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DOE OSTI2010

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010

The mission of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is to clean up the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons research and production during the Cold War. That mission includes cleaning up nuclear waste, contaminated groundwater and soil, nuclear materials, and contaminated facilities covering two million acres of land in thirty-five states. EM's principal program goals include timely completion of tank waste treatment facilities, reduction of the life-cycle costs and acceleration of the cleanup of the Cold War legacy, and reduction of the EM footprint. The mission of the EM Technology Innovation and Development program is to transform science and innovation into practical solutions to achieve the EM mission. During fiscal year 2010 (October 2009-September 2010), EM focused upon accelerating environmental cleanup by expeditiously filling identified gaps in available knowledge and technology in the EM program areas. This report describes some of the approaches and transformational technologies in tank waste processing, groundwater and soil remediation, nuclear materials disposition, and facility deactivation and decommissioning developed during fiscal year 2010 that will enable EM to meet its most pressing program goals.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Decommissioning an Active Historical Reactor Facility at the Savannah River Site - 13453

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). In 2004, DOE recognized SRS as structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. This reactor has five primary areas within it, including a Disassembly Basin (DB) that received irradiated materials from the reactor, cooled them and prepared the components for loading and transport to a Separation Canyon for processing. The 6,317 square meter area was divided into numerous work/storage areas. The walls between the individual basin compartments have narrow vertical openings called 'slots' that permit the transfer of material from one section to another. Data indicated there was over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The need for an action was identified in 2010 to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. DOE, its regulators [U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)-Region 4 and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC)] and the SC Historical Preservation Office (SHPO) agreed/concurred to perform a non-time critical removal action for the In Situ Decommissioning (ISD) of the 105-C Disassembly Basin. ISD consisted of stabilization/isolation of remaining contaminated water, sediment, activated reactor equipment, and scrap metal by filling the DB with underwater non-structural grout to the appropriate (-4.877 meter) grade-level, thence with dry area non-structural grout to the final -10 centimeter level. The roof over the DB was preserved due to its potential historical significance and to prevent the infiltration of precipitation. Forced evaporation was the form of treatment implemented to remove the approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated basin water. Using specially formulated grouts, irradiated materials and sediment were treated by solidification/isolation thus reducing their mobility, reducing radiation exposure and creating an engineered barrier thereby preventing access to the contaminants. Grouting provided a low permeability barrier to minimize any potential transport of contaminants to the aquifer. Efforts were made to preserve the historical significance of the Reactor in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act. ISD provides a cost effective means to isolate and contain residual radioactivity from past nuclear operations allowing natural radioactive decay to reduce hazards to manageable levels. This method limits release of radiological contamination to the environment, minimizes radiation exposure to workers, prevents human/animal access to the hazardous substances, and allows for ongoing monitoring of the decommissioned facility. Field construction was initiated in August 2011; evaporator operations commenced January 2012 and ended July 2012 with over 9 M liters of water treated/removed. Over 8,525 cubic meters of grout were placed, completing in August 2012. The project completed with an excellent safety record, on schedule and under budget. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1999

Single Step to Orbit; a First Step in a Cooperative Space Exploration Initiative

At the end of the Cold War, disarmament planners included a recommendation to ease reduction of the U.S. and Russian aerospace industries by creating cooperative scientific pursuits. The idea was not new, having earlier been suggested by Eisenhower and Khrushchev to reduce the pressure of the "Military Industrial Complex" by undertaking joint space exploration. The Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) proposed at the end of the Cold War by President Bush and Premier Gorbachev was another attempt to ease the disarmament process by giving the bloated war industries something better to do. The engineering talent and the space rockets could be used for peaceful pursuits, notably for going back to the Moon and then on to Mars with human exploration and settlement. At the beginning of this process in 1992 staff of the Stanford Center for International Cooperation in Space attended the International Space University in Canada, met with Russian participants and invited a Russian team to work with us on a joint Stanford-Russian Mars Exploration Study. A CIA student and Airforce and Navy students just happened to join the Stanford course the next year and all students were aware that the leader of the four Russian engineers was well versed in Russian security. But, as long as they did their homework, they were welcome to participate with other students in defining the Mars mission and the three engineers they sent were excellent. At the end of this study we were invited to give a briefing to Dr. Edward Teller at Stanford's Hoover Institution of War and Peace. We were also encouraged to hold a press conference on Capitol Hill to introduce the study to the world. At a pre-conference briefing at the Space Council, we were asked to please remind the press that President Bush had asked for a cooperative exploration proposal not a U.S. alone initiative. The Stanford-Russian study used Russia's Energia launchers, priced at $300 Million each. The mission totaled out to $71.5 Billion, to send a six-person crew to establish a Mars base and return. It was an on going international venture with plans for new crews, base expansion, and extended exploration at every two year opportunity. The $71.5 Billion international approach contrasted with NASA's own 90-day U.S. - alone study that proposed a package topping $500 Billion by some admissions. NASA's approach was also challenged by an internal D.O.E. proposal at much lower cost, described to the Mars Society last year by Lowell Wood and, of course, by Bob Zubrin's "Mars Direct" proposal.

Lusignan, Bruce↗
DOE OSTI2015

Decommissioning of a facility in a historical reactor at SRS: achieving both historical significance preservation and effective in-situ decommissioning - 15275

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). In 2004, US DOE recognized SRS as a structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance because it is composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. US DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. The Disassembly Basin (DB) in C Reactor was evaluated for action under CERCLA. Data indicated there were over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 million (M) liters (L) of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. The need for an action was identified to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. In-situ decommissioning was selected as the remedy. The remedial action proceeded in stages: -Above-grade modifications to the interior of DB building -Relocation of irradiated scrap and reactor components to the deepest segments of the DB - Construction of a metal building to house evaporators - Forced evaporation of the DB's radiologically contaminated water - Grouting with special hybrid grouts - Removal of the evaporators and temporary building. Since the building itself was not demolished and will remain unchanged in appearance with the exception of filling the DB with grout, this ISD removal action/methodology did not adversely impact the historical significance of the 105-C Reactor Building, in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, nor did it adversely affect the ability to determine the full extent and details of preservation at some later date. Both special hybrid grout materials met all requirements. Overall average 7-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 1.54 MPa (223 psi) and for the underwater mix 2.94 MPa (427 psi).Overall 28-day compressive strength for the dry area mix was 2.88 MPa (417 psi) and for the underwater mix 4.99 MPa (724 psi). A limited amount of testing was also performed at 91 days, where the overall compressive strength for the dry area mix was found to be 9.40 MPa (1363 psi) and for the underwater mix 13.98 MPa (2028 psi). All compressive strength values far exceeded the 0.34 MPa (50 psi) minimum requirements. The special, flowable-fill grouts designed and used for P- and R-Reactor ISD and used again for this 105-C ISD removal action resulted in considerable labor, cost, and schedule savings versus conventional materials. As an added bonus/benefit, the CO{sub 2} footprint of the SRS C-Reactor DB ISD was minimized by using a small amount of cement and byproduct material to produce the structural fill materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Long-Term Assessment of Critical Radionuclides and Associated Environmental Media at the Savannah River Site

During the operational history of the Savannah River Site (SRS), many different radionuclides have been released from site facilities. However, only a relatively small number of the released radionuclides have been significant contributors to doses and risks to the public. At SRS dose and risk assessments indicate tritium oxide in air and surface water, and Cs-137 in fish and deer have been, and continue to be, the critical radionuclides and pathways. In this assessment, indepth statistical analyses of the long-term trends of tritium oxide in atmospheric and surface water releases and Cs-137 concentrations in fish and deer are provided. Correlations also are provided with 1) operational changes and improvements, 2) geopolitical events (Cold War cessation), and 3) recent environmental remediation projects and decommissioning of excess facilities. For example, environmental remediation of the F- and H-Area Seepage Basins and the Solid Waste Disposal Facility have resulted in a measurable impact on the tritium oxide flux to the onsite Fourmile Branch stream. Airborne releases of tritium oxide have been greatly affected by operational improvements and the end of the Cold War in 1991. However, the effects of SRS environmental remediation activities and ongoing tritium operations on tritium concentrations in the environment are measurable and documented in this assessment. Controlled hunts of deer and feral hogs are conducted at SRS for approximately six weeks each year. Before any harvested animal is released to a hunter, SRS personnel perform a field analysis for Cs-137 concentrations to ensure the hunter's dose does not exceed the SRS administrative game limit of 0.22 millisievert (22 mrem). However, most of the Cs-137 found in SRS onsite deer is not from site operations but is from nuclear weapons testing fallout from the 1950's and early 1960's. This legacy source term is trended in the SRS deer, and an assessment of the ''effective'' half-life of Cs-137 in deer (including the physical decay half-life and the environmental dispersion half-life) is provided. The ''creek mouth'' fisherman is the next most critical pathway at SRS. On an annual basis, three species of fish (panfish, catfish, and bass) are sampled from the mouths of the five SRS streams. Three composites of up to five fish of each species are analyzed from each sampling location. Long-term trending of the Cs-137 concentrations in fish and the subsequent doses from consumption of SRS fish is provided.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Long-Term Assessment of Critical Radionuclides and Associated Environmental Media at the Savannah River Site - 13038

During the operational history of the Savannah River Site (SRS), many different radionuclides have been released from site facilities. However, only a relatively small number of the released radionuclides have been significant contributors to doses and risks to the public. At SRS dose and risk assessments indicate tritium oxide in air and surface water, and Cs-137 in fish and deer have been, and continue to be, the critical radionuclides and pathways. In this assessment, statistical analyses of the long-term trends of tritium oxide in atmospheric and surface water releases and Cs-137 concentrations in fish and deer are provided. Correlations also are provided with 1) operational changes and improvements, 2) geopolitical events (Cold War cessation), and 3) recent environmental remediation projects and decommissioning of excess facilities. For example, environmental remediation of the F- and H-Area Seepage Basins and the Solid Waste Disposal Facility have resulted in a measurable impact on the tritium oxide flux to the onsite Fourmile Branch stream. Airborne releases of tritium oxide have been greatly affected by operational improvements and the end of the Cold War in 1991. However, the effects of SRS environmental remediation activities and ongoing tritium operations on tritium concentrations in the environment are measurable and documented in this assessment. Controlled hunts of deer and feral hogs are conducted at SRS for approximately six weeks each year. Before any harvested animal is released to a hunter, SRS personnel perform a field analysis for Cs-137 concentrations to ensure the Hunter's dose does not exceed the SRS administrative game limit of 0.22 milli-sievert (22 mrem). However, most of the Cs-137 found in SRS onsite deer is not from site operations but is from nuclear weapons testing fallout from the 1950's and early 1960's. This legacy source term is trended in the SRS deer, and an assessment of the 'effective' half-life of Cs-137 in deer (including the physical decay half-life and the environmental dispersion half-life) is provided. The 'creek mouth' fisherman is the next most critical pathway at SRS. On an annual basis, three species of fish (panfish, catfish, and bass) are sampled from the mouths of the five SRS streams. Three composites of up to five fish of each species are analyzed from each sampling location. Long-term trending of the Cs-137 concentrations in fish and the subsequent doses from consumption of SRS fish is provided. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 34: US DOE Featured Site: Savannah River Operations Office: 70 Years of Service

The Savannah River Site celebrates its 70. anniversary on November 28, 2020. On this date in 1950, President Harry S. Truman requested the Dupont Company to design, build and operate what was then known as the Savannah River Plant in response to the Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic weapon, which set the Cold War into motion. During the 1950's, six South Carolina towns were relocated for the construction of SRS and by 1953, the 310 square mile site was complete. Nearly 40,000 workers were employed t build five nuclear reactors and support facilities, two chemical separations plants, heavy water extraction plant, nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. SRS played a key role in winning the Cold War and for seven decades, SRS has been a leader within the DOE complex. Today, the site supports environmental stewardship and maintains the nation's nuclear deterrent while ensuring the safekeeping and disposal of domestic and international nuclear materials. The site continues to support the nation's nuclear defense as it explores new potential NNSA missions. SRS has a proud 70- year history and looks forward to a future of service as a national asset and strong community partner. The session was kicked off with a video message from Secretary of Energy, Dan Brouillette, who thanked employees past and current for their efforts. The video also provided an overview of the history and future of the Site. This panel provided an overview of the Savannah River Site's 70 years of service (history, challenges, opportunities, and future) presented by the SRS's Senior leadership and the local Aiken, South Carolina Mayor. Panelists with presentations: US DOE Secretary Dan Brouillette's Overview of DOE and SRS - A Legacy of 70 Years of Service (Amy Boyette); 70 Years of Service (Michael Budney); 70 Years of Service (Stuart MacVean); SRS Liquid Waste (Thomas Foster); National Nuclear Security Administration (Nicole Nelson-Jean)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2010

R- AND P- REACTOR VESSEL IN-SITU DECOMISSIONING VISUALIZATION

The R- & P- Reactor facilities were constructed in the early 1950's in response to Cold War efforts. The mission of the facilities was to produce materials for use in the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. R-Reactor was removed from service in 1964 when President Johnson announced a slowdown of he nuclear arms race. PReactor continued operation until 1988 until the facility was taken off-line to modernize the facility with new safeguards. Efforts to restart the reactor ended in 1990 at the end of the Cold War. Both facilities have sat idle since their closure and have been identified as the first two reactors for closure at SRS.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2010

Assessing the Institution of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is facing a crisis of effectiveness. During the Cold War, the regime was relatively effective in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and building an institutional structure that could, under certain conditions, ensure continued success. However, in the evolving global context, the traditional approaches are becoming less appropriate. Globalization has introduced new sets of stresses on the nonproliferation regime, such as the rise of non-state actors, broadening extensity and intensity of supply chains, and the multipolarization of power. This evolving global context demands an analytical and political flexibility in order to meet future threats. Current institutional capabilities established during the Cold War are now insufficient to meet the nonproliferation regime’s current and future needs. The research was based on information gathered through interviews and reviews of the relevant literature, and two dominant themes emerged. First, that human security should be integrated into the regime to account for the rise of non-state actors and networked violence. Second, confidence in the regime’s overall effectiveness has eroded at a time where verification-based confidence is becoming more essential. The research postulates that a critical analysis of the regime that fully utilizes institutional theory, with its focus on rules, normative structures, and procedures will be essential to adapting the regime to the current global context, building mechanisms for generating trust, creating better enforcement, and providing flexibility for the future.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Remixing the ‘Appropriate Mix’: Reassessing NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture in the Face of New Threats

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the countries of Europe face a renewed challenge from the east vis-à-vis the Putin regime in Moscow. In the face of these new challenges, NATO must reconsider its deterrence and defense posture in order to deter conflict in Europe. Unfortunately, Russian attempts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War international order by force have been coupled with nuclear saber rattling and overt nuclear threats. Russia’s nuclear threats, in addition to provocative changes to Russia’s nuclear posture in its Military Doctrine, are methods to make up for Russia’s conventional military inferiority relative to NATO and the United States. Some have described Moscow’s actions as laying the groundwork for a nuclear coercion strategy. While the decrease in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States has reduced the likelihood of nuclear annihilation to an all-time low since the height of the Cold War, Russia’s nuclear coercion strategy is increasing the probability of nuclear employment in Europe. The probability of nuclear use is compounded by Russia’s tremendous local military advantage around its periphery in spite of U.S. global military primacy. This military advantage increases the incentive to use military force if Russian decision-makers conclude that a quick military victory is possible, or if Russian leaders miscalculate based on an incorrect assessment of military force balance or resolve of their adversary. The integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (referred to as the Baltics in this paper) into the NATO alliance in 2004 makes Russia’s military advantage in its periphery increasingly relevant. Each NATO state is required to assist any NATO state that comes under attack per Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic states’ proximity to Russia, their weak indigenous militaries, their former status as Soviet Republics, large population of ethnic Russians, and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s claim that he will protect Russians wherever they are makes the Baltics the most likely flashpoint for conflict between NATO and Russia. This analysis will tackle the problem of reshaping NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in light of the new Russian threat and its obligation to defend its most vulnerable members. Specifically, it will assess the suitability of NATO’s “appropriate mix” of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities to deterring conventional conflict with Russia and, if conventional deterrence fails, preventing Russian nuclear escalation. It will use a scenario-based approach informed by a deterrence model to explore how changes to NATO’s posture and policy could impact the deterrence of Russian aggression.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 133: Integrating Economic Redevelopment and Workforce Transition Into DOE Site Closure Planning (R1.18)

This panel focused on post-closure impacts to the long-term site workforce and communities in DoE's approach to accelerated site cleanup and expedited reduction of long-term financial liabilities. At sites where Cold-War workers shifted from weapons production to the cleanup effort, a more holistic approach to the workforce transition Post-EM cleanup is needed. This holistic approach would include incentives for expedited closure, trade re-training, and a vision for future site commercial activities. The panel discussed the importance of the right workforce incentives that includes appropriate training for displaced workers so that they can be integrated into a next job. A key aspect of this discussion was to re-assess the current and future land use opportunities related to land re-use concepts. By re-arranging cleanup sequencing is it possible to divest land sooner than originally projected for productive commercial use hence reducing the DOE long-term liability and consequently increasing an economic soft landing for those Cold-War workers. Panelists with presentations: Integrating Economic Redevelopment and Workforce Transition Into DOE Site Closure Planning (Sean Todd); Sustaining, Growing and Re-Developing DOD/DOD Facilities and Assets (Jonathan Taylor)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2011

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT FOR 2010

This report was prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,' to present summary environmental data for the purpose of: (a) characterizing site's environmental management performance; (b) summarizing environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (c) describing compliance status with respect to environmental standards and requirements; and (d) highlighting significant site programs and efforts. This report is the principal document that demonstrates compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, 'Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,' and is a key component of DOE's effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at Savannah River Site (SRS). SRS has four primary missions: (1) Environmental Management - Cleaning up the legacy of the Cold War efforts and preparing decommissioned facilities and areas for long-term stewardship; (2) Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Support - Meeting the needs of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile through the tritium programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); (3) Nuclear Nonproliferation Support - Meeting the needs of the NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs by safely storing and dispositioning excess special nuclear materials; and (4) Research and Development - Supporting the application of science by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to meet the needs of SRS, the DOE complex, and other federal agencies During 2010, SRS worked to fulfill these missions and position the site for future operations. SRS continued to work with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to find and implement solutions and schedules for waste management and disposition. As part of its mission to clean up the Cold War legacy, SRS will continue to address the highest-risk waste management issues by safely storing and preparing liquid waste and nuclear materials for disposition, and by safely stabilizing any tank waste residues that remain on site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

E-36: The First Proto-Megascience Experiment at NAL

E-36, an experiment on small-angle proton-proton scattering, began testing equipment at the National Accelerator Laboratory (NAL) using a newly achieved 100 GeV proton beam on February 12, 1972, marking the beginning of NAL’s experimental program. This experiment, which drew collaborators from NAL, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (Dubna, USSR), the University of Rochester (Rochester, New York), and Rockefeller University (New York, New York) was significant not only as a milestone in Fermilab’s history but also as a model of cooperation between the East and West at a time when Cold War tensions still ran high. An examination of the origin, operation, and resolution of E-36 and the chain of experiments it spawned reveals the complex interplay of science and politics that drove these experiments as well as seeds of the megascience paradigm that has come to dominate high energy physics research since the 1970s.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Fissile Material Stockpile Declarations and Cooperative Nuclear Archaeology

With the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union quickly began to produce fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium, HEU) for military purposes on an industrial scale. By the mid-1950s, both countries were already making ton-quantities of fissile material per year to supply their growing nuclear arsenals. They were soon joined by the United Kingdom (1951), France (1955), China (1964), and Israel (1965)—and later by India, Pakistan, and finally North Korea. By the time most of these production efforts ended in the early 1990s, the global stockpile of military fissile material had reached fantastic levels. While the combined global nuclear weapon inventory had peaked at about 64,000 in 1986,1 the military fissile-material stockpile ultimately reached almost 2200 tons (240 tons of plutonium and 1960 tons of highly enriched uranium), which is sufficient to make about 200,000 simple nuclear weapons.2 Since the end of the Cold War, almost 700 tons of highly enriched uranium have been down-blended and other material is now reserved for naval fuel. Overall, the military material available for weapon purposes today is sufficient for more than 150,000 weapons (Figure 1).

Glaser, Alexander↗
DOE OSTI2020

Proven Technologies for the Solidification of Complex Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW): Global Case Studies of Applications and Disposal Options - 20424

Legacy radioactive waste streams from the Cold War still exist and newly generated waste streams from nuclear power plants and research institutes go untreated and expose environmental hazards at many nuclear sites. The nature of the waste is diverse, depending upon the source or the process from which it originated. The most problematic waste streams include complex liquids such as organic (tri-butyl-phosphate TBP) solutions contaminated with Pu and U isotopes, mixed sludge types, high acid radioactive waste, H-3 contaminated organic and aqueous streams, etc. Technological, environmental and economic challenges exist for the treatment and disposal of such waste streams. A proven technology that has been applied to LRW on a global basis provides one option as a low-cost solution to legacy streams and small volume, highly complex LRW frequently found during decommissioning at nuclear power plants and weapons sites. The engineered polymer technology from Nochar, USA, is capable of solidifying standard and highly complex LLW and ILW waste streams for interim or final storage, or for incineration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Managing Records for the Long Term - 12363

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing vast amounts of information documenting historical and current operations. This information is critical to the operations of the DOE Office of Legacy Management. Managing legacy records and information is challenging in terms of accessibility and changing technology. The Office of Legacy Management is meeting these challenges by making records and information management an organizational priority. The Office of Legacy Management mission is to manage DOE post-closure responsibilities at former Cold War weapons sites to ensure the future protection of human health and the environment. These responsibilities include environmental stewardship and long-term preservation and management of operational and environmental cleanup records associated with each site. A primary organizational goal for the Office of Legacy Management is to 'Preserve, Protect, and Share Records and Information'. Managing records for long-term preservation is an important responsibility. Adequate and dedicated resources and management support are required to perform this responsibility successfully. Records tell the story of an organization and may be required to defend an organization in court, provide historical information, identify lessons learned, or provide valuable information for researchers. Loss of records or the inability to retrieve records because of poor records management processes can have serious consequences and even lead to an organisation's downfall. Organizations must invest time and resources to establish a good records management program because of its significance to the organization as a whole. The Office of Legacy Management will continue to research and apply innovative ways of doing business to ensure that the organization stays at the forefront of effective records and information management. DOE is committed to preserving records that document our nation's Cold War legacy, and the Office of Legacy Management will keep records management as a high priority. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Implications of Non-Bingham Rheology

One of the key challenges now facing the US Department of Energy (DOE) is the fate of radioactive waste remaining from World War II and the Cold War which is stored underground in tanks some 75 feet in diameter and over 30 feet tall. Over time, the waste has segmented into multiple layers with sludges and slurries at the bottom with salt crust layers often at the top and liquid in between. DOE’s current official baseline plans call for remaining sludges and slurries to be removed from the tanks and converted into a more stable glass waste form. Minimizing worker exposure to radiation drives DOE to use slurry processing techniques to suspend, mobilize, transport, mix, and process the waste. Therefore, a clear and quantitative understanding of Hanford waste rheology is essential for the success of the DOE mission. Historically much of the waste has been characterized using Eugene Bingham’s model more than a century old that provides a straight line fit to higher shear rate data with the intercept suggesting a yield stress and the slope providing the consistency. Yet, Bingham fits overestimate the shear stress at a given shear rate for low to intermediate shear rates, exactly the range of shear rates typically encountered in pipe flow, where shear rates peak along the pipe wall and vanish in the center. This model produces a fictitious yield stress for some of the wastes that do not exhibit yield phenomena. While over estimating the yield stress may be prudent, safe, and conservative for some applications (e.g., pump sizing to ensure that pumps can handle yield stresses), over estimating the rheology may be inaccurate and non-conservative for other applications (e.g., eroding settled particle beds). Therefore, this paper evaluates the slurry rheology of Hanford and Savannah River wastes using a more modern rheological model that fits the full range of experimental data. Although a bias has been recognized and alternative models proposed, the magnitude of this bias and the implications for tank waste have only been qualitatively suggested. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate quantitatively implications of the poor quality of fit between a Bingham model for rheology and experimental data at modest shear rates. We first demonstrate the magnitude of the bias between the data and the Bingham extrapolation. We then evaluate quantitatively the velocity profile under laminar conditions. This analysis shows that the bias may be large (hundreds of percent or more) at modest shear rates and that modest shear rates dominate pipe velocity profiles.

Rheology, Radioactive waste↗