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At least 523 records · Page 29

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Climate-derived tensions in Arctic security.

Globally, there is no lack of security threats. Many of them demand priority engagement and there can never be adequate resources to address all threats. In this context, climate is just another aspect of global security and the Arctic just another region. In light of physical and budgetary constraints, new security needs must be integrated and prioritized with existing ones. This discussion approaches the security impacts of climate from that perspective, starting with the broad security picture and establishing how climate may affect it. This method provides a different view from one that starts with climate and projects it, in isolation, as the source of a hypothetical security burden. That said, the Arctic does appear to present high-priority security challenges. Uncertainty in the timing of an ice-free Arctic affects how quickly it will become a security priority. Uncertainty in the emergent extreme and variable weather conditions will determine the difficulty (cost) of maintaining adequate security (order) in the area. The resolution of sovereignty boundaries affects the ability to enforce security measures, and the U.S. will most probably need a military presence to back-up negotiated sovereignty agreements. Without additional global warming, technology already allows the Arctic to become a strategic link in the global supply chain, possibly with northern Russia as its main hub. Additionally, the multinational corporations reaping the economic bounty may affect security tensions more than nation-states themselves. Countries will depend ever more heavily on the global supply chains. China has particular needs to protect its trade flows. In matters of security, nation-state and multinational-corporate interests will become heavily intertwined.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗

New Approach for 2D Readout of GEM Detectors

Detectors based on Gas Electron Multiplication (GEM) technology are becoming more and more widely used in nuclear and high energy physics and are being applied in astronomy, medical physics, industry, and homeland security. GEM detectors are thin, low mass, insensitive to magnetic fields, and can currently provide position resolutions down to {approx}50 microns. However, the designs for reconstructing the position, in two dimensions (2D), of the charged particles striking a GEM detector are often complicated to fabricate and expensive. The objective of this proposal is to investigate a simpler procedure for producing the two dimensional readout layer of GEM detectors using readily available printed circuit board technology which can be tailored to the detector requirements. We will use the established GEM laboratory and facilities at M.I.T. currently employed in developing GEM detectors for the STAR forward tracking upgrade to simplify the testing and evaluation of the new 2D readout designs. If this new design proves successful it will benefit future nuclear and high energy physics experiments already being planned and will similarly extend and simplify the application of GEM technology to other branches of science, medicine, and industry. These benefits would be not only in lower costs for fabrication but also it increased flexibility for design and application.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Radiation hard gallium oxide scintillators for high count rate radiation detection

Despite decades of materials research, the availability of appropriate crystalline radiation-hard scintillators with ultrafast decay times (~10ns) and high light yields (>2000 ph/MeV) are still limited. In this study, we demonstrate the potential of gallium oxide (β-Ga 2 O 3 ) based scintillators for high count rate applications. The low-cost rugged β-Ga 2 O 3 scintillators were grown using the optical float zone (FZ) technique. Several dopants and growth atmospheres were used to demonstrate the balance between ultrafast primary decay time and the light yield of the scintillators. Light yields as high as 6446 ± 716 ph/MeV were obtained with 18.3 ns decay time for 662 keV gamma rays. Decay times as fast as 12ns were obtained with a 3212 ± 357 ph/MeV light yield. An excellent 662 keV gamma energy resolution of 7% was obtained using the β-Ga 2 O 3 :Ce crystals. Even with these excellent scintillation properties, the gamma radiation hardness of β-Ga 2 O 3 crystals was better than the leading radiation-hard lead tungstate (PbWO 4 ) crystals. Twenty-six scintillators fabricated from the grown β-Ga 2 O 3 crystals were tested for radiation hardness with a 60 Co gamma irradiation rate of 14 krad/h with a total radiation dose of 2 Mrad. The scintillation properties of these crystals remained unaffected. To date, no other scintillator has demonstrated such high radiation resistance. Furthermore, these FZ-grown low-cost, non-hygroscopic, and high-density β-Ga 2 O 3 scintillators can replace the existing scintillators in many applications ranging from nuclear and high energy physics experiments to nuclear security.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids

The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Reactive Sequencing for Autonomous Navigation Evolving from Phoenix Entry, Descent, and Landing

Virtual Machine Language (VML) is an award-winning advanced procedural sequencing language in use on NASA deep-space missions since 1997, and was used for the successful entry, descent, and landing (EDL) of the Phoenix spacecraft onto the surface of Mars. Phoenix EDL utilized a state-oriented operations architecture which executed within the constraints of the existing VML 2.0 flight capability, compatible with the linear "land or die" nature of the mission. The intricacies of Phoenix EDL included the planned discarding of portions of the vehicle, the complex communications management for relay through on-orbit assets, the presence of temporally indeterminate physical events, and the need to rapidly catch up four days of sequencing should a reboot of the spacecraft flight computer occur shortly before atmospheric entry. These formidable operational challenges led to new techniques for packaging and coordinating reusable sequences called blocks using one-way synchronization via VML sequencing global variable events. The coordinated blocks acted as an ensemble to land the spacecraft, while individually managing various elements in as simple a fashion as possible. This paper outlines prototype VML 2.1 flight capabilities that have evolved from the one-way synchronization techniques in order to implement even more ambitious autonomous mission capabilities. Target missions for these new capabilities include autonomous touch-and-go sampling of cometary and asteroidal bodies, lunar landing of robotic missions, and ultimately landing of crewed lunar vehicles. Close proximity guidance, navigation, and control operations, on-orbit rendezvous, and descent and landing events featured in these missions require elaborate abort capability, manifesting highly non-linear scenarios that are so complex as to overtax traditional sequencing, or even the sort of one-way coordinated sequencing used during EDL. Foreseeing advanced command and control needs for small body and lunar landing guidance, navigation and control scenarios, work began three years ago on substantial upgrades to VML that are now being exercised in scenarios for lunar landing and comet/asteroid rendezvous. The advanced state-based approach includes coordinated state transition machines with distributed decision-making logic. These state machines are not merely sequences - they are reactive logic constructs capable of autonomous decision making within a well-defined domain. Combined with the JPL's AutoNav software used on Deep Space 1 and Deep Impact, the system allows spacecraft to autonomously navigate to an unmapped surface, soft-contact, and either land or ascend. The state machine architecture enabled by VML 2.1 has successfully performed sampling missions and lunar descent missions in a simulated environment, and is progressing toward flight capability. The authors are also investigating using the VML 2.1 flight director architecture to perform autonomous activities like rendezvous with a passive hypothetical Mars sample return capsule. The approach being pursued is similar to the touch-and-go sampling state machines, with the added complications associated with the search for, physical capture of, and securing of a separate spacecraft. Complications include optically finding and tracking the Orbiting Sample Capsule (OSC), keeping the OSC illuminated, making orbital adjustments, and physically capturing the OSC. Other applications could include autonomous science collection and fault compensation.

asteroid↗

Computational Physics Overview [Slides]

Computational physics is an important part of the overall investment in National Security Science at LANL. Computational physics is the study and implementation of numerical analysis to solve problems in physics for which a quantitative theory already exists. Historically, computational physics was the first application of modern computers in science. There are three key elements to computational physics: mathematical models of physical phenomena and conservation equations, computer codes that implement these models, and computer platforms that execute the code instructions and manipulate the data.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Radioactive Threat Detection with Scattering Physics: A Model-Based Application

The detection of radioactive contraband is a critical problem in maintaining national security for any country. Emissions from threat materials challenge both detection and measurement technologies especially when concealed by various types of shielding complicating the transport physics significantly. The development of a model-based sequential Bayesian processor that captures both the underlying transport physics including scattering offers a physics-based approach to attack this challenging problem. It is shown that this processor can be used to develop an effective detection technique.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Potential National Security Applications of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Methods

The objective of this report is to document the initial investigation into the possible research issues related to the development of NRF-based national security applications. The report discusses several potential applications ranging from measuring uranium enrichment in UF6 canisters to characterization of gas samples. While these applications are varied, there are only a few research issues that need to be addressed to understand the limitation of NRF in solving these problems. These research issues range from source and detector development to measuring small samples. The next effort is to determine how best to answer the research issues, followed by a prioritization of those questions to ensure that the most important are addressed. These issues will be addressed through either analytical calculations, computer simulations, analysis of previous data or collection of new measurements. It will also be beneficial to conduct a thorough examination of a couple of the more promising applications in order to develop concrete examples of how NRF may be applied in specific situations. The goals are to develop an understanding of whether the application of NRF is limited by technology or physics in addressing national security applications, to gain a motivation to explore those possible applications, and to develop a research roadmap so that those possibilities may be made reality.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Data Release Report for the Source Physics Experiment Phase II: Dry Alluvium Geology Experiments (DAG-1 through DAG-4), Nevada National Security Site

The Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) project was Phase II of the Source Physics Experiment and consisted of a series of four chemical explosive tests conducted in the same source hole on the Nevada National Security Site. This hole is located at 37.1146°N and -116.0693°W, with a surface elevation of 1,285.2 meters (m) (4,216.5 feet [ft]) above sea level. The first test (DAG-1) was conducted on July 20, 2018, at 16:51:52.67838 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The explosive source for DAG-1 was nitromethane initiated by a small plastic-bonded explosive (PBX) charge, detonated at the depth of 385.0 m (1,263.2 ft) below ground surface. DAG-1 had a trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent yield of 0.908 metric tons (2,002 pounds [lbs]). DAG-2 was conducted on December 19, 2018, at 18:45:56.92115 UTC. This test was the largest in the series, with a TNT equivalent yield of 50.997 metric tons (112,429 lbs). The explosive source for DAG-2 was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 299.8 m (983.6 ft) below ground surface. DAG-3 was conducted on April 27, 2019, at 15:49:01.84183 UTC. The explosive source for this test was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 149.9 m (492.0 ft) below ground surface. DAG-3 had a TNT equivalent yield of 0.908 metric tons (2,002 lbs). The final DAG test (DAG-4) was conducted on June 22, 2019, at 21:06:19.87632 UTC. The explosive source for DAG-4 was nitromethane initiated by a small PBX charge, detonated at the depth of 51.6 m (169.3 ft) below ground surface. DAG-4 had a TNT equivalent yield of 10.357 metric tons (22,833 lbs). The four tests were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that included sensors both at near-field (less than 200 m) and far-field (200 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component (3C) accelerometers installed at various depths ranging from 51.6 to 385 m (169.3 to 1,263.1 ft) below ground surface in boreholes positioned around the source hole, and arrays of single-component and 3C accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network comprised a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and 3C accelerometers at distances of 200 m to 400 kilometers. In addition, the DAG-2, DAG-3, and DAG-4 explosions were recorded by a temporary array of 496 geophones arranged in a densely spaced grid pattern known as “Large N.” This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the four DAG tests and the various types of near-field, far-field, and other data that are available. Assembled data sets are accessible through: Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, Data Management Center 1408 NE 45th Street, Suite 201, Seattle, Washington 98105 USA. www.iris.washington.edu

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

A wireless sensor tag platform for container security and integrity

Cargo containers onboard ships are widely used in the global supply chain. The need for container security is evidenced by the Container Security Initiative launched by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). One method of monitoring cargo containers is using low power wireless sensor tags. The wireless sensor tags are used to set up a network that is comprised of tags internal to the container and a central device. The sensor network reports alarms and other anomalies to a central device, which then relays the message to an outside network upon arrival at the destination port. This allows the port authorities to have knowledge of potential security or integrity issues before physically examining the container. Challenges of using wireless sensor tag networks for container security include battery life, size, environmental conditions, information security, and cost among others. PNNL developed an active wireless sensor tag platform capable of reporting data wirelessly to a central node as well as logging data to nonvolatile memory. The tags, operate at 2.4 GHz over an IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, and were designed to be distributed throughout the inside of a shipping container in the upper support frame. The tags are mounted in a housing that allows for simple and efficient installation or removal prior to, during, or after shipment. The distributed tags monitor the entire container volume. The sensor tag platform utilizes low power electronics and provides an extensible sensor interface for incorporating a wide range of sensors including chemical, biological, and environmental sensors.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Virtual supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) automation controller

One or more virtual supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) controllers are provided. The virtual SCADA controller(s) may be deployed upon a detection of a failure of a physical SCADA controller. An on-site module may detect failure including a security breach which causes the physical SCADA controller to be disconnected from a network and the virtual SCADA controller(s) to take over control. The virtual SCADA controller(s) may be on-site or off-site.

Smith, Jared M.↗

Industry Level Feasibility of LiDAR Data into Fire Modeling Using Fire Risk Investigation in 3D (FRI3D)

Many evaluation, assessment, and modeling tasks at nuclear power plants require spatial information this often requires physical visits to locations within the facility because the 2D or 3D schematics and current models do not contain enough detail or do not capture as-built and real-world conditions. These visits require extensive manual labor for not only the requesting party, but support groups such as security. LIDAR mapping is trying to solve that problem by providing very detailed 3D models for low costs. However, the use of these models can be very limited because either component reference information is missing and too costly to add, or there is no way to extract specific spatial data needed for other tools. This report presents Idaho National Lab's work with Environmental Intellect (Ei) covering two main efforts. First, to reduce the effort of "tagging" data in large 3D models. By using both existing plant database information, and artificial intelligence (AI) to find and read equipment labels. This research explores the ability of to provide a simple way for the user to tag items and verify plant data, capturing both the speed of AI and human verification. The second part of the work is the development of an interface for importing pieces needed for Modeling & Simulation. Analysis work such as that for fire, flood, or physical security all require spatial or 3D models in various levels of detail. This interface will allow for the retrieval of item location or boundaries, enabling the auto generation of models for varying tools. The application program interface (API) of the fire risk investigation in 3D (FRI3D) was used to test feasibility of exporting the LiDAR tagged spatial information. Outcomes from this work provide preliminary data to determine if the tools and methods could provide substantial industry benefit if fully matured.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Earth Sciences Applications for Energy and Global Security: A Few Vignettes [Slides]

Understanding the physics of flow and transport in the subsurface environment is crucial to several National Security applications. In the Energy Security realm, some examples include characterizing radioactive waste disposal, exploring natural gas extraction and sequestering CO2. An example in the Global Security arena is to be able to distinguish between anthropogenic and naturally occurring seismic disturbances, the former being of particular concern as underground nuclear testing activity has seen an increase in recent years. A common theme across these applications is the ability to accurately model fluid flow in porous and/or fractured subsurface media. For decades, researchers have grappled with how to include the effects of uncertainties in these models, including but not limited to heterogeneity, unknown initial and boundary conditions and issues with scalability. More recently advances in computing and machine learning methodologies have allowed a broader exploration of the uncertainty space as we strive for real time decision making. I will present an overview of the field and discuss a few examples of how my own research in these topics has evolved over nearly two decades.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Source Characterization at Low Yields from Physics Experiment One A

The detonation of a well-recorded coupled explosion at the well-characterized Nevada National Security Site, as part of Physics Experiment One, has provided us with an opportunity to compare and contrast methods and results of yield estimation and other event characterization methods. Yield estimates are made using several methods, including local/regional magnitudes, waveform envelopes, acoustic amplitudes, joint seismoacoustic yield, and moment tensors. We include in our analysis a discussion and comparison of applicability, calibrations, assumptions, and uncertainties involved in each. With the exception of magnitude-based methods, all the techniques were more or less successful in recovering the known yield. It is, however, useful to be cognizant of requirements and calibrations, such as station coverage, emplacement conditions, propagation characterization, and uncertainties, to apply the methods to other areas with less complete information. We demonstrate that we can be successful at monitoring low-yield explosions using a variety of methods assuming that the signal-to-noise ratio is adequate at recording stations, and that the material properties are taken into account. Depth estimates are also important, particularly if one allows the possibility of a surface explosion.

Pasyanos, Michael E. [Lawrence Livermore National ↗