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Measurement of Argon-37 Background Concentrations in the Atmosphere

Radioisotopes of noble gases, primarily xenon and argon, are important indicators of underground nuclear explosions. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes monitoring capabilities to identify potential nuclear explosions conducted in violation of the CTBT. This monitoring currently focuses on measurement of the xenon isotopes 133 Xe, 135 Xe, 131 mXe and 133 mXe. However, it is predicted that within 100 days of an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) 37 Ar would be released to the atmosphere at higher concentrations than xenon isotopes (Haas et al. 2010). Therefore, inclusion of 37 Ar measurement capabilities at atmospheric International Monitoring System (IMS) stations could improve the capability to detect a nuclear explosion. At an IMS station, it could be difficult to determine what constitutes an elevated concentration as a result of an UNE without first understanding the expected range of background concentrations. This work describes our analysis of atmospheric samples for 37 Ar to evaluate the range of background concentrations. The range of 37 Ar concentrations measured in atmospheric air samples was relatively narrow ranging between less than 1 mBq/m 3 to greater than 2 mBq/m 3 . The average atmospheric concentration of all samples was 0.98 mBq/m 3 , with a standard deviation of 0.5 mBq/m 3 . This is consistent with previous published results. The results presented here demonstrate the capability to detect background concentrations of 37 Ar in atmospheric air.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Discrimination of nuclear explosions against civilian sources based on atmospheric xenon isotopic activity ratios

A global monitoring system for atmospheric xenon radioactivity is being established as part of the International Monitoring System that will be used to verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) once the treaty has entered into force. This paper studies isotopic activity ratios to support interpretation of observed atmospheric concentrations of 135Xe, 133mXe, 133Xe and 131mXe. The goal is to distinguish nuclear explosion sources from civilian releases. Simulations of nuclear explosions, empirical data for both test and reactor releases as well as observations by measurement stations of the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE) are used to provide a proof of concept for the isotopic ratio based method for source discrimination.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Comparison of Radionuclide Ratios in Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions and Nuclear Releases from Chernobyl and Fukushima seen in Gamma Ray Spectormetry

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has remote radionuclide monitoring followed by an On Site Inspection (OSI) to clarify the nature of a suspect event. An important aspect of radionuclide measurements on site is the discrimination of other potential sources of similar radionuclides such as reactor accidents or medical isotope production. The Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear reactor disasters offer two different reactor source term environmental inputs that can be compared against historical measurements of nuclear explosions. The comparison of whole-sample gamma spectrometry measurements from these three events and the analysis of similarities and differences are presented. This analysis is a step toward confirming what is needed for measurements during an OSI under the auspices of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground Sources of Radioactive Noble Gas

It is well known that radon is present in relatively high concentrations below the surface of the Earth due to natural decay of uranium and thorium. However, less information is available on the background levels of other isotopes such as 133Xe and 131mXe produced via spontaneous fission of either manmade or naturally occurring elements. The background concentrations of radioxenon in the subsurface are important to understand because these isotopes potentially can be used to confirm violations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) during an On-Site Inspection (OSI). Recently, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) measured radioxenon concentrations from the subsurface at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS—formerly known as the Nevada Test Site) to determine whether xenon isotope background levels could be detected from spontaneous fission of naturally occurring uranium or legacy 240Pu as a result of historic nuclear testing. In this paper, we discuss the results of those measurements and review the sources of xenon background that must be taken into account during OSI noble gas measurements.

radioxenon, noble gas, soil gas sampling, CTBT, On↗

Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski et al., 2014) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133 Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131m Xe and 133m Xe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133 Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. In conclusion, signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Measurement of 37Ar to support technology for On-site Inspection under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

On-Site Inspection (OSI) is a key component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclide isotopes created by an underground nuclear explosion are a valuable signature of a Treaty violation. Argon-37 is produced from neutron interaction with calcium in soil, 40Ca(n,α)37Ar. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of 37Ar provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for completion of an inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This paper presents a low-background internal-source gas proportional counter with an 37Ar measurement sensitivity level equivalent to 45.1 mBq/SCM in whole air.

CTBT On-site Inspection↗

Xenon monitoring and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

How do you monitor (verify) a CTBT? It is a difficult challenge to monitor the entire world for nuclear tests, regardless of size. Nuclear tests 'normally' occur underground, above ground or underwater. Setting aside very small tests (let's limit our thinking to 1 kiloton or more), nuclear tests shake the ground, emit large amounts of radioactivity, and make loud noises if in the atmosphere (or hydroacoustic waves if underwater)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doing this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Issues Involving The OSI Concept of Operation For Noble Gas Radionuclide Detection

The development of a technically sound protocol for detecting the subsurface release of noble gas radionuclides is critical to the successful operation of an on site inspection (OSI) under the CTBT and has broad ramifications for all aspects of the OSI regime including the setting of specifications for both sampling and analysis equipment used during an OSI. With NA-24 support, we are investigating a variety of issues and concerns that have significant bearing on policy development and technical guidance regarding the detection of noble gases and the creation of a technically justifiable OSI concept of operation. The work at LLNL focuses on optimizing the ability to capture radioactive noble gases subject to the constraints of possible OSI scenarios. This focus results from recognizing the difficulty of detecting gas releases in geologic environments - a lesson we learned previously from the LLNL Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Evaluation of a number of important noble gas detection issues, potentially affecting OSI policy, has awaited the US re-engagement with the OSI technical community. Thus, there have been numerous issues to address during the past 18 months. Most of our evaluations of a sampling or transport issue necessarily involve computer simulations. This is partly due to the lack of OSI-relevant field data, such as that provided by the NPE, and partly a result of the ability of LLNL computer-based models to test a range of geologic and atmospheric scenarios far beyond what could ever be studied in the field making this approach very highly cost effective. We review some highlights of the transport and sampling issues we have investigated during the past year. We complete the discussion of these issues with a description of a preliminary design for subsurface sampling that is intended to be a practical solution to most if not all the challenges addressed here.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A General Investigation of Optimized Atmospheric Sample Duration

ABSTRACT The International Monitoring System (IMS) consists of up to 80 aerosol and xenon monitoring systems spaced around the world that have collection systems sensitive enough to detect nuclear releases from underground nuclear tests at great distances (CTBT 1996; CTBTO 2011). Although a few of the IMS radionuclide stations are closer together than 1,000 km (such as the stations in Kuwait and Iran), many of them are 2,000 km or more apart. In the absence of a scientific basis for optimizing the duration of atmospheric sampling, historically scientists used a integration times from 24 hours to 14 days for radionuclides (Thomas et al. 1977). This was entirely adequate in the past because the sources of signals were far away and large, meaning that they were smeared over many days by the time they had travelled 10,000 km. The Fukushima event pointed out the unacceptable delay time (72 hours) between the start of sample acquisition and final data being shipped. A scientific basis for selecting a sample duration time is needed. This report considers plume migration of a nondecaying tracer using archived atmospheric data for 2011 in the HYSPLIT (Draxler and Hess 1998; HYSPLIT 2011) transport model. We present two related results: the temporal duration of the majority of the plume as a function of distance and the behavior of the maximum plume concentration as a function of sample collection duration and distance. The modeled plume behavior can then be combined with external information about sampler design to optimize sample durations in a sampling network.

CTBT↗

Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Technology Roadmap

This GNDD Technology Roadmap is intended to provide guidance to potential researchers and help management define research priorities to achieve technology advancements for ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring science being pursued by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team within the Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Four science-based elements were selected to encompass the entire scope of nuclear monitoring research and development (R&D) necessary to facilitate breakthrough scientific results, as well as deliver impactful products. Promising future R&D is delineated including dual use associated with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Important research themes as well as associated metrics are identified along with a progression of accomplishments, represented by a selected bibliography, that are precursors to major improvements to nuclear explosion monitoring.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Measurements of Worldwide Radioxenon Backgrounds - The "EU" Project

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), radioactive xenon (radioxenon) measurements are one of the principle techniques used to detect nuclear underground nuclear explosions, and specifically, the presence of one or more radioxenon isotopes allows one to determine whether a suspected event was a nuclear explosion or originated from an innocent source. During the design of the International Monitoring System (IMS), which was designed as the verification mechanism for the Treaty, it was determined that radioxenon measurements should be performed at 40 or more stations worldwide. At the time of the design of the IMS, however, very few details about the background of the xenon isotopes was known and it is now recognized that the backgrounds were probably evolving anyhow. This paper lays out the beginning of a study of the worldwide concentrations of xenon isotopes that can be used to detect nuclear explosions and several sources that also release radioxenons, and will have to be accounted for during analysis of atmospheric levels. Although the global concentrations of the xenon isotopes are the scope of a much larger activity that could span over several years, this study measures radioxenon concentrations in locations where there was either very little information or there was a unique opportunity to learn more about emissions from known sources. The locations where radioxenon levels were measured and reported are included.

background measurements↗

Characterization of a Commercial Silicon Beta Cell

Silicon detectors are of interest for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) due to their enhanced energy resolution compared to plastic scintillators beta cells. Previous work developing a figure-of-merit (FOM) for comparison of beta cells suggests that the minimum detectable activity (MDA) could be reduced by a factor of two to three with the use of silicon detectors. Silicon beta cells have been developed by CEA (France) and Lares Ltd. (Russia), with the PIPSBox developed by CEA being commercially available from Canberra for approximately $35k, but there is still uncertainty about the reproducibility of the capabilities in the field. PNNL is developing a high-resolution beta-gamma detector system in the shallow underground laboratory, which will utilize and characterize the operation of the PIPSBox detector. Throughout this report, we examine the capabilities of the PIPSBox as developed by CEA. The lessons learned through the testing and use of the PIPSBox will allow PNNL to strategically develop a silicon detector optimized to better suit the communities needs in the future.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Testing of the KRI-developed Silicon PIN Radioxenon Detector

Radioxenon detectors are used for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in a network of detectors throughout the world called the International Monitoring System (IMS). The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) has tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) with testing a V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute (KRI) and Lares Ltd-developed Silicon PIN detector for radioxenon detection. PNNL measured radioxenon with the silicon PIN detector and determined its potential compared to current plastic scintillator beta cells. While the PNNL tested Si detector experienced noise issues, a second detector was tested in Russia at Lares Ltd, which did not exhibit the noise issues. Without the noise issues, the Si detector produces much better energy resolution and isomer peak separation than a conventional plastic scintillator cell used in the SAUNA systems in the IMS. Under the assumption of 1 cm 3 of Xe in laboratory-like conditions, 24-hr count time (12-hr count time for the SAUNA), with the respective shielding the minimum detectable concentrations for the Si detector tested by Lares Ltd (and a conventional SAUNA system) were calculated to be: 131m Xe – 0.12 mBq/m 3 (0.12 mBq/m 3 ); 133 Xe – 0.18 mBq/m 3 (0.21 mBq/m 3 ); 133m Xe – 0.07 mBq/m 3 (0.15 mBq/m 3 ); 135 Xe – 0.45 mBq/m 3 (0.67 mBq/m 3 ). Detection limits, which are one of the important factors in choosing the best detection technique for radioxenon in field conditions, are significantly better than for SAUNA-like detection systems for 131m Xe and 133m Xe, but similar for 133 Xe and 135 Xe. Another important factor is the amount of “memory effect” or carry over signal from one radioxenon measurement to the subsequent sample. The memory effect is reduced by a factor of 10 in the Si PIN detector compared to the current plastic scintillator cells. There is potential for further reduction with the removal of plastics within the cell, which will need to be explored in future work. A third important parameter in choosing the best detection technique for radioxenon is the resolution of the electron detection. While the resolution is important in determining the minimum detectable concentration, it plays a larger role in source identification when there is a visible signal. The Silicon PIN diodes generated improved resolution over a similar plastic scintillator cell. With the improved resolution, it becomes easier to distinguish the radioxenon isomers ( 133m Xe and 131m Xe) from the 133 Xe beta continuum background. With the beta background from 133 Xe ever present with the detection of the isomers, the improved resolution proves vital in calculating the ratios of the three isotopes. With an accurate measurement of the isotopic ratios, the anthropogenic sources of radioxenon (medical isotope production and nuclear reactors) can be more accurately distinguished. Based on the results shown within this report, a Si PIN beta cell shows the potential to aid in the operation and discriminating power of the IMS for the CTBTO. However, there are a number of issues that need attention before a detector of this design would be reliable enough for field operations in the IMS. Issues that need develop include, but are not limited to: studying the robustness of the design in field conditions, eliminating or minimizing the noise and variability of individual Si detector elements, understanding the long-term gain stability of the Si detectors, and reducing the non-Si materials within the cell (i.e. the plastic housing).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

LESSONS LEARNED IN AEROSOL MONITORING WITH THE RASA

The Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler/Analyzer (RASA) is an automated aerosol collection and analysis system designed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in the 1990's and is deployed in several locations around the world as part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) required under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The RASA operates unattended, save for regularly scheduled maintenance, iterating samples through a three-step process on a 24-hour interval. In its 15-year history, much has been learned from the operation and maintenance of the RASA that can benefit engineering updates or future aerosol systems. On 11 March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami rocked the eastern coast of Japan, resulting in power loss and cooling failures at the Daiichi nuclear power plants in Fukushima Prefecture. Aerosol collections were conducted with the RASA in Richland, WA. We present a summary of the lessons learned over the history of the RASA, including lessons taken from the Fukushima incident, regarding the RASA IMS stations operated by the United States.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗