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Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation and counter-terrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters world-wide provide significant benefits to global public health.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Demonstration and Concept of Operations for a Zero-Knowledge Protocol Passive Imaging Measurement for Arms Control

Here, we present an imaging system that employs zero-knowledge protocols to protect sensitive geometrical information, along with procedures to increase confidence in the result. The goal of this work is to enable the inclusion of warhead confirmation measurements in future arms control treaties. We present a demonstration of both true positive and true negative measurements that validate models and establish authenticating procedures toward meeting acceptance requirements for use in nuclear facilities. We use a two-dimensional time-encoded fast neutron imaging system with an anti-symmetric mask pattern; the fast neutron count values exceeding minimum or maximum thresholds indicate that two measured items are not identical. Laboratory measurements over twenty trials show that alarm rates for negative confirmation measurements are within uncertainties of model predictions. Positive confirmation measurements indicate that alarm rates are large enough to encourage treaty compliance.

Sweany, Melinda Dominique [Sandia National Laborat↗

Image-Based Verification Algorithms for Arms Control

PNNL is developing and evaluating radiographic image analysis techniques (active and passive) for verifying sensitive objects in a material control or warhead counting regime in which sensitive information may be acquired and processed behind an information barrier. Since sensitive image information cannot be present outside the information barrier, these techniques are necessary to extract features from the full images and reduce them to relevant parameters (attributes) of the inspected items. This evaluation can be done behind the information barrier, allowing for reporting and storage of non-sensitive attributes only. Several advances have been made to radiographic object verification algorithms, in the areas of spectral imaging for passive detectors and estimation of material density in active radiographic images. Both of these advances are pertinent in an arms control context. While passive radiographic images produced by previous work may be evaluated for the presence of emissive objects, approaches which leverage the spectroscopic potential of the detectors allow a much greater discrimination of SNM from background and other sources. Spectral passive imaging approaches to warhead discrimination and counting include specific materials and geometric arrangement localization, as well as “spectral difference” metrics which group regions with similar spectra together. These approaches may improve resolution for discrimination between materials in addition to locating SNM within surrounding shielding and/or structural elements. Previous work by our group has developed the capability to discern material density and composition in radiographic images by examining the edge transition characteristics of objects. The material construction of an object can be investigated in this way. In a weapons counting or discrimination context, unknown occultation of objects of interest, as well as additional elements of warhead construction, construction materials of varying geometry and makeup and various angles of radiograph are expected to impact algorithm performance. Advances in material discrimination algorithms are presented as a mechanism to help make these approaches robust to these sorts of variations.

Robinson, Sean M.↗

Towards a mutually reinforcing future : opportunities to integrate nuclear weapons stewardship and arms control objectives.

2010 NPR and President Obama's 2009 Prague Speech highlighted two key objectives with an inherent underlying tension: (1) Moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons; and (2) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Objective 1 depends, inter alia, upon reductions in stockpiles at home and abroad and maintaining stability. Objective 2 depends upon needed investments in modernization and life extension. Objectives being pursued predominantly in parallel by largely separate communities.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A physical unclonable neutron sensor for nuclear arms control inspections

Abstract Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware. This approach has significant shortcomings, however. Hardware can be manipulated, including below transistor level, and cryptographic keys are at risk of extraction attacks. A further weakness is that sensor media themselves are assumed to be trusted, and any authentication and encryption is done ex situ and a posteriori. Here we propose and demonstrate a different approach to sensor security that does not rely on classical cryptography and trusted electronics. We designed passive sensor media that inherently produce secure and trustworthy data, and whose honest and non-malicious nature can be easily established. As a proof-of-concept, we manufactured and characterized the properties of non-electronic, physical unclonable, optically complex media sensitive to neutrons for use in a high-security scenario: the inspection of a military facility to confirm the absence or presence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Extended Deterrence in the New Security Environment

To address the challenges of the emerging security environment and its impact on extended deterrence and assurance, there has been an effort in the United States to ensure it maintains capabilities for extended deterrence, to enhance assurances and to continue to pursue with allies non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorism - including defenses and consequence management-as priorities. These and other activities are important to the US and its allies, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain. As the developments leading to the ban treaty suggest, the political requirement for dealing with calls for disarmament in the NPT context is indisputable. This may not have been the understanding of the negotiators of the treaty, but it is today's reality.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

The ability to track nuclear material is a challenge for resiliency of complex systems, e.g., harsh environments. RF tags, frequently used in national security applications, cannot be used for technological, operational, or safety reasons. Magnetic Smart Tags (MaST) is a novel tag technology based on magnetoelastic sensing that circumvents these issues. This technology is enabled by a new, cost-effective, batch manufacturing electrochemical deposition (ECD) process. This new advancement in fabrication enables multi-frequency tags capable of providing millions of possible codes for tag identification unlike existing theft deterrent tags that can convey only a single bit of information. Magnetostrictive 70% Co: 30% Fe was developed as the base alloy comprising the magnetoelastic resonator transduction element. Saturation magnetostriction, λ S , has been externally measured by the Naval Research Laboratory to be as high as 78 ppm. Description of a novel MEMS variable capacitive test structure is described for future measurements of this parameter.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A Call to Arms Control: Synergies between Nonproliferation Applications of Neutrino Detectors and Large-Scale Fundamental Neutrino Physics Experiments (A Snowmass White Paper)

The High Energy Physics community can benefit from a natural synergy in research activities into next-generation large-scale water and scintillator neutrino detectors, now being studied for remote reactor monitoring, discovery and exclusion applications in cooperative nonproliferation contexts. Since approximately 2010, US nonproliferation researchers, supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), have been studying a range of possible applications of relatively large (100 ton) to very large (hundreds of kiloton) water and scintillator neutrino detectors. In parallel, the fundamental physics community has been developing detectors at similar scales and with similar design features for a range of high-priority physics topics, primarily in fundamental neutrino physics. These topics include neutrino oscillation studies at beams and reactors, solar, and geological neutrino measurements, supernova studies, and others. Examples of ongoing synergistic work at U.S. national laboratories and universities include prototype gadolinium-doped water and water-based and opaque scintillator test-beds and demonstrators, extensive testing and industry partnerships related to large area fast position-sensitive photomultiplier tubes, and the development of concepts for a possible underground kiloton-scale water-based detector for reactor monitoring and technology demonstrations. Some opportunities for engagement between the two communities include bi-annual Applied Antineutrino Physics conferences, collaboration with U.S. National Laboratories engaging in this research, and occasional NNSA funding opportunities supporting a blend of nonproliferation and basic science R&D, directed at the U.S. academic community.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

R&D Outcomes of Surrogate Environmental Swipe Manufacturing Technique Method Development for Arms Control and Treaty Verification Applications

The analysis of environmental samples is a critical component of nuclear compliance verification and safeguards activities. While the associated particle analyses have benefitted from recent advances in the production of actinide-bearing particulates with uniform and well-characterized particle size, material phase, and isotopic ratios to serve as reference materials for calibration and interlaboratory comparisons, there is an outstanding need for surrogate environmental samples, which resemble field-collected samples, with the aforementioned reference particulates to support future nuclear compliance verification exercises and method development. This effort seeks to leverage the recent advances in tailored reference particle production to generate surrogate environmental swipe samples via parallel production techniques (direct and indirect) which are uniquely suited to the hydrothermal and aerosol-based synthesis routes developed at PNNL and SRNL, respectively. PNNL’s hydrothermal particle production method was used to generate surrogate reference particles for the indirect production of test swipes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗