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At least 523 records · Page 29

Modeling of the Influence of a Damaged Thermally Grown Oxide (TGO) Layer in an Environmental Barrier Coating System

Environmental barrier coatings (EBC) are an enabling technology for the successful application of ceramic matrix composites (CMCs) in air-breathing gas turbine engines. EBCs are susceptible to a number of failure modes including oxidation/delamination, recessions, chemical attack and dissolution, thermomechanical degradation, erosion, and foreign object impact damage in a combustion environment. Spallation of environmental barrier coating (EBC), induced by a thermally grown oxide (TGO) layer, is a key EBC failure mode. The TGO layer, resulting from steam oxidation, grows either from a silicon bond coat layer (if present) or from a silicon carbide (SiC) based substrate itself. The TGO layer evolves (i.e., thickness increases with time) as water vapor and oxygen gradually diffuse through the EBC, and the EBC spalls off once the TGO layer reaches some critical thickness. The critical thickness of the TGO layer for failure is in the range of 20-30 microns, but it can vary due to exposure temperature, microstructure etc. Current work at NASA Glenn Research Center, under the Revolutionary Tools and Methods (RTM) subproject is aimed at addressing associated failure modes in EBC systems and developing robust analysis tools to aid in the design/analysis of these systems. The objective of the current work is to conduct a sensitivity study to examine the influence of uniformly and non-uniformly grown oxide layers on the associated driving forces leading to spallation of the EBC when subjected to isothermal loading. The effect of damage in the TGO layer on the resulting stress states is also assessed both in uniform and non-uniform TGO layers.

Mital, Subodh K.↗

Modeling of the Influence of Thermally Grown Oxide (TGO) Layers on the Driving Forces in Environmental Barrier Coating Systems

Environmental barrier coatings (EBC) are an enabling technology for the successful application of ceramic matrix composites (CMCs) in air-breathing gas turbine engines. EBCs are susceptible to several failure modes including oxidation/delamination, recession, chemical attack and dissolution, thermomechanical degradation, erosion, and foreign object impact damage in a combustion environment. Spallation of environmental barrier coating (EBC), induced by a thermally grown oxide (TGO) layer, is a key EBC failure mode. The TGO layer, resulting from steam oxidation, grows either from a silicon bond coat layer (if present) or from a silicon carbide (SiC) based substrate itself. The TGO layer evolves (i.e., thickness increases with time) as water vapor and oxygen gradually diffuse through the EBC, and the EBC spalls off once the TGO layer reaches some critical thickness. The critical thickness of the TGO layer for failure is in the range of 20-30 microns, with the actual value depending upon exposure temperature, microstructure, etc. Current work at NASA Glenn Research Center, under the Transformative Tools and Technology (TTT) subproject is aimed at addressing associated failure modes in EBC systems and developing robust analysis tools to aid in the design/analysis of these systems. The objective of the current work is to conduct a sensitivity study to examine the influence of uniformly and non-uniformly grown oxide layers on the associated driving forces leading to spallation of the EBC when subjected to isothermal loading. The effect of damage in the TGO layer on the resulting stress states is also assessed both in uniform and non-uniform TGO layers.

Coatings↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbital maneuvering system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter OMS hardware. The IOA analysis defined the OMS as being comprised of the following subsystems: helium pressurization, propellant storage and distribution, Orbital Maneuvering Engine, and EPD and C. The IOA product for the OMS analysis consisted of 284 hardware and 667 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 160 hardware and 216 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which consisted of 101 hardware and 142 EPD and C CIL items.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Comparative Study of Vibration Condition Indicators for Detecting Cracks in Spur Gears

This paper reports the results of an empirical study on the tooth breakage failure mode in spur gears. Of four dominant gear failure modes (breakage, wear, pitting, and scoring), tooth breakage is the most precipitous and often leads to catastrophic failures. The cracks were initiated using a fatigue tester and a custom-designed single-tooth bending fixture to simulate over-load conditions, instead of traditional notching using wire electrical discharge machining (EDM). The cracks were then propagated on a dynamometer. The ground truth of damage level during crack propagation was monitored with crack-propagation sensors. Ten crack propagations have been performed to compare the existing condition indicators (CIs) with respect to their: ability to detect a crack, ability to assess the damage, and sensitivity to sensor placement. Of more than thirty computed CIs, this paper compares five commonly used: raw RMS, FM0, NA4, raw kurtosis, and NP4. The performance of combined CIs was also investigated, using linear, logistic, and boosted regression trees based feature fusion.

Nanadic, Nenad↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the aft and forward Reaction Control System (RCS) hardware, and Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RCS hardware and EPD and C systems. The IOA product for the RCS analysis consisted of 208 hardware and 2064 EPD and C failure mode worksheets that resulted in 141 hardware and 449 EPD and C potential critical items (PCIs) being identified. A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. After comparison and discussions with the NASA subsystem manager, 96 hardware issues, 83 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, and 280 EPD and C issues, 158 of which concern CIL items or PCIs, remain unresolved. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Prust, Chet D.↗

Reliability Growth Modeling and Testing

Reliability growth has been modelled as an exponential decline in the cumulative failure rate that continues indefinitely as long as testing continues. Contrary to this, most reliability growth data show a brief high initial failure rate due to infant mortality followed by a long period of constant low failure rate. A two part failure rate model with an initial exponential decline followed by a constant failure rate usually fits the data and provides a more realistic description of reliability growth. The reliability growth process consists of testing, experiencing failures, finding the failure causes, and redesigning the system to remove them. The cost of reliability growth increases with the number of inherent failure modes and the time needed for them to occur and be removed. The failure modes with the lower failure rates will tend to occur later, as their Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) is the inverse of the failure rate. Reliability growth testing has diminishing returns, since it takes longer to find and remove the less probable failures.This paper first discusses the reliability bathtub curve and then explains that reliability growth is produced by testing, identifying failure causes, and designing to remove them. A simple model of reliability growth is introduced, with a brief group of early failures followed by a constant failure rate. The cumulative failure rate n(t)/t can decline as rapidly as1/t or t-1butdeclines more slowly if additiona lfailures occur. The 56-failure Crow data seti s used to demonstrate the two-phase model of reliability growth followed by a constant failure rate. 13 additional data sets are modeled, with 9 of the 14 data sets showing reliability growth approximately as n(t)/t =1/t or t-1and substantial final failure rates. The model fits most of the data sets, but 4of the 14 show no reliability growth. The reliability growth period typically includes six failures and extends one-quarter or half the total test time. As reliability growth testing continues, the cumulative failure rate should be tracked to estimate the reliability growth exponent and the final failure rate.

reliability growth modeling↗

Modeling Reliability Growth

Reliability growth has been modelled as an exponential decline in the cumulative failure rate that continues indefinitely as long as testing continues. Contrary to this, most reliability growth data show a brief high initial failure rate due to infant mortality followed by a long period of constant low failure rate. A two part failure rate model with an initial exponential decline followed by a constant failure rate usually fits the data and provides a more realistic description of reliability growth. The reliability growth process consists of testing, experiencing failures, finding the failure causes, and redesigning the system to remove them. The cost of reliability growth increases with the number of inherent failure modes and the time needed for them to occur and be removed. The failure modes with the lower failure rates will tend to occur later, as their Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) is the inverse of the failure rate. Reliability growth testing has diminishing returns, since it takes longer to find and remove the less probable failures.This paper first discusses the reliability bathtub curve and then explains that reliability growth is produced by testing, identifying failure causes, and designing to remove them. A simple model of reliability growth is introduced, with a brief group of early failures followed by a constant failure rate. The cumulative failure rate n(t)/t can decline as rapidly as1/t or t-1butdeclines more slowly if additiona lfailures occur. The 56-failure Crow data seti s used to demonstrate the two-phase model of reliability growth followed by a constant failure rate. 13 additional data sets are modeled, with 9 of the 14 data sets showing reliability growth approximately as n(t)/t =1/t or t-1and substantial final failure rates. The model fits most of the data sets, but 4of the 14 show no reliability growth. The reliability growth period typically includes six failures and extends one-quarter or half the total test time. As reliability growth testing continues, the cumulative failure rate should be tracked to estimate the reliability growth exponent and the final failure rate.

reliability growth modeling↗

Static stability of the Space Station solar array FASTMast structure

The combined loads test of the 3-Bay FASTMast marks the end of the Lewis Research Center (LeRC) effort to characterize the behavior of the principal Space Station solar array support structure. The primary objective of this test and analysis effort was to develop a method to predict structural stability failure modes under flight-like applied loads. Included at the beginning of this report is a brief historical perspective of the hardware design development and FASTMast structural stability problem evolution. Once an understanding of the solution process has been established, test and analysis details are presented and related to the postulated failure theories. The combined load test series subjected the structure to a combination of transverse, moment, and torsion loads similar to that expected in the service environment. Nonlinear finite element (FE) models were developed and large displacement analyses were performed to support the test effort and failure mode predictions. Details of the test configuration as well as test and analysis results are presented. The results were then critiqued to establish valid and successful support of the failure mode assessments. Finally, study conclusions are drawn and recommendations for safe operation of the FASTMast structure are presented for consideration.

Shaker, John F.↗

Single fiber peel test to assess ultra high molecular weight polyethylene fiber mesostructure interactions

ABSTRACT In this work, a variable angle, single fiber peel test is developed to analyze the effects of fiber structure on the mixed mode failure within ultra high molecular weight polyethylene fibers. The Mode I and Mode II peel energy release rates are quantified and the effects of fiber meso/nanostructure on these modes are examined. Comparison of the load‐extension curves from the peel test with in‐situ video, and post‐mortem analysis using high‐resolution microscopy techniques indicates that Mode I and Mode II splitting are both significantly influenced by the deformation of nanoscale fibrils within a mesoscale network. The fibrils in the network are placed in tension across the peel/shear interface resulting in elevated values of peel energy release rates with an increasing number of engaged fibrils. The number of engaged fibrils is shown to increase with decreasing peel angle and increasing Mode II failure contribution. A bi‐linear mixed‐mode failure criterion is established. The results, and analysis of the fiber structure are discussed in context of their implications for load pathways in the fiber. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J. Appl. Polym. Sci. 2018 , 135 , 46156.

McDaniel, Preston B.↗

Variational mechanics analysis of the stresses in microdrop debond specimens

A recently derived variational mechanics analysis of stresses in single-fiber model composites has been applied to the analysis of the stresses in the microdrop debond specimen. The new analysis is more accurate than the commonly applied shear-lag or elastic-plastic analyses. The results from a sample stress state calculation suggest that interfacial failure between the fiber and the microdrop is by mode I or opening mode failure at the beginning of the microdrop. The opening mode failure is caused by a large tensile radial stress at the fiber/matrix interface. Previous analyses of microdrop debond data have been in terms of a shear strength. It is suggested that these analyses misrepresent microdrop debond results and recommend instead a failure analysis based on energy release rate and interfacial fracture toughness. A procedure for calculating the energy release rate for the growth of an interfacial crack is described.

Scheer, Robert J.↗

A Misperception in Reliability Growth Modelling

The Duane reliability growth model is n(t)/t = k t^-alpha (1) The reliability growth rate is alpha, the downward slope of n(t)/t versus t. It usually varies from 0.2 to 0.6. k is a constant. Crow used a 56-failure data set to illustrate reliability growth.1 A graphical Duane model fit to this data gives n(t)/t = 0.640 t^-0.283 (2) A problem in using the Duane-Crow reliability growth model is that it assumes that reliability growth continues and the failure rate decreases throughout the test period. It is more usual that reliability growth stops when the failure rated is low enough. Growth testing is often followed by testing with a low constant failure rate due to rare or uncorrectable failure modes. As more and more low constant rate acceptable failures accumulate after the period of reliability growth, the reliability growth time exponent alpha decreases toward zero. This occurs if constant rate failures are treated as occurring during the reliability growth period. It is more accurate to model a period of initial reliability growth followed by testing without repair to more accurately determine the final constant failure rate. This is done in the abcd model. n(t)/t = a t^-b + c from t = 0 to td (3) = c + d after td, where d = a td^-b (4) The term a t^-b describes the continuous reliability growth that continues out to time td and c is the constant uncorrected failure rate. The parameter d represents an additional constant failure rate due to correctable but uncorrected failure modes. After the reliability growth process is terminated, the failure rate n(t)/t = c + d.

Harry W Jones↗

Effects Of Environmental And Operational Stresses On RF MEMS Switch Technologies For Space Applications

Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) have been heralded for their ability to provide tremendous advantages in electronic systems through increased electrical performance, reduced power consumption, and higher levels of device integration with a reduction of board real estate. RF MEMS switch technology offers advantages such as low insertion loss (0.1- 0.5 dB), wide bandwidth (1 GHz-100 GHz), and compatibility with many different process technologies (quartz, high resistivity Si, GaAs) which can replace the use of traditional electronic switches, such as GaAs FETS and PIN Diodes, in microwave systems for low signal power (x < 500 mW) applications. Although the electrical characteristics of RF MEMS switches far surpass any existing technologies, the unknown reliability, due to the lack of information concerning failure modes and mechanisms inherent to MEMS devices, create an obstacle to insertion of MEMS technology into high reliability applications. All MEMS devices are sensitive to moisture and contaminants, issues easily resolved by hermetic or near-hermetic packaging. Two well-known failure modes of RF MEMS switches are charging in the dielectric layer of capacitive membrane switches and contact interface stiction of metal-metal switches. Determining the integrity of MEMS devices when subjected to the shock, vibration, temperature extremes, and radiation of the space environment is necessary to facilitate integration into space systems. This paper will explore the effects of different environmental stresses, operational life cycling, temperature, mechanical shock, and vibration on the first commercially available RF MEMS switches to identify relevant failure modes and mechanisms inherent to these device and packaging schemes for space applications. This paper will also describe RF MEMS Switch technology under development at NASA GSFC.

Jah, Muzar↗

Challenges in leveraging existing human performance data for quantifying the IDHEAS HRA method

Our article documents an exploratory study for collecting and using human performance data to inform human error probability (HEP) estimates for a new human reliability analysis (HRA) method, the IntegrateD Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS). The method was based on cognitive models and mechanisms underlying human behaviour and employs a framework of 14 crew failure modes (CFMs) to represent human failures typical for human performance in nuclear power plant (NPP) internal, at-power events [1]. A decision tree (DT) was constructed for each CFM to assess the probability of the CFM occurring in different contexts. Data needs for IDHEAS quantification are discussed. Then, the data collection framework and process is described and how the collected data were used to inform HEP estimation is illustrated with two examples. Next, five major technical challenges are identified for leveraging human performance data for IDHEAS quantification. Furthermore, these challenges reflect the data needs specific to IDHEAS. More importantly, they also represent the general issues with current human performance data and can provide insight for a path forward to support HRA data collection, use, and exchange for HRA method development, implementation, and validation.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

PacWave South SeaRAY k2 Risk Registers

The SeaRAY is a deployable power system for maritime sensors, monitoring equipment, communications, unmanned underwater vehicles, and other similar payloads. This project is to design, deliver, and test a prototype low-power WEC that lowers the total cost of ownership and provides robust, new capabilities for customers in the maritime environment. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is conducted to systematically identify all potential failure modes and their effects on the system, and to analyze the criticality of each risk based on the likelihood of the event and the severity of the impact. Actions may then be recommended to mitigate the criticality of a risk, either by reducing the likelihood of the risk or the severity of its impact. Risk assessment is executed iteratively as an integral part of the design process. By incorporating risk assessment early in the development cycle, mitigation of risk can be achieved cost effectively. The actions recommended to mitigate risk may be subsequently executed, and as the design progresses the risk assessment is reviewed and revised. Review of the risk assessment is integrated into structured design reviews, ensuring that critical risks are comprehended and that the Project will not progress to e.g. fabrication while intolerable risks remain. The risk assessment process results in the population and maintenance of Risk Registers (RRs). Each major system (and as needed, subsystem) will have a distinct RR. This allows each system or subsystem to be assessed individually, rendering the RRs to a manageable size for review.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

An improved approach for flight readiness assessment

An improved methodology for quantitatively evaluating failure risk for a spaceflight system in order to assess flight readiness is presented. This methodology is of particular value when information relevant to failure prediction, including test experience and knowledge of parameters used in engineering analyses of failure phenomena, is limited. In this approach, engineering analysis models that characterize specific failure modes based on the physics and mechanics of the failure phenomena are used in a prescribed probabilistic structure to generate a failure probability distribution that is modified by test and flight experience in a Bayesian statistical procedure. The probabilistic structure and statistical methodology are generally applicable to any failure mode for which quantitative engineering analysis can be employed to characterize the failure phenomenon and are particularly well suited for use under the constraints on information availability that are typical of such spaceflight systems as the Space Shuttle and planetary spacecraft.

Moore, N. R.↗

TU-AB-BRD-00: Task Group 100

Current quality assurance and quality management guidelines provided by various professional organizations are prescriptive in nature, focusing principally on performance characteristics of planning and delivery devices. However, published analyses of events in radiation therapy show that most events are often caused by flaws in clinical processes rather than by device failures. This suggests the need for the development of a quality management program that is based on integrated approaches to process and equipment quality assurance. Industrial engineers have developed various risk assessment tools that are used to identify and eliminate potential failures from a system or a process before a failure impacts a customer. These tools include, but are not limited to, process mapping, failure modes and effects analysis, fault tree analysis. Task Group 100 of the American Association of Physicists in Medicine has developed these tools and used them to formulate an example risk-based quality management program for intensity-modulated radiotherapy. This is a prospective risk assessment approach that analyzes potential error pathways inherent in a clinical process and then ranks them according to relative risk, typically before implementation, followed by the design of a new process or modification of the existing process. Appropriate controls are then put in place to ensure that failures are less likely to occur and, if they do, they will more likely be detected before they propagate through the process, compromising treatment outcome and causing harm to the patient. Such a prospective approach forms the basis of the work of Task Group 100 that has recently been approved by the AAPM. This session will be devoted to a discussion of these tools and practical examples of how these tools can be used in a given radiotherapy clinic to develop a risk based quality management program. Learning Objectives: Learn how to design a process map for a radiotherapy process Learn how to perform failure modes and effects analysis analysis for a given process Learn what fault trees are all about Learn how to design a quality management program based upon the information obtained from process mapping, failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analysis. Dunscombe: Director, TreatSafely, LLC and Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences; Consultant to IAEA and Varian Thomadsen: President, Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences Palta: Vice President of the Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

TU-AB-BRD-03: Fault Tree Analysis

Current quality assurance and quality management guidelines provided by various professional organizations are prescriptive in nature, focusing principally on performance characteristics of planning and delivery devices. However, published analyses of events in radiation therapy show that most events are often caused by flaws in clinical processes rather than by device failures. This suggests the need for the development of a quality management program that is based on integrated approaches to process and equipment quality assurance. Industrial engineers have developed various risk assessment tools that are used to identify and eliminate potential failures from a system or a process before a failure impacts a customer. These tools include, but are not limited to, process mapping, failure modes and effects analysis, fault tree analysis. Task Group 100 of the American Association of Physicists in Medicine has developed these tools and used them to formulate an example risk-based quality management program for intensity-modulated radiotherapy. This is a prospective risk assessment approach that analyzes potential error pathways inherent in a clinical process and then ranks them according to relative risk, typically before implementation, followed by the design of a new process or modification of the existing process. Appropriate controls are then put in place to ensure that failures are less likely to occur and, if they do, they will more likely be detected before they propagate through the process, compromising treatment outcome and causing harm to the patient. Such a prospective approach forms the basis of the work of Task Group 100 that has recently been approved by the AAPM. This session will be devoted to a discussion of these tools and practical examples of how these tools can be used in a given radiotherapy clinic to develop a risk based quality management program. Learning Objectives: Learn how to design a process map for a radiotherapy process Learn how to perform failure modes and effects analysis analysis for a given process Learn what fault trees are all about Learn how to design a quality management program based upon the information obtained from process mapping, failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analysis. Dunscombe: Director, TreatSafely, LLC and Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences; Consultant to IAEA and Varian Thomadsen: President, Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences Palta: Vice President of the Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

TU-AB-BRD-01: Process Mapping

Current quality assurance and quality management guidelines provided by various professional organizations are prescriptive in nature, focusing principally on performance characteristics of planning and delivery devices. However, published analyses of events in radiation therapy show that most events are often caused by flaws in clinical processes rather than by device failures. This suggests the need for the development of a quality management program that is based on integrated approaches to process and equipment quality assurance. Industrial engineers have developed various risk assessment tools that are used to identify and eliminate potential failures from a system or a process before a failure impacts a customer. These tools include, but are not limited to, process mapping, failure modes and effects analysis, fault tree analysis. Task Group 100 of the American Association of Physicists in Medicine has developed these tools and used them to formulate an example risk-based quality management program for intensity-modulated radiotherapy. This is a prospective risk assessment approach that analyzes potential error pathways inherent in a clinical process and then ranks them according to relative risk, typically before implementation, followed by the design of a new process or modification of the existing process. Appropriate controls are then put in place to ensure that failures are less likely to occur and, if they do, they will more likely be detected before they propagate through the process, compromising treatment outcome and causing harm to the patient. Such a prospective approach forms the basis of the work of Task Group 100 that has recently been approved by the AAPM. This session will be devoted to a discussion of these tools and practical examples of how these tools can be used in a given radiotherapy clinic to develop a risk based quality management program. Learning Objectives: Learn how to design a process map for a radiotherapy process Learn how to perform failure modes and effects analysis analysis for a given process Learn what fault trees are all about Learn how to design a quality management program based upon the information obtained from process mapping, failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree analysis. Dunscombe: Director, TreatSafely, LLC and Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences; Consultant to IAEA and Varian Thomadsen: President, Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences Palta: Vice President of the Center for the Assessment of Radiological Sciences.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗