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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3

Impact of Sr-Containing Secondary Phases on Oxide Conductivity in Solid-Oxide Electrolyzer Cells

Solid-oxide electrolyzer cells (SOECs) based on a yttria-stabilized zirconia (YSZ) oxide electrolyte produce hydrogen from water with the assistance of excess thermal energy; however, Sr diffusion within the Gd-doped CeO 2 (GDC) barrier layer during processing or operation can lead to the formation of unwanted secondary phases such as SrO and SrZrO 3 . Here, to establish and compare the degree of impact of these phases on SOEC performance, we conduct first-principles calculations to study their bulk oxide conductivities and compare them to that of the YSZ electrolyte. We find that SrO has a low conductivity arising from the poor mobility and low concentration of mobile oxygen vacancies, and its presence in SOECs should therefore be avoided. SrZrO 3 also has a lower oxide conductivity than YSZ; however, this discrepancy is primarily due to lower vacancy concentrations rather than low mobility. We find that sufficient levels of Y-doping on the Zr site can increase oxygen vacancy concentrations in SrZrO 3 to achieve an oxide ionic conductivity on par with that of YSZ, thereby mitigating any potential deleterious effect on transport performance. Energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscopy confirms that Y is the most common minority element present in SrZrO 3 forming near the GDC–YSZ interface, alleviating concerns regarding the impact of SrZrO 3 on device performance. These results from our combined computational–experimental analysis can inform future engineering strategies designed to limit the detrimental effects of Sr-induced secondary phase formation on SOEC performance.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Carbohydrate-Containing Conjugated Polymers: Solvent-Resistant Materials for Greener Organic Electronics

Organic semiconducting polymers are exciting materials for electronic applications because of their good mechanical and optoelectronic properties. A major advantage of organic semiconductors is their solution processability. This allows access to a variety of simple and cost-effective device fabrication methods compared to the expensive, high-temperature processing methods required for silicon-based electronics. However, these materials often have low solubility, which limits their processing to toxic halogenated solvents. Also, their limited solubility often leads to interfacial mixing during device fabrication. Herein, this work explores the incorporation of environmentally friendly carbohydrate side chains in conjugated polymers to enhance processability in eco-friendly solvents. Moreover, a mild postprocessing treatment was designed to enable solvent resistance. Isoindigo-based polymers with varied ratios of acetyl-protected galactose side chains were synthesized to improve solubility in o-anisole in the protected state, while inducing solvent resistance through intramolecular hydrogen bonding in the deprotected state. Solvent resistance was confirmed both visually upon submersion in various solvents and using UV–visible spectroscopy. Importantly, the mild basic treatment to achieve solvent resistance has no negative impact on the electronic performance of these materials in organic field-effect transistors, even after subsequent submersion in various solvents, making them a valuable platform for the production of green processable multilayer electronics.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Rheo-electric measurements of carbon black suspensions containing polyvinylidene difluoride in N -methyl-2-pyrrolidone

Lithium-ion battery cathode slurries have a microstructure that depends sensitively on how they are processed due to carbon black's (CB) evolving structure when subjected coating flows. While polyvinylidene difluoride (PVDF), one of the main components of the cathode slurry, plays an important role in modifying the structure and rheology of CB, a quantitative understanding is lacking. In this work, we explore the role of PVDF in determining the structural evolution of Super C65 CB in N-methyl-2-pyrrolidinone (NMP) with rheo-electric measurements. We find that PVDF enhances the viscosity of NMP resulting in a more extensive structural erosion of CB agglomerates with increasing polymer concentration and molecular weight. We also show that the relative viscosity of all suspensions can be collapsed by the fluid Mason number (Mnf), which compares the hydrodynamic forces imposed by the medium to cohesive forces holding CB agglomerates together. Using simultaneous rheo-electric measurements, we find at high Mnf, the dielectric strength (Δε) scales with Mnf, and the power-law scaling can be quantitatively predicted by considering the self-similar break up of CB agglomerates. The collapse of the relative viscosity and scaling of Δε both suggest that PVDF increases the hydrodynamic force of the suspending medium without directly changing the CB agglomerate structure. These findings are valuable for optimizing the rheology of lithium ion battery cathode slurries. We also anticipate that these findings can be extended to understand the microstructure of similar systems under flow.

Mechanics↗

ILAW Container Cost Reduction and Optimization Study

This study, performed on behalf of Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), examines the potential for making cost savings for the Immobilized Low Active Waste (ILAW) containers over the mission life of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). it builds on earlier study assessments 24590-LAW-RPT-M-01-001 Rev 0 ILAW Product Container Specifications Optimization Study and DOE/ORP-2013-02 Rev 0 Decision Analysis of Low-Active Waste Container Finishing Handling System Alternatives. The WTP design and installed equipment has evolved over an extended period ~20 years. Consequently, some of the existing requirements relating the ILAW containers may no longer be applicable under current mission plans where the glass filled containers are placed into the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) rather than stacked in an engineered purpose-built ventilated store as originally envisioned. The study team reviewed available WTP project reference documents to establish the functions the container must perform and assign requirements against each of these functions. With the assumptions that some of the existing WTP contract restrictions would not necessarily apply to the subsequent facility operations contract the container requirements were reviewed to identify those which were ‘hard constraints‘, imposed by regulatory requirements. Initially each of these hard constraints were reviewed, evaluated and documented to see if they precluded the use of an alternate less expensive material of construction, carbon steel, to the existing 304 L stainless steel in the current container specification. That review did not generate any fatal flaws for a change in material of construction to carbon steel allowing the study team to examine the impacts of material cost savings, potential changes to the design and requirements and impacts on interfaces of the containers with the existing WTP process equipment from container receipt, transfers, glass filling, cooling and export. In addition, a change in container target fill level was evaluated and qualitative, and quantitative where feasible, impacts to the container fabrication process assessed. Lastly, additional follow on development or testing activities to support the use of carbon steel were assessed and a recommended path forward with a ROM cost and timescale developed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Measuring 3D Profilometry of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers: Novacam TubeInspect Capabilities Report

The SAVY-4000 container series is a general-purpose interim storage container for nuclear materials, developed and maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It is the first vented, general-use nuclear material container to be demonstrated as meeting the requirements outlined in DOE M 441.1-1, the Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. Due to the challenging radiation, thermal, and corrosive storage conditions that the SAVY containers must endure, continuous surveillance techniques are employed to ensure the containers meet all safety standards and specifications. These inspections are typically performed by human operators, who check for issues such as corrosion, O-ring deterioration, corrosion, filter integrity, and potential manufacturing defects. However, human inspections alone are not sufficient, and automated inspection technologies, such as the ATIS system, as well as other automated systems are also utilized. The MicroCam TubeInspect, developed by Novacam Technologies Inc., is designed to address the challenges of understanding how manufacturing variations in the SAVY-4000 container series may affect performance. It is a 3D profilometry measurement system that enables detailed analysis of surface features, including defects, surface roughness, and manufacturing variations. This advanced tool significantly enhances rapid surveillance techniques for both pristine and used containers. In this study, container properties such as surface roughness, thickness, and geometric attributes like circularity are measured for SAVY-4000 containers. Artificially corroded or dented containers are examined to demonstrate the MicroCam's ability to quantify defects. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted, comparing the MicroCam results to those obtained using more precise instruments such as confocal microscopy. This comparison aims to provide valuable insights into container quality, durability, and potential improvements in manufacturing processes.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Towards Improving Container Security by Preventing Runtime Escapes

Container escapes enable the adversary to execute code on the host from inside an isolated container. Notably, these high severity escape vulnerabilities originate from three sources: (1) container profile misconfigurations, (2) Linux kernel bugs, and (3) container runtime vulnerabilities. While the first two cases have been studied in the literature, no works have investigated the impact of container runtime vulnerabilities. In this paper, to fill this gap, we study 59 CVEs for 11 different container runtimes. As a result of our study, we found that five of the 11 runtimes had nine publicly available PoC container escape exploits covering 13 CVEs. Our further analysis revealed all nine exploits are the result of a host component leaked into the container. Here, we apply a user namespace container defense to prevent the adversary from leveraging leaked host components and demonstrate that the defense stops seven of the nine container escape exploits.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Destructive Examination Protocol for 3013-Container-Package Storing Plutonium-Bearing Materials

The 3013-container-package consists of a convenience, inner and outer container and is used for long-term storage of plutonium-bearing materials. A destructive examination (DE) protocol has been developed to examine the container package visually and with microscopic aid to find any corrosion conditions that could result in the loss of the integrity of the container package over its lifetime. The DE protocol contains three main steps: initial container examination, helium (He) leak testing, and detailed imaging and analysis of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). The ICCWR has been determined to be bounding, defined as exhibiting worst case conditions for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the inner container. To assess SCC in the ICCWR, the inner container lid is cut into quarters and the weld and He-leak testing gasket are removed. Then a citric acid wash is performed to remove adherent chlorides from the ICCWR. The wash is then sent for analysis to determine the concentration of chlorides in the ICCWR. While the analysis for chloride concentration is being performed, the quarter sections are further sectioned into 1/8th subsections by cutting each section in half. These subsections are washed using nitric acid to remove corrosion products. Then each subsection is imaged using a Wide Angle 3-D Measurement System (WAMS). After analysis of microscope images for potential SCC, additional imaging can be performed, including subsurface imaging. After review, a determination is made of whether the container integrity may potentially affect the safe storage of the material.

container↗

Development of the 3 m{sup 3} Low Level Radioactive Waste Container in Taiwan - 20037

Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant stopped its business operation in July, 2019, and Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant will also be permanently shut down in 2023. Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act requires a nuclear facility must be dismantled in 25 years after being permanently ceased operation. According to the approved decommissioning plan of Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant and the proposed one of Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant, the 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste container is planned to store the low level radioactive wastes with higher radiation produced during the decommissioning. However, 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste containers are not used or developed in Taiwan before. To meet such need, Institute of Nuclear Energy Research develops a new type of 3 m{sup 3} low level radioactive waste container and performs the corresponding analyses and tests based on Guidelines of Applying the Usage License of Low Level Radioactive Waste Containers and Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. In this article, it provides the information of the low level radioactive waste containers that have been approved or is under reviewing in Taiwan, and so do the design specifications of the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container. Besides, the numerical evaluation and test results of the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container are also included in this article. Based on the evaluation and test results, the developed 3 m{sup 3} waste container satisfies the requirements of the storage container and industrial package type 2. Institute of Nuclear Energy Research will submit the usage license applications to the authority this year, and the usage licenses would be granted in 2021, expectedly. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sensitivity Analyses of Natural Convection in the AP1000 Passive Containment Cooling System Following LBLOCA Using CFD

The AP1000 power plant has implemented multiple layers of passive safety systems to enhance reactor safety and ensure system integrity during postulated scenarios, such as loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and main steam line break (MSLB). Among these, the passive containment cooling system (PCCS) is a safety-related system designed to prevent the containment from exceeding the design limits of both pressure and temperature following a postulated design basis accident, by transferring heat from the steel containment vessel to the atmosphere. During LOCA, natural air convection plays a vital role in removing heat from the steel containment vessel to the atmosphere. This is integrated with the condensate film from the Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). Air natural convection is also the only heat removal mechanism after the dry-out of the PCCWST and during the loss of shutdown decay heat removal (LOSDHR) event. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the thermal hydraulics behavior of the containment under transient conditions to ensure its safety and integrity. This paper presents a simplified CFD/ANSYS FLUENT model developed to analyze the impact of different parameters, such as air relative humidity, air temperature, and steel containment temperature, on the natural convection capability to remove the decay heat following LOCA. The model aims to examine the thermal behavior of the containment and provides a comprehensive understanding of the system's natural convection capability during postulated accidents. The results obtained from the model can be used to improve the safety and integrity of the containment system and provide valuable insights for future research in the field.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Rules of Use Report Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55

A set of obligations in the yearly storage container surveillance program, ensures that a retrospective approach is applied with loaded containers in inventory to confirm compliance with all “users” to ensure nuclear material storage container requirements are being followed. Validation that packaged containers are properly used, within a specific set of container types prescribed “bounding conditions of use,” is based on meeting requirements as identified in operating procedures associated with TA55-DOP-091, TA-55 Nuclear Material Packaging, and PA-RD-01022, Nuclear Material Packaging Requirements. The surveillance plan obligation requires the application of local area nuclear material accountability software or (LANMAS) to produce queries. The data queries are used to assess attributes of containers in storage these investigations are conducted on a bi-annual basis. This rules of use (ROU) compliance process ensures proper usage of storage containers as containment systems and therefore provides effective worker protection. It is structured as a supporting effort by implementing aspects of PA-AP-01207, Nuclear Material Container Safety Management at TA-55.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Engineering evaluations of nuclear material storage containers against the packaging requirements at TA-55 (FY22 Rules of Use Report)

A set of obligations in the yearly storage container surveillance program, ensures that a retrospective approach is applied with loaded containers in inventory to confirm compliance with all “users” to ensure nuclear material storage container requirements are being followed. Validation that packaged containers are properly used, within a specific set of container types prescribed “bounding conditions of use,” is based on meeting requirements as identified in operating procedures associated with TA55-DOP-091, TA-55 Nuclear Material Packaging, and PA-RD-01022, Nuclear Material Packaging Requirements. The surveillance plan obligation requires the application of local area nuclear material accountability software or (LANMAS) to produce queries. The data queries are used to assess attributes of containers in storage these investigations are conducted on a bi-annual basis. This rules of use (ROU) compliance process ensures proper usage of storage containers as containment systems and therefore provides effective worker protection. It is structured as a supporting effort by implementing aspects of PA-AP-01207, Nuclear Material Container Safety Management at TA-55.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗