Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “operating systems security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 523 records · Page 29
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Control and Non-Payload Communications Generation 1 Prototype Radio Flight Test Report

Unmanned aircraft (UA) represent a new capability that will provide a variety of services in the Government (public) and commercial (civil) aviation sectors. The growth of this potential industry has not yet been realized because of the lack of a common understanding of what is required to safely operate Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS). The desire and ability to fly UA is of increasing urgency. The application of UA to perform national security, defense, scientific, and emergency management are driving the critical need for less restrictive access by UA to the NAS. Existing Federal Aviation Regulations, procedures, and technologies do not allow routine UA access to the NAS. Access to the NAS is hampered by challenges such as the lack of an onboard pilot to see and avoid other aircraft; the ability of a single pilot or operator to control multiple UA; the reliance on command and control (C2) links; the altitudes, speeds, and duration at which the aircraft fly; and the wide variation in UA size and performance. NASA is working with other Government agencies to provide solutions that reduce technical barriers and make access to the NAS routine. This goal will be accomplished through system-level integration of key concepts, technologies, or procedures and through demonstrations of these integrated capabilities in an operationally relevant environment. This project provides an opportunity to transition the acquired empirical data and knowledge to the Federal Aviation Administration and other stakeholders to help them define the requirements for routine UA access to the NAS.Radio communications channels for UA are currently managed through exceptions and use either Department of Defense frequencies for line-of-sight (LOS) and satellite-based communications links, low-power LOS links in amateur bands, or unlicensed Industrial/Scientific/Medical (ISM) frequencies. None of these frequency bands are designated for safety and regularity of flight. Only recently has radiofrequency (RF) spectrum been allocated by the International Telecommunications Union specifically for commercial UA C2, LOS communication (L-Band: 960 to 1164 MHz, and C-Band: 5030 to 5091 MHz). The safe and efficient integration of UA into the NAS requires the use of protected RF spectrum allocations and a new data communications system that is both secure and scalable to accommodate the potential growth of these new aircraft. Data communications for UA-referred to as control and non-payload communications (CNPC)-will be used to exchange information between a UA and a ground station (GS) to ensure safe, reliable, and effective UA flight operation. The focus of this effort is on validating and allocating new RF spectrum and data link communications to enable civil UA integration into the NAS. Through a cost-sharing cooperative agreement with Rockwell Collins, Inc., the NASA Glenn Research Center is exploring and performing the necessary development steps to realize a prototype UA CNPC system. These activities include investigating signal waveforms and access techniques, developing representative CNPC radio hardware, and executing relevant testing and validation activities. There is no intent to manufacture the CNPC end product, rather the goals are to study, demonstrate, and validate a typical CNPC system that will allow safe and efficient communications within the L-Band and C-Band spectrum allocations. The system is addressing initial "seed" requirements from RTCA, Inc., Special Committee 203 (SC-203) and is on a path to Federal Aviation Administration certification. This report provides results from the flight testing campaign of the Rockwell Collins Generation 1 prototype radio, referred hereafter as the "radio." The radio sets operate within the 960- to 977-MHz frequency band with both air and ground radios using identical hardware. Flight tests involved one aircraft and one GS. Results include discussion of aircraft flight paths and associated radio performance.

Shalkhauser, Kurt A.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Transformational Spaceport and Range Concept of Operations: A Vision to Transform Ground and Launch Operations

The Transformational Concept of Operations (CONOPS) provides a long-term, sustainable vision for future U.S. space transportation infrastructure and operations. This vision presents an interagency concept, developed cooperatively by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for the upgrade, integration, and improved operation of major infrastructure elements of the nation s space access systems. The interagency vision described in the Transformational CONOPS would transform today s space launch infrastructure into a shared system that supports worldwide operations for a variety of users. The system concept is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to support new types of missions for exploration, commercial enterprise, and national security, as well as to endure further into the future when space transportation technology may be sufficiently advanced to enable routine public space travel as part of the global transportation system. The vision for future space transportation operations is based on a system-of-systems architecture that integrates the major elements of the future space transportation system - transportation nodes (spaceports), flight vehicles and payloads, tracking and communications assets, and flight traffic coordination centers - into a transportation network that concurrently accommodates multiple types of mission operators, payloads, and vehicle fleets. This system concept also establishes a common framework for defining a detailed CONOPS for the major elements of the future space transportation system. The resulting set of four CONOPS (see Figure 1 below) describes the common vision for a shared future space transportation system (FSTS) infrastructure from a variety of perspectives.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2023

Design of Nuclear Criticality Safety Framework for Hands-on Construction of Fast Systems Over Ranges of Multiplication

Since 1945, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has performed critical experiments, primarily at the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) at Technical Area 18 (TA-18). Since 2011, these experiments have been conducted by the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC), operated by LANL, at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These experiments utilize various types of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Some of these experiments utilize what is referred to as the Rocky Flat Shells, which are called such as they came from the Rocky Flats Plant. These concentric hemi-shells are made of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), which is 93 w/o 235U. Fig. 1. Subset of the Rocky Flat Shells LANL is designing a new subcritical hands-on experiment with the goal of achieving a neutron multiplication in the range of 50 to 200, which correlates to Keff values of 0.98 to 0.995. ANSI/ANS-1 is the standard for Conduct of Critical Experiments which governs critical operations at NCERC. Section 3.9 of ANSI/ANS-1 states that when manipulating a critical assembly by hand, the predicted k eff of a known configuration should not exceed 0.95 (a neutron multiplication of 20). This presents a challenge, as this system would have a higher multiplication than 20 and the assembly would have to remain subcritical in normal and credible accident scenarios. To ensure the safety of such an assembly, the different normal and abnormal conditions that could alter the criticality 1 MCNP® and Monte Carlo N-Particle® are registered trademarks owned by Triad National Security, LLC, manager and operator of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any third party use of such registered marks should be properly of the system must be considered and analyzed. If such a condition is deemed to be credible, it will be further investigated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code. If the results of these simulations show that a k eff larger than one could be possible, modifications to the assembly will be made until such an event is deemed no longer possible.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2023

Testing SOAR tools in use

Investigations within Security Operation Centers (SOCs) are tedious as they rely on manual efforts to query diverse data sources, overlay related logs, correlate the data into information, and then document results in a ticketing system. Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) tools are a relatively new technology that promise, with appropriate configuration, to collect, filter, and display needed diverse information; automate many of the common tasks that unnecessarily require SOC analysts’ time; facilitate SOC collaboration; and, in doing so, improve both efficiency and consistency of SOCs. There has been no prior research to test SOAR tools in practice; hence, understanding and evaluation of their effect is nascent and needed. Here, in this paper, we design and administer the first hands-on user study of SOAR tools, involving 24 participants and six commercial SOAR tools. Our contributions include the experimental design, itemizing six characteristics of SOAR tools, and a methodology for testing them. We describe configuration of a cyber range test environment, including network, user, and threat emulation; a full SOC tool suite; and creation of artifacts allowing multiple representative investigation scenarios to permit testing. We present the first research results on SOAR tools. Concisely, our findings are that: per-SOC SOAR configuration is extremely important; SOAR tools increase efficiency and reduce context switching, although with potentially decreased ticketing accuracy/completeness; user preference is slightly negatively correlated with their performance with the tool; internet dependence varies widely among SOAR tools; and balance of automation with assisting decision making is preferred by senior participants. We deliver a public user- and tool-anonymized and -obfuscated version of the data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1973

Restraint system for ergometer

A restraint system for securing a person to an ergometer while exercising under zero gravity conditions or while operating the ergometer in earth environment in a position other than the upright position. A padded, form-fitting body belt fits around the operator's waist and suspenders are attached to the body belt. The body belt is secured to the ergometer forwardly and rearwardly of the ergometer seat by adjustable belts joined to the body belt and releasably hooked to the ergometer frame.

Gause, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Interchangeable Tools for Remote Manipulators

Report presents concepts and specifications for set of interchangeable end-effector tools used on remotely operated manipulator to work on satellites in orbit. Tools make urgent repairs, do routine maintenance, transfer fluids, construct and assemble satellites, and deploy and retract appendages. With modifications, tool concepts and systematic approach to tool design applicable to such terrestrial uses as industrial robots, manually operated tools, and safety equipment. Report discusses concept for tool-storage system that holds tools securely when not used but kept accessible to manipulator.

Cody, J. C.↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Multi-Site Networked Hardware-in-Loop Platform for Evaluation of Interoperability and Distributed Intelligence at Grid-Edge

Electric power systems have experienced large increases in the number of intelligent, connected and controllable devices being deployed, leading to a high degree of distributed intelligence at the grid-edge. These devices, both utility-owned and consumer-owned, include but are not limited to: renewable generation sources, energy storage, remote switches, voltage regulators, and smart controllable loads such as electric vehicles. These new devices provide significant potential for increased operational flexibility that can be leveraged to achieve system reconfiguration, resiliency improvements, power quality improvements, and distribution system automation. However, there are two significant challenges that must be addressed before these assets can be leveraged for operations: interoperability and system level validation prior to deployment. Because of the complexity of distributed control systems, and their interactions with legacy centralized controls, a purely simulations-based approach for pre-deployment validation is not sufficient. It requires hardware-in-loop testing to emulate the operational hardware devices and evaluate their performance. Additionally, securely integrating multiple test facilities at utility operators and vendors might enable rapid scale-up of evaluation platforms, and remove the need for multiple expensive standalone installations. Presented in this paper, is the development of a multi-site evaluation platform that employs Advanced Distribution Management Systems (ADMS), distributed control devices, real-time hardware-in-loop assets, secure communication links, and protocol adapters. This platform uses standards-based approaches and open-source tools, and hence can serve as a template for other researchers and institutions to implement their multi-site evaluation frameworks for pre-deployment testing.

Essakiappan, Somasundaram↗
DOE OSTI2025

Large Scale Bilevel Optimization for N-K SCOPF Using Adversarial Robustness

Ensuring a secure dispatch against multiple simultaneous outages has long been desired to maintain grid security in the presence of severe events, such as extreme weather phenomena. Traditionally denoted as N-k security constrained optimal power flow (N-k SCOPF), this problem is intractable to solve due to its size being combinatorial in the number of simultaneous outages and due to the non-convex nature of the AC network constraints. This hinders the use of N-k SCOPF for operating realistic-scale systems. In this paper, we introduce a methodology to scalably solve an AC-feasible dispatch that improves security over k simultaneous outages. Our methodology poses N-k SCOPF as a bilevel optimization problem and solves it using an adversarial robustness approach. We develop new efficient methods to solve each level of the bilevel optimization by employing knowledge of the physics of the underlying system. This yields significant improvements in speed and convergence that enable us to address the N-k SCOPF problem at scale. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method by conducting a comprehensive analysis of an N-3 SCOPF for a 500-bus network. Furthermore, we emphasize the ability of our physics-driven techniques to handle larger systems by successfully scaling up to 12,000 buses.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

BWR modernization project: installation of a new digital feedwater control system - 295

A European BWR plant carried out a relevant and pioneering modernization project regarding the Feedwater and Feed Pump Turbine Control System, replacing the legacy analogic control with the new General Electric MarkVIe digital system. This digital instrumentation and control modernization, motivated by obsolescence, had a great impact on the main control room and on the plant operation. Tecnatom collaborated with the nuclear power plant in the project performing the following activities: early installation of the system in the full scope and classroom simulators, Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Verification and Validation (V and V), Simulation Assisted Engineering (SAE), design and implementation of cyber secure communication with the Plant Process Computer (PPC), operating procedures modification and plant operators training. Those activities contributed to the success of the project that was completed during the refueling outage as planned. Scheduling HFE verification before the design freeze allowed the plant to modify the Human Machine Interface (HMI) to comply with the standards and increase safety without overcharging the project. SAE resulted in the reduction of costs and time during the system commissioning through the detection of discrepancies and improvements in the control, covering different plant scenarios. All the activities carried out in the simulators before the implementation of the system in the plant contributed to validate it and to build confidence in the new control among the plant personnel. New digital system communication interfaces with the PPC saved cable laying works and allowed future expansions. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2016

Testbed-based Performance Evaluation of Attack Resilient Control for AGC

The modern electric power grid is a complex cyber-physical system whose reliable operation is enabled by a wide-area monitoring and control infrastructure. This infrastructure, supported by an extensive communication backbone, enables several control applications functioning at multiple time scales to ensure the grid is maintained within stable operating limits. Recent events have shown that vulnerabilities in this infrastructure may be exploited to manipulate the data being exchanged. Such a scenario could cause the associated control application to mis-operate, potentially causing system-wide instabilities. There is a growing emphasis on looking beyond traditional cybersecurity solutions to mitigate such threats. In this paper we perform a testbed-based validation of one such solution - Attack Resilient Control (ARC) - on Iowa State University's \textit{PowerCyber} testbed. ARC is a cyber-physical security solution that combines domain-specific anomaly detection and model-based mitigation to detect stealthy attacks on Automatic Generation Control (AGC). In this paper, we first describe the implementation architecture of the experiment on the testbed. Next, we demonstrate the capability of stealthy attack templates to cause forced under-frequency load shedding in a 3-area test system. We then validate the performance of ARC by measuring its ability to detect and mitigate these attacks. Our results reveal that ARC is efficient in detecting stealthy attacks and enables AGC to maintain system operating frequency close to its nominal value during an attack. Our studies also highlight the importance of testbed-based experimentation for evaluating the performance of cyber-physical security and control applications.

attack resilience↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings (GEB) through Cyber Defense and Resilient System (CYDRES)

The DOE CYDRES project is driven by the urgent need to address critical research gaps in the domain of cyber-physical security of smart buildings, including Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings (GEBs). CYDRES, a real-time advanced building resilient platform, aims to enhance the cyber-attack-immune capabilities of buildings through multi-layered prevention, detection, and adaptation mechanisms. CYDRES consists of five key modules: a multi-layer network analyzer, an Automatic Fault Detection, Diagnosis, and Prognosis (AFDDP) framework, an intelligent mode selector, a cyber-resilient control framework, and a situation awareness platform. The Network Analyzer employs a data-driven framework that includes a protocol state learning tool and a CRF (Conditional Random Field) command validator. In Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) testbeds, it achieved 100% detection accuracy with a false alarm rate of 3%, validating its efficacy in identifying selected cyber-attacks. The AFDDP framework leverages pattern matching, PCA (Principal Component Analysis)-based strategies, and a DBN (Dynamic Bayesian Network)-based fault diagnosis approach to pinpoint the causes of physical system abnormalities using Building Automation System (BAS) data. In HIL experiments, the AFDDP module attained a detection accuracy of over 95% with a false alarm rate below 7%. Additionally, the fault detector utilized machine learning (Random Forest) and deep learning (Multi-Layer Perceptron) methods with acoustic sensor data to achieve a 100% fault detection accuracy in Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) equipment. The Mode Selector offered real-time impact analysis, allowing immediate actions to protect BASs in the face of emerging threats. The cyber-resilient control framework included an adaptive Model Predictive Control (MPC) and a measurement compensator, reducing temperature violations by up to 94% and improving the total demand flexibility by up to 70% in HIL experiments. Such HIL experiments covered a cyber-attack case and a physical fault case, showcasing CYDRES’ efficiency in maintaining operational continuity during threats. The situation awareness platform in Grafana enhanced real-time threat detection and response visualization, augmenting the operational awareness for building operators. CYDRES demonstrated high technical effectiveness in various test scenarios, particularly in HIL environments. The project's phased development approach ensured efficient use of resources, highlighting its practical feasibility and readiness for commercialization. By enhancing the security and resilience of building operations, CYDRES represents a significant advance in mitigating risks associated with cyber-physical systems, thereby enhancing public confidence in the safety of modern building infrastructure. Future directions for the project include expanding testing protocols, refining AFDDP methodologies, exploring more comprehensive resilient control strategies, and testing in real commercial buildings.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Cyber security using multi-threaded architecture data diode at the NBSR - 114

Ongoing upgrades for the control room of the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) located at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) require the ability to collect sensor data from the secured reactor network and transfer to the outside network for trend analysis, while maintaining the security of the reactor network. To accomplish this, a data diode was created to provide a physical barrier that prevents any outside data from reaching the secured reactor network. The hardware of the data diode consists of two embedded computers, running Unix based operating systems, connected by three DB-9 serial cables. The serial cables have been modified so that only two wires, a ground and a transmission line, provide connection between the computers. The data diode relies on a multi-threaded architecture to collect and simultaneously transfer data over three serial connections. A software program, implemented in Java, has been written to request data from the digital recorders installed to monitor the NBSR process instrumentation and transfer that data across the serial connections. The data diode can collect over 1200 data points from multiple digital recorders each second. The collected data can then be stored in a relational database for later analysis. The source codes for the software are available open source on GitHub. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

A Method of Synchrophasor Technology for Detecting and Analyzing Cyber-Attacks

Studying cybersecurity events and analyzing their impacts encourage planners and operators to develop innovative approaches for preventing attacks in order to avoid outages and other disruptions. This work considers two parts in security studies; detecting an integrity attack and examining its effects on power system generators. The detection was conducted through employing synchrophasor technology to provide authentication of ACG commands based on observed system operating characteristics. The examination of an attack is completed via a detailed simulation of a modified IEEE 68-bus benchmark model to show the associated power system dynamic response. The results of the simulation are discussed for assessing the impacts of cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Small Modular Reactors in Urban Environments

Current small modular reactor (SMR) deployment use cases consider both rural and urban deployments, depending on the operational in-country needs for clean and reliable sources of energy. Many studies have been conducted analyzing security in rural and remote deployment locations, but this study looks at the physical security implications of an SMR placed in an urban environment and its uses for electricity production, district heating, and process heating. SMRs used for electricity production, district heating, and process heating may be key sources of both energy infrastructure and commercial infrastructure within a city and a State. As a result, long-term shutdowns could have a serious impact on a State’s overall energy or commercial production. Therefore, operators may consider further security applications to protect an SMR plant from physical attacks against both radiological sabotage and sabotage acts that could result in the SMR facility being offline for a significant amount of time. In this study, the team designed and analyzed a physical protection system (PPS) for securing an urban SMR facility against acts of radiological sabotage and sabotage acts that could disrupt the facility’s long-term operation. Additionally, this work analyzed the nuanced security issues related to siting an SMR near an urban environment (versus in a rural environment). The result of these analyses includes recommendations for PPSs for urban SMR facilities used for energy production, district heating, and process heating.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗