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At least 523 records · Page 29

Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program 2011 Report

The Ecological Monitoring and Compliance (EMAC) Program, funded through the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, monitors the ecosystem of the Nevada National Security Site and ensures compliance with laws and regulations pertaining to NNSS biota. This report summarizes the program's activities conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC, during calendar year 2011. Program activities included (a) biological surveys at proposed construction sites, (b) desert tortoise compliance, (c) ecosystem monitoring, (d) sensitive plant species monitoring, (e) sensitive and protected/regulated animal monitoring, (f) habitat restoration monitoring, and (g) monitoring of the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex. During 2011, all applicable laws, regulations, and permit requirements were met, enabling EMAC to achieve its intended goals and objectives.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Internship at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is located in Los Alamos, New Mexico. It provides support for our country's nuclear weapon stockpile as well as many other scientific research projects. I am an Undergraduate Student Intern in the Systems Design and Analysis group within the Nuclear Nonproliferation division of the Global Security directorate at LANL. I have been tasked with data analysis and modeling of particles in a fluidized bed system for the capture of carbon dioxide from power plant flue gas.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

LANL Analytical and Radiochemistry Capabilities

The overview of this presentation is: (1) Introduction to nonproliferation efforts; (2) Scope of activities Los Alamos National Laboratory; (3) Facilities for radioanalytical work at LANL; (4) Radiochemical characterization capabilities; and (5) Bulk chemical and materials analysis capabilities.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Improved capture gamma-ray libraries for nuclear applications

The neutron-capture reaction is of fundamental use in identifying and analyzing the γ-ray spectrum from an unknown object as it gives unambiguous information on exactly what isotopes are absorbing the neutrons. There are many applications where this can be used passively (nonproliferation), or actively where an external neutron source is used to probe an unknown assembly (planetary studies).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Multiscale models of nuclear waste reprocessing: from the mesoscale to the plant-scale

Nuclear waste reprocessing and nonproliferation models are needed to support the renaissance in nuclear energy. This report summarizes an LDRD project to develop predictive capabilities to aid the next-generation nuclear fuel reprocessing, in SIERRA Mechanics, Sandia’s high performance computing multiphysics code suite and Cantera, an open source software product for thermodynamics and kinetic modeling.

Rao, Rekha Ranjana↗

BAZAAR DIPLOMACY: Examining Iran's Nuclear Bargaining Tactics

Since undeclared elements of Iran’s nuclear program were revealed in 2002, Tehran has engaged in a decade of efforts to justify and advance its nuclear program. Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has maximized advantage and minimized backlash by maneuvering near the borders of the NPT system. Iran has embraced a three-pronged approach to bargain with the international community: (1) divide international opposition, (2) delay international monitoring, negotiations, and sanctions, (3) and defy international monitoring, commitments, and pressure. Iran’s nuclear bargaining can be divided into several time periods, and Iran used divide, delay, and defy tactics in each period. During the first phase from 2003 to 2005, Iranian reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was more willing to negotiate with the international community, but his ability to negotiate was constrained domestically and particularly during his last year of leadership. Tehran mainly negotiated with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the European 3 (EU-3) – to drive a wedge between European and U.S. pressures on Iran and to delay outside monitoring and prevent international sanctions. It is in this early period that Iran developed its range of divide, delay, and defy tactics. For divide, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 because Europe had a close and influential relationship with the United States, whereas other international actors such as Russia and China were powerful but could not form an united bloc against the U.S. Iran began to delay international monitoring of its nuclear program by creating hurdles for international inspectors, stalling requests for information, and not volunteering information but providing updates only when Iranian nuclear developments were exposed by other parties. Iranian diplomats also delayed negotiations and sanctions by framing talks, negotiating and responding slowly to offers, providing false hopes and the appearance of concessions before key international events and resolutions, and adopting temporary and shifting negotiating positions. To defy, Iran modified and razed nuclear sites to prevent detection, used legalistic and minimal interpretations to subvert commitments, argued for an international right to enrich uranium, and proclaimed a fatwa against nuclear weapons. After President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iran took a tougher stance internationally. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet did not provide major concessions to facilitate international negotiations, were less willing to seriously consider proposals to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and linked Iran’s nuclear program to sovereignty and national pride. Realizing that Europe was less optimistic about negotiations, Ahmadinejad leveraged Russia and China to Iran’s advantage. Both countries helped delay and dilute United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinejad employed more tactics to defy international monitoring and pressure. These tactics involved demonstrating Iran’s nuclear progress even as Tehran engaged in negotiations over its program. Iran also increased the cost of failed negotiations by sustaining and escalating regional and global tensions to coincide with international events and resolutions that criticized or condemned Iran’s nuclear program. The third and present phase of Iranian nuclear bargaining began during Ahmadinejad’s second term as president (2009-2012). During this period, Ahmadinejad’s power significant weakened and domestic turf wars made Iranian nuclear negotiations unpredictable and at times contradictory. Due to the domestic situation and the exhausting of successful divide and delay tactics, Iran began using more defy tactics. Iran, for example, considered enriching uranium to a higher percentage for naval reactors, warned of closing the Straits of Hormuz, and engaged in terrorist acts against the West and its allies. Currently, Iran’s range of bargaining options has narrowed, with many divide and delay tactics less useful since the international community has become more aware of Iranian efforts to stall and buy time. While Iran leaders have employed more acts of defiance, Iran’s ability to sustain its defy tactics are waning and it is still possible to prevent greater confrontation between Iran and the West.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Enhancing Safeguards Analysts’ Geospatial Usage

This report is the final summation of Sandia‘s Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project #151316, "Open Source Information Verification" (OSIV) which ran from FY11 through FY12. The aim of OSIV was to research, develop, and evaluate relevant geospatial analysis capabilities that address open-source information needs for international safeguards. OSIV generated a number of technical, programmatic, and cultural advances, detailed in this report. There were new methodological insights and research that resulted in ten publications and presentations; this report concludes with an abstract-annotated listing of all materials. OSIV generated a substantial prototype, GeoSafeguards, that not only achieved its intended goal of testing our hypothesis, but which also served as a vehicle for customer education and program development. OSIV, as intended, has catalyzed future work in this domain; by the end of two years, it has already brought considerable attention to this work both domestically and with our international partners. Finally, the OSIV project knit together previously disparate research staff and user expertise in a fashion that not only addressed our immediate research goals, which has created cross- understanding, in service of Sandia‘s national security responsibilities in safeguards and nonproliferation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Technosocial Modeling for Determining the Status and Nature of a State’s Nuclear Activities

The International Atomic Energy Agency State Evaluation Process: The Role of Information Analysis in Reaching Safeguards Conclusions (Mathews et al. 2008), several examples of nonproliferation models using analytical software were developed that may assist the IAEA with collecting, visualizing, analyzing, and reporting information in support of the State Evaluation Process. This paper focuses on one of the examples a set of models developed in the Proactive Scenario Production, Evidence Collection, and Testing (ProSPECT) software that evaluates the status and nature of a state’s nuclear activities. The models use three distinct subject areas to perform this assessment: the presence of nuclear activities, the consistency of those nuclear activities with national nuclear energy goals, and the geopolitical context in which those nuclear activities are taking place. As a proof-of-concept for the models, a crude case study was performed. The study, which attempted to evaluate the nuclear activities taking place in Syria prior to September 2007, yielded illustrative, yet inconclusive, results. Due to the inconclusive nature of the case study results, changes that may improve the model’s efficiency and accuracy are proposed.

Gastelum, Zoe N.↗

The Use of Geomorphometrics for Geologic Site Characterization

The Problem: Developing an accurate geologic site characterization is difficult for denied-access sites. A good understanding of the geology (both in terms of the rock types and the fracture networks) is required for event evaluation (e.g., modulation of seismic signals from the source), planning of treaty monitoring sensors (fracture play a key role in the gas migration pathways), and evaluation of containment strategies. The Hypothesis: Quantitative analysis of terrain characteristics provides a way to relate the topography (easily obtained at high resolution) to surface geology. The Method: Integration of Terrain Complexity Index (TCI, derived from surface roughness) with drainage patterns and texture to produce a "predicted" geologic map. The viability of this method was evaluated by applying the algorithm to an area of know geology (Area 15 at the Nevada Test Site - NNSS). A 10-meter digital elevation model (DEM) was used for this evaluation. The Application: We have demonstrated the utility of this method by developing an improved surface geologic map for the North Korean Test Site using a 5-meter DEM. Why Now: Improved geologic characterization of potential nuclear test sites in a number of countries is needed for a number of Nonproliferation objectives. What's Needed Next: 1) A more robust and automated interpretation algorithm for the drainage analysis aspect; 2) improved data fusion of the TCI with drainage patterns; and 3) evaluation of the potential for fracture mapping in granite using a very high resolution DEM at the NNSS site (a 1-meter DEM in on order).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program 2012 Report

The Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program (EMAC), funded through the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO, formerly Nevada Site Office), monitors the ecosystem of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and ensures compliance with laws and regulations pertaining to NNSS biota. This report summarizes the program’s activities conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), during calendar year 2012. Program activities included (a) biological surveys at proposed construction sites, (b) desert tortoise compliance, (c) ecosystem monitoring, (d) sensitive plant species monitoring, (e) sensitive and protected/regulated animal monitoring, (f) habitat restoration monitoring, and (g) monitoring of the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC). During 2012, all applicable laws, regulations, and permit requirements were met, enabling EMAC to achieve its intended goals and objectives.

2012↗

Security by Design Handbook

This document is a draft Security-by-Design (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to “encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.” The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PAS-PP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessons-learned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the system-level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A four-element strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

Snell, Mark Kamerer↗

Report on Project Action Sheet PP05 task 3 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST)

This report documents the results of Task 3 of Project Action Sheet PP05 between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST) for Support with Review of an ROK Risk Evaluation Process. This task was to have Sandia National Laboratories collaborate with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) on several activities concerning how to determine the Probability of Neutralization, P N , and the Probability of System Effectiveness, P E , to include: providing descriptions on how combat simulations are used to determine P N and P E ; comparisons of the strengths and weaknesses of two neutralization models (the Neutralization.xls spreadsheet model versus the Brief Adversary Threat-Loss Estimator (BATLE) software); and demonstrating how computer simulations can be used to determine P N . Note that the computer simulation used for the demonstration was the Scenario Toolkit And Generation Environment (STAGE) simulation, which is a stand-alone synthetic tactical simulation sold by Presagis Canada Incorporated. The demonstration is provided in a separate Audio Video Interleave (.AVI) file.

Snell, Mark Kamerer↗

Challenges to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) was viewed as a success in largest part because it adopted a Final Document that included an unprecedented Action Plan that addressed all three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – as well as a decision on the Middle East that outlined steps to be taken to convene a conference to begin to address calls for a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ). The 2015 NPT RevCon faces a number of challenges to attain a positive outcome that strengthens the NPT and advances its agenda. These challenges include unresolved issues of Treaty compliance and the role of NPT Parties and the review process in addressing them; the role in NPT diplomacy of the Non-Aligned Movement, now led by Iran, whose membership represents a majority of NPT parties; obstacles to convening the Middle East conference endorsed by the 2010 NPT RevCon; and the pressure the NPT Nuclear Weapon States will face to demonstrate further, tangible progress toward nuclear disarmament. This paper will address several challenges facing the 2015 RevCon, and will offer initial ideas for overcoming these barriers to success.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Reductions without Regret: Avoiding Wrong Turns, Roach Motels, and Box Canyons

This is the third of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. In this paper, we provide one example each of our judgments on what constitutes a box canyon, a roach motel, and a wrong turn: Wrong Turn: The Reliable Replacement Warhead: Roach Motel: SRAM T vs the B61: and A Possible Box Canyon: A Low-Yield Version of the W76 SLBM Warhead. Recognizing that new nuclear missions or weapons are not demanded by current circumstances ₋ a development path that yields future capabilities similar to those of today, which are adequate if not always ideal, and a broader national-security strategy that supports nonproliferation and arms control by reducing the role for, and numbers, of nuclear weapons ₋ we briefly consider alternate, less desirable futures, and their possible effect on the complex problem of regional deterrence. In this regard, we discuss the issues posed by, and possible responses to, three example regional deterrence challenges: in-country defensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; reassurance of U.S. allies with limited strategic depth threatened by an emergent nuclear power; and extraterritorial, non-strategic offensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary in support of limited military objectives against a U.S. ally.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development of Database of SFL2a Signals for Neutron Generator Techniques Proposed for Integration

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has sponsored a multi-laboratory, university, international partner collaboration to (1) quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass of a spent fuel assembly, (2) detect partial defects in assemblies, and (3) verify the initial enrichment (IE), burnup (BU) and cooling time (CT) of an assembly. A wide variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques were researched to achieve these goals [Ref. 1 and 2]. A subset of 5 NDA techniques involving passive counting and/or a neutron generator were researched for integration potential with the focus on the first of the three goals, quantifying Pu mass.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Elpasolite scintillators.

This work was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nonproliferation Research to develop elpasolite materials, with an emphasis on high-atomic-number rare-earth elpasolites for gamma-ray spectrometer applications. Low-cost, high-performance gamma-ray spectrometers are needed for detection of nuclear proliferation. Cubic materials, such as some members of the elpasolite family (A2BLnX6; Ln-lanthanide and X-halogen), hold promise due to their high light output, proportionality, and potential for scale-up. Using both computational and experimental studies, a systematic investigation of the composition structure property relationships of these high-atomic-number elpasolite halides was performed. The results reduce the barrier to commercialization of large single crystals or transparent ceramics, and will facilitate economical scale-up of elpasolites for high-sensitivity gamma-ray spectroscopy.

Doty, F. Patrick↗

Semiconductor detectors with proximity signal readout

Semiconductor-based radiation detectors are routinely used for the detection, imaging, and spectroscopy of x-rays, gamma rays, and charged particles for applications in the areas of nuclear and medical physics, astrophysics, environmental remediation, nuclear nonproliferation, and homeland security. Detectors used for imaging and particle tracking are more complex in that they typically must also measure the location of the radiation interaction in addition to the deposited energy. In such detectors, the position measurement is often achieved by dividing or segmenting the electrodes into many strips or pixels and then reading out the signals from all of the electrode segments. Fine electrode segmentation is problematic for many of the standard semiconductor detector technologies. Clearly there is a need for a semiconductor-based radiation detector technology that can achieve fine position resolution while maintaining the excellent energy resolution intrinsic to semiconductor detectors, can be fabricated through simple processes, does not require complex electrical interconnections to the detector, and can reduce the number of required channels of readout electronics. Proximity electrode signal readout (PESR), in which the electrodes are not in physical contact with the detector surface, satisfies this need.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗