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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 523 records · Page 29
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Molten Salt Reactor Technical and Safety Considerations Outside of Guidance Documents

This document provides information on distinctive characteristics of liquid salt–fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs) for US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) consideration as it seeks to achieve effective and efficient advanced reactor mission readiness. The NRC has requested that Oak Ridge National Laboratory provide advice regarding technical and safety considerations that might be advantageous to address via policy, rulemaking, or license conditions (i.e., beyond the scope of guidance documents) for accommodating MSRs. It is recognized that MSRs could be regulated based on existing rules, with exceptions, to reflect their distinctive characteristics and technologies. However, directly applying the existing regulatory processes that evolved with the light water reactor fleet to MSRs could be unduly burdensome to the point that their application would inhibit deployment of MSRs in the United States.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Safeguards by Design Projects (Final Report-FY-22)

This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have Bachelor degree programs in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Human Capital Development (HCD): University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards. In FY22, three teams at the University of Rhode Island and two teams at the University of Texas - Austin participated in researching, designing, building, and testing projects to support international nuclear safeguards measurements or verification. The projects involved engaging in activities at the university’s research reactors. All the projects engaged students with prototyping a design and/or tool for application at the Universities’ reactor. At the end of the course, most of the students expressed the experience was positive and they learned more about international nuclear safeguards and applying requirements than they had previously encountered. This school year the projects were further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Both universities had limited in classes on campus, still relying on Zoom classes, and limited direct student/professor interactions. Furthermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) greatly restricted travel, therefore making it impossible to visit the students at the end of the semester for the review of their design projects. The final design and review meeting for the projects happened via meetings over the internet. Additionally, the teams did build and test some prototypes but could only do so in a limited capacity.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Safety Testing of AGR-5/6/7 Compacts 2-2-2 and 2-2-4

Compacts 2-2-2 and 2-2-4 from the Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification Program’s final irradiation campaign (AGR-5/6/7) were each separately subjected to a thermal soak at 1600°C for 300 h under flowing helium to simulated conditions experienced during a postulated high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) depressurization conduction cooldown event. The safety testing of the fuel compacts’ performance under accident conditions was conducted in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF), which utilizes a stand-alone hot cell at the Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory (IFEL). The CCCTF heats fuel to temperatures up to 1900°C in a non-oxidizing environment while continuously monitoring the sweep gas for radioactive 85 Kr to detect release levels associated with hermetic failure of the tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) coating surrounding each fuel kernel. In addition, certain metallic radionuclides that escape the fuel compact are collected on deposition cups that are periodically exchanged with a new cup to obtain information on the overall retention behavior of the TRISO coating layers. Because cesium can diffuse through intact pyrocarbon layers, abnormal degradation of the silicon carbide (SiC) layer in the absence of holistic TRISO coating failure is indicated by release of 134 Cs at levels equivalent to an individual particle inventory in the absence of significant 85 Kr release (Hunn et al. 2014). Additional description of the CCCTF system is provided in Appendix A.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Subcriticality Measurements for a Changing Concentration Uranyl Nitrate Solution Tank by Californium Source-Driven Noise Analysis

Subcritical californium source-driven noise analysis (CSDNA) measurements were performed at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility in 1983 using a stainless-steel tank with an inside diameter of 76.2 cm and a height of 91.4 cm but only filled with a uranyl (93.16 wt.% 235 U) nitrate solution to a height of 76.2 cm for all measurements. The free acid content of the uranyl nitrate solution was less than 0.01 N to minimize hazards in handling. The total available highly enriched uranium for these measurements was 5,296 g. The concentration of the solution was varied from the highest density of 14.71 grams of uranium per liter (g U/L) initially in 16 steps, lowering the concentration to 0.3492 g U/L, and finally using a tank filled with only water. The tank had a Plexiglas lid to minimize evaporation. The Cf source was contained in a re-entrant Lexan tube which could be in the solution parallel to the axis of the cylindrical tank. The detectors were 3 He proportional counters in the solution in shrink-fit tubing to isolate the counters from the fissile solution and adjacent to the outside of the tank. In some cases, the detectors were scintillators adjacent to the outside of the tank. In other cases, the source was external to the tank. Some data presented in this report are from notes and are not in the logbook. The prompt neutron decay constant was obtained from fitting the date from the CSDNA measurements. The purpose of this report is to document the experimental information for the measurements performed so that later, researchers could perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Nuclear Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) or a Nuclear Energy Agency benchmark. The prompt neutron decay measurements could be the basis of as International Reactor Physic Benchmark Program. The data from these measurements are available from the Records Management Services Department of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the logbook is also available from the ICSBEP at Idaho National Laboratory. Preparation of the present report is part of a larger cooperative effort between Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other USDOE critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Forensics in Support of National Response Plans [Slides]

Become familiar with nuclear forensics methodologies in support of nuclear security investigations and how Los Alamos National Laboratory supports the development of sustainable global nuclear forensics capacities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advancing Vision-based Feedback and Convolutional Neural Networks for Visual Outlier Detection

Machine learning has matured into a technology that has immediate applicability to the surveillance needs of nuclear material storage containers. These containers at LANL are the barrier preventing release of radioactive material to the workers, public, and environment during the storage period of the material. Annual surveillance activities can only provide coverage on a handful of containers. There is a significant need for surveillance tools to identify potential issues and precursors to containment failure that can be used during opportunistic inspections and, more generally, outside of annual surveillance activities. In this report we provide details on the advancement of our proposed embodiment that combines an automation system for taking pictures and a high-accuracy machine learning-driven object detection software. We further showcase the improvements on the software side with progress on extracting unique identification features and advances in detecting damage. The current state of the system captures subject matter expert training and a space-conscious design whose implementation is envisioned in the near future.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

ATHENA: Analytical Tool for Heterogeneous Neuromorphic Architectures

The ASC program seeks to use machine learning to improve efficiencies in its stockpile stewardship mission. Moreover, there is a growing market for technologies dedicated to accelerating AI workloads. Many of these emerging architectures promise to provide savings in energy efficiency, area, and latency when compared to traditional CPUs for these types of applications — neuromorphic analog and digital technologies provide both low-power and configurable acceleration of challenging artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. If designed into a heterogeneous system with other accelerators and conventional compute nodes, these technologies have the potential to augment the capabilities of traditional High Performance Computing (HPC) platforms [5]. This expanded computation space requires not only a new approach to physics simulation, but the ability to evaluate and analyze next-generation architectures specialized for AI/ML workloads in both traditional HPC and embedded ND applications. Developing this capability will enable ASC to understand how this hardware performs in both HPC and ND environments, improve our ability to port our applications, guide the development of computing hardware, and inform vendor interactions, leading them toward solutions that address ASC’s unique requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Fast/Epi-thermal Neutron Mapping (FY2022 NA-241 Annual Report)

Development of a spent-fuel verification method based upon positional measurement of fast neutrons emitted from the top surface of the dry storage casks. A proof-of-principle field test on a partially loaded spent-fuel cask will be conducted by measuring the fast neutron flux on the top of the cask as a function of position using a single detector. If a useful verification signature is demonstrated, a multidetector scanning array will be built and tested to demonstrate a practical rapid verification system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability Expansion (DCX) Strategy

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is a vital and important part of the Nation’s nuclear security enterprise. With more than two decades of operations, DARHT has a storied history. Conceived in the 1970s, constructed in the 1990s, and operational since 2000, DARHT has advanced from open-air hydrodynamic experiments (hydros) to foam-confined hydros, to vessel-confined hydros, and in 2022, the 75th hydro was successfully completed. Radiography has advanced from a single-axis, single-pulse system to a dual-axis, multi-pulse capability to variable fields of view (VFV) on both accelerators. The culmination of these experiences, accomplishments, and advancements has brought us to a very important question: What do the next two decades at DARHT look like? The world is not the same place it was in the 1990s when construction at DARHT was in progress. Evolving threats, an expanding mission, and technology changes necessitate adaptation. To adapt, the aging facility, accelerators, vessels, and detector systems require improvements to ensure DARHT remains the Nation’s hydrodynamic data foundation for stockpile certification, safety, surety, and global security threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Knowledge Transfer and Training in Safeguards for Decommissioned Nuclear Facilities (Project Final Report for FY2022)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Emerging Threats and Technology Investigation: Industrial Internet of Things - Risk and Mitigation for Nuclear Infrastructure

Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Perspectives on Response to an Abnormal Radiological Event [Slides]

On May 2, 2019, a sealed radioactive source containing cesium-137 was breached at the University of Washington Harborview Research and Training (HRT) Building in downtown Seattle while attempting to recover the source for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Off-site Source Recovery Program (OSRP). The breach of the source resulted in the contamination of personnel, large sections of the building, and a release of material to the local environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

International Workshop on Security of Radioactive Sources during Extraordinary Events

On May 2, 2019, a subcontractor to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) inadvertently breached a sealed Cs-137 source while attempting to remove the source for disposition as part of a United States (US) government-sponsored program. The source breach resulted in contamination of personnel, the building, and a release of material to the local environment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗