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At least 523 records · Page 29

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Potential Failure Modes and Failure Mitigation Strategies

Electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems hold great potential for the reduction of aircraft fuel burn, emissions, and noise. Currently, NASA and other organizations are actively working to identify and mature technologies necessary to bring EAP designs to reality. A requirement for the development of any civil aircraft and its systems is to ensure that potential hazards in the design are identified and appropriately mitigated to ensure that the system is safe. During aircraft development, a system safety assessment that consists of a functional hazard assessment is conducted to identify all potential failure conditions of each function, and classify those failures according to the severity of their effects on the aircraft or its occupants. The more severe a function's failure condition classification, the greater the development assurance level required for the function to ensure that the probability of the hazard is acceptably low. Today, aircraft engines and their control systems receive type certificate approval as a stand-alone system to signify their airworthiness. However, the complex coupling and distributed nature of EAP designs are expected to place added challenges on the certification of these systems. This presentation will provide an initial high-level review of the potential failure modes and hazards posed by a generic EAP system along with potential mitigation strategies for those failures. The EAP system is assumed to be a hybrid design consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems will be discussed along with the potential failure modes they may encounter. This will include a discussion of coupled failure effects, where a fault in one EAP subsystem effects the operation of other subsystems in the architecture. Next, potential failure mitigation strategies are discussed including both software-based and hardware-based mitigation strategies. The presentation will conclude with an example evaluation of the potential failure modes and mitigation strategies for a concept EAP system proposed by NASA.

Simon, Donald L.↗

Fault Tolerant Magnetic Bearing for Turbomachinery

NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) has developed a Fault-Tolerant Magnetic Bearing Suspension rig to enhance the bearing system safety. It successfully demonstrated that using only two active poles out of eight redundant poles from each radial bearing (that is, simply 12 out of 16 poles dead) levitated the rotor and spun it without losing stability and desired position up to the maximum allowable speed of 20,000 rpm. In this paper, it is demonstrated that as far as the summation of force vectors of the attracting poles and rotor weight is zero, a fault-tolerant magnetic bearing system maintained the rotor at the desired position without losing stability even at the maximum rotor speed. A proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller generated autonomous corrective actions with no operator's input for the fault situations without losing load capacity in terms of rotor position. This paper also deals with a centralized modal controller to better control the dynamic behavior over system modes.

Choi, Benjamin↗

Large-Scale Spacecraft Fire Safety Experiments in ISS Resupply Vehicles

Our understanding of the fire safety risk in manned spacecraft has been limited by the small scale of the testing we have been able to conduct in low-gravity. Fire growth and spread cannot be expected to scale linearly with sample size so we cannot make accurate predictions of the behavior of realistic scale fires in spacecraft based on the limited low-g testing to date. As a result, spacecraft fire safety protocols are necessarily very conservative and costly. Future crewed missions are expected to be longer in duration than previous exploration missions outside of low-earth orbit and accordingly, more complex in terms of operations, logistics, and safety. This will increase the challenge of ensuring a fire-safe environment for the crew throughout the mission. Based on our fundamental uncertainty of the behavior of fires in low-gravity, the need for realistic scale testing at reduced gravity has been demonstrated. To address this concern, a spacecraft fire safety research project is underway to reduce the uncertainty and risk in the design of spacecraft fire safety systems by testing at nearly full scale in low-gravity. This project is supported by the NASA Advanced Exploration Systems Program Office in the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. The activity of this project is supported by an international topical team of fire experts from other space agencies to maximize the utility of the data and to ensure the widest possible scrutiny of the concept. The large-scale space flight experiment will be conducted on three missions; each in an Orbital Sciences Corporation Cygnus vehicle after it has deberthed from the ISS. Although the experiment will need to meet rigorous safety requirements to ensure the carrier vehicle does not sustain damage, the absence of a crew allows the fire products to be released into the cabin. The tests will be fully automated with the data downlinked at the conclusion of the test before the Cygnus vehicle reenters the atmosphere. The international topical team is collaborating with the NASA team in the definition of the experiment requirements and performing supporting analysis, experimentation and technology development.

Combustion↗

Autonomy and the human element in space

NASA is contemplating the next logical step in the U.S. space program - the permanent presence of humans in space. As currently envisioned, the initial system, planned for the early 1990's, will consist of manned and unmanned platforms situated primarily in low Earth orbit. The manned component will most likely be inhabited by 6-8 crew members performing a variety of tasks such as materials processing, satellite servicing, and life science experiments. The station thus has utility in scientific and commercial enterprises, in national security, and in the development of advanced space technology. The technical foundations for this next step have been firmly established as a result of unmanned spacecraft missions to other planets, the Apollo program, and Skylab. With the shuttle, NASA inaugurates a new era of frequent flights and more routine space operations supporting a larger variety of missions. A permanently manned space system will enable NASA to expand the scope of its activities still further. Since NASA' s inception there has been an intense debate over the relative merits of manned and unmanned space systems. Despite the generally higher costs associated with manned components, astronauts have accomplished numerous essential, complex tasks in space. The unique human talent to evaluate and respond inventively to unanticipated events has been crucial in many missions, and the presence of crews has helped arouse and sustain public interest in the space program. On the other hand, the hostile orbital environment affects astronaut physiology and productivity, is dangerous, and mandates extensive support systems. Safety and cost factors require the entire station complex, both space and ground components, to be highly automated to free people from mundane operational chores. Recent advances in computer technology, artificial intelligence (AI), and robotics have the potential to greatly extend space station operations, offering lower costs and superior productivity. Extended operations can in turn enhance critical technologies and contribute to the competitive economic abilities of the United States. A high degree of automation and autonomy may be required to reduce dependence on ground systems, reduce mission costs, diminish complexity as perceived by the crew, increase mission lifetime and expand mission versatility. However, technologies dealing with heavily automated, long duration habitable spacecraft have not yet been thoroughly investigated by NASA. A highly automated station must amalgamate the diverse capabilities of people, machines, and computers to yield an efficient system which capitalizes on unique human characteristics. The station also must have an initial design which allows evolution to a larger and more sophisticated space presence. In the early years it is likely that AI-based subsystems will be used primarily in an advisory or planning capacity. As human confidence in automated systems grows and as technology advances, machines will take on more critical and interdependent roles. The question is whether, and how much, system autonomy will lead to improved station effectiveness.

Source record↗

Topics on Test Methods for Space Systems and Operations Safety: Applicability of Experimental Data

This viewgraph presentation reviews topics on test methods for space systems and operations safety through experimentation and analysis. The contents include: 1) Perception of reality through experimentation and analysis; 2) Measurements, methods, and correlations with real life; and 3) Correlating laboratory aerospace materials flammability data with data in spacecraft environments.

Hirsch, David B.↗

Robotics

Lunar robotic functions include: 1. Transport of crew and payloads on the surface of the moon; 2. Offloading payloads from a lunar lander; 3. Handling the deployment of surface systems; with 4. Human commanding of these functions from inside a lunar vehicle, habitat, or extravehicular (space walk), with Earth-based supervision. The systems that will perform these functions may not look like robots from science fiction. In fact, robotic functions may be automated trucks, cranes and winches. Use of this equipment prior to the crew s arrival or in the potentially long periods without crews on the surface, will require that these systems be computer controlled machines. The public release of NASA's Exploration plans at the 2nd Space Exploration Conference (Houston, December 2006) included a lunar outpost with as many as four unique mobility chassis designs. The sequence of lander offloading tasks involved as many as ten payloads, each with a unique set of geometry, mass and interface requirements. This plan was refined during a second phase study concluded in August 2007. Among the many improvements to the exploration plan were a reduction in the number of unique mobility chassis designs and a reduction in unique payload specifications. As the lunar surface system payloads have matured, so have the mobility and offloading functional requirements. While the architecture work continues, the community can expect to see functional requirements in the areas of surface mobility, surface handling, and human-systems interaction as follows: Surface Mobility 1. Transport crew on the lunar surface, accelerating construction tasks, expanding the crew s sphere of influence for scientific exploration, and providing a rapid return to an ascent module in an emergency. The crew transport can be with an un-pressurized rover, a small pressurized rover, or a larger mobile habitat. 2. Transport Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) equipment and construction payloads. 3. Transport habitats and power modules over long distances, pre-positioning them for the arrival of crew on a subsequent lander. Surface Handling 1. Offload surface system payloads from the lander, breaking launch restraints and power/data connections. Payloads may be offloaded to a wheeled vehicle for transport. 2. Deploy payloads from a wheeled vehicle at a field site, placing the payloads in their final use site on the ground or mating them with existing surface systems. 3. Support regolith collection, site preparation, berm construction, or other civil engineering tasks using tools and implements attached to rovers. Human-Systems Interaction 1. Provide a safe command and control interface for suited EVA to ride on and drive the vehicles, making sure that the systems are also safe for working near dismounted crew. 2. Provide an effective control system for IV crew to tele-operate vehicles, cranes and other equipment from inside the surface habitats with evolving independence from Earth. .. Provide a supervisory system that allows machines to be commanded from the ground, working across the Earth-Lunar time delays on the order of 5-10 seconds (round trip) to support operations when crew are not resident on the surface. Technology Development Needs 1. Surface vehicles that can dock, align and mate with outpost equipment such as landers, habitats and fluid/power interfaces. 2. Long life motors, drive trains, seals, motor electronics, sensors, processors, cable harnesses, and dash board displays. 3. Active suspension control, localization, high speed obstacle avoidance, and safety systems for operating near dismounted crew. 4. High specific energy and specific power batteries that are safe, rechargeable, and long lived.

Ambrose, Robert O.↗

Multiple Changes to Reusable Solid Rocket Motors, Identifying Hidden Risks

The Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) baseline is subject to various changes. Changes are necessary due to safety and quality improvements, environmental considerations, vendor changes, obsolescence issues, etc. The RSRM program has a goal to test changes on full-scale static test motors prior to flight due to the unique RSRM operating environment. Each static test motor incorporates several significant changes and numerous minor changes. Flight motors often implement multiple changes simultaneously. While each change is individually verified and assessed, the potential for changes to interact constitutes additional hidden risk. Mitigating this risk depends upon identification of potential interactions. Therefore, the ATK Thiokol Propulsion System Safety organization initiated the use of a risk interaction matrix to identify potential interactions that compound risk. Identifying risk interactions supports flight and test motor decisions. Uncovering hidden risks of a full-scale static test motor gives a broader perspective of the changes being tested. This broader perspective compels the program to focus on solutions for implementing RSRM changes with minimal/mitigated risk. This paper discusses use of a change risk interaction matrix to identify test challenges and uncover hidden risks to the RSRM program.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗

Improved Nuclear Reactor and Shield Mass Model for Space Applications

New technologies are being developed to explore the distant reaches of the solar system. Beyond Mars, solar energy is inadequate to power advanced scientific instruments. One technology that can meet the energy requirements is the space nuclear reactor. The nuclear reactor is used as a heat source for which a heat-to-electricity conversion system is needed. Examples of such conversion systems are the Brayton, Rankine, and Stirling cycles. Since launch cost is proportional to the amount of mass to lift, mass is always a concern in designing spacecraft. Estimations of system masses are an important part in determining the feasibility of a design. I worked under Michael Barrett in the Thermal Energy Conversion Branch of the Power & Electric Propulsion Division. An in-house Closed Cycle Engine Program (CCEP) is used for the design and performance analysis of closed-Brayton-cycle energy conversion systems for space applications. This program also calculates the system mass including the heat source. CCEP uses the subroutine RSMASS, which has been updated to RSMASS-D, to estimate the mass of the reactor. RSMASS was developed in 1986 at Sandia National Laboratories to quickly estimate the mass of multi-megawatt nuclear reactors for space applications. In response to an emphasis for lower power reactors, RSMASS-D was developed in 1997 and is based off of the SP-100 liquid metal cooled reactor. The subroutine calculates the mass of reactor components such as the safety systems, instrumentation and control, radiation shield, structure, reflector, and core. The major improvements in RSMASS-D are that it uses higher fidelity calculations, is easier to use, and automatically optimizes the systems mass. RSMASS-D is accurate within 15% of actual data while RSMASS is only accurate within 50%. My goal this summer was to learn FORTRAN 77 programming language and update the CCEP program with the RSMASS-D model.

Robb, Kevin↗

Ejecta Management in a Safe Lithium Ion Battery Design

As lithium-ion battery energy densities continue to rise, managing the heat and pressure generated during failure events has become increasingly critical. Safety systems must effectively relieve pressure without releasing sparks, flames, or particulate matter, requiring robust filtration solutions. The challenge is compounded by the reduced free volume available for gas expansion in high-density designs, which increases the demands on these filters. While significant progress has been made through experimental studies and modeling efforts to understand the behavior of ejecta during battery failures, there remains a pressing need for practical, rule-of-thumb sizing parameters. These parameters would help correlate high-energy waste streams with appropriate filter design, ensuring reliable containment and safety. This talk will explore recent experimental findings in this area and discuss the potential pathways for developing these essential sizing guidelines.

Ejecta Management↗

Autonomous Contingency Management In Urban Air Mobility: The Communication Network Awareness Machine System

Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) has begun the modernization of the nation’s air transportation system (NAS), with goals to improve system safety, increase operation efficiency and capacity, provide enhanced predictability, resilience and robustness [1]. The overall objective of the Air Traffic Management-eXploration (ATM-X) project is to facilitate the goals of NextGen by conducting research to enable the growing demand of new, mission variant, air vehicles with safe access to the NAS. The implementation and utilization of new and burgeoning technologies that are both flexible, scalable, and systematically user-focused are requisite for ATM-X to achieve its intention of NAS safe entry [2]. Researchers from NASA Langley’s Flight Deck Integration Team have developed a system architecture that would allow ATM-X to leverage the necessary capabilities of an Increasingly Autonomous System (IAS), machine-agent that will promote the safe access and operation of air vehicles within what has become the byproduct of NextGen modernization, a Net-Centric airspace architecture and an Urban Air Mobility (UAM) community. Conducting flight operations within this type of architecture constrains the human-agent’s natural ability by data management. When the massive volume of data, its types, and the acquisition speed at which the data is ingested is observed it becomes evident that the human-agent will be functioning at an operational disadvantage. Therefore, the development and integration of intelligent machine-agents into the flight deck are a necessary implementation to achieve ATM-X overall objective of safe access and operation in the NAS.

Urban Air Mobility↗

Integrated modeling and analysis of a space-truss article

MSC/NASTRAN is being used in the Controls-Structures Interaction (CSI) program at NASA Langley Research Center as a key analytical tool for structural analysis as well as the basis for control law development, closed-loop performance evaluation, and system safety checks. Guest investigators from academia and industry are performing dynamics and control experiments on a flight-like deployable space truss called Mini-Mast to determine the effectiveness of various active-vibration control laws. MSC/NASTRAN was used to calculate natural frequencies and mode shapes below 100 Hz to describe the dynamics of the 20-meter-long lightweight Mini-Mast structure. Gravitational effects contribute significantly to structural stiffness and are accounted for through a two-phase solution in which the differential stiffness matrix is calculated and then used in the eigensolution. Reduced modal models are extracted for control law design and evaluation of closed-loop system performance. Predicted actuator forces from controls simulations are then applied to the extended model to predict member loads and stresses. These pre-test analyses reduce risks associated with the structural integrity of the test article, which is a major concern in closed-loop control experiments due to potential instabilities.

Alan E Stockwell↗

Advancing Aircraft Operations in a Net-Centric Environment with the Incorporation of Increasingly Autonomous Systems and Human Teaming

NextGen has begun the modernization of the nation’s air transportation system, with goals to improve system safety, increase operation efficiency and capacity, provide enhanced predictability, resilience and robustness. With these improvements, NextGen is poised to handle significant increases in air traffic operations, more than twice the number recorded in 2016, by 2025.1 NextGen is evolving toward collaborative decision-making across many agents, including automation, by use of a Net-Centric architecture, which in itself creates a very complex environment in which the navigation and operation of aircraft are to take place. An intricate environment such as this, coupled with the expected upsurge of air traffic operations generates concern respecting the ability of the human-agent to both fly and manage aircraft within. Therefore, it is both necessary and practical to begin the process of increasingly autonomous systems within the cockpit that will act independently to assist the human-agent achieve the overall goal of NextGen. However, the straightforward technological development and implementation of intelligent machines into the cockpit is only part of what is necessary to maintain, at minimum, or improve human-agent functionality, as desired, while operating in NextGen. The full integration of Increasingly Autonomous Systems (IAS) within the cockpit can only be accomplished when the IAS works in concert with the human, formulating trust between the two, thereby establishing a team atmosphere. Imperative to cockpit implementation is ensuring the proper performance of the IAS by the development team and the human-agent with which it will be paired when given a specific piloting, navigation, or observational task. Described in this paper are the steps taken, at NASA Langley Research Center, during the second and third phases of the development of an IAS, the Traffic Data Manager (TDM), its verification and validation by human-agents, and the foundational development of Human Autonomy Teaming (HAT) between the two.

Houston, Vincent E.↗

Supporting Hazard Analysis for Wildfire Response Using fmdtools and MIKA

The System Wide Safety (SWS) Safety Demonstrator (SD) Series drives development of an increasingly capable In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) focusing on humanitarian applications, starting with wildfire response (SD-1). The goals of this report are to (1) provide an early hazard analysis and mitigation evaluation of wildfire response to support these efforts and (2) provide a demonstration of capabilities of the Fault Model Design Tools (fmdtools) and Manager for Intelligent Knowledge Access (MIKA) tools. fmdtools provides a modeling, simulation, and resiliency analysis framework in which a wildfire response model, the System Modeling and Analysis of Resiliency in Scalable Traffic Management for Emergency Response Operations (SMARt-STEReO), is built. MIKA is an intelligent knowledge manager with several capabilities, including assisting in hazard analysis by extracting and analyzing hazards from historical incident reports. The following topics are covered in the report: Understanding Wildfire Hazard Dynamics. We provide a description and simulated examples of how hazards occur in the SMARt-STEReO model of wildfire response and their effect on its outcome. This provides a common mental model and focuses the analysis presented in the remainder of the report. Wildfire Hazard Identification. MIKA identifies wildfire hazards from three relevant datasets: the ICS-209-PLUS, SAFECOM, and SAFENET. Hazards are manually organized into a taxonomy and MIKA analyzes each hazard’s effects, likelihood, severity, and risk. Evaluating Mitigation Strategies. The SMARt-STEReO wildfire response model built in fmdtools evaluates a subset of identified hazards. Specifically, we simulate the effect of communications faults and equipment faults on operator safety, the effect of changing winds and flammability, and a scenario with multiple ignition points and heavy smoke. Tool Limitations and Usage Considerations. We provide a discussion of appropriate tool use cases as well as limitations and considerations for usage. The tool findings are used to synthesize recommendations for wildfire response operations, which can be captured as part of an IASMS. Key recommendations are as follows: Hazards are identified from a broad spectrum of sources including aircraft subsystems, operational sources, and ground crew operations. Highest risk operational environment hazards identified are Evacuations. The highest risk manned aerial operations hazard categorized is Jumper Operations Mishap. Ground crew hazards that are highest risk are Burns, Cargo Operations Overhead, Dehydration, Entrapment, Falling Objects, Heart Attacks, Heat Exhaustion, Inadequate Training or Certification, Vehicle Breakdown, and Vehicle Collision. Modelled containment failures arise from a mismatch between the difficulty of the firefighting scenario and the capacity (e.g., speed, effectiveness, awareness) of the response. In firefighting scenarios where containment is possible (e.g., because the fire does not spread too quickly), these mismatches can occur because of a change in environmental conditions (e.g., wind, flammability, etc) or because of planning, equipment, or communications faults. Improvements to communications increase the capacity of the firefighting response by reducing the time needed to respond to the fire. While surveillance does not increase this capacity by itself, it increases operator safety by increasing state awareness, enabling firefighters to evade approaching fires. Increasing both has a synergistic effect. In general, these performance and resilience increases generalize over fault scenarios as well as unforeseen changes to circumstances (i.e., wind, aridity, etc.). However, these improvements need to be designed so as not to make the system prone to persistent large-scale communications outages, which can reduce performance.

Hazard analysis↗

Usability of Pre-Flight Planning Interfaces for Supplemental Data Service Provider Tools to Support Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management

Small uncrewed aircraft systems (sUASs) operate in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace – where support services for their operators (UASOs) are not currently provided. NASA’s System-Wide Safety (SWS) project is identifying the potential risks and hazards to sUAS operations to provide, inform, and improve the designs of In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS). The IASMS will include a suite of data-driven tools that compile and analyze data collected from aviation systems and environmental sources to predict hazards, and provide information to allow operators to mitigate these risks (Young et al., 2020). These risk and hazard services can be run and displayed to operators on graphical user interfaces (GUIs), as they relate to a vehicle(s)’ route of flight. These interfaces offer both a means to present hazard service output and offer an opportunity to test user understanding of the information, user decision making, and the best ways to present such data to an operator. Based on these future technologies and intended missions, it is important to investigate interface requirements and evaluate how operators might use these tools. Presenting salient and meaningful risk assessment information to operators is necessary to increase situation awareness and ultimately safety. Building on previous research (Feldman et al., 2022), a usability study comparing two GUIs was conducted to explore how individuals interacted with different styles of information displays. A series of pre-flight hazard and risk-assessment tasks were developed to evaluate participant performance using the Supplemental Data Service Provider Consolidated Dashboard and the Human Automation Team Interface System interfaces. Participants were trained to use both GUIs and their performance was analysed across different scenarios involving multiple sUASs. Performance on simple tasks and the System Usability Scale scores were reported by Feldman et al., 2023. Additional analyses and evaluations on more complex tasks (e.g., risk assessment, prioritization), workload and response times are examined in this paper.

sUAV interfaces↗

Usability of Pre-flight Planning Interfaces for Supplemental Data Service Provider Tools to Support Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management

Small uncrewed aircraft systems (sUASs) operate in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace – where support services for their operators (UASOs) are not currently provided. NASA’s System-Wide Safety (SWS) project is identifying the potential risks and hazards to sUAS operations to provide, inform, and improve the designs of In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS). The IASMS will include a suite of data-driven tools that compile and analyze data collected from aviation systems and environmental sources to predict hazards, and provide information to allow operators to mitigate these risks (Young et al., 2020). These risk and hazard services can be run and displayed to operators on graphical user interfaces (GUIs), as they relate to a vehicle(s)’ route of flight. These interfaces offer both a means to present hazard service output and offer an opportunity to test user understanding of the information, user decision making, and the best ways to present such data to an operator. Based on these future technologies and intended missions, it is important to investigate interface requirements and evaluate how operators might use these tools. Presenting salient and meaningful risk assessment information to operators is necessary to increase situation awareness and ultimately safety. Building on previous research (Feldman et al., 2022), a usability study comparing two GUIs was conducted to explore how individuals interacted with different styles of information displays. A series of pre-flight hazard and risk-assessment tasks were developed to evaluate participant performance using the Supplemental Data Service Provider Consolidated Dashboard and the Human Automation Team Interface System interfaces. Participants were trained to use both GUIs and their performance was analysed across different scenarios involving multiple sUASs. Performance on simple tasks and the System Usability Scale scores were reported by Feldman et al., 2023. Additional analyses and evaluations on more complex tasks (e.g., risk assessment, prioritization), workload and response times are examined in this paper.

sUAV interfaces↗

Autonomous Mission Manager for Rendezvous, Inspection and Mating

To meet cost and safety objectives, space missions that involve proximity operations between two vehicles require a high level of autonomy to successfully complete their missions. The need for autonomy is primarily driven by the need to conduct complex operations outside of communication windows, and the communication time delays inherent in space missions. Autonomy also supports the goals of both NASA and the DOD to make space operations more routine, and lower operational costs by reducing the requirement for ground personnel. NASA and the DoD have several programs underway that require a much higher level of autonomy for space vehicles. NASA's Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program has ambitious goals of reducing costs by a factor or 10 and improving safety by a factor of 100. DARPA has recently begun its Orbital Express to demonstrate key technologies to make satellite servicing routine. The Air Force's XSS-ll program is developing a protoflight demonstration of an autonomous satellite inspector. A common element in space operations for many NASA and DOD missions is the ability to rendezvous, inspect anclJor dock with another spacecraft. For DARPA, this is required to service or refuel military satellites. For the Air Force, this is required to inspect un-cooperative resident space objects. For NASA, this is needed to meet the primary SLI design reference mission of International Space Station re-supply. A common aspect for each of these programs is an Autonomous Mission Manager that provides highly autonomous planning, execution and monitoring of the rendezvous, inspection and docking operations. This paper provides an overview of the Autonomous Mission Manager (AMM) design being incorporated into many of these technology programs. This AMM provides a highly scalable level of autonomous operations, ranging from automatic execution of ground-derived plans to highly autonomous onboard planning to meet ground developed mission goals. The AMM provides the capability to automatically execute the plans and monitor the system performance. In the event of system dispersions or failures the AMM can modify plans or abort to assure overall system safety. This paper describes the design and functionality of Draper's AMM framework, presents concept of operations associated with the use of the AMM, and outlines the relevant features of the flight demonstrations.

Zimpfer, Douglas J.↗

Microbial Monitoring of the International Space Station

Humans living and working in the harsh environment of space present many challenges for habitability engineers and microbiologists. Spacecraft must provide an internal environment in which physical (gas composition, pressure, temperature, and humidity), chemical, and biological environmental parameters are maintained at safe levels. Microorganisms are ubiquitous and will accompany all human-occupied spacecraft, but if biological contamination were to reach unacceptable levels, long-term human space flight would be impossible. Prevention of microbiological problems, therefore, must have a high priority. Historically, prevention of infectious disease in the crew has been the highest priority, but experience gained from the NASA-Mir program showed that microbial contamination of vehicle and life-support systems, such as biofouling of water and food, are of equal importance. The major sources of microbiological risk factors for astronauts include food, drinking water, air, surfaces, payloads, research animals, crew members, and personnel in close contact with the astronauts. In our efforts to eliminate or mitigate the negative effects of microorganisms in spacecraft, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) implemented comprehensive microbial analyses of the major risk factors. This included the establishment of acceptability requirements for food, water, air, surfaces, and crew members. A robust monitoring program was then implemented to verify that the risks were within acceptable limits. Prevention of microbiological problems is preferred over mitigation of problems during flight, and preventive steps must begin very early in the design phase. Spacecraft development must include requirements to control free water from humidity, condensate, hygiene activities, and other releases. If water is available, microbes are likely to grow because sufficient nutrients are potentially available. Materials selected for the spacecraft must not promote or support microbial growth. Air filtration can dramatically reduce the number of airborne bacteria, fungi, and particulates in spacecraft breathing air. Waterborne bacteria can be reduced to acceptable levels by thermal inactivation of bacteria during water processing, along with a residual biocide, and filtration at the point of use can ensure safety. System design must include onboard capability to achieve recovery of the system from contamination. Robust housekeeping procedures that include periodic cleaning and disinfection will prevent high levels of microbial growth on surfaces. Food for consumption in space must be thoroughly tested for excessive microbial content and pathogens before launch. Thorough preflight examination of flight crews, consumables, payloads, and the environment can greatly reduce pathogens in spacecraft. Many of the lessons learned from the Space Shuttle and previous programs were applied in the early design phase of the International Space Station, resulting in the safest space habitat to date. This presentation describes the monitoring program for the International Space Station and will summarize results from preflight and on-orbit monitoring.

Pierson, Duane L.↗

Modeling and Analysis of Realistic Fire Scenarios in Spacecraft

An accidental fire inside a spacecraft is an unlikely, but very real emergency situation that can easily have dire consequences. While much has been learned over the past 25+ years of dedicated research on flame behavior in microgravity, a quantitative understanding of the initiation, spread, detection and extinguishment of a realistic fire aboard a spacecraft is lacking. Virtually all combustion experiments in microgravity have been small-scale, by necessity (hardware limitations in ground-based facilities and safety concerns in space-based facilities). Large-scale, realistic fire experiments are unlikely for the foreseeable future (unlike in terrestrial situations). Therefore, NASA will have to rely on scale modeling, extrapolation of small-scale experiments and detailed numerical modeling to provide the data necessary for vehicle and safety system design. This paper presents the results of parallel efforts to better model the initiation, spread, detection and extinguishment of fires aboard spacecraft. The first is a detailed numerical model using the freely available Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). FDS is a CFD code that numerically solves a large eddy simulation form of the Navier-Stokes equations. FDS provides a detailed treatment of the smoke and energy transport from a fire. The simulations provide a wealth of information, but are computationally intensive and not suitable for parametric studies where the detailed treatment of the mass and energy transport are unnecessary. The second path extends a model previously documented at ICES meetings that attempted to predict maximum survivable fires aboard space-craft. This one-dimensional model implies the heat and mass transfer as well as toxic species production from a fire. These simplifications result in a code that is faster and more suitable for parametric studies (having already been used to help in the hatch design of the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, MPCV).

life support↗