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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 55 records · Page 3
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Data-driven Vulnerability Analysis of Networked Pipeline System

This paper introduces an attack generation framework for evaluating the vulnerability of nonlinear networked pipeline systems. The vulnerability analysis is formulated as determining the presence of feasible attack sets, defined by boundary functions representing the effectiveness and stealthiness of attack signals with respect to the objective and attack detection module. The framework utilizes three data-driven models, including two discriminative models that learn the boundary functions and a generative model that produces elements of the feasible attack set. A new loss function ensures successful attack generation with high probability.

03 NATURAL GAS↗
DOE OSTI2025

An Advanced Cyber-Physical System Security Testbed for Substation Automation

A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) testbed serves as a powerful platform for testing and validating cyber intrusion detection and mitigation strategies in substations. This study presents the design and development of a CPS testbed that can effectively assess the real-time dynamics of a substation. Cyber attacks exploiting IEC 61850-based SV and GOOSE protocols are demonstrated using the testbed, along with an analysis on attack detection. Realistic timing measurements are obtained, and the time frames for deploying detection and mitigation strategies are evaluated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Online and Offline Identification of False Data Injection Attacks in Battery Sensors Using a Single Particle Model

The cells in battery energy storage systems are monitored, protected, and controlled by battery management systems whose sensors are susceptible to cyberattacks. False data injection attacks (FDIAs) targeting batteries’ voltage sensors affect cell protection functions and the estimation of critical battery states like the state of charge (SoC). Inaccurate SoC estimation could result in battery overcharging and over discharging, which can have disastrous consequences on grid operations. This paper proposes a three-pronged online and offline method to detect, identify, and classify FDIAs corrupting the voltage sensors of a battery stack. To accurately model the dynamics of the series-connected cells a single particle model is used and to estimate the SoC, the unscented Kalman filter is employed. FDIA detection, identification, and classification was accomplished using a tuned cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm, which was compared with a baseline method, the chi-squared error detector. Online simulations and offline batch simulations were performed to determine the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Throughout the batch simulations, the CUSUM algorithm detected attacks, with no false positives, in 99.83% of cases, identified the corrupted sensor in 97% of cases, and determined if the attack was positively or negatively biased in 97% of cases.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Hybrid Data-Driven Physics-Based Model Framework Implementation: Towards a Secure Cyber-Physical Operation of the Smart Grid

False data injection cyber-attack detection models on smart grid operation have been much explored recently, considering analytical physics-based and data-driven solutions. Recently, a hybrid data-driven physics-based model framework for monitoring the smart grid is developed. However, the framework has not been implemented in real-time environment yet. In this paper, the framework of the hybrid model is developed within a real-time simulation environment. OPAL-RT real-time simulator is used to enable Hardware-in-the-Loop testing of the framework. IEEE 9-bus system is considered as a testing grid for gaining insight. The process of building the framework and the challenges faced during development are presented. The performance of the framework is investigated under various false data injection attacks.

false data injection attack, machine learning, sta↗
DOE OSTI2023

Machine Learning Based Resilience Testing of an Address Randomization Cyber Defense

Moving target defenses (MTDs) are widely used as an active defense strategy for thwarting cyberattacks on cyber-physical systems by increasing diversity of software and network paths. Recently, machine Learning (ML) and deep Learning (DL) models have been demonstrated to defeat some of the cyber defenses by learning attack detection patterns and defense strategies. It raises concerns about the susceptibility of MTD to ML and DL methods. Here, in this article, we analyze the effectiveness of ML and DL models when it comes to deciphering MTD methods and ultimately evade MTD-based protections in real-time systems. Specifically, we consider a MTD algorithm that periodically randomizes address assignments within the MIL-STD-1553 protocol—a military standard serial data bus. Two ML and DL-based tasks are performed on MIL-STD-1553 protocol to measure the effectiveness of the learning models in deciphering the MTD algorithm: 1) determining whether there is an address assignments change i.e., whether the given system employs a MTD protocol and if it does 2) predicting the future address assignments. The supervised learning models (random forest and k-nearest neighbors) effectively detected the address assignment changes and classified whether the given system is equipped with a specified MTD protocol. On the other hand, the unsupervised learning model (K-means) was significantly less effective. The DL model (long short-term memory) was able to predict the future addresses with varied effectiveness based on MTD algorithm's settings.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Operational resilience of additively manufactured parts to stealthy cyberphysical attacks using geometric and process digital twins

Cyberphysical attacks on the digital backbone of Additive Manufacturing (AM) can compromise the printed part’s functionality. They can alter features in the digital geometry to introduce geometric defects (e.g., missing fillets) or alter process parameters to create local defects (e.g., voids). Addressing the downtime, waste, and quality deterioration associated with existing solutions requires operational resilience, i.e., rapid elimination or disruption of defect formation (to retain part function) without production stoppage or part disposal (to retain yield). This need is unmet due to the inherently unpredictable nature of attack-induced alterations, lack of access to the original geometric model for identification of altered geometric features, and in-process imposition of unknown process dynamics via attack-driven alteration of real-time-uncontrolled (or exogenous) parameters. This work establishes the above-mentioned operational resilience for the first time by creating two Digital Twins (DT). The Geometric DT (Geo-DT) is based on a unique physical-field-driven soft sensor and topology optimization method. The Process Digital Twin (Pro-DT) combines local defect quantification with a novel Reinforcement Learning formulation and training method. The importance of these methodological advances and the scalability of our approach are examined on a real AM testbed. It is shown that Geo-DT can correct geometric defects without access to the original digital geometry or explicit knowledge of attack-altered geometric features. Further, Pro-DT can accelerate real-time disruption of local defects despite attack-driven imposition of unknown process dynamics. We discuss how our framework goes beyond the contemporary focus on pre-attack security and in-attack detection towards resilience for AM and beyond.

Additive Manufacturing↗
DOE OSTI2024

Model-Based Detection of Coordinated Attacks (DCA) in Distribution Systems

The fast-paced growth in digitization of smart grid components enhances system observability and remote-control capabilities through efficient communication. However, enhanced connectivity results in heightened system vulnerability towards cybersecurity risks in the cyber-physical power system. Coordinated cyber-attacks (CCA), when undetected, lead to system-wide impact in terms of large disturbances or widespread outages. Detecting CCA in the cyber layer is critical to thwart cyber-attacks in real-time before the attack impacts the physical system. The challenge of locating CCA stems from the complex grid dynamics, making it difficult to distinguish between normal operational variations and cyber-attack impact. CCA often employs multiple attack vectors targeting geographically distributed components, further complicating CCA identification. Existing research in intrusion detection is primarily focused on the transmission network and limited to detecting individual attacks. In this paper, a novel proactive DCA strategy is proposed for early detection of CCA by establishing correlations among distinct attack events through model-based reinforcement learning that utilizes abductive reasoning to conclude the attacker goal. The solution includes understanding the system model, learning the system dynamics, and correlating individual cyber-attacks to extract the attacker’s objective. The developed learning algorithm identifies the most probable attack path to reach the attacker’s objective by predicting the next attack steps. A DNP3-based cyber-physical co-simulation testbed is developed to test the proposed algorithm using the IEEE 13-node test feeder.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Real-World Cyber Security Demonstration for Networked Electric Drives

In this article, we present the design and implementation of a cyber-physical security testbed for networked electric drive systems, aimed at conducting real-world security demonstrations. To our knowledge, this is one of the first security testbeds for networked electric drives, seamlessly integrating the domains of power electronics and computer science, and cybersecurity. By doing so, the testbed offers a comprehensive platform to explore and understand the intricate and often complex interactions between cyber and physical systems. The core of our testbed consists of four electric machine drives, meticulously configured to emulate small-scale but realistic information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. This setup both provides a controlled environment for simulating a wide array of cyber-attacks, and mirrors potential real-world attack scenarios with a high degree of fidelity. The testbed serves as an invaluable resource for the study of cyber-physical security, offering a practical and dynamic platform for testing and validating cybersecurity measures in the context of networked electric drive systems. As a concrete example of the testbed's capabilities, we have developed and implemented a Python-based script designed to execute step-stone attacks over a wireless local area network (WLAN). This script leverages a sequence of target IP addresses, simulating a real-world attack vector that could be exploited by adversaries. To counteract such threats, we demonstrate the efficacy of our developed cyber-attack detection algorithms, which are integral to our testbed's security framework. Furthermore, the testbed incorporates a real-time visualization system using InfluxDB and Grafana, providing a dynamic and interactive representation of networked electric drives and their associated security monitoring mechanisms. This visualization component not only enhances the testbed's usability but also offers insightful, real-time data for researchers and practitioners, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber-physical security dynamics in networked electric drive systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Collection And Analysis Of Telemetry For The Cyote Heuristic

CATCH CLI focuses on gathering telemetry data, storing it in the Neo4j database, querying for Mitre ATT&CK patterns, and creating STIX 2.1 reports. Key Components: Analysis Modules: Analyze data to detect attack patterns. GoSTOTS Collection Engines: Collect telemetry data. These tools can be used together or individually. Analysis modules rely on data from specific engines to identify attack patterns. Source Code Organization: Engines: CATCH/catch/cmd/collection Modules: CATCH/catch/cmd/analysis CGUI Overview CATCH Graphical User Interface (CGUI) offers a graphical shell to execute CATCH CLI, allowing easy editing of: Analysis Modules Database configurations Profiles (collection and device settings) Neo4j Overview Neo4j is a graph database using the Cypher query language, storing data in JSON. It seamlessly integrates with STIX 2.1 data for: Data Submission: CATCH Collection Engines Data Querying: Analysis Modules CATCH modifies STIX 2.1 data for Neo4j submission and reverts it back during querying. STIG Overview Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG) is a tool for creating, editing, querying, analyzing, and visualizing threat intelligence using STIX 2.1 and storing data in Neo4j. Usage Tools can be run: Manually (CLI): Refer to CATCH documentation User Interface: Run ./cgui/CGUI or go run ./cgui/ Additional Information Logging System: Detailed in the config documentation Further Documentation: Available for CATCH and CGUI

Madsen, MichaelJ. [Idaho National Laboratory (INL)↗
DOE OSTI2023

Design and Development of a High Fidelity Cyber-Physical Testbed

In order to ensure that future critical infrastructure systems are resilient to various types of such advanced and persistent threats, it is important to develop and integrate tailored solutions that holistically address cyber-attack detection and mitigation in a timely manner such that adverse system impacts that impact a large population are avoided. Further, it is essential to create environments that allow control, protection and communication to exist within a realistic environment to analyze the effects of adverse conditions and system operating modes. This project aims to establish a high-fidelity testbed environment for modeling and simulating a single microgrid all the way up to a network of microgrids along with baseline controls, protection, and associated cyber communication. This is an important activity because accurately modeling and simulating the various power-electronics-based DERs and loads in a microgrid is critical to adequately capturing their behaviors over a wide range of off-normal conditions, as well as to evaluate the resilience of the system using the developed controls. The work presented in this report focuses on the process of building this high-fidelity testbed and the associated experimentation it enables. The model enables the creation of high-fidelity use cases and associated datasets that have been used extensively within the initiative to study resilience and support novel control development and prototyping. The work heavily leverages existing capability that is part of the high-fidelity cyber-physical system experimentation lab to create a power hardware-in-the-loop setup. The report also details the creation of an automated model building platform that can enable high-fidelity real-time models to be built without much effort allowing existing low-fidelity models to be analyzed in higher fidelity. Lastly, the report also discusses efforts center around scaling to large complex power system models to make the experimentation more effective.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Physical Secure Observer-Based Corrective Control under Compromised Sensor Measurements

In this paper we introduce the objectives and design principles of corrective control under cyber-physical attacks. We propose two types of observer-based corrective control for both the open-loop stable and the open-loop unstable LTI systems. The basic idea of our corrective control design is to use the observer as the ground-truth during the attack, making the plant dynamics follow the observer behavior. This is the opposite to the no-attack-detected period in which the observer is designed to follow the plant dynamics. We show stability of the proposed control under compromised sensor measurements, and quantify the effects of the discrepancy between the observer and the plant. Numerical examples, with illustrations using microgrid energy dynamics, are presented to show benefits of the proposed corrective control.

Wu, Dan↗
DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for global cyber-attack or fault detection model

An industrial asset may have monitoring nodes that generate current monitoring node values representing a current operation of the industrial asset. An abnormality detection computer may detect when a monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault based on a current feature vector, calculated in accordance with current monitoring node values, and a detection model that includes a decision boundary. A model updater (e.g., a continuous learning model updater) may determine an update time-frame (e.g., short-term, mid-term, long-term, etc.) associated with the system based on trigger occurrence detection (e.g., associated with a time-based trigger, a performance-based trigger, an event-based trigger, etc.). The model updater may then update the detection model in accordance with the determined update time-frame (and, in some embodiments, continuous learning).

Xu, Rui↗
NASA NTRS1992

Simple Method For Detection Of Intergranular Attack

Evidence of intergranular attack occurring on chemically milled and wire-electrical-discharge-machined metal parts detected with replicating tape which makes it unnecessary to manufacture and stock test coupons and inspect them microscopically. Tape pressed on part to be inspected. When removed, it presents visual evidence of intergranular attack.

Jackson, Amy A.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Adaptive anomaly detection for identifying attacks in cyber-physical systems: A systematic literature review

Modern cyberattacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) rapidly evolve and cannot be deterred effectively with most current methods, which focus on characterizing past threats. Adaptive anomaly detection (AAD) is among the most promising techniques to detect evolving cyberattacks, with an emphasis on fast data processing and model adaptation. AAD has been researched extensively; however, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first systematic literature review (SLR) on current research in this field. We present a comprehensive SLR, gathering 397 relevant papers and systematically analyzing 65 of them (47 research and 18 survey papers) on AAD in CPS from 2013 to November 2023. We introduce a novel taxonomy considering attack types, CPS application, learning paradigm, data management, and algorithms. Our findings show that most studies addressed either model adaptation or data processing, but rarely both simultaneously. This indicates a research gap in fully adaptive solutions. We also categorize algorithms, datasets, and attack characteristics, and summarize strengths and weaknesses across the literature. Our review provides a structured and accessible reference for researchers and practitioners, offering insights into key trends and highlighting limitations in current approaches. Finally, we outline several future research directions, including the need for integrated real-time processing and adaptive learning, explainability, and uncertainty quantification in AAD for CPS.

Adaptation↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Smart Manufacturing: Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in CNC-Based Systems

As Industry 4.0 advances, the integration of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and advanced manufacturing technologies is transforming production into smart manufacturing systems that blend physical and digital processes as cyber-physical systems. However, this increased cyber-physical connectivity exposes manufacturing systems to cyber threats that can cause severe operational and financial disruptions. This paper presents a comparative study on cyber attacks and anomaly detection techniques in manufacturing, focusing on network traffic from CNC machines. The data extracted from network packets includes machine commands and control signals exchanged between the machine's interface and control system, crucial for maintaining operational integrity. We explore two types of cyber attacks, design modification and command injection, which pose substantial risks to CNC machine productivity and system integrity. Our investigation involves experiments on a real CNC system, highlighting the urgent need for effective detection mechanisms. To address these threats, we evaluate three anomaly detection methods: dynamic time warping (DTW), rolling average, and a deep learning, long short-term memory (LSTM) time-series-based autoencoder. Each is assessed for its effectiveness in identifying anomalous behaviors caused by the attacks. Our findings demonstrate the unique strengths and limitations of each detection technique, providing a deeper understanding of their applicability in realworld manufacturing environments. The comparative analysis indicates that while certain methods are highly effective against specific attack types, others offer broader applicability across different attacks. This study contributes to the accurate detection of anomalies in CNC machining processes, thereby enhancing the reliability and security of smart manufacturing systems against diverse cyber threats.

Williams, Bethanie [Tennessee Technological Univer↗
NASA NTRS2013

Detecting Distributed SQL Injection Attacks in a Eucalyptus Cloud Environment

The cloud computing environment offers malicious users the ability to spawn multiple instances of cloud nodes that are similar to virtual machines, except that they can have separate external IP addresses. In this paper we demonstrate how this ability can be exploited by an attacker to distribute his/her attack, in particular SQL injection attacks, in such a way that an intrusion detection system (IDS) could fail to identify this attack. To demonstrate this, we set up a small private cloud, established a vulnerable website in one instance, and placed an IDS within the cloud to monitor the network traffic. We found that an attacker could quite easily defeat the IDS by periodically altering its IP address. To detect such an attacker, we propose to use multi-agent plan recognition, where the multiple source IPs are considered as different agents who are mounting a collaborative attack. We show that such a formulation of this problem yields a more sophisticated approach to detecting SQL injection attacks within a cloud computing environment.

Kebert, Alan↗