Results for “instrumentation and control” — Page 29

DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2020

The SuperCam Instrument Suite on the NASA Mars 2020 Rover: Body Unit and Combined System Tests

The SuperCam instrument suite provides the Mars 2020 rover, Perseverance, with a number of versatile remote-sensing techniques that can be used at long distance as well as within the robotic-arm workspace. These include laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS), remote time-resolved Raman and luminescence spectroscopies, and visible and infrared (VISIR; separately referred to as VIS and IR) reflectance spectroscopy. A remote micro-imager (RMI) provides high-resolution color context imaging, and a microphone can be used as a stand-alone tool for environmental studies or to determine physical properties of rocks and soils from shock waves of laser-produced plasmas. SuperCam is built in three parts: The mast unit (MU), consisting of the laser, telescope, RMI, IR spectrometer, and associated electronics, is described in a companion paper. The on-board calibration targets are described in another companion paper. Here we describe SuperCam’s body unit (BU) and testing of the integrated instrument. The BU, mounted inside the rover body, receives light from the MU via a 5.8 m optical fiber. The light is split into three wavelength bands by a demultiplexer, and is routed via fiber bundles to three optical spectrometers, two of which (UV and violet; 245–340 and 385–465 nm) are crossed Czerny-Turner reflection spectrometers, nearly identical to their counterparts on ChemCam. The third is a high-efficiency transmission spectrometer containing an optical intensifier capable of gating exposures to 100 ns or longer, with variable delay times relative to the laser pulse. This spectrometer covers 535–853 nm ( $105\text{--}7070~\text{cm}^{-1}$ Raman shift relative to the 532 nm green laser beam) with $12~\text{cm}^{-1}$ full-width at half-maximum peak resolution in the Raman fingerprint region. The BU electronics boards interface with the rover and control the instrument, returning data to the rover. Thermal systems maintain a warm temperature during cruise to Mars to avoid contamination on the optics, and cool the detectors during operations on Mars.Results obtained with the integrated instrument demonstrate its capabilities for LIBS, for which a library of 332 standards was developed. Examples of Raman and VISIR spectroscopy are shown, demonstrating clear mineral identification with both techniques. Luminescence spectra demonstrate the utility of having both spectral and temporal dimensions. Finally, RMI and microphone tests on the rover demonstrate the capabilities of these subsystems as well.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

In recent years, there has been considerable effort to modernize existing and new nuclear power plants with digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C). However, there has also been considerable concern both by industry and regulatory bodies for the risk and consequence analysis of these systems. Of particular concern are digital common cause failures (CCFs) specifically related to software defects. These “misbehaviors” by the software can occur in both the control and monitoring of a system. While many new methods have been proposed to identify potential software failure modes, such as Systems-theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), etc., these methods are focused primarily on the control action pathway of a system. In contrast, the information feedback pathway lacks unsafe control actions (UCAs), which are typically related to software basic events; thus, assessment of software basic events in such systems is unclear. In this work, we present the idea of intermediate processors and unsafe information flow (UIF) to help safety analysts trace failure mechanisms in the feedback pathway and how they can be integrated into a fault tree for improved assessment capability. The concepts presented are demonstrated in two comprehensive case studies, a smart sensor integrated platform for unmanned autonomous vehicles and another on a representative advanced human system interface (HSI) for safety critical plant monitoring. The qualitative software basic events are identified, and a fault tree analysis is conducted based on a modified Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) methodology. The case studies demonstrate the use of UIF and intermediate processors in the fault tree to improve traceability of software failures in highly complex digital instrumentation feedback. The improved method can also clarify fault tree construction when multiple component dependencies are present in the system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

In recent years, there has been considerable effort to modernize existing and new nuclear power plants with digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C). However, there has also been considerable concern both by industry and regulatory bodies for the risk and consequence analysis of these systems. Of particular concern are digital common cause failures (CCFs) specifically related to software defects. These “misbehaviors” by the software can occur in both the control and monitoring of a system. While many new methods have been proposed to identify potential software failure modes, such as Systems-theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), etc., these methods are focused primarily on the control action pathway of a system. In contrast, the information feedback pathway lacks unsafe control actions (UCAs), which are typically related to software basic events; thus, assessment of software basic events in such systems is unclear. In this work, we present the idea of intermediate processors and unsafe information flow (UIF) to help safety analysts trace failure mechanisms in the feedback pathway and how they can be integrated into a fault tree for improved assessment capability. The concepts presented are demonstrated in two comprehensive case studies, a smart sensor integrated platform for unmanned autonomous vehicles and another on a representative advanced human system interface (HSI) for safety critical plant monitoring. The qualitative software basic events are identified, and a fault tree analysis is conducted based on a modified Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) methodology. The case studies demonstrate the use of UIF and intermediate processors in the fault tree to improve traceability of software failures in highly complex digital instrumentation feedback. The improved method can also clarify fault tree construction when multiple component dependencies are present in the system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS1995

Retrieval of water vapor mixing ratios from a laser-based sensor

Langley Research Center has developed a novel external path sensor which monitors water vapor along an optical path between an airplane window and reflective material on the plane's engine. An infrared tunable diode laser is wavelength modulated across a water vapor absorption line at a frequency f. The 2f and DC signals are measured by a detector mounted adjacent to the laser. The 2f/DC ratio depends on the amount of wavelength modulation, the water vapor absorption line being observed, and the temperature, pressure, and water vapor content of the atmosphere. The present work concerns efforts to quantify the contributions of these factors and to derive a method for extracting the water vapor mixing ratio from the measurements. A 3 m cell was fabricated in order to perform laboratory tests of the sensor. Measurements of 2f/DC were made for a series of pressures and modulation amplitudes. During my 1994 faculty fellowship, a computer program was created which allowed 2f/DC to be calculated for any combination of the variables which effect it. This code was used to generate 2f/DC values for the conditions measured in the laboratory. The experimental and theoretical values agreed to within a few percent. As a result, the laser modulation amplitude can now be set in the field by comparing the response of the instrument to the calculated response as a function of modulation amplitude. Once the validity of the computer code was established, it was used to investigate possible candidate absorption lines. 2f/DC values were calculated for pressures, temperatures, and water vapor mixing ratios expected to be encountered in future missions. The results have been incorporated into a database which will be used to select the best line for a particular mission. The database will also be used to select a retrieval technique. For examples under some circumstances there is little temperature dependence in 2f/DC so temperature can be neglected. In other cases, there is a dependence with temperature for a particular pressure, requiring a more complicated retrieval algorithm. Future experimental work is necessary to test agreement with the theoretical values over a range of temperatures and mixing ratios. Additionally, retrieval algorithms for forthcoming missions must be incorporated into the software package which controls the instrument.

Tucker, George F.↗

DOE OSTI1988

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 259 Fifteenth Water Reactor Safety Information Meeting by E. G. Silver; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 284 Reliability Technology to Improve and/or Maintain Emergency Diesel Generator Performance by S. Karimian and J. H. Taylor, 293 A Noise Diagnostics System for Operator Advice by G. Hessel, P. Liewers, P. Schumann, W. Schmitt, and F.-P. Weiss; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 307 A Passive Containment System for Advanced Light-Water Reactors by O. B. Falls, Jr., and F. W. Kleimola; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 318 Data Base Construction for a Computerized Radiological Risk Investigation System by L. M. Hively, J. E. Nyquist, J. L. Bledsoe, and A. L. Sjoreen, 326 Erratum to "Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety," Vol. 29, No. 1; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 327 Operational Safety Experience and Passive Safety Testing at the Fast Flux Text Facility by Q. L. Baird, J. L. Rathbun, D. D. Stepnewski, R. L. Stover, and A. E. Waltar, 344 Backfilling of Independent Residual Heat Removal Systems in West Germany and Switzerland by G. Eckert and Y. Salomon, 353 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 356 Selected Safety-Related Events Compiled by G. A. Murphy, 363 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 384 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 390 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 395 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 400 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31,1988; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 283 International ENS/ANS Conference on Thermal Reactor Safety "NUCSAFE 88", 317 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 407 Second International Seminar on Small- and Medium-Sized Nuclear Reactors, 407 International Workshop on New Developments in Occupational Dose Control and ALARA Implementation at Nuclear Power Plants and Similar Facilities, 408 Fourth International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics (NURETH-4), 404 The Authors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

INS–Support for Formal Cyber Security Education in Brazil–After Action Report

The adoption of digital technology into Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in nuclear facilities fundamentally changes the nature of these systems. Greater interconnectivity of reprogrammable, and functionally interdependent control systems has given rise to the need for computer security consideration in digital I&C Systems. The cyber security of I&C systems presents a growing risk to nuclear facilities and requires the development of educational and research tools to ensure the safety of these facilities. Currently there is a major gap in formal educational offerings on cyber security for these Operational Technology (OT) systems. To provide formal cyber security education resources, DOE’s office of International Nuclear Security (INS) partnered with the University of São Paulo (USP) to develop a training course on the cyber security of nuclear facility I&C systems using the hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant, Asherah.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NASA NTRS1984

A real-time, portable, microcomputer-based jet engine simulator

Modern piloted flight simulators require detailed models of many aircraft components, such as the airframe, propulsion system, flight deck controls and instrumentation, as well as motion drive and visual display systems. The amount of computing power necessary to implement these systems can exceed that offered by dedicated mainframe computers. One approach to this problem is through the use of distributed computing, where parts of the simulation are assigned to computing subsystems, such as microcomputers. One such subsystem, such as microcomputers. One such subsystem, a real-time, portable, microcomputer-based jet engine simulator, is described in this paper. The simulator will be used at the NASA Ames Vertical Motion Simulator facility to perform calculations previously done on the facility's mainframe computer. The mainframe will continue to do all other system calculations and will interface to the engine simulator through analog I/0. The engine simulator hardware includes a 16-bit microcomputer and floating-point coprocessor. There is an 8 channel analog input board and an 8 channel analog output board. A model of a small turboshaft engine/control is coded in floating-point FORTRAN. The FORTRAN code and a data monitoring program run under the control of an assembly language real-time executive. The monitoring program allows the user to isplay and/or modify simulator variables on-line through a data terminal. A dual disk drive system is used for mass storage of programs and data. The CP/M-86 operating system provides file management and overall system control. The frame time for the simulator is 30 milliseconds, which includes all analog I/0 operations.

Blech, R. A.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Multi-amplifier Sensing Charge-coupled Devices for Next Generation Spectroscopy

We present characterization results and performance of a prototype Multiple-Amplifier Sensing (MAS) silicon charge-coupled device (CCD) sensor with 16 channels potentially suitable for faint object astronomical spectroscopy and low-signal, photon-limited imaging. The MAS CCD is designed to reach sub-electron readout noise by repeatedly measuring charge through a line of amplifiers during the serial transfer shifts. Using synchronized readout electronics based on the Dark Energy Spectroscopic Instrument CCD controller, we report a read noise of 1.03 e$^{−}$ rms pix$^{−1}$ at a speed of 26 μs pix$^{−1}$ with a single-sample readout scheme where charge in a pixel is measured only once for each output stage. At these operating parameters, we find the amplifier-to-amplifier charge transfer efficiency (ACTE) to be >0.9995 at low counts for all amplifiers but one for which the ACTE is 0.997. This charge transfer efficiency falls above 50,000 electrons for the read-noise optimized voltage configuration we chose for the serial clocks and gates. The amplifier linearity across a broad dynamic range from ∼300 to 35,000 e$^{−}$ was also measured to be ±2.5%. We describe key operating parameters to optimize on these characteristics and describe the specific applications for which the MAS CCD may be a suitable detector candidate.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2020

2020 Transportation Research Board Workshop: Infrastructure Spatial Sensing at Intersections: The Potential to Enhance Safety and Enable Automation

The sensing technology that is enabling vehicle automation also can revolutionize traffic intersection safety, control, and efficiency. Infrastructure spatial sensing technology refers to the deployment of sensors that can detect and track all objects in the field of view - for example, mounting lidar sensors, radar, and video imaging at an intersection and fusing the data to produce a three-dimensional dynamic operational awareness. Combining such sensing capability with fail-safe vehicle communications can facilitate applications such as eco-approach and departure, optimizing efficient vehicle-signal coordination, and reducing traffic accidents through increasing safety. Furthermore, evidence is mounting suggesting that infrastructure-based sensing is needed in order to safely deploy automated public mobility alongside the normal vehicle and pedestrian traffic in our cities. Six speakers were invited to present their work from various aspects (safety, efficiency, and automation) addressing infrastructure-based sensing at the workshop on Infrastructure Spatial Sensing hosted in Washington DC as part of the Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting in January 12, 2019. A summary of the presentation are included herein.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Anomalous behavior detection by an artificial intelligence-enabled system with multiple correlated sensors

Multi-metric artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML) models for detection of anomalous behavior of a machine/system are disclosed. The multi-metric AI/ML models are configured to detect anomalous behavior of systems having multiple sensors that measure correlated sensor metrics such as coolant distribution units (CDUs). The multi-metric AI/ML models perform the anomalous system behavior detection in a manner that enables both a reduction in the amount of sensor instrumentation needed to monitor the system's operational behavior as well as a corresponding reduction in the complexity of the firmware that controls the sensor instrumentation. As such, AI-enabled systems and corresponding methods for anomalous behavior detection disclosed herein offer a technical solution to the technical problem of increased failure rates of existing multi-sensor systems, which is caused by the presence of redundant sensor instrumentation that necessitates complex firmware for controlling the sensor instrumentation.

Serebryakov, Sergey↗

DOE OSTI2022

An Application of a Modified Beta Factor Method for the Analysis of Software Common Cause Failures

This paper presents an approach for modeling software common cause failures (CCFs) within digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. CCFs consist of a concurrent failure between two or more components due to a shared failure cause and coupling mechanism. This work emphasizes the importance of identifying software-centric attributes related to the coupling mechanisms necessary for simultaneous failures of redundant software components. The groups of components that share coupling mechanisms are called common cause component groups (CCCGs). Most CCF models rely on operational data as the basis for establishing CCCG parameters and predicting CCFs. This work is motivated by two primary concerns: (1) a lack of operational and CCF data for estimating software CCF model parameters; and (2) the need to model single components as part of multiple CCCGs simultaneously. A hybrid approach was developed to account for these concerns by leveraging existing techniques: a modified beta factor model allows single components to be placed within multiple CCCGs, while a second technique provides software-specific model parameters for each CCCG. This hybrid approach provides a means to overcome the limitations of conventional methods while offering support for design decisions under the limited data scenario.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Systems-Theoretic Hazard Analysis of Digital Human-System Interface Relevant to Reactor Trip

Slides for 2021 ANS-NPIC-HMIT conference

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Hazard analysis for identifying common cause failures of digital safety systems using a redundancy-guided systems-theoretic approach

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection, digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Here, this paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the causal factors of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2022

Progress in ITER ECE diagnostic design and integration

The ITER electron cyclotron emission (ECE) diagnostic system has primary roles in providing measurements of the core electron temperature profile and the electron temperature fluctuation associated with the neoclassical tearing modes. The ITER ECE system includes a radial and oblique line-of-sight. Four 43-meter long low-loss transmission lines (TLs) are designed to transmit millimeter wave power in the frequency range of 70–1000 GHz in both X- and O-mode polarization from the port plug to the ECE instrumentation room in the diagnostic building. The measurement instrumentation includes two Fourier transform spectrometer (FTS) systems and two radiometer systems. The Indian Domestic Agency (IN-DA) and United States Domestic Agency share the responsibility. The IN-DA scope excluding instrumentation and control has passed its preliminary design review and is progressing towards the final design review (FDR). In parallel, the diagnostic integration in different areas is ongoing. Furthermore, several captive components for the TLs have passed FDR and will be manufactured for installation in the tokamak building soon. A peer review meeting has been held on the prototype hot calibration source, and its integration and new thermal analysis in the diagnostic shield module are continuing. A prototype TL is being tested. A prototype polarizing Martin-Puplett type FTS, operating in the frequency range 70–1000 GHz, features an in-vacuo fast scanning mechanism and a cryo-cooled dual-channel THz detector system. Its performance has been assessed in detail against ITER requirements.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Preliminary design of a helium cryogenic system for SAND detector at LBNF-DUNE near site

The Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility (LBNF) is providing a helium cryogenic system to support the superconducting solenoid magnet of the System for on-Axis Neutrino Detection (SAND) for the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) Near Site at Fermilab in Batavia, IL. The design started in 2020 and construction is set to begin in the mid 2020‘s.The helium cryogenic system primarily consists of a helium refrigerator system, distribution valve boxes, vacuum-jacketed helium and nitrogen transfer lines, warm gaseous helium transfer system, instruments and control system, and gaseous helium storage tanks. It is designed to provide supercritical helium at around 3 bara and 5 K with expansion from 3 to 1.2 bara in the SAND cryostat and 70K forced cold gas helium to cool the thermal shields of the SAND cryostat. The SAND superconductive magnet is indirectly cooled through a liquid helium thermosiphon cycle. A pair of 3 kA leads is cooled by the gas helium vaporized from the liquid helium reservoir in the cryostat turret. The helium system will share the liquid nitrogen tank and liquid nitrogen phase separator with the Near Site Liquid Argon system. The helium recycle compressor system, GHe tanks and LN2 tank will be located on the Surface. The cryogenic facilities including refrigerator cold box, valve boxes and LN2 phase separator will be located on the shaft cryo-mezzanine in the underground cavern. The shaft connecting surface and cavern is more than 60 meter deep. The helium vacuum-jacketed transfer line between the cold box and the SAND magnet is more than 50 meter long. This paper presents the preliminary design of the helium cryogenic system including the design scheme, process flow diagram, heat load estimates, layout plan and so on.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2024

Considerations for Introducing Artificial Intelligence into Nuclear Power Plants

Advanced computational tools and techniques such as artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) can transform the nuclear power industry. This is necessary given that the economic viability of the existing fleet is in jeopardy and its labor-centric approach to operations and maintenance. Currently, AI/ML research is being undertaken for reactor system design and analysis including fault and accident prognosis, nuclear risk analysis such as plant safety and security evaluation, and plant operations and maintenance including predictive maintenance. Applications include both existing and advanced reactor technologies with the aim of improving operational and business efficiencies. Most every aspect of the organization can benefit, from instrumentation and control, to work planning, to human-machine interactions and business management. AI/ML in nuclear can simplify complex problems and produce more effective decision-making. Nonetheless, careful consideration must be given to the implementation of an AI/ML initiative. The aims of this research are to 1) review barriers to AI/ML adoption within the nuclear power industry, and 2) suggest potential solutions. These barriers are organized along five distinct categories (Figure 1) that are interconnected. The first are historical barriers that track the industry’s development over the decades including worldwide nuclear events that shaped public perceptions. The resulting federal scrutiny and intense safety culture that emerged are discussed. Technical barriers to AI/ML adoption are considerable, and include data privacy concerns, data governance, and the current lack of AI/ML expert knowledge at the plants. The main business case barrier remains cost, but an absence of an industry-wide vision and wide-scale adoption also produces reluctance. Stakeholder readiness is reviewed with special attention given to regulatory readiness. The 5-year strategic plan for AI readiness recently published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is highlighted. Last, adoption barriers at the user level are addressed including the importance of user experience and explainable AI. The AI adoption barriers described here are inter-related and ideally should be addressed in a holistic fashion.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗