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Verification and Implementation of Operations Safety Controls for Flight Missions

There are several engineering disciplines, such as reliability, supportability, quality assurance, human factors, risk management, safety, etc. Safety is an extremely important engineering specialty within NASA, and the consequence involving a loss of crew is considered a catastrophic event. Safety is not difficult to achieve when properly integrated at the beginning of each space systems project/start of mission planning. The key is to ensure proper handling of safety verification throughout each flight/mission phase. Today, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) operations engineers continue to conduct these flight product reviews across all open flight products. As such, these reviews help ensure that each mission is accomplished with safety requirements along with controls heavily embedded in applicable flight products. Most importantly, the S&MA operations engineers are required to look for important design and operations controls so that safety is strictly adhered to as well as reflected in the final flight product.

Smalls, James R.↗

2009 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

This year, NASA Range Safety transitioned to a condensed annual report to allow for Secretariat support to the Range Safety Group, Risk Committee. Although much shorter than in previous years, this report contains full-length articles concerning various subject areas, as well as links to past reports. Additionally, summaries from various NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place throughout the year are presented, as well as information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be done in the future. The sections include a program overview and 2009 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy; Independent Assessments Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities.

Source record↗

2010 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

this report provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and potential range users. This report contains articles which cover a variety of subject areas, summaries of various NASA Range Safety Program activities conducted during the past year, links to past reports, and information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be done in the future. Specific topics discussed in the 2010 NASA Range Safety Annual Report include a program overview and 2010 highlights; Range Safety Training; Range Safety Policy revision; Independent Assessments; Support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch/flight operations; a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities. Every effort has been made to include the most current information available. We recommend this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified for updates. Once again, the web-based format was used to present the annual report.

Dumont, Alan G.↗

Launch Services Safety Overview

NASA/KSC Launch Services Division Safety (SA-D) services include: (1) Assessing the safety of the launch vehicle (2) Assessing the safety of NASA ELV spacecraft (S/C) / launch vehicle (LV) interfaces (3) Assessing the safety of spacecraft processing to ensure resource protection of: - KSC facilities - KSC VAFB facilities - KSC controlled property - Other NASA assets (4) NASA personnel safety (5) Interfacing with payload organizations to review spacecraft for adequate safety implementation and compliance for integrated activities (6) Assisting in the integration of safety activities between the payload, launch vehicle, and processing facilities

Loftin, Charles E.↗

Systems Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program: Final Report

A three-month study (February to April 2010) of the NASA Aviation Safety (AvSafe) program was conducted. This study comprised three components: (1) a statistical analysis of currently available civilian subsonic aircraft data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system to identify any significant or overlooked aviation safety issues; (2) a high-level qualitative identification of future safety risks, with an assessment of the potential impact of the NASA AvSafe research on the National Airspace System (NAS) based on these risks; and (3) a detailed, top-down analysis of the NASA AvSafe program using an established and peer-reviewed systems analysis methodology. The statistical analysis identified the top aviation "tall poles" based on NTSB accident and FAA incident data from 1997 to 2006. A separate examination of medical helicopter accidents in the United States was also conducted. Multiple external sources were used to develop a compilation of ten "tall poles" in future safety issues/risks. The top-down analysis of the AvSafe was conducted by using a modification of the Gibson methodology. Of the 17 challenging safety issues that were identified, 11 were directly addressed by the AvSafe program research portfolio.

Jones, Sharon M.↗

Overview of Risk Mitigation for Safety-Critical Computer-Based Systems

This report presents a high-level overview of a general strategy to mitigate the risks from threats to safety-critical computer-based systems. In this context, a safety threat is a process or phenomenon that can cause operational safety hazards in the form of computational system failures. This report is intended to provide insight into the safety-risk mitigation problem and the characteristics of potential solutions. The limitations of the general risk mitigation strategy are discussed and some options to overcome these limitations are provided. This work is part of an ongoing effort to enable well-founded assurance of safety-related properties of complex safety-critical computer-based aircraft systems by developing an effective capability to model and reason about the safety implications of system requirements and design.

Torres-Pomales, Wilfredo↗

"Evidence" Under a Magnifying Glass: Thoughts on Safety Argument Epistemology

Common definitions of "safety case" emphasize that evidence is the basis of a safety argument, yet few widely referenced works explicitly define "evidence". Their examples suggest that similar things can be regarded as evidence. But the category evidence seems to contain (1) processes for finding things out, (2) information resulting from such processes, and (3) relevant documents. Moreover, any item of evidence could be replaced by further argument. Normative models of informal argumentation do not offer clear guidance on when a safety argument should cite evidence rather than appeal to a more detailed argument. Disciplines such as the law address the problem with a practical, domain-specific epistemology. In this paper, we explore these problems associated with evidence citations in safety arguments, identify goals for a theory of safety argument evidence and a practical safety argument epistemology, propose a model of safety evidence citation that advances the identified goals, and present a related extension to the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).

Graydon, P. J.↗

Potential Improvements to the Nuclear Safety and Launch Approval Process for Nuclear Reactors Utilized for Space Power and Propulsion Applications

This study examines potential improvements that could be made to the nuclear safety and launch approval process for fission reactors to reduce the associated uncertainties in cost and schedule while continuing to ensure public safety and environmental protection. It concentrates on the launch approval and mission safety of fission power and propulsion applications of nuclear energy. Improvements to the launch approval process for radioisotope power systems (RPSs) are being considered elsewhere but are acknowledged throughout the report. The study considered technical, process, and organizational improvements to the launch approval processes. The study exclusively evaluated reactors that would not be started up prior to achieving a “sufficiently high orbit,” per United Nations (UN) Resolution 47/68.Potential criticality accidents were considered that could occur during a launch failure or abort or during reentry. Numerous scenarios were examined that might involve one or more Earth flybys as well as potential transportation missions that could intentionally return an active, or previously active fission reactor to Earth orbit. The Study Group was guided in its deliberations according to a number of fundamental principles. These included the paramount importance of adequate and appropriate levels of public safety and environmental protection as well as the importance of the inclusion of independent scientific, engineering, and safety reviews of the applications and proposals as a critical part of the process. Also considered was the need for the development of launch approval processes that might be different, depending upon the source of the application for launch approval, whether it be derived as a governmental launch, a commercial launch, or a hybrid/combination of the two. It is clear that all launches of nuclear reactors into space should have similar safety requirements; however, the safety review effort and the details of the analysis that are required should be commensurate with the potential hazards and the actual risk, which may differ based on the reactor design and its intended purpose. Finally, the study aimed at ensuring that whatever processes and procedures are developed should maximize the sufficiency, simplicity, and transparency of the processes. The Study Group reached five Conclusions and makes thirteen Recommendations. The Conclusions and Recommendations presented here are extensions of those presented previously in other studies. This report attempts to add specificity to the actions that need to be taken in order to move forward with successful space fission reactor programs. Without action to address the perceived and real problems in the launch approval process, designers and mission managers will be reluctant to commit the resources necessary to make space fission reactors a reality.

Camp, Allen↗

Challenges and Opportunities of International Cooperation for Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) on the European Service Module (ESM) of the Orion Program

ESA is providing the ESM to NASA for the Orion Program in accordance with the Implementing Arrangement (IA) established between the two Agencies in 2012. This IA is a barter agreement, in which ESA provides Service Module vehicles for the first two flights of Orion in exchange for two servicing missions to the ISS. This arrangement has provided opportunities and challenges to both communities. It represents an important opportunity for ESA to build on its experience in the development and operations of ATV and play an active role in the development and flight of a manned space vehicle. This paper will explore some of the unique aspects of this arrangement as it affects Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA).The assessment of ESM compliance with applicable safety requirements is the responsibility of the Joint Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP). The JSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering and SMA organizations co-chair this Panel. Previously, Safety has chaired, with Engineering as a member of the Panel. Inclusion of Engineering as a co-chair has offered greater leverage within the technical community. Second, the JSERP includes a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety (PA/S) organizations. This recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership.Another source of both opportunity and challenge is the differing experience base of ESA and NASA. NASA has decades of experience in manned spaceflight, dating back to the Mercury program and following through Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, Skylab, Shuttle and the International Space Station. The risk posture for manned missions is much more rigorous than for unmanned missions. ESA brings a wealth of knowledge as well, with their flights of Ariane and Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), development and operation of the Columbus module on ISS, and satellite programs. The result is that both parties have developed paradigms related to risk and failure that contribute to ESM discussions.Orion represents humanity's first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) in over fifty years. Much of that experience is captured in program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous spacecraft with attendant safety-related issues.This paper will explore these and other challenges as we approach the flight of the first Orion vehicle.

Ciancone, Michael L.↗

NASA's Journey to Safety Culture

One of the organizational causes of the Shuttle Columbia mishap found by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was a "Broken Safety Culture". Since its release, NASA has strived to improve its Safety Culture In 2009, the Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance asked a member of the Air Force Safety Center and of the CAIB for assistance to develop a NASA Safety Culture Program. This presentation describes the journey that NASA personnel has taken developing a NASA Safety Culture Program to "repair" its Safety Culture.

Dillinger, Tracy↗

FUELEAP Model-Based System Safety Analysis

NASA researchers, in a partnership with Boeing, are investigating a fuel-cell powered variant of the X-57 “Maxwell” Mod-II electric propulsion aircraft, which is itself derived from a stock Tecnam P2006T. The “Fostering Ultra-Efficient Low-Emitting Aviation Power” (FUELEAP) project will replace the X-57 power subsystem with a hybrid Solid-Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) system to increase the potential range of the electric-propulsion aircraft while dramatically improving efficiency and emissions over stock internal-combustion engines. Our FUELEAP safety analysis faces two primary challenges. First, the Part 23 certificated Tecnam P2006T is undergoing significant modifications to host the hybrid electric-propulsion system, and the challenge is to assure that the safety inherent in the stock aircraft (and subsequently in X-57 Mod-II) is not compromised by changes in avionics, aircraft structural loading, weight and balance, or other considerations. Secondly, because the SOFC power system has little (if any) relevant in-service precedent, our challenge is to assure that we identify and mitigate all reasonably plausible hazards introduced by unique FUELEAP equipage. We are investigating and utilizing Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) methods to help us address these FUELEAP safety challenges. We captured aircraft-level system hazard conditions using instances of a SysML hazard block via aircraft-level Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA). Then, using SysML models of the FUELEAP architecture, we related the hazard conditions to initiating system events and possible mitigations, such as design architecture modifications or operational constraints. We are continuing to define our approach to MBSA by developing a component-by-component inventory of local failure modes and tracing their possible contribution to hazard conditions. Finally, we are applying an argument-based approach to FUELEAP assurance. Through a FUELEAP “safety case,” we are providing an explicit argument for FUELEAP safety by associating assurance evidence with overarching safety claims through a structured argument.

Woodham, Kurt P.↗

Human Interfaces and Management of Information (HIMI) Challenges for “In-time” Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS)

The envisioned transformation of the National Airspace System to integrate an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS)to assure safety in Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)brings unprecedented challenges to the design of human interfaces and management of safety information. Safety in design and operational safety assurance are critical factors for how humans will interact with increasingly autonomous systems. The IASMS Concept of Operations builds from traditional commercial operator safety management and scales in complexity to AAM. The transformative changes in future aviation systems pose potential new critical safety risks with novel types of aircraft and other vehicles having different performance capabilities, flying in increasingly complex airspace, and using adaptive contingencies to manage normal and non-normal operations. These changes compel development of new and emerging capabilities that enable innovative ways for humans to interact with data and manage information. In-creasing complexity of AAM corresponds with use of predictive modeling, data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence to effectively address known hazards and emergent risks. The roles of humans will dynamically evolve in increments with this technological and operational evolution. The interfaces for how humans will interact with increasingly complex and assured systems designed to operate autonomously and how information will need to be presented are important challenges to be resolved.

Lawrence J Prinzel↗

In-time Safety Management Capabilities for Wildland Fire Management Aircraft Operations - A Gap Assessment

This study assesses the in-time safety management services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)being investigated by NASA’s System Wide Safety (SWS) project to determine applicability to the project’s planned safety demonstrator (SD-1) for wildland fire management. The purpose of this work is to evaluate how effectively existing SFCs address the different hazards presented by a safety demonstrator operating in a wildland fire management scenario. This will help inform decision makers which SFCs would provide the most cost-effective solutions to fill the hazard gaps for further research. Hazards for the safety demonstrator wildland fire management scenario were collated, and the SFCs were evaluated for each hazard based on how applicable and effective the unmodified SFCs are at addressing the hazard. The SFCs are also evaluated for the gap type that needs to be addressed to improve the SFC effectiveness for the given hazard. The key finding of this assessment is that all the existing SFCs require at least some research and development to adapt to the safety demonstrator. No single SFC fully addresses any of the safety demonstrator operation hazards. The result of this study will be used to determine the performance of current SFCs and suggest strategies to adapt existing SFCs or add new SFCs.

Patricia Revolinsky↗

Leveraging Human Performance Data to Change the Narrative that People are the Safety Problem

The study of errors and failure has a long and productive history in the behavioral sciences. By studying how systems fail, we rule out various mechanisms for how those systems might work, thereby refining our theories of how they actually work. Human performance, however, includes more than errors; human performance comprises both failures and successes. A systematic bias to collect and analyze data only on error affects the decisions we make as a community by promoting the narrative that “people are the safety problem.” This narrative manifests in both obvious and subtle ways in the design of systems intended for human use. When the only safety data that are available are about human failure, then “data-driven” designs can only consider that humans fail. Changing this narrative will depend on new data and new ways to examine data – specifically, data on the processes by which human create and contribute to safety. An alternate narrative is that people represent a primary source of safety, through their capability to anticipate, monitor for, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected change. This presentation will describe research efforts to expand the range of safety-relevant events to include not just rare safety failures but frequent safety successes. These efforts include use of data from both operations and simulations to develop methods and metrics for learning from structured observation, self-report, and system data.

Jon Holbrook↗

Investigation of criticality safety control infraction data at a nuclear facility

Chemical and metallurgical operations involving plutonium and other nuclear materials account for most activities performed at the LANL's Plutonium Facility (PF-4). Here, the presence of large quantities of fissile materials in numerous forms at PF-4 makes it necessary to maintain an active criticality safety program. The LANL Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program provides guidance to enable efficient operations while ensuring prevention of criticality accidents in the handling, storing, processing and transportation of fissionable material at PF-4. In order to achieve and sustain lower criticality safety control infraction (CSCI) rates, PF-4 operations are continuously improved, through the use of Lean Manufacturing and Six Sigma (LSS) business practices. Employing LSS, statistically significant variations (trends) can be identified in PF-4 CSCI reports. In this study, trends have been identified in the NCS Program using the NCS Database. An output metric has been developed that measures ADPSM Management progress toward meeting its NCS objectives and goals. Using a Pareto Chart, the primary CSCI attributes have been determined in order of those requiring the most management support. Data generated from analysis of CSCI data help identify and reduce number of corresponding attributes. In-field monitoring of CSCI's contribute to an organization's scientific and technological excellence by providing information that can be used to improve criticality safety operation safety. This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

WE-G-BRA-03: Developing a Culture of Patient Safety Utilizing the National Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (ROILS)

Purpose: To transition from an in-house incident reporting system to a ROILS standards system with the intent to develop a safety focused culture in the Department and enroll in ROILS. Methods: Since the AAPM Safety Summit (2010) several safety and reporting systems have been implemented within the Department. Specific checklists and SBAR reporting systems were introduced. However, the active learning component was lost due to reporting being viewed with distrust and possible retribution.To Facilitate introducing ROILS each leader in the Department received a copy of the ROILS participation guide. Four specific tasks were assigned to each leader: develop a reporting tree, begin the ROILS based system, facilitate adopting ROILS Terminology, and educate the staff on expectations of safety culture. Next, the ROILS questions were broken down into area specific questions (10–15) per departmental area. Excel spreadsheets were developed for each area and setup for error reporting entries. The Role of the Process Improvement Committee (PI) has been modified to review and make recommendations based on the ROILS entries. Results: The ROILS based Reporting has been in place for 4 months. To date 64 reports have been entered. Since the adoption of ROILS the reporting of incidents has increased from 2/month to 18/month on average. Three reports had a dosimetric effect on the patient (<5%) dose variance. The large majority of entries have been Characterized as Processes not followed or not sure how to Characterize, and Human Behavior. Conclusion: The majority of errors are typo’s that create confusion. The introduction of the ROILS standards has provided a platform for making changes to policies that increase patient safety. The goal is to develop a culture that sees reporting at a national level as a safe and effective way to improve our safety, and to dynamically learn from other institutions reporting.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Innovative Safety Ideas for Fusion Experimental Machines

Throughout the early stages of design of fusion experimental devices, such as ITER, safety experts have worked with designers to incorporate safety features into the design. Recent efforts have focused on passive safety features. Although designs of near-term fusion machines may appear consistent with expected regulatory requirements, the safety characteristics can potentially be more attractive. Here, a variety of suggestions that appear promising in terms of improving safety are given. These include new concepts, innovative technologies, further support of past concepts, and possible modification to operating scenarios. Some technical discussion on the feasibility of the proposals is provided. The ideas are generally conceptual at this stage and require further assessment and development work. However, each has the potential for enhancing the safety of experimental devices.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

A Model-Based Systems Engineering Evaluation of the Evolution to an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

In 2018, as result of a recommendation from the National Academies, NASA began to prototype an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS). The purpose of the IASMS is to enable innovative aviation operations and greater heterogeneity of the overall National Airspace (NAS) by automating much of the safety monitoring, assessment, and risk and hazard mitigation functionspresent in today’s Safety Management Systems (SMS). NASA has worked together with early industry collaborators to understand how such a system might work and has published several early Concepts of Operation (ConOps) and other technical memoranda that illustrate the primary considerations for selected aviation domains. The shift from an SMS to an IASMS is predicated on several assumptions, including: 1.) automating safety functions will decrease the amount of time necessary for risk and hazard identification and analysis, making it more likely that safety concerns are understood ‘in-time’ to mitigate them, and 2.) an IASMS will allow easier tailoring of safety management processes to the particular risks and hazards inherent to that aviation operation. In this paper, we begin to validate these assumptions through the use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).

In-time Aviation Safety Management System↗