Mobile Radiation Detection for Ground Contamination Mapping (Consequence Management)
Presentation outlining the the intention and procedures of a mobile radiation detection system for emergency response and monitoring
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Presentation outlining the the intention and procedures of a mobile radiation detection system for emergency response and monitoring
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Dramatic advances in data management have been made as a result of the Paperless FRMAC initiative, sponsored by the DOE’s Office of Emergency Response (NA-42). The FRMAC (Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center) is the hub for all radiological monitoring and the production of data products that interpret those measurements in terms of protective action guidelines. As such, very large amounts of data must be quickly assimilated from numerous sources and then widely distributed as graphical interpretations as fast as possible. Paperless FRMAC is a broad initiative to move that data faster, farther and better through telemetry, automation, and networking. This discussion reviews for the first time the status of the now two-year-old Paperless FRMAC initiative. Key features of Paperless FRMAC include multipath telemetry of measurements from DOE field teams, 24/7 Internet presence, early data entry by first responders, support for distance collaborations, and data exchange with the EPA’s SCRIBE database. The heart of the enterprise is the RAMS database, which provides seamless interfacing with GIS, LIMS, and TurboFRMAC for calculations. Paperless FRMAC is presented to users via two Internet websites. The first, FRMAC Portal website, is restricted to the emergency responders for data input, analysis, and product development. The second, CMweb website, is the showroom for completed and approved products, which are made much more widely available. In fact, CMweb offers seamless, single log-in access to all data products for any IMAAC, NARAC or CMweb user.
It is unlikely that we will ever have a deterministic predictive framework for the study of flows in urban scale scenarios purely based on computational fluid dynamics. This is due to the inherent difficulty in modeling and validating all relevant physical sub-processes and acquiring all the necessary and relevant boundary condition information. On the other hand, this case is representative of very fundamental ones for which whole-domain scalable laboratory (or field) studies are impossible or very difficult, but for which it is also crucial to develop predictability. In this paper, we discuss a framework for detailed dispersal predictions in urban and regional settings based on effective linkage of strong motion codes - capable of simulating detailed energetic and contaminant sources, and large-eddy simulation - capable of emulating contaminant transport due to wind and turbulence fields in built-up areas. Challenging technical aspects of the simulation approach are outlined and recent progress is reviewed in th is context.
In 2002, the Director of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Nuclear Security Administration, Division of Emergency Response, requested a team of DOE scientists, considered experts in the field of radiological consequence management, assemble and construct a mission analysis upon which the DOE could build its response program and plan for future requirements. The team developed five scenarios upon which to build the data quality objectives (DQOs) that they considered necessary to ensure a comprehensive consequence management response from the DOE perspective. The resulting document was called the Consequence Management Mission Analysis. Based upon the positive reaction to this document and its obvious benefit to the Consequence Management mission, it was decided to expand the scope of the document to cover a mission analysis of the entire Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) mission. The documentation team was expanded to include representatives from all signatories to the National Response Plan who have a role in responding to radiological emergencies. The scope of the FRMAC Mission Analysis includes all federal response resources which are activated to provide rapid support to affected state and local governments in the form of radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities at the incident site. An analysis of the necessary resources was performed to determine the required numbers and types of responders, in addition to the procedures and equipment necessary for performing the monitoring and dose assessment activities from the time the federal assets arrive at the site through the first week of the incident. The five scenarios that were considered were: (1) Nuclear Detonation; (2) Nuclear Reactor Incident or Event Involving Significant Release; (3) Alpha Radiological Dispersal Devise or Failed Improvised Nuclear Device; (4) Beta-Gamma Radiological Dispersal Device; and (5) Psychological Threat.
The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is an operational center, available on request by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents as described in the National Response Framework (NRF). Under the Federal Interagency Operational Plan for Response and Recovery’s Nuclear/Radiological Annex, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has the responsibility to maintain the operational readiness of the FRMAC during the emergency phase of an event. FRMAC is initially established and managed by the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) and serves as an interagency operations center with representatives from various federal, state, and local radiological response organizations. The purpose of the FRMAC is to assist state, local, tribal, and territorial governments (SLTT) in their mission to protect the health and well-being of their citizens with: • Verified radiation measurements. • Interpretations of radiation distributions based on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), or local Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs). • Characterization of overall radiological conditions. Once a declaration to respond to a radiological emergency has been made, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Headquarters will coordinate the response in consultation with the cognizant NNSA Regional Coordinating Office (RCO). Each of the eight RCOs maintain a 24-hour response capability for radiological emergencies that may occur in states served by its region. When a FRMAC is established, it operates under the parameters of the Incident Command System (ICS), as defined in the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) construct. The Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) will be activated immediately during normal business hours (Pacific Time Zone), and within two hours otherwise. The Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT) is prepared for deployment within six hours after activation. Along with the assets, FRMAC provides an operational framework for coordinating of all federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities during a response to a radiological emergency to support the coordinating agency and SLTT governments. Potential radiological emergencies that fall within FRMAC vary widely in terms of the area affected, the nature of the contamination, and the scope of the government’s response. Detonation of a nuclear device, accidental release of radiation from a nuclear power plant, and a terrorist threat are just a few of the many possible scenarios FRMAC must be prepared to address. Through all this, supporting the state, local, and tribal organizations in the protection of the public remains the primary goal of the federal response.
Health physics is an important discipline with regard to understanding the effects of radiation on human health; however, there are major differences between health physics for research or occupational safety and health physics during a large-scale radiological emergency. The deployment of a U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) monitoring and assessment team to Japan in the wake of the March 2011 accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant yielded a wealth of lessons on these difference. Critical teams (CMOC (Consequence Management Outside the Continental U.S.) and CMHT (Consequence Management Home Team) ) worked together to collect, compile, review, and analyze radiological data from Japan to support the response needs of and answer questions from the Government of Japan, the U.S. military in Japan, the U.S. Embassy and U.S. citizens in Japan, and U.S. citizens in America. This paper addresses the unique challenges presented to the health physicist or analyst of radiological data in a large-scale emergency. A key lesson learned was that public perception and the availability of technology with social media requires a diligent effort to keep the public informed of the science behind the decisions in a manner that is meaningful to them.
This paper outlines several improvements to the Particle Activity Module of the Defense Land Fallout Interpretive Code (DELFIC). The modeling of each phase of the fallout process is discussed within DELFIC to demonstrate the capabilities and limitations with the code for modeling and simulation. Expansion of the DELFIC isotopic library to include actinides and light elements is shown. Several key features of the new library are demonstrated, including compliance with ENDF/B-VII standards, augmentation of hardwired activated soil and actinide decay calculations with exact Bateman calculations, and full physical and chemical fractionation of all material inventories. Improvements to the radionuclide source term are demonstrated, including the ability to specify heterogeneous fission types and the ability to import source terms from irradiation calculations using the Oak Ridge Isotope Generation (ORIGEN) code. Additionally, the dose, kerma, and effective dose conversion factors are revised. Finally, the application of DELFIC for consequence management planning and forensic analysis is presented. For consequence management, DELFIC is shown to provide disaster recovery teams with simulations of real-time events, including the location, composition, time of arrival, activity rates, and dose rates of fallout, accounting for site-specific atmospheric effects. The results from DELFIC are also demonstrated for use by nuclear forensics teams to plan collection routes (including the determination of optimal collection locations), estimate dose rates to collectors, and anticipate the composition of material at collection sites. These capabilities give mission planners the ability to maximize their effectiveness in the field while minimizing risk to their collectors.
This paper summarizes the activities of the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) during the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant crisis. NARAC provided a wide range of products and analyses as part of its support including: (1) Daily Japanese weather forecasts and hypothetical release (generic source term) dispersion predictions to provide situational awareness and inform planning for U.S. measurement data collection and field operations; (2) Estimates of potential dose in Japan for hypothetical scenarios developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to inform federal government considerations of possible actions that might be needed to protect U.S. citizens in Japan; (3) Estimates of possible plume arrival times and dose for U.S. locations; and (4) Plume model refinement and source estimation based on meteorological analyses and available field data. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) deployed personnel to Japan and stood up 'home team' assets across the DOE complex to aid in assessing the consequences of the releases from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. The DOE Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) coordinated response activities, while DOE personnel provided predictive modeling, air and ground monitoring, sample collection, laboratory analysis, and data assessment and interpretation. DOE deployed the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) personnel, and the Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT) to Japan. DOE/NNSA home team assets included the Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT); National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC); Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS); and Radiological Triage. NARAC was activated by the DOE/NNSA on March 11, shortly after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami occurred. The center remained on active operations through late May when DOE ended its deployment to Japan. Over 32 NARAC staff members, supplemented by other LLNL scientists, invested over 5000 person-hours of time and generated over 300 analyses and predictions.
The IBRD Operational Decision Framework in this document is an expansion of an emerging general risk management framework under development by an interagency working group. It provides the level of detail necessary to develop a general Consequence Management Guidance Document for biological contamination remediation and restoration. It is the intent of this document to support both wide area and individual site remediation and restoration activities. This product was initiated as a portion of the IBRD Task 1 Systems Analysis to aid in identification of wide area remediation and restoration shortcomings and gaps. The draft interagency general risk management framework was used as the basis for the analysis. The initial Task 1 analysis document expanded the draft interagency framework to a higher level of resolution, building on both the logic structure and the accompanying text explanations. It was then employed in a qualitative manner to identify responsible agencies, data requirements, tool requirements, and current capabilities for each decision and task. This resulted in identifying shortcomings and gaps needing resolution. Several meetings of a joint LLNL/SNL working group reviewed and approved the initial content of this analysis. At the conclusion of Task 1, work continued on the expanded framework to generate this Operational Decision Framework which is consistent with the existing interagency general risk management framework. A large LLNL task group met repeatedly over a three-month period to develop the expanded framework, coordinate the framework with the biological remediation checklist, and synchronize the logic with the Consequence Management Plan table of contents. The expanded framework was briefed at a large table top exercise reviewing the interagency risk management framework. This exercise had representation from major US metropolitan areas as well as national agencies. This product received positive comments from the participants. Upon completion of the Operational Decision Framework, another joint LLNL/SNL working group conducted a day-long review. Identified modifications were made to the document, resulting in the included product.
Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) of canisters has been identified as a potential degradation mechanism requiring ageing management — especially in a marine air environment. Methods for monitoring helium gas leakage from canisters have been developed on the basis of a phenomenon that the bottom temperature of the canister increases as the top temperature of the canister decreases when helium gas leaks during storage. In this paper, we consider the radiological consequences of CISCC based on two scenarios of helium gas leakage and propose effective management that includes a timeline for monitoring and mitigation. Monitoring helium gas leakage by measuring the difference in temperature between canister surfaces in the dry cask storage of spent fuel (SF) can detect leakage before SF undergoes oxidation as a result of air ingress and before country-specific regulatory limits of off-site doses are exceeded, thereby enabling mitigatory action.
During the summer and fall of 2021, several functional area drills were held that focused on exercising Consequence Management’s (CM) ability to extract and use data from RadResponder for the purpose of answering intermediate-phase questions presented as technical inject requests for information (RFI) in Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Consequence Management Operational System (COSMOS) software. The scenario chosen was that of Northern Lights 2016 (NL16) which was a large-scale nuclear power plant (NPP) release exercise in the state of Minnesota. The NL16 data was extracted from the Radiological Assessment and Monitoring System (RAMS) event where it was created and was reformatted for implanting to a new RadResponder event. Next, the beta-version of a laboratory sample data simulator was used to generate more sample data that was injected to the event. Five “mini-drills” were devised with each prompt defined by a data-based need. For each drill, a team of assessment and NARAC scientists worked the problem using the drill prompt and the available data in RadResponder. The teams held a kickoff meeting, had several days to work the problem, and then reported their results as well as observations in a hotwash. Several areas for improvement in both the software and process were identified during the course of these drills. This report will document the process of addressing each RFI and the discovered gaps in both software capability and methodology so that they can be considered for future development and investment by the CM and NIRT programs.
The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Consequence Management Program was contacted by the Health Physics Chief of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) to review public radiation exposure calculations for an event that occurred on its Gaithersburg, Maryland, campus on February 3, 2021. Subject matter experts from the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) assets, specifically the Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) and the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), were selected to provide support. CMHT used three separate modeling codes to validate the results the scientists at NCNR calculated using the HotSpot model. The analyses were performed using NARAC’s in-house Lagrangian dispersion codes known as LODI and Aeolus, as well as the Turbo FRMAC software from Sandia National Laboratories. The team used parameters provided by the NCNR scientists regarding the site, applicable observable meteorological data, and environmental survey and sampling data to estimate public exposure. Each model estimated public dose at much less than 0.5 mrem. CMHT concurs with the NCNR public radiation exposure calculations which state that members of the public at the 400-meter boundary would have received a radiological dose of less than 0.5 mrem.
This document is intended to codify, to the extent currently possible, the representation of map products produced for and by the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) and the Consequence Management Home Team (CHMT), particularly those that include model products from the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC). This is to facilitate consistency between GIS products produced by different members of these teams, which should ease the task of interpreting these products by both team members and those outside the team who may need to use these products during a response. The aspects of symbology being considered are primarily isopleths levels (breakpoints) and colors used to plot NARAC modeled dose or deposition fields on mpas, although some comments will be made about the handling of legend and supporting textual information. Other aspects of symbolizing such products (e.g., transparency) are being left to the individual team members to allow them to adapt to particular organizational needs or requirements that develop during a particular a response or exercise. This document has been written in coordination with the creation of training material in Baskett, et al., 2008. It is not intended as an aid to NARAC product interpretation but to facilitate the work of GIS specialists who deal with these products in map design and in the development of supporting scripts and software that partially or completely automate the integration of NARAC model products with other GIS data. This work was completed as part of the NA-42 Technical Integration Project on GIS Automated Data Processing and Map Production in FY 2008. Other efforts that are part of this work include (a) updating the NARAC shapefile product representation to facilitate the automation work proceed at RSL as part of the same TI effort and (b) to ensure that the NARAC shapefile construct includes all of the necessary legend and other textual data to interpret dispersion and deposition patterns and related products correctly. This document is focusing on the products produced by the GIS Division of the Remove Sensing Laboratory (RSL) and by the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), both separately and in combination. The expectation is that standard products produced by either group independently or in combination should use the same key attributes in displaying the same kinds of data so that products of a given type generally look similar in key aspects of the presentation, thereby minimizing any confusion of users when a variety of products from these groups may be needed. This document is dealing with the set of common standard products used in responding to radiological/nuclear releases. There are a number of less standard products that are used occasionally or in certain specific situations that are not addressed here. This includes special products that are occasionally produced by both NARAC and RSL in responses and major exercises to meet immediate and unanticipated requirements. At some future time, it may be appropriate to review the handling of such special products by both organizations to determine if there are any areas that would benefit from being integrated with the conventions described here. A particular area that should be addressed in the near-term is that of Derived Response Levels (DRLs) calculated by the Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) or FRMAC Assessment Scientists. A new calculation is done for every event assigning contour levels, or break-points, based upon field measurements. These contour levels can be applied to deposition or dose rate NARAC calculations. Because these calculations are different every time, they can not be stored in a database.
No abstract prepared.
Sponsored by NA-81 as part of international Consequence Management training offered by the NA-80 office
Presentation for an International Atomic Energy Agency sponsored workshop on Consequence Management (virtual). Presentation sponsored by DOE NA-81
Case study on contingency planning for the MARS 2020 rover launch. Intended as part of a training for international consequence management personnel for IAEA and/or NATO-sponsored training classes. Funded through NA-81