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At least 523 records · Page 29

Synchrophasors-based Master State Awareness Estimator for Cybersecurity in Power Grid: Testbed Implementation & Field Demonstration

The integration of distributed energy resources(DERs) and expansion of complex network in the distribution grid requires an advanced distributed state estimator to monitor the grid health at micro-level. The distribution state estimator will improve the situational awareness and resiliency of distributed power system. This paper proposes a synchrophasors-based master state awareness (MSA) estimator to enhance the cybersecurity in distribution grid by providing a real-time estimation of system operating states to control center operators. In this paper, the proposed MSA estimator utilizes only phasor measurements, bus magnitudes and angles, from phasor measurement units (PMUs),deployed in local substations, to estimate the system states and also detects data integrity attacks, such as load tripping attack that disconnects the load. To validate the proof of concept, we implement the proposed methodology in cyber-physical testbed environment at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Electric Grid Security Testbed. Further, to address the “valley of death” and support technology commercialization, field demonstration is also performed at the Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex(CITRC) at the INL. Our experimental results reveal a promising performance in detecting load tripping attack and providing an accurate situational awareness through an alert visualization dashboard in real-time

42 ENGINEERING↗

Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Cybersecurity Initiative

Recent cyber-attacks on industrial control systems, and inadvertent exposure of nuclear plant systems to cyber-exploits underscore the need for plant operators to adopt and deploy cyber-security defense solutions made for industrial control systems. Of increasing concern is the fact that international cyber hackers are beginning to target critical infrastructure, and because these more modern controls systems depend on advanced use of digital systems, they are more vulnerable than ever before to cyber-attacks. Traditional cyber defense strategies and products that have been available for decades are tailored for use on IT or corporate networks but can cause interruptions and catastrophic damage when deployed on industrial control system networks. The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy established the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) program to provide private companies pursuing innovative nuclear energy technologies with access to the technical support necessary to move toward commercialization. One of these GAIN small business vouchers was awarded to Dragos, Inc. to enable collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the Dragos Platform on a production nuclear reactor test bed, hence laying the path for future commercial adoption. The vision was to provide a guide for industrial operators on implementing an industrial monitoring solution and to show how these solutions can be deployed without causing safety and reliability issues. This report documents the results of the collaboration between ORNL and Dragos, Inc.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Assessment of Cloud-Based Applications Enabling a Scalable Risk-Informed Predictive Maintenance Strategy Across the Nuclear Fleet

The current light water reactor fleet uses time-based or failure-based maintenance strategies to achieve high-capacity factors. But to make nuclear more competitive in the energy market, these reactors could utilize emerging technologies in terms of artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing to enable a cost-effective, predictive maintenance strategy. This report examines the feasibility of cloud computing for the nuclear industry’s needs in terms of the cloud’s computing capabilities, feasibility, and regulatory concerns. The technical viability of cloud computing was analyzed using one year worth of data from a boiling water reactor’s safety relief valve. Models were hosted on a local desktop, Idaho National Laboratory’s high-performance computer, and Microsoft Azure. Data was loaded, processed, and two types of models were trained in an A/B fashion. Based on the speed at which these actions were completed, it was used to determined that cloud computing has adequate computing resources. Additionally, the computing power can scale with the demanded load. To enable cloud computing in the existing fleet, additional sensors, networks, and other requirements must be implemented to ensure a smooth transition from current maintenance strategies. However, there is a benefit as the plant no longer needs manage their own servers, software, cybersecurity, and IT support staff. Many of these features can be offloaded on to the cloud provider. A comprehensive analysis was completed that showed the current annual cost of operating is more expensive than using cloud computing resources. Lastly, the regulatory framework does not explicitly address AI or autonomous control. Currently, the NRC and other regulatory bodies are evaluating providing guidance to address gaps rather than new regulations to address the use of AI and ML. But since many of the AI applications are focused on non-safety related applications, such as balance-of-plant components, they will likely have little or no regulatory restrictions or necessary approvals. Demonstrating how AI can improve maintenance and operation of these non-safety related systems seems like the likely path forward for implementing AI and cloud computing resources inside nuclear power plants (NPPs).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Nine Canyon Long-Duration Energy Storage: A Feasibility Study

The Nine Canyon Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES) Feasibility Study explores the technical and economic viability of deploying advanced energy storage technologies at Energy Northwest's (EN) Nine Canyon (9C) Wind Project site in Benton County, Washington. Supported by the Washington State Department of Commerce and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity under its LDES Voucher Program, the study represents a collaborative effort between EN, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and ARES North America. At the core of this effort is the development of a generalized techno-economic modeling framework and evaluation tool designed to assess the value proposition of LDES projects across a variety of contexts. The modeling tool is technology-agnostic and accommodates user-defined parameters such as rated power, energy duration, round-trip efficiency, capital and operational costs, and dispatch constraints. It also integrates economic inputs, including market prices, energy revenue structures, and financing parameters to evaluate performance through key metrics. The tool provides utilities with a transparent, adaptable platform to support decision-making, investment prioritization, and portfolio planning for various storage technologies. To guide scenario design and interpretation, the study first surveyed the LDES technology landscape, including lithium-ion batteries, flow batteries, non-hydro gravity storage, and thermo-mechanical systems, comparing cost trajectories, technical performance, safety and hazards, materials sourcing and recyclability, and spatial/siting considerations. This literature-grounded review highlights technology trade-offs and reinforces the need to align technology choice with site characteristics, use cases, and project objectives. A companion chapter examines ownership structures (EN ownership, third-party ownership, shared models) and offtake options (energy marketing, capacity/energy PPAs, time-of-use PPAs, block-delivery PPAs, and tolling), where PPAs (power purchase agreements) represent contractual arrangements for buying and selling electricity. The chapter also highlights implications for risk allocation, capital access, operational control, and revenue certainty. The study also evaluates supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and transmission interconnection pathways, options include upgrading the existing SCADA or deploying a dedicated LDES controller, with attention to protection schemes, data telemetry, cybersecurity, and regulatory coordination with BPA. In addition, an ARES-specific geotechnical and hydrology assessment presented in the appendix screens multiple corridors for slope stability, bearing capacity, cut-and-fill magnitude, and stormwater behavior.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Cyber Halo Innovation Research Program (CHIRP) Handbook: CHIRP Program Document 2026

The Cyber Halo Innovation Research Program (CHIRP) handbook outlines a comprehensive framework designed to advance space cybersecurity education, workforce development, recruitment efforts for United States Space Force (USSF) Space Systems Command (SSC) and the Department of the Airforce, and foster students’ professional growth. It provides an overview of CHIRP's objectives and strategic focus, establishing the foundation for participant engagement through a network of collaborations with academic institutions, contracted industry partners, training and certification organizations, federal agencies, and community organizations. It states a clear participation strategy for SSC and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for program execution and successful support for student transition to a career in space cybersecurity.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Automation, Autonomy & Megacities 2025: A Dark Preview

This paper extrapolates from present trends to describe very plausible – and actually quite likely – future crises playing out in multiple global cities. While predicting the future is fraught with uncertainty, much of what occurs in the scenarios that follow is fully possible today and absent a significant course change, probable in the timeframe discussed. The authors want to caveat that we are not commenting on a specific organization or technology deployment. It is not hard to find tech evangelists touting that ubiquitous and highly interconnected digital technology will bring great advances in productivity and efficiency, as well as new capabilities we cannot foresee. This paper attempts to reveal what is possible when these technologies are applied to critical infrastructure applications en masse without adequate security in densely populated cities that by their nature are less resilient than other environments. Megacities need and will deploy these new technologies to keep up with insatiable demand for energy, communications, transportation and other services, but it is important to recognize that they are also made more vulnerable by following this path .

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Patching

While computer systems, software applications, and operational technology (OT)/Industrial Control System (ICS) devices are regularly updated through automated and manual processes, there are several unique challenges associated with distributed energy resource (DER) patching. Millions of DER devices from dozens of vendors have been deployed in home, corporate, and utility network environments that may or may not be internet-connected. These devices make up a growing portion of the electric power critical infrastructure system and are expected to operate for decades. During that operational period, it is anticipated that critical and noncritical firmware patches will be regularly created to improve DER functional capabilities or repair security deficiencies in the equipment. The SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup created a Patching Subgroup to investigate appropriate recommendations for the DER patching, holding fortnightly meetings for more than nine months. The group focused on DER equipment, but the observations and recommendations contained in this report also apply to DERMS tools and other OT equipment used in the end-to-end DER communication environment. The group found there were many standards and guides that discuss firmware lifecycles, patch and asset management, and code-signing implementations, but did not singularly cover the needs of the DER industry. This report collates best practices from these standards organizations and establishes a set of best practices that may be used as a basis for future national or international patching guides or standards.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Report on the Implementation of Smart Grids in Mexico

As part of Mexico's implementation of its constitutional energy reform and the transformation of its electric power industry, Mexico is addressing the central importance of a modernized grid. The energy sector reform laws establish a Smart Grid Program to make Mexico's power grid capable of meeting the country's lofty clean energy goals while improving efficiencies, maintaining system reliability, and increasing its security. Implementing Smart Grids in Mexico required a compilation of data and information from many sources that document Mexico's progress in implementing a Smart Grid. In this report, various knowledge experts contribute with an assessment on the topics of the legislation that created the sectoral transformation now underway; the state of smart grid technology in Mexico's power sector and the efforts undertaken to date; a review of policy in the power sector describing the development of the Smart Grid Implementation Plan by the Ministry of Energy; a review of Mexico's priorities for smart grid deployment; the mapping of several smart grid measures to the specific smart grid drivers; substantial detail from smart grid experts from NREL and from Swedish smart grid research centers describing smart grid measures to assist Mexico's move to a cleaner, more-efficient grid; institutional policies that are recommended for smart grid growth; discussion of some of the barriers to smart grid deployment, including cybersecurity concerns and consumer receptivity.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

2021 Annual Report Laboratory Directed Research & Development

The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program is an essential pathway for innovation, capability growth, and research staff development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). This program enables timely and agile response to national security, energy, and environmental challenges that motivate INL’s mission to discover and demonstrate innovative nuclear energy solutions and other clean energy options as well as securing our critical infrastructure. This report highlights INL’s LDRD projects concluding in fiscal year (FY) 2021 which included innovative research and development (R&D) across INL’s five science and technology initiatives: nuclear reactor sustainment and expanded deployment, integrated fuel cycle solutions, integrated energy systems, advanced design and manufacturing for extreme environments, and secure and resilient cyber-physical systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

INL FY 2021 Laboratory Overview

The INL FY 2021 Laboratory Overview is an opportunity for INL to share its achievements and plans for the future with the entire Laboratory, stakeholders, and the public. This document outlines how INL will advance its clean energy and national security objectives in the future and highlights FY 2020 accomplishments across the Laboratory in science and technology, community outreach, and operations.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Attack Surface of Renewable Energy Technologies

This slide deck presents an overview of the threat landscape for renewable energy technologies. It highlights he growing penetration of renewable resources and potential impact of an attack. Standard architectures are shared to highlight where vulnerabilities may exist and attack paths to reach critical infrastructure. We discuss threat actors and attack paths. Several recent events impacting renewable energy assets or companies are explained.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Why does cyber deterrence fail and when might it succeed? A framework for cyber scenario analysis

Through cyberattacks on information technology and digital communications systems, antagonists have increasingly been able to alter the strategic balance in their favor without provoking serious consequences. Conflict within and through the cyber domain is inherently different from conflict in other domains that house our critical systems. These differences result in new challenges for defending and creating resilient systems, and for deterring those who would wish to disrupt or destroy them. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the question of whether or not deterrence can be an effective strategy in cyber conflict, given our broad and varied interests in cyberspace. We define deterrence broadly as the creation of conditions that dissuade antagonists from taking unwanted actions because they believe that they will incur unacceptably high costs and/or receive insufficient benefits from taking that action. Deterrence may or may not be the most credible or effective strategy for achieving our desired end states in cybersecurity. Regardless of the answer here, however, it is important to consider why deterrence strategies might succeed under certain conditions, and to understand why deterrence is not effective within the myriad contexts that it appears fail. Deterrence remains a key component of U.S. cyber strategy, but there is little detail on how to operationalize or implement this policy, how to bring a whole-of-government and whole-of- private-sector approach to cyber deterrence, which types of antagonists can or should be deterred, and in which contexts. Moreover, discussion about how nations can and should respond to significant cyber incidents largely centers around whether or not the incident constitutes a "use of force," which would justify certain types of responses according to international law. However, we believe the "use of force" threshold is inadequate to describe the myriad interests and objectives of actors in cyberspace, both attackers and defenders. In this paper, we propose an approach to further examine if deterrence is an effective strategy and under which conditions. Our approach includes systematic analysis of cyber incident scenarios using a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of various activities in influencing antagonist behavior. While we only examine a single scenario for this paper, we propose that additional work is needed to more fully understand how various alternative thresholds constrain or unleash options for actors to influence one another's behavior in the cyber domain.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Alliance Project: Secure Control Systems for the Energy Sector

The Alliance Project addresses Area of Interest 4: Secure Remote Access for the Energy Sector, by combining physical and cyber access under one cybersecurity access system. The Alliance Project built on the successful completion of the Lemnos and Padlock Project (DOE-Funded Project started in 2007 and 2010) and researched and developed a solution for an Ethernet Security Gateway with the functionality required to integrate the physical access control cyber system and interface with legacy and new proximity card readers used for physical access requests. This project focused on securing and enhancing the cyber system the physical access control system operates on. The team tested and demonstrated the system solution on the SEL campus. Currently the physical access cyber system is completely separate from the cyber access control cyber system. With a single system industry benefits include: (1) Single system to learn and teach employees; (2) Single system that collects and alerts on logs and events simplifying incident response plans and NERC CIP compliance; (3) Unifies trust management to a single system reducing the potential errors in privilege escalation or revocation; (4) Provides a stronger cybersecurity platform the physical access control system operates on. Today they are mostly plain text protocols and little cyber awareness; (5) Integration of physical access awareness allows the cyber system to react and adjust. In some cases, the cyber access can be enhanced with authorized physical access and other cases the cyber access can be more restricted with unauthorized physical access; and (6) Enables the utility to establish as large or as small a physical access control system as they require. One example would be when a utility shares a substation with a neighbor utility and can’t rely on the substation door for the physical access control. The Alliance technology enables them to lock equipment racks simply with no scalability issues because it stands on the cyber security infrastructure which is already highly scalable.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Security Hardened Cyber Components for Nuclear Power Plants: Phase I SBIR Final Technical Report

SpiralGen, Inc. built a proof-of-concept toolkit for enhancing the cyber security of nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure with high-assurance instrumentation and control code. The toolkit is based on technology from the DARPA High-Assurance Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) program, which has focused on applying the science of formal methods to the formidable set of problems involved in securing cyber physical systems. The primary challenges beyond HACMS in developing this toolkit were to make the new technology usable by control system engineers and compatible with the regulatory and commercial constraints of the nuclear power industry. The toolkit, packaged as a Simulink add-on, allows a system designer to assemble a high-assurance component from formally specified and proven blocks and generate provably correct control and monitor code for that subsystem.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Ambassador Project (Final Report)

SEL, in collaboration with its partners, performed research, development and demonstration of a trust, data, and resource management software layer enabling multiple software applications from different suppliers to operate in a Software Defined Infrastructure. The Energy sector has successfully deployed Software Defined Networking (SDN) technology and is rapidly scaling deployments. One major benefit of SDN is the abstracted centralized nature of the orchestration and management of the network. This architecture enables end users to deploy new technology and capabilities as quickly as they perform firmware upgrades to field devices. When an end user needs to roll trucks to install new equipment, they simply deploy new software to run on top of this SD-Infrastructure. This has attracted many software companies to develop value added features and introduce new capabilities, which is all good for the industry but has also introduced new challenges, including how to manage trust between these software applications, how to manage the data integrity and access, and how to manage access to the network resources each of these software applications are demanding. Completion of this project developed and demonstrated a safe and reliable resource scheduler and cybersecurity trust management communication platform allowing multiple software applications to operate in a SD-Infrastructure resulting in the commercialization of a software eco-system and architecture that maintains interoperability, cybersecurity, and reliability where the end user can safely scale out their software to leverage the powerful benefits of SDN.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) for Standard Development Organizations [Slides]

SDO stands for Standard Development Organization. For our purposes, an SDO is an organization whose primary activities are developing, coordinating, promulgating, revising, amending, issuing, or publishing standards. These standards are crucial for interoperability, safety, quality, and innovation across various industries and technologies. In the context of our discussion, when we refer to an "SDO," we are specifically targeting these organizations as our primary audience. The purpose is to provide an overview of CIE and how SDOs can apply its concepts in standards development and updates.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗