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Developing VSC-HVDC Oscillation Damping Control Constraints in Unit Commitment

High-voltage direct current (HVDC) systems within the existing power grids will play a pivotal role in enabling high share of renewable power integration and transportation electrification. There is a need for transmission planning models to accurately capture the impact of VSC-HVDC oscillation damping control on the system planning and model the constraints in the security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) problem. In this paper, the SCUC problem in a hybrid DC-AC grid considering damping on electromechanical inter-area oscillation is studied. An electromechanical oscillation-driven transmission capability constraints are derived from system swing equation and incorporated into the SCUC. Multiple system damping control scenarios are set based on the extracted plausible bounds of damping coefficient and inertia constant to linearize the nonlinear expressions. The SCUC problem with proposed constraints is tested on the Reliability Test System Grid Modernization Lab Consortium (RTS-GMLC) via PLEXOS. The impact of the proposed constraints on regional generation, inertia, power flow, annual system cost, and renewable energy curtailment are fully assessed.

damping control↗

Driving Economics and Reducing Risks: The Business Case for Security-by-Design in Nuclear Power

This report provides an analysis of the financial, operational, and strategic advantages of incorporating Security-by-Design (SeBD) early in the lifecycle of nuclear power plant projects. By framing security as a foundational design element rather than a late-stage add-on, owners, vendors, and operators can reduce budget overruns, strengthen regulatory compliance, and increase revenue opportunities. The report details key lifecycle phases, highlighting the strategic imperative for organizations (including project developers, investors, vendors, and regulators) to adopt SeBD. Drawing on industry estimates, real-world case studies, and comparative cost analyses, the findings underscore that even a modest upfront investment in SeBD can yield substantial long-term returns by preventing costly retrofit activities, minimizing regulatory delays, and positioning nuclear vendors for the ability to adapt in the evolving security market. By avoiding excessive retrofit expenses and positioning security as a built-in feature rather than an afterthought, nuclear projects can protect their financial performance, enhance public trust, and secure a competitive edge in an increasingly complex global energy market. The authors advocate for SeBD’s strategic implementation, supported by established quality management methodologies, thereby promoting continuous improvement and defect avoidance. Ultimately, early SeBD integration represents a strategic investment, yielding significant returns by preventing costly retrofits and positioning nuclear projects for enhanced competitiveness and public trust.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computational Tools and Workflows for Quantitative Risk Assessment and Decision Support for Geologic Carbon Storage Sites: Progress and Insights from the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership

The 2005 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on CCS raised the profile of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) as an important technology for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. CCS is now recognized as a key component of most climate change mitigation scenarios. Since publication of that report the international research, development, and deployment (RD&D) community has advanced key technical aspects, clarified regulatory requirements, explored value chain and infrastructure solutions, and developed incentive paradigms to enable and promote large-scale deployment of CCS. These efforts have included research to better characterize geologic storage resources, to improve injection performance and storage efficiency, to assess and manage subsurface environmental risks, and to advance monitoring technologies to assure system conformance. These efforts have helped to build confidence in the viability of geologic carbon storage (GCS), but stakeholder concerns about long-term risks and liability associated with GCS remain a hurdle to broad acceptance and large-scale deployment of CCS. Since 2010, the U.S. DOE’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) – a research collaboration between five contributing national laboratories – has worked to establish and demonstrate methods and tools to quantify and manage the subsurface environmental risks associated with GCS, amidst uncertainty. This work supports the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management Carbon Transport and Storage Program’s goal of advancing safe and secure commercial-scale GCS deployment. To address the technical challenge of simulating the physical response of the GCS site to large-scale CO2 injection, NRAP has adopted an approach that relies on coupling computationally efficient reduced-order and/or data-driven proxy models of important system components (i.e., storage reservoir, sealing caprock, leakage pathways, intermediate formations, overlying groundwater aquifers, and the atmosphere) in integrated assessment framework. That integrated model of the physical system is complemented with fit-for purpose functionality to support site characterization and risk-related decisions. The recently released NRAP Phase II toolset includes the Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) for evaluation of trends in leakage risk and potential impact, tools to support monitoring design optimization (Designs for Risk Evaluation and Management – DREAM v3.0 and Passive Seismic Monitoring Tool - PSMT), and tools for state of stress evaluation (State-of-Stress Analysis Tool - SOSAT) and forecasting induced seismicity risk. The NRAP team has also released a pair of reports describing conceptual workflows to incorporate physics-based, quantitative risk assessment into many of the design, planning, operation, and closure decisions for GCS projects. An online catalogue highlights published studies where these tools and methods are demonstrated. In this presentation, the utility of these products to assess risks and address key stakeholder questions will be highlighted through examples, and related insights about the safety and security of geologic carbon storage in qualified storage sites will be discussed. The prospect of rapid, large-scale deployment of GCS technology to aggressively reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions requires careful consideration of interference between multiple commercial-scale storage projects within a basin. Going forward, NRAP is expanding and adapting site-scale risk quantification tools and methods to enable assessment of risks and inform management decisions for basin-scale deployment. Increasingly, this work will leverage next-generation approaches for surrogate modelling, fast prediction, and advanced visualization enabled by machine learning and artificial intelligence to promote virtual learning, scenario evaluation, and augment risk-based decision making.

quantitative risk assessment, geologic carbon stor↗

Tailoring NIST Security Controls for the Ground System: Selection and Implementation -- Recommendations for Information System Owners

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).

GOVERNANCE↗

Advanced Simulation and Computing: ASC FY24 Implementation Plan

The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP incorporates nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. The suite of data analyzed comes from activities including previous nuclear tests, stockpile surveillance, experimental research, and development and engineering programs. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and the computational capabilities to support the SSP missions. These component parts, in addition to an appropriately scaled production capability, enable NNSA to support stockpile requirements. The ultimate goal of the SSP, and thus of the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program, is to ensure that the U.S. maintains a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent. The ASC program is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computational resources to support the annual stockpile assessment and certification process, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This work requires a balance of resources, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. The ASC program focuses on increasing the predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The Program continues to improve its unique tools for understanding and solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further from the original test base. While the focus remains on the U.S. nuclear weapons program, where possible, the Program also enables the use of high-performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and nuclear counterterrorism. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for NNSA to “deliver a modern, adaptive nuclear security enterprise based on an integrated strategy for risk management, production-based resilience, science and technology innovation, and workforce initiatives.” Furthermore, “NNSA will establish a Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate the integration of science and technology (S&T) throughout its activities.” Executing this strategy necessitates the continued emphasis on developing and sustaining high-quality scientific and engineering staff, as well as supporting computational and experimental capabilities. These components constitute the foundation of the nuclear weapons program. The continued success of the SSP and LEPs is predicated upon the ability to credibly certify the stockpile, without a return to underground nuclear tests (UGTs). Shortly after the nuclear test moratorium entered into force in 1992, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) was established to provide an extensive simulation capability to underpin stockpile certification. While computing and simulation have always been essential to the success of the nuclear weapons program, the program goal of ASCI was to execute NNSA’s vision of using these tools in support of the stockpile stewardship mission. The ASCI program was essential to the successful demonstration of the SSP, providing critical nuclear weapons simulation and modeling capabilities. ASCI officially evolved into the ASC program in fiscal year (FY) 2005, but the mission remains essentially the same: provide the simulation and computational capabilities that underpin the ability to maintain a safe, secure, effective nuclear weapon stockpile, without returning to underground nuclear testing. The capabilities that the ASC program provides at the national laboratories play a vital role in the nuclear security enterprise and are necessary for fulfilling the stockpile stewardship and life extension requirements outlined for NNSA. The Program develops modern simulation tools that provide insights into stockpile aging issues, provide the computational and simulation tools that enable designers and analysts to certify the current stockpile and life-extended nuclear weapons, and inform the decision-making process when any modifications in nuclear warheads or the associated manufacturing processes are deemed necessary. Furthermore, ASC is enhancing the predictive simulation capabilities that are essential to evaluate weapons effects, design experiments, and ensure test readiness. The ASC program continues to improve its unique tools to solve stockpile problems— with a focus on sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific detail—to enable Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) and to resolve the increasingly difficult analyses needed for stockpile stewardship. The needs of the Stockpile Management and Production Modernization programs (formerly Directed Stockpile Work) also drive the requirements for simulation and computational resources. These requirements include planned LEPs, stockpile support activities, and mitigation efforts against the potential for technical surprise. All of the weapons within the current stockpile are in some stage of the life extension process. The simulation and computational capabilities are crucial for successful execution of these life extensions and for ensuring NNSA can certify these life-extended weapons without conducting a UGT.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Prioritizing Countries by Concern Regarding Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction Materials

This article presents a global prioritization methodology that evaluates the relative risks of non-state actor acquisition of materials that could be used in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high explosive Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) from the country’s relevant infrastructure. Prioritization is based on three domains: 1. Assessing relative scale of materials in each country, 2. The country’s corresponding security posture, and 3. The presence of threat actors. The output is a list of countries prioritized from greatest risk to least. Rather than providing an overall 1 to N ranking, however, the results are placed into tiers based upon their natural groupings within the three domains. The countries in the highest tiers are flagged as potential US national security concern; those scoring in the middle and at the bottom are flagged as posing lower US national security concern. A systematic approach assesses each country by leveraging many disciplines, such as risk and decision analysis, as well as expert judgement. A quantitative value model based on Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT) organizes the objectives scoring criteria into a value tree using lessons learned from previous studies, published literature, and expert judgement. The article presents the prioritization categories and corresponding value model scoring criteria to include measurement type, weight, range, and value preference. Country names and data are notional in order to share the details on the underlying methodology and model without identification of actual security risks. A deliberative process addresses factors external to the model and scrutinizes inputs, methodology, model, and results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

CYDRES: CYber Defense and REsilient System for securing grid-interactive efficient buildings

Smart buildings, especially Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings (GEBs), suffer from cyber-attacks and physical faults due to the integration of a large number of sensors and controls, connected devices, and associated communication networks. This study demonstrated a real-time advanced building resilient platform, called CYber Defense and REsilient System (CYDRES), which is deployable for existing and emerging Building Automation Systems (BASs). CYDRES aims to empower GEBs with cyber-attack-immune capabilities through multi-layer prevention and adaptation mechanisms to monitor, detect, and respond to cyber-attacks and physical operational faults. CYDRES is demonstrated through real-time experiments in a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) testbed.

Building automation system, Cyber-attacks, Physica↗

Design and Operation of Energy Systems with Large Amounts of Variable Generation: IEA Wind TCP Task 25 (Final Summary Report)

This report summarizes findings on wind integration from the 17 countries or sponsors participating in the International Energy Agency Wind Technology Collaboration Program (IEA Wind TCP) Task 25 from 2006-2020. Both real experience and studies are reported. Many wind integration studies incorporate solar energy, and most of the results discussed here are valid for other variable renewables in addition to wind. The national case studies address several impacts of wind power on electric power systems. In this report, they are grouped under long-term planning issues and short-term operational impacts. Long-term planning issues include grid planning and capacity adequacy. Short-term operational impacts include reliability, stability, reserves, and maximizing the value of wind in operational timescales (balancing related issues). The first section presents the variability and uncertainty of power system-wide wind power, and the last section presents recent studies toward 100% shares of renewables. The appendix provides a summary of ongoing research in the national projects contributing to Task 25 for 2021-2024. The design and operation of power and energy systems is an evolving field. As ambitious targets toward net-zero carbon energy systems are announced globally, many scenarios are being made regarding how to reach these future decarbonized energy systems, most of them involving large amounts of variable renewables, mainly wind and solar energy. The secure operation of power systems is increasingly challenging, and the impacts of variable renewables, new electrification loads together with increased distribution system resources will lead to somewhat different challenges for different systems. Tools and methods to study future power and energy systems also need to evolve, and both short-term operational aspects (such as power system stability) and long-term aspects (such as resource adequacy) will probably see new paradigms of operation and design. The experience of operating and planning systems with large amounts of variable generation is accumulating, and research to tackle the challenges of inverter-based, nonsynchronous generation is on the way. Energy transition and digitalization also bring new flexibility opportunities, both short and long term.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Genomics of sorghum local adaptation to a parasitic plant

Host–parasite coevolution can maintain high levels of genetic diversity in traits involved in species interactions. In many systems, host traits exploited by parasites are constrained by use in other functions, leading to complex selective pressures across space and time. Here, we study genome-wide variation in the staple crop Sorghum bicolor (L.) Moench and its association with the parasitic weed Striga hermonthica (Delile) Benth., a major constraint to food security in Africa. We hypothesize that geographic selection mosaics across gradients of parasite occurrence maintain genetic diversity in sorghum landrace resistance. Suggesting a role in local adaptation to parasite pressure, multiple independent loss-of-function alleles at sorghum LOW GERMINATION STIMULANT 1 (LGS1) are broadly distributed among African landraces and geographically associated with S. hermonthica occurrence. However, low frequency of these alleles within S. hermonthica-prone regions and their absence elsewhere implicate potential trade-offs restricting their fixation. LGS1 is thought to cause resistance by changing stereochemistry of strigolactones, hormones that control plant architecture and below-ground signaling to mycorrhizae and are required to stimulate parasite germination. Consistent with trade-offs, we find signatures of balancing selection surrounding LGS1 and other candidates from analysis of genome-wide associations with parasite distribution. Experiments with CRISPR–Cas9-edited sorghum further indicate that the benefit of LGS1-mediated resistance strongly depends on parasite genotype and abiotic environment and comes at the cost of reduced photosystem gene expression. Our study demonstrates long-term maintenance of diversity in host resistance genes across smallholder agroecosystems, providing a valuable comparison to both industrial farming systems and natural communities.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Enabling Innovation and Collaboration Across Geography and Culture: A Case Study of NASA's Systems Engineering Community of Practice

In 2004, NASA faced major knowledge sharing challenges due to geographically isolated field centers that inhibited personnel from sharing experiences and ideas. Mission failures and new directions for the agency demanded better collaborative tools. In addition, with the push to send astronauts back to the moon and to Mars, NASA recognized that systems engineering would have to improve across the agency. Of the ten field centers, seven had not built a spacecraft in over 30 years, and had lost systems engineering expertise. The Systems Engineering Community of Practice came together to capture the knowledge of its members using the suite of collaborative tools provided by the NASA Engineering Network (NEN.) The NEN provided a secure collaboration space for over 60 practitioners across the agency to assemble and review a NASA systems engineering handbook. Once the handbook was complete, they used the open community area to disseminate it. This case study explores both the technology and the social networking that made the community possible, describes technological approaches that facilitated rapid setup and low maintenance, provides best practices that other organizations could adopt, and discusses the vision for how this community will continue to collaborate across the field centers to benefit the agency as it continues exploring the solar system.

NEN↗

A full-scope, high-fidelity simulator-based hardware-in-the-loop testbed for comprehensive nuclear power plant cybersecurity research

Nuclear power plant (NPP) cybersecurity research often relies on hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbeds that integrate real hardware components into simulated environments. These testbeds allow researchers to identify vulnerabilities, evaluate attack impacts, and test security measures in a controlled setting. Furthermore, previous HIL testbeds lacked fidelity to accurately represent real nuclear systems, limiting the scope of cybersecurity analysis. This study presents the creation of a HIL testbed, devised upon a full-scope, high-fidelity NPP simulator, to facilitate realistic and comprehensive cybersecurity research. To demonstrate its capabilities, the control logic for the steam generator water level was migrated from the simulator to an external programmable logic controller. As a practical application of the developed testbed, supply chain attack scenarios were simulated by injecting malicious code into the controller logic, and the effects of manipulating sensor inputs and control commands were observed. While this HIL testbed provides more detailed simulations, enhanced realism, and wider applicability compared to other options utilizing a less complex simulator, it is also more intricate and costly. For this reason, we include a detailed comparison with some alternative architectures to aid fellow researchers and practitioners in the selection of a suitable HIL architecture based on specific research objectives.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

A comprehensive study of near midair collisions in terminal airspace, derived from the ASRS database is presented. A selection of controller and pilot reports on airport perimeter security, unauthorized takeoffs and landings, and on winter operations is presented. A sampling of typical Alert Bulletins and their responses is presented.

Source record↗

Photoneutron Production Using an Electron Linear Accelerator for Applications in Neutron Imaging

Photoneutron production is possible using an electron linear accelerator and a target capable of generating photonuclear reactions. A short pulse neutron source can be useful for neutron imaging dynamic experiments. This study is aimed at the feasibility of photoneutron production using a 20 MeV electron linear accelerator and tungsten and depleted uranium targets of various thicknesses. MCNP6 (Monte Carlo N-Particle) code will be used to develop a computational model to estimate total neutron yield, and this will be verified at the Idaho State University’s Accelerator Center. After verification of the neutron yield and energy spectra, an additional MCNP6 model will be developed to analyze the neutron imaging processes. This study will potentially prove it is possible to conduct multi-mode imaging experiments on the anticipated Scorpius electron linear accelerator at the Nevada National Security Sites.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

ELaNa - Educational Launch of Nanosatellite Providing Routine RideShare Opportunities

Since the creation of the NASA CubeSat Launch Initiative (NCSLI), the need for CubeSat rideshares has dramatically increased. After only three releases of the initiative, a total of 66 CubeSats now await launch opportunities. So, how is this challenge being resolved? NASA's Launch Services Program (LSP) has studied how to integrate PPODs on Athena, Atlas V, and Delta IV launch vehicles and has been instrumental in developing several carrier systems to support CubeSats as rideshares on NASA missions. In support of the first two ELaNa missions the Poly-Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (P-POD) was adapted for use on a Taurus XL (ELaNa I) and a Delta n (ELaNa III). Four P-PODs, which contained a total eight CubeSats, were used on these first ELaNa missions. Next up is ELaNa VI, which will launch on an Atlas V in August 2012. The four ELaNa VI CubeSats, in three P-PODs, are awaiting launch, having been integrated in the NPSCuLite. To increase rideshare capabilities, the Launch Services Program (LSP) is working to integrate P-PODs on Falcon 9 missions. The proposed Falcon 9 manifest will provide greater opportunities for the CubeSat community. For years, the standard CubeSat size was 1 U to 3U. As the desire to include more science in each cube grows, so does the standard CubeSat size. No longer is a 1 U, 1.5U, 2U or 3U CubeSat the only option available; the new CubeSat standard will include 6U and possibly even 12U. With each increase in CubeSat size, the CubeSat community is pushing the capability of the current P-POD design. Not only is the carrier system affected, but integration to the Launch Vehicle is also a concern. The development of a system to accommodate not only the 3U P-POD but also carriers for larger CubeSats is ongoing. LSP considers payloads in the lkg to 180 kg range rideshare or small/secondary payloads. As new and emerging small payloads are developed, rideshare opportunities and carrier systems need to be identified and secured. The development of a rideshare carrier system is not always cost effective. Sometimes a launch vehicle with an excellent performance record appears to be a great rideshare candidate however, after completing a feasibility study, LSP may determine that the cost of the rideshare carrier system is too great and, due to budget constraints, the development cannot go forward. With the current budget environment, one cost effective way to secure rideshare opportunities is to look for synergy with other government organizations that share the same interest.

Skrobot, Garrett Lee↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Electrical Fault Detection, Power Quality, Distributed Energy Resource Use Cases, and Cyber Event Applications with the Cyber Grid Guard System Using Distributed Ledger Technology

Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substation and are associated with distributed energy resources (DERs). The integrity and confidentiality of data from IEDs is crucial, and distributed ledger technology (DLT) could improve the resilience of microgrids by helping to make these data more secure. The most popular applications using blockchain technology for electrical utilities is in the field is based on energy trading. However, the dynamism of the penetration of customer owned DERs and the deployment of sensors with IEDs have led to the identification of new applications using DLT that are focused on other areas, such as monitoring, operation and management of the grid and its assets. In addition, the majority of studies on electrical grid applications with blockchain were validated with software simulations. Although general monitoring of power systems for using DLT could be evaluated in operational electric grids, other DLT research applications such as defense against cyber-attacks and/or electrical fault detection are not likely to be performed in a real infrastructure because of possible risks to the network/equipment security. This report summarizes the application of power system applications using distributed ledger technology (DLT), providing a secure DLT framework for collecting data from IEDs like power meters and protective relays inside and outside of an electrical substation and/or between two different electrical utilities. In this study, the use case scenarios were created and assessed for different power system application by using DLT. The electrical fault detection for faulted phases (1), power quality monitoring of phase voltage magnitudes, frequency levels and load power factor (2), DERs use case monitoring (3), and cyber-event applications (4) were performed in a test bed with a Cyber-Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. It had a real-time simulator with power meters and protective relays in-the-loop. The first section of this report presents a literature review of power system applications using blockchain at research level. The second section shows the theory and equations used on this report. The third section shows the description of the test bed, equipment, architecture, and electrical grid diagrams. The fourth section shows the experimental models and use case scenarios that were performed for the electrical fault detection, power quality, DERs use case, and cyber event applications with the CGG system using DLT. The fifth section shows the results collected from the tests based on comparing the time stamped events of the analog signals from the IEDs, DLT computer and real time simulator. The sixth section performed the discussion of the results for the use case scenarios. Finally, section seven presents the conclusions for this report were presented.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Case Study - Intentional Inclusion: How embedding inclusion into the fabric of Idaho National Laboratory positioned the organization for a sustainable future

Idaho National Laboratory, a Department of Energy national laboratory headquartered in Idaho Falls, Idaho, set out to embed inclusion into every aspect of its organization. The goal was to ensure the laboratory is a place where everyone feels they are valued, belong and can bring their best selves to work each day. The laboratory viewed inclusion as a journey in which a consistent, collective commitment to intentional decision-making and incremental progress ultimately achieves amazing results. INL’s intentional inclusion strategy has allowed the organization to: • Retain and build a next-generation workforce to transform the world’s energy future and secure the nation’s most critical infrastructure. • Lead inclusively through individual, team-based, and labwide actions that elevate organizational effectiveness. • Grow laboratory cultural acumen by establishing a clear connection between inclusion and mission success. This case study shares how INL brought employees along on the inclusion journey and inspired everyone to keep moving forward together.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗