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At least 523 records · Page 29

Emergency department management of patients internally contaminated with radioactive material

After a radiation emergency that involves the dispersal of radioactive material, patients can become externally and internally contaminated with one or more radionuclides. Internal contamination can lead to the delivery of harmful ionizing radiation doses to various organs and tissues or the whole body. The clinical consequences can range from acute radiation syndrome (ARS) to the long term development of cancer. Estimating the amount of radioactive material absorbed into the body can guide the management of patients. Treatment includes, in addition to supportive care and long term monitoring, certain medical countermeasures like Prussian blue, Calcium DTPA and Zinc DTPA.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Transient thermal analysis for radioactive liquid mixing operations in a large-scaled tank

A transient heat balance model was developed to assess the impact of a Submersible Mixer Pump (SMP) on radioactive liquid temperature during the process of waste mixing and removal for the high-level radioactive materials stored in Savannah River Site (SRS) tanks. The model results will be mainly used to determine the SMP design impacts on the waste tank temperature during operations and to develop a specification for a new SMP design to replace existing longshaft mixer pumps used during waste removal. The present model was benchmarked against the test data obtained by the tank measurement to examine the quantitative thermal response of the tank and to establish the reference conditions of the operating variables under no SMP operation. The results showed that the model predictions agreed with the test data of the waste temperatures within about 10%.

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Transport of radioactive ion beams and related safety issues: The {sup 132}Sn{sup +} case study

The transport of intense radioactive ion beam currents requires a careful design in order to limit the beam losses, the contamination and thus the dose rates. Some investigations based on numerical models and calculations have been performed in the framework of the SPIRAL 2 project to evaluate the performance of a low energy beam transport line located between the isotope separation on line (ISOL) production cell and the experiment areas. The paper presents the results of the transverse phase-space analysis, the beam losses assessment, the resulting contamination, and radioactivity levels. They show that reasonable beam transmission, emittance growth, and dose rates can be achieved considering the current standards.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

On feasibility of a closed nuclear power fuel cycle with minimum radioactivity

Practical implementation of a closed nuclear fuel cycle implies solution of two main tasks. The first task is creation of environmentally acceptable operating conditions of the nuclear fuel cycle considering, first of all, high radioactivity of the involved materials. The second task is creation of effective and economically appropriate conditions of involving fertile isotopes in the fuel cycle. Creation of technologies for management of the high-level radioactivity of spent fuel reliable in terms of radiological protection seems to be the hardest problem.

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Milestones for Selection, Characterization, and Analysis of the Performance of a Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain.

This report presents a concise history in tabular form of events leading up to site identification in 1978, site selection in 1987, subsequent characterization, and ongoing analysis through 2009 of the performance of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high - level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain in southern Nevada. The tabulated events generally occurred in five periods: (1) commitment to mined geologic disposal and identification of sites; (2) site selection and analysis, based on regional geologic characterization through literature and analogous data; (3) feasibility analysis demonstrating calculation procedures and importance of system components, based on rough measures of performance using surface exploration, waste process knowledge, and general laboratory experiments; (4) suitability analysis demonstrating viability of disposal system, based on environment - specific laboratory experiments, in - situ experiments, and underground disposal system characterization; and (5) compliance analysis, based on completed site - specific characterization . The current sixth period beyond 2010 represents a new effort to set waste management policy in the United States. Because the relationship is important to understanding the evolution of the Yucca Mountain Project , the tabulation also shows the interaction between the policy realm and technical realm using four broad categories of events : (a) Regulatory requirements and related federal policy in laws and court decisions, (c) Presidential and agency directives, (c) technical milestones of implementing institutions, and (d) critiques of the Yucca Mountain Project and pertinent national and world events related to nuclear energy and radioactive waste. Preface The historical progression of technical milestones for the Yucca Mountain Project was originally developed for 10 journal articles in a special issue of Reliability Engineering System Safety on the performance assessment for the Yucca Mountain license application [1-10]. The listing of mile stones, a distinct feature of those articles, has been collected and tabulated here. A lthough a brief description is presented here (based on the summaries in the 10 journal articles), the emphasis remains on the tabulation because of its usefulness in providing a comprehensive but concise history of the Yucca Mountain Project. The tabulation presented here is more elaborate than originally presented in that many of the interactions that occurred between the technical realm and policy realm can be depicted in separate columns. The usefulness of the milestones table is due in part to L.A. Connolly, for editorial and reference support, and S.K. Best, Raytheon, and L. Mays, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), for illustration support. Reviewers P.N. Swift, SNL, and K. Gupta, University of Oklahoma, helped improve the discussion. The historical perspective presented is that of the author and is not necessarily held by reviewers, Sandia National Laboratories , and the US Department of Energy. As a historic perspective, the author is reporting on the work of others; however, any interpretative error s of the documentation are those of the author alone. The characterization and modeling of the Yucca Mountain disposal system required numerous participants with expertise in many areas of science and technology, as evident from the extensive reference list. Their diligent efforts are generally acknowledged here and through the many references to their impressive work, but the 10 journal articles acknowledge by name many of the numerous participants that contributed to the Yucca Mountain Project .

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Milestones for Selection, Characterization, and Analysis of the Performance of a Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain

This report presents a concise history in tabular form of events leading up to site identification in 1978, site selection in 1987, subsequent characterization, and ongoing analysis through 2008 of the performance of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain in southern Nevada. The tabulated events generally occurred in five periods: (1) commitment to mined geologic disposal and identification of sites; (2) site selection and analysis, based on regional geologic characterization through literature and analogous data; (3) feasibility analysis demonstrating calculation procedures and importance of system components, based on rough measures of performance using surface exploration, waste process knowledge, and general laboratory experiments; (4) suitability analysis demonstrating viability of disposal system, based on environment-specific laboratory experiments, in-situ experiments, and underground disposal system characterization; and (5) compliance analysis, based on completed site-specific characterization. Because the relationship is important to understanding the evolution of the Yucca Mountain Project, the tabulation also shows the interaction between four broad categories of political bodies and government agencies/institutions: (a) technical milestones of the implementing institutions, (b) development of the regulatory requirements and related federal policy in laws and court decisions, (c) Presidential and agency directives and decisions, and (d) critiques of the Yucca Mountain Project and pertinent national and world events related to nuclear energy and radioactive waste.

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2014 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

This report summarizes the results and conclusions of the annual review of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) of the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs). The Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs were issued Disposal Authorization Statements (DASs) in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy Order DOE O 435.1 “Radioactive Waste Management” (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] 2001). The Area 3 RWMS and Area 5 RWMS DASs (DOE 1999a, 2000) require preparation of an annual summary report and a determination of the continuing adequacy of the PAs and CAs. The requirement to prepare an annual summary report is implemented in the Maintenance Plan for the PAs and CAs (National Security Technologies, LLC [NSTec] 2007a). The annual summary report is submitted to the DOE Office of Environmental Management for review and approval.

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Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Materials and Energy Corporation Sealed Sources at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Materials and Energy Corporation (M&EC) Sealed Source waste stream (PERM000000036, Revision 0) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the M&EC Sealed Source waste meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The M&EC Sealed Source waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Public Preferences Related to Radioactive Waste Management in the United States: Methodology and Response Reference Report for the 2016 Energy and Environment Survey.

This report presents the questions and responses to a nationwide survey taken June 2016 to track preferences of US residents concerning the environment, energy, and radioactive waste management. A focus of the 2016 survey is public perceptions on different options for managing spent nuclear fuel, including on-site storage, interim storage, deep boreholes, general purpose geologic repositories, and geologic repositories for only defense-related waste. Highlights of the survey results include the following: (1) public attention to the 2011 accident and subsequent cleanup at the Fukushima nuclear facility continues to influence the perceived balance of risk and benefit for nuclear energy; (2) the incident at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 2014 could influence future public support for nuclear waste management; (3) public knowledge about US nuclear waste management policies has remined higher than seen prior to the Fukushima nuclear accident and submittal of the Yucca Mountain application; (6) support for a mined disposal facility is higher than for deep borehole disposal, building one more interim storage facilities, or continued on-site storage of spent nuclear fuel; (7) support for a repository that comingles commercial and defense related waste is higher than for a repository for only defense related waste; (8) the public’s level of trust accorded to the National Academies, university scientists, and local emergency responders is the highest and the level trust accorded to advocacy organizations, public utilities, and local/national press is the lowest; and (9) the public is willing to serve on citizens panels but, in general, will only modestly engage in issues related to radioactive waste management.

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Framework for The Analysis of US Permanent Geologic Disposal Options for Radioactive Waste

The U.S. study of permanent geologic disposal options of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) provided a technical basis for informing policy decisions regarding strategies for the management and disposal of radioactive waste requiring geologic isolation through the evaluation of potential impacts of waste forms on the feasibility and performance of representative generic concepts for geologic disposal. The goal of the study was to help inform relevant policy questions including: Is a "one-size-fits-all" repository a good strategic option for disposal? Do different waste types and forms perform differently enough in different disposal concepts that they warrant different treatment? Do some disposal concepts perform significantly better with or without specific waste types or forms?

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Contaminated Concrete and General Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Contaminated Concrete and General Debris (WVDP000000013, Revision 12 [WVDP 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris waste stream meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris is recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total radium-226 (226Ra) activity not exceed 8.1E9 becquerels (Bq).

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Drum Cell Cement Solidified Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste (WVDP000000018, Revision 4 [WVDP 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste meets all performance objectives in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual , Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The WVDP Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Los Alamos National Laboratory H3 Waste from the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Tritium ( 3 H) Waste from the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) (LANL000000039, Revision 0 [LANL 2018]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LANL 3H Waste from WETF waste stream meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 2011). The LANL 3 H Waste from the WETF waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Vault Clean-Out Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Vault Clean-Out waste stream (LANL000000030, Revision 4 [LANL 2018]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LANL Vault Clean-Out waste stream meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 2011). The LANL Vault Clean-Out waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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Special Analysis for the Disposal of U.S. Department of Energy High Activity Cesium Sources Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis evaluates whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) High Activity Cesium (Cs) Sources waste stream is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the LLNL DOE High Activity Cs Sources waste meets all DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LLNL DOE High Activity Cs Sources waste stream is recommended for acceptance with the conditions that 1) the total waste stream cesium-137 activity be limited to 1.7E16 Bq and 2) the waste be disposed 4.4 m (10 ft) below existing grade.

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Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Activated Metals at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Activated Metals (ORNLACTMETAL1, Revision 6 [ORNL 2018a]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the ORNL Activated Metals waste stream meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The ORNL Activated Metals waste stream is acceptable for disposal with the conditions that the total cobalt-60 ( 60 Co) activity shall not exceed 1.1E+14 Bq, the total niobium-94 ( 94 Nb) activity shall not exceed 4.5E+10 Bq, the total cesium-137 ( 137 Cs) activity shall not exceed 1.1E+12 Bq, the total lead-210 ( 210 Pb) activity shall not exceed 1.3E+09 Bq, and the total radium-226 ( 226 Ra) activity shall not exceed 5.0E+11 Bq.

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UNREVIEWED COMPOSITE ANALYSIS QUESTION EVALUATION: Update of Composite Analysis Sources Potentially Interacting with the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This unreviewed composite analysis question evaluation (UCAQE) assesses the impacts of the FFACO corrective actions on the Area 5 RWMS CA and the need to revise or update the CA Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO, a legal agreement among the NNSA/NFO, the state of Nevada, and the U.S. Department of Defense, establishes a process to identify, characterize, and implement corrective actions for historical sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) contaminated with hazardous or radioactive materials. Review of FFACO corrective actions involving sources of residual radioactive contamination potentially interacting with the Area 5 RWMS indicates that no significant changes affecting CA results and conclusions have occurred. Doses from the Area 5 RWMS, Industrial Sites, and Soils sites are a small fraction of the 0.3 mSv CA dose constraint, and significant interactions with releases from the Area 5 RWMS are unlikely. Doses from FFACO CASs, including UGTA sites, can be controlled by FFACO URs and institutional controls that have been implemented since the CA was prepared. As the interactions between the Area 5 RWMS and the FFACO CASs are negligible, the sites can be managed independently. The Area 5 RWMS CA reached the same conclusions about the interaction of the Area 5 RWMS with other sources of residual contamination. Therefore, there is no need to revise or update the Area 5 RWMS CA.

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