pyrotechnics on Spacecraft

Pyrotechnics accomplish many functions on today's spacecraft, possessing minimum volume/weight, providing instantaneous operation on demand, and requiring little input energy. However, functional shock, safety, and overall system cost issues, combined with emergence and availability of new technologies question their continued use on space missions. Upon request from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Program Management Council (PMC), Langley Research Center (LaRC) conducted a survey to identify and evaluate state-of-the-art non-explosively actuated (NEA) alternatives to pyrotechnics, identify NEA devices planned for NASA use, and investigate potential interagency cooperative efforts. In this study, over 135 organizations were contacted, including NASA field centers, Department of Defense (DOD) and other government laboratories, universities, and American and European industrial sources resulting in further detailed discussions with over half, and 18 face-to-face briefings. Unlike their single use pyrotechnic predecessors, NEA mechanisms are typically reusable or refurbishable, allowing flight of actual tested units. NEAs surveyed include spool-based devices, thermal knife, Fast Acting Shockless Separation Nut (FASSN), paraffin actuators, and shape memory alloy (SMA) devices (e.g., Frangibolt). The electro-mechanical spool, paraffin actuator and thermal knife are mature, flight proven technologies, while SMA devices have a limited flight history. There is a relationship between shock, input energy requirements, and mechanism functioning rate. Some devices (e.g., Frangibolt and spool based mechanisms) produce significant levels of functional shock. Paraffin, thermal knife, and SMA devices can provide gentle, shock-free release but cannot perform critically timed, simultaneous functions. The FASSN flywheel-nut release device possesses significant potential for reducing functional shock while activating nearly instantaneously. Specific study recommendations include: (1) development of NEA standards, specifically in areas of material characterization, functioning rates, and test methods; (2) a systems level approach to assure successful NEA technology application; and (3) further investigations into user needs, along with industry/government system-level real spacecraft cost benefit trade studies to determine NEA application foci and performance requirements. Additional survey observations reveal an industry and government desire to establish partnerships to investigate remaining unknowns and formulate NEA standards, specifically those driven by SMAs. Finally, there is increased interest and need to investigate alternative devices for such functions as stage/shroud separation and high pressure valving. This paper summarizes results of the NASA-LaRC survey of pyrotechnic alternatives. State of-the-art devices with their associated weight and cost savings are presented. Additionally, a comparison of functional shock characteristics of several devices are shown, and potentially related technology developments are highlighted.

Lucy, M. H.↗
DOE OSTI2011

IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY TRANSPORTATION TASK REPORT ON ACHIEVING MODERATOR EXCLUSION AND SUPPORTING STANDARDIZED TRANSPORTATION

Following the defunding of the Yucca Mountain Project, it is reasonable to assume that commercial used fuel will remain in storage for the foreseeable future. This report proposes supplementing the ongoing research and development work related to potential degradation of used fuel, baskets, poisons, and storage canisters during an extended period of storage with a parallel path. This parallel path can assure criticality safety during transportation by implementing a concept that achieves moderator exclusion (no in-leakage of moderator into the used fuel cavity). Using updated risk assessment insights for additional technical justification and relying upon a component inside of the transportation cask that provides a watertight function, a strong argument can be made that moderator intrusion is not credible and should not be a required assumption for criticality evaluations during normal conditions of transportation. A demonstrating testing program supporting a detailed analytical effort as well as updated risk assessment insights can provide the basis for moderator exclusion during hypothetical accident conditions. This report also discusses how this engineered concept can support the goal of standardized transportation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2011

Secure Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) Considerations for Smart Grid Devices

In this paper, we examine some unique challenges associated with key management in the Smart Grid and concomitant research initiatives: 1) effectively model security requirements and their implementations, and 2) manage keys and key distribution for very large scale deployments such as Smart Meters over a long period of performance. This will set the stage to: 3) develop innovative, low cost methods to protect keying material, and 4) provide high assurance authentication services. We will present our perspective on key management and will discuss some key issues within the life cycle of a cryptographic key designed to achieve the following: 1) control systems designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber assault with no loss of critical function, and 2) widespread implementation of methods for secure communication between remote access devices and control centers that are scalable and cost-effective to deploy.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗