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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, Continuity Readiness Assurance Report — Fiscal Year 2016

Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, the prime contractor for Idaho National Laboratory (INL), provides this Continuity Readiness Assurance Report (CRAR) in accordance with DOE O 150.1, “Continuity Programs.” This CRAR documents the readiness of the INL Continuity of Operations Program using emergency response planning, recovery actions, and preparedness activities, and where applicable, summarizes and/or provides supporting information for Fiscal Year 2016. This CRAR also provides goals for Fiscal Year 2017. Specifically, this CRAR assures the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office that the emergency capabilities at INL are sufficient to implement the INL Continuity of Operations Plan.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1995

Metrology: Measurement Assurance Program Guidelines

The 5300.4 series of NASA Handbooks for Reliability and Quality Assurance Programs have provisions for the establishment and utilization of a documented metrology system to control measurement processes and to provide objective evidence of quality conformance. The intent of these provisions is to assure consistency and conformance to specifications and tolerances of equipment, systems, materials, and processes procured and/or used by NASA, its international partners, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. This Measurement Assurance Program (MAP) guideline has the specific objectives to: (1) ensure the quality of measurements made within NASA programs; (2) establish realistic measurement process uncertainties; (3) maintain continuous control over the measurement processes; and (4) ensure measurement compatibility among NASA facilities. The publication addresses MAP methods as applied within and among NASA installations and serves as a guide to: control measurement processes at the local level (one facility); conduct measurement assurance programs in which a number of field installations are joint participants; and conduct measurement integrity (round robin) experiments in which a number of field installations participate to assess the overall quality of particular measurement processes at a point in time.

Eicke, W. G.↗
DOE OSTI2023

pnnl/Remote-QA-Web-App

set of data collection forms implemented as a web app to be used for quality assurance purposes by residential efficiency contractors during the installation process. There are data collection forms for several efficiency measures including heat pump, heat pump water heater, attic weatherization, and basement weatherization.

Holly, Charlie↗
NASA NTRS1992

NASA Johnson Space Center: Total quality partnership

The development of and benefits realized from a joint NASA, support contractor continuous improvement process at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is traced. The joint effort described is the Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Directorate relationship with its three support contractors which began in early 1990. The Continuous Improvement effort started in early 1990 with an initiative to document and simplify numerous engineering change evaluation processes. This effort quickly grew in scope and intensity to include process improvement teams, improvement methodologies, awareness, and training. By early 1991, the support contractor had teams in place and functioning, program goals established and a cultural change effort underway. In mid-l991 it became apparent that a major redirection was needed to counter a growing sense of frustration and dissatisfaction from teams and managers. Sources of frustration were isolated to insufficient joint participation on teams, and to a poorly defined vision. Over the next year, the effort was transformed to a truly joint process. The presentation covers the steps taken to define vision, values, goals, and priorities and to form a joint Steering Committee and joint process improvement teams. The most recent assessment against the President's award criteria is presented as a summary of progress. Small, but important improvement results have already demonstrated the value of the joint effort.

Harlan, Charlie↗
NASA NTRS2002

Engineering Management Capstone Project EM 697: Compare and Contrast Risk Management Implementation at NASA and the US Army

NASA at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and the U.S. Army at Redstone Arsenal were analyzed to determine whether they were successful in implementing their risk management program. Risk management implementation surveys were distributed to aid in this analysis. The scope is limited to NASA S&MA (Safety and Mission Assurance) at MSFC, including applicable support contractors, and the US Army Engineering Directorate, including applicable contractors, located at Redstone Arsenal. NASA has moderately higher risk management implementation survey scores than the Army. Accordingly, the implementation of the risk management program at NASA is considered good while only two of five of the survey categories indicated that the risk management implementation is good at the Army.

Brothers, Mary Ann↗
NASA NTRS2003

Improving the Agency's Software Acquisition Capability

External development of software has oftc n led to unsatisfactory results and great frustration for the assurE 7ce community. Contracts frequently omit critical assuranc 4 processes or the right to oversee software development activitie: At a time when NASA depends more and more on software to in plement critical system functions, combination of three factors ex; cerbate this problem: I ) the ever-increasing trend to acquire rather than develop software in-house, 2) the trend toward performance based contracts, and 3) acquisition vehicles that only state softwar 2 requirements while leaving development standards and assur! ince methodologies up to the contractor. We propose to identify specific methods at d tools that NASA projects can use to mitigate the adverse el ects of the three problems. TWO broad classes of methoddt ~ols will be explored. The first will be those that provide NASA p ojects with insight and oversight into contractors' activities. The st cond will be those that help projects objectively assess, and thus i nprwe, their software acquisition capability. Of particular interest is the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) Software Acqt isition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMMO).

Hankinson, Allen↗
DOE OSTI2015

Idaho National Laboratory Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan - Fiscal Year 2015

Department of Energy Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System requires that each Department of Energy field element documents readiness assurance activities, addressing emergency response planning and preparedness. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, as prime contractor at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), has compiled this Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan to provide this assurance to the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office. Stated emergency capabilities at the INL are sufficient to implement emergency plans. Summary tables augment descriptive paragraphs to provide easy access to data. Additionally, the plan furnishes budgeting, personnel, and planning forecasts for the next 5 years.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2016

Ensuring Payload Safety in Missions with Special Partnerships

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) payload space flight missions involve cooperative work between NASA and partners including spacecraft (or payload) contractors, universities, nonprofit research centers, Agency payload organization, Range Safety organization, Agency launch service organizations, and launch vehicle contractors. The role of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate is typically fairly straightforward, but when a mission's partnerships become more complex, to realize cost and science benefits (e.g., multi-agency payload(s) or cooperative international missions), the task of ensuring payload safety becomes much more challenging. This paper discusses lessons learned from NASA safety professionals working multiple-agency missions and offers suggestions to help fellow safety professionals working multiple-agency missions.

Agency launch service organizations↗
NASA NTRS1992

Defining the performance gap: Conducting a self-assessment

This paper presents two different approaches to performing self-assessments of continuous improvement activities. Case Study 1 describes the activities performed by JSC to assess the implementation of continuous improvement efforts at the NASA Center. The JSC approach included surveys administered to randomly selected NASA personnel and personal interviews with NASA and contractor management personnel. Case Study 2 describes the continuous improvement survey performed by the JSC Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) organization. This survey consisted of a short questionnaire (50 questions) administered to all NASA and contractor SR&QA personnel. The questionnaire is based on the eight categories of the President's Award for Quality and Productivity Improvement. It is designed to objectively determine placement on the TQ benchmark and identify a roadmap for improvement.

Braymer, Susan A.↗
NASA NTRS1966

New developments in NASA quality assurance

The purpose of this talk is to examine and discuss NASA's basic quality concept, the policy and procedures which define and implement this concept and subsequently explore the NASA-Industry quality relationships which are essential to the success of NASA's quality assurance concept. It is important to emphasize that NASA's Quality Assurance program is predicated on the concept of an individually tailored quality program for each significant NASA procurement - particularly, large space systems. As a result, NASA's Quality Assurance program - to be effective - must be responsive to various technologies, hardware systems, and space missions. In addition, the program must be responsive to changing policies and practices in research, engineering and procurement. Key issues in the NASA-Contractor quality relationships in the framework of an over all NASA-Industry partnership include: (1) the necessity for NASA to effectively discharge its responsibility for providing clear and complete definition of quality requirements at all phases of the procurement cycle; (2) the right of the contractor to expect an explicit definition of NASA quality requirements in each RFP and contract and to request same if it is not provided; (3) the necessity for the contractor to have a dynamic and responsive quality program which is directed towards assuring that the hardware meets all technical requirements and to accomplish this in an effective and efficient manner; and (4) the critical need for investigation and study of the economic aspects of quality and an evaluation of our policies and practices based upon the results of such a study.

Condon, John E.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report provides findings, conclusions and recommendations regarding the National Space Transportation System (NSTS), the Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), aeronautical projects and other areas of NASA activities. The main focus of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) during 1988 has been monitoring and advising NASA and its contractors on the Space Transportation System (STS) recovery program. NASA efforts have restored the flight program with a much better management organization, safety and quality assurance organizations, and management communication system. The NASA National Space Transportation System (NSTS) organization in conjunction with its prime contractors should be encouraged to continue development and incorporation of appropriate design and operational improvements which will further reduce risk. The data from each Shuttle flight should be used to determine if affordable design and/or operational improvements could further increase safety. The review of Critical Items (CILs), Failure Mode Effects and Analyses (FMEAs) and Hazard Analyses (HAs) after the Challenger accident has given the program a massive data base with which to establish a formal program with prioritized changes.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Solar Sails

The Solar Sail Propulsion investment area has been one of the three highest priorities within the In-Space Propulsion Technology (ISPT) Project. In the fall of 2003, the NASA Headquarters' Science Mission Directorate provided funding and direction to mature the technology as far as possible through ground research and development from TRL 3 to 6 in three years. A group of experts from government, industry, and academia convened in Huntsville, Alabama to define technology gaps between what was needed for science missions to the inner solar system and the current state of the art in ultra1ightweight materials and gossamer structure design. This activity set the roadmap for development. The centerpiece of the development would be the ground demonstration of scalable solar sail systems including masts, sails, deployment mechanisms, and attitude control hardware and software. In addition, new materials would be subjected to anticipated space environments to quantify effects and assure mission life. Also, because solar sails are huge structures, and it is not feasible to validate the technology by ground test at full scale, a multi-discipline effort was established to develop highly reliable analytical models to serve as mission assurance evidence in future flight program decision-making. Two separate contractor teams were chosen to develop the SSP System Ground Demonstrator (SGD). After a three month conceptual mission/system design phase, the teams developed a ten meter diameter pathfinder set of hardware and subjected it to thermal vacuum tests to compare analytically predicted structural behavior with measured characteristics. This process developed manufacturing and handling techniques and refined the basic design. In 2005, both contractor teams delivered 20 meter, four quadrant sail systems to the largest thermal vacuum chamber in the world in Plum Brook, Ohio, and repeated the tests. Also demonstrated was the deployment and articulation of attitude control mechanisms. In conjunction with these tests, the stowed sails were subjected to launch vibration and ascent vent tests. Other investments studied radiation effects on the solar sail materials, investigated spacecraft charging issues, developed shape measuring techniques and instruments, produced advanced trajectory modeling capabilities, and identified and resolved gossamer structure dynamics issues. Technology validation flight and application to a He1iophysics science mission is on the horizon.

Young, Roy↗
NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗
NASA NTRS1979

Safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle program

This publication establishes common safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle Program. NASA Centers shall use this publication both as the basis for negotiating safety, reliability, maintainability and quality requirements with Shuttle Program contractors and as the guideline for conduct of program safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities at the Centers. Centers shall assure that applicable provisions of the publication are imposed in lower tier contracts. Centers shall give due regard to other Space Shuttle Program planning in order to provide an integrated total Space Shuttle Program activity. In the implementation of safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities, consideration shall be given to hardware complexity, supplier experience, state of hardware development, unit cost, and hardware use. The approach and methods for contractor implementation shall be described in the contractors safety, reliability, maintainability and quality plans. This publication incorporates provisions of NASA documents: NHB 1700.1 'NASA Safety Manual, Vol. 1'; NHB 5300.4(IA), 'Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'; and NHB 5300.4(1B), 'Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'. It has been tailored from the above documents based on experience in other programs. It is intended that this publication be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to reflect new experience and to assure continuing viability.

M S Malkin↗
DOE OSTI2019

EM Program Expectations on Implementation of DOE O 458: Radiation Protection of Public/Environment - 19553

DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, was issued in 2011. DOE sites were given 18 months to implement. The revised Order promulgates requirements for property clearance actions and independent verification. DOE Order 458.1 allows for preapproved authorized limits for the clearance of property. However, when property with the potential to contain residual radioactive material does not meet preapproved authorized limits, an authorized limits package must be developed. The Order contains a range of requirements for demonstrating with reasonable assurance that dose constraints are met for any actual or likely future use of the property to be released. EM has developed a draft guidance document that provides the elements of an authorized limits package. These elements are used to review all authorized limits packages that are submitted to EM. Expected elements include property description and process knowledge documentation, current and likely future use, the conceptual site model, dose modeling methodologies, specific authorized limits, dose- or concentration-based constraints, collective dose estimate to the potentially exposed population, stakeholder communications, description of the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) analysis, implementation plan, evaluation of difficult to assess surfaces, and independent verification plan. The draft guidance document also provides further explanation of the desired elements of an independent verification (IV) plan. An IV plan should describe the planning phase, implementation phase, assessment phase, and decision phase of an activity. The planning phase includes scope and cost, concurrent with cleanup contractor procurement, and review and approval of site radiological survey clearance program and IV program plans. The implementation phase assures sufficient collection of data and adjustment can be made as necessary. During the assessment phase, data and reports are reviewed, and coordination between the clean-up contractor and IV personnel occurs. A decision of whether or not the clearance actions need to be altered occurs during the decision phase. IV certification that the clearance action is complete also occurs during the decision phase. Issuance of the final guidance document is meant to improve the consultation process and minimize iterative interactions with EM. Standardizing and formalizing property clearance and IV actions also helps assure that cleanup actions are transparent and sustainable for future scrutiny. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1962

Development of techniques for forming segments of a parabolic solar concentrator

This report covers a comprehensive research study of Androforming, explosive forming, and stretch forming as applied to shaping a parabolic reflector segment for use in a solar furnace. Development efforts were directed toward attaining accurate part contour, and assurance of process reproducibility. The three forming processes mentioned above were investigated by qualified contractors. Three test segments formed by each method along with a detailed analysis were submitted to MSFC. It was concluded that optimum results could be obtained with the stretch forming process. The three test segments of the solar concentrator tha.t were produced by this method, and evaluated optically, revealed a maximum contour deviation of O. 76 degrees.

P.H. Schuerer↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Software Engineering Benchmarking Study

To identify best practices for the improvement of software engineering on projects, NASA's Offices of Chief Engineer (OCE) and Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) formed a team led by Heather Rarick and Sally Godfrey to conduct this benchmarking study. The primary goals of the study are to identify best practices that: Improve the management and technical development of software intensive systems; Have a track record of successful deployment by aerospace industries, universities [including research and development (R&D) laboratories], and defense services, as well as NASA's own component Centers; and Identify candidate solutions for NASA's software issues. Beginning in the late fall of 2010, focus topics were chosen and interview questions were developed, based on the NASA top software challenges. Between February 2011 and November 2011, the Benchmark Team interviewed a total of 18 organizations, consisting of five NASA Centers, five industry organizations, four defense services organizations, and four university or university R and D laboratory organizations. A software assurance representative also participated in each of the interviews to focus on assurance and software safety best practices. Interviewees provided a wealth of information on each topic area that included: software policy, software acquisition, software assurance, testing, training, maintaining rigor in small projects, metrics, and use of the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) framework, as well as a number of special topics that came up in the discussions. NASA's software engineering practices compared favorably with the external organizations in most benchmark areas, but in every topic, there were ways in which NASA could improve its practices. Compared to defense services organizations and some of the industry organizations, one of NASA's notable weaknesses involved communication with contractors regarding its policies and requirements for acquired software. One of NASA's strengths was its software assurance practices, which seemed to rate well in comparison to the other organizational groups and also seemed to include a larger scope of activities. An unexpected benefit of the software benchmarking study was the identification of many opportunities for collaboration in areas including metrics, training, sharing of CMMI experiences and resources such as instructors and CMMI Lead Appraisers, and even sharing of assets such as documented processes. A further unexpected benefit of the study was the feedback on NASA practices that was received from some of the organizations interviewed. From that feedback, other potential areas where NASA could improve were highlighted, such as accuracy of software cost estimation and budgetary practices. The detailed report contains discussion of the practices noted in each of the topic areas, as well as a summary of observations and recommendations from each of the topic areas. The resulting 24 recommendations from the topic areas were then consolidated to eliminate duplication and culled into a set of 14 suggested actionable recommendations. This final set of actionable recommendations, listed below, are items that can be implemented to improve NASA's software engineering practices and to help address many of the items that were listed in the NASA top software engineering issues. 1. Develop and implement standard contract language for software procurements. 2. Advance accurate and trusted software cost estimates for both procured and in-house software and improve the capture of actual cost data to facilitate further improvements. 3. Establish a consistent set of objectives and expectations, specifically types of metrics at the Agency level, so key trends and models can be identified and used to continuously improve software processes and each software development effort. 4. Maintain the CMMI Maturity Level requirement for critical NASA projects and use CMMI to measure organizations developing software for NASA. 5.onsolidate, collect and, if needed, develop common processes principles and other assets across the Agency in order to provide more consistency in software development and acquisition practices and to reduce the overall cost of maintaining or increasing current NASA CMMI maturity levels. 6. Provide additional support for small projects that includes: (a) guidance for appropriate tailoring of requirements for small projects, (b) availability of suitable tools, including support tool set-up and training, and (c) training for small project personnel, assurance personnel and technical authorities on the acceptable options for tailoring requirements and performing assurance on small projects. 7. Develop software training classes for the more experienced software engineers using on-line training, videos, or small separate modules of training that can be accommodated as needed throughout a project. 8. Create guidelines to structure non-classroom training opportunities such as mentoring, peer reviews, lessons learned sessions, and on-the-job training. 9. Develop a set of predictive software defect data and a process for assessing software testing metric data against it. 10. Assess Agency-wide licenses for commonly used software tools. 11. Fill the knowledge gap in common software engineering practices for new hires and co-ops.12. Work through the Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) program with universities in strengthening education in the use of common software engineering practices and standards. 13. Follow up this benchmark study with a deeper look into what both internal and external organizations perceive as the scope of software assurance, the value they expect to obtain from it, and the shortcomings they experience in the current practice. 14. Continue interactions with external software engineering environment through collaborations, knowledge sharing, and benchmarking.

Rarick, Heather L.↗