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At least 523 records · Page 29

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2003

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

Electrical interactions between the F2 region ionospheric plasma and the 160V photovoltaic (PV) electrical power system on the International Space Station (ISS) can produce floating potentials (FP) on the ISS conducting structure of greater magnitude than are usually observed on spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. Flight through the geomagnetic field also causes magnetic induction charging of ISS conducting structure. Charging processes resulting from interaction of ISS with auroral electrons may also contribute to charging albeit rarely. The magnitude and frequency of occurrence of possibly hazardous charging events depends on the ISS assembly stage (six more 160V PV arrays will be added to ISS), ISS flight configuration, ISS position (latitude and longitude), and the natural variability in the ionospheric flight environment. At present, ISS is equipped with two plasma contactors designed to control ISS FP to within 40 volts of the ambient F2 plasma. The negative-polarity grounding scheme utilized in the ISS 160V power system leads, naturally, to negative values of ISS FP. A negative ISS structural FP leads to application of electrostatic fields across the dielectrics that separate conducting structure from the ambient F2 plasma, thereby enabling dielectric breakdown and arcing. Degradation of some thermal control coatings and noise in electrical systems can result. Continued review and evaluation of the putative charging hazards, as required by the ISS Program Office, revealed that ISS charging could produce a risk of electric shock to the ISS crew during extra vehicular activity. ISS charging risks are being evaluated in ongoing ISS charging measurements and analysis campaigns. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed detailed model of the ISS charging process and an extensive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data, to assess ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA analysis (estimated frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards) are then used to select the hazard control strategy that provides the best overall safety and mission success environment for ISS and the ISS crew. This paper presents: 1) a summary of ISS spacecraft charging analysis, measurements, observations made to date, 2) plans for future ISS spacecraft charging measurement campaigns, and 3) a detailed discussion of the PRA strategy used to assess ISS spacecraft charging risks and select charging hazard control strategies

Koontz, Steve↗

DOE OSTI2023

Identifying human failure events (HFEs) for external hazard probabilistic risk assessment

In recent years, several advancements in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) have been driven by increased understanding of external hazards, plant response, and uncertainties. However, major sources of uncertainty associated with external hazard PRA remain. One important source is how risk-significant human actions that are carried out to enable plant response and recovery from natural hazards cause the close coupling of physical impacts on plants and overall plant risk during these hazard events. This makes human reliability and human-plant interactions important elements to consider in resolving PRA gaps in external hazards. One of the challenges in considering human response in external hazard probabilistic risk assessment (XHPRA) is that most existing human reliability analysis (HRA) models were not developed for assessing actions outside the control room (termed ex-control room actions) and hazard response. To support this new scope, HRA models will need to be developed or modified to support identification of human activities, causal factors, and uncertainties inherent in external hazard response, thereby providing insights regarding event timing and physical event conditions as they relate to human performance. In this study, there are two main objectives: (1) evaluate the applicability of an existing cognitive-based HRA method, Phoenix, to ex-control room actions, and (2) identify sources of uncertainty to be characterized or reduced in order to make this method suitable for XHPRA. The first step of such work is performed by assessing the suitability of existing HRA methods to support identifying human failure events (HFEs) for human response to flooding hazards. These HFEs are human actions or inactions that are involved in human responses to flooding hazards and could contribute to the loss of a critical function for the plant in the scenario being examined. Here, in this work, decomposition analyses using the cognitive-based Phoenix HRA model are used to identify HFEs. The Phoenix method was found to be suitable for analyzing ex-control room actions as well as identifying specific HFEs and underlying crew failure modes (CFMs). However, the method's suitability for use in ex-control room actions would benefit from expanding the available CFMs to accommodate a larger variety of physical and communication tasks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

High-Quality Revision of the Israeli Seismic Bulletin

Seismic bulletins, with trustworthy phase picks, origin times, and source locations are key for regional seismic studies, such as travel-time (TT) tomography, attenuation tomography, and anisotropy studies. To lay the groundwork for such studies in Israel, we revised the seismic bulletin of Israel and the surrounding area and obtained a trustworthy TT data set. From the earthquake and explosion bulletins of the Geophysical Institute of Israel, we compiled a starting data set of about 123,000 earthquakes and explosions that occurred during the past 40 yr. After screening out the poorly recorded events, we were left with a data set of ~38,000 well-recorded events. We then revised the remaining data set in two consecutive steps. In the first, we reviewed and updated station metadata, including changes in station metadata parameters over time. In the second step, we jointly relocated a list of selected seismic events, using the Bayesian hierarchical location software package (BayesLoc) of Myers et al. (2007) that performs joint relocation of multiple events. We observed striking dissimilarities between the spatial distributions of the newly relocated catalog and the initial locations. Although the depth distribution of the starting catalog is trimodal with peaks at 0, 5, and 10 km, the distribution in this study is unimodal, with a broad peak between 7.5 and 12.5 km. By differencing the observed arrival times and the origin times obtained through relocation with BayesLoc, we obtained a revised TT database that consists of 261,336 Pg, 132,876 Pn, 114,816 Sg, and 60,394 Sn arrivals, from a set of 30,458 jointly relocated seismic sources. In this work, we compared prerevision and postrevision TTs as a function of epicentral distance and concluded that the revised data set contains far fewer outliers and inconsistencies than the original data set. The revised TT data set may be used for seismic studies, such as TT tomography, attenuation tomography, and anisotropy studies.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Characterizing Hazardous Gases from NMC811 Materials and Coin Cells with TGA and Tube-Furnace FTIR-MS Evolved-Gas-Analysis

Abuse testing is useful for informing the risks of different battery chemistries but has been limited to larger formats. This paper conducted thermal abuse tests at the smaller coin cell level to determine its relevance in specifying vent gas flammability and toxicity. A nitrogen purge carried the evolved gases into a parallel Fourier-transform infrared spectrometer (FTIR) and a mass spectrometer (MS) downstream of the tube furnace. The experimental system was validated by comparing evolved gas data for single components between the tube furnace system and a thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) instrument. Multiple samples were tested during validation, including CaCO3, electrolyte, delithiated NMC 811 cathode, and lithiated graphite anode. Temperature-resolved gas evolution of HF, CO2, CO, H2, and hydrocarbons from isolated components helped to characterize the emission sources. A previously unreported H2 generation mechanism was found. It was shown that the reduced NMC cathode acts as a catalyst to crack polypropylene-decomposed hydrocarbons into H2 at around 450 degrees C. It was also shown, while studying LiPF6 thermal decomposition, that using the tube furnace with a coin cell casing as the sample holder has some advantages for evolved-gas analysis of environmentally sensitive samples relative to testing in TGA instruments. After validation with single components, a fully charged NMC 811 coin cell was failed in the tube furnace. The measured evolved gases were found to be a combination of the species measured from the single component tests. H2 formation related to the reduced cathode was found to have greater abundance than H2 formed from the anode. Hydrogen fluoride emission factors and diethyl carbonate conversion emission factors assist in understanding the gaseous hazards for larger format cells.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

NASA NTRS1973

General aviation air traffic pattern safety analysis

A concept is described for evaluating the general aviation mid-air collision hazard in uncontrolled terminal airspace. Three-dimensional traffic pattern measurements were conducted at uncontrolled and controlled airports. Computer programs for data reduction, storage retrieval and statistical analysis have been developed. Initial general aviation air traffic pattern characteristics are presented. These preliminary results indicate that patterns are highly divergent from the expected standard pattern, and that pattern procedures observed can affect the ability of pilots to see and avoid each other.

Parker, L. C.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) operates in the F2 region of Earth's ionosphere, orbiting at altitudes ranging from 350 to 450 km at an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The relatively dense, cool F2 ionospheric plasma suppresses surface charging processes much of the time, and the flux of relativistic electrons is low enough to preclude deep dielectric charging processes. The most important spacecraft charging processes in the ISS orbital environment are: 1) ISS electrical power system interactions with the F2 plasma, 2) magnetic induction processes resulting from flight through the geomagnetic field and, 3) charging processes that result from interaction with auroral electrons at high latitude. Recently, the continuing review and evaluation of putative ISS charging hazards required by the ISS Program Office revealed that ISS charging could produce an electrical shock hazard to the ISS crew during extravehicular activity (EVA). ISS charging risks are being evaluated in an ongoing measurement and analysis campaign. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed model of ISS charging (the Plasma Interaction Model) and an exhaustive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data (ISS Ionospheric Specification) to evaluate ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA combines estimates of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards with estimates of the reliability of various hazard controls systems, as required by NASA s safety and risk management programs, to enable design and selection of a hazard control approach that minimizes overall programmatic and personnel risk. The PRA provides a quantitative methodology for incorporating the results of the ISS charging measurement and analysis campaigns into the necessary hazard reports, EVA procedures, and ISS flight rules required for operating ISS in a safe and productive manner.

Koontz, Steve↗

NASA NTRS2012

Dust Hazard Management in the Outer Solar System

Most robotic missions to the outer solar system must grapple with the hazards posed by the dusty rings of the gas giants. Early assessments of these hazards led simply to ring avoidance due to insufficient data and high uncertainties on the dust population present in such rings. Recent approaches, principal among them the Cassini dust hazard management strategy, provide useful results from detailed modeling of spacecraft vulnerabilities and dust hazard regions, which along with the range of mission trajectories are used to to assess the risks posed by each passage through a zone of potential hazard. This paper shows the general approach used to implement the analysis for Cassini, with recommendations for future outer planet missions.

mission hazards↗

NASA NTRS1988

Debris prevention analysis for DFI/OFI/OEI (STS-26 configuration only)

The first 3 shuttle flights to use the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) will utilize Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI), as well as Operational Flight Instrumentation (OFI), and Operational Environment Instrumentation (OEI). The OFI consists of high pressure transducers used on both RSRMs to monitor the igniter and motor chamber pressure. DFI consists of assorted strain gages, temperature sensors, accelerometers, girth gages, and low level pressure transducers. The latter are installed on the left hand booster to measure post-separation aerodynamic loading. OEI consistes of temperature sensors. After Flight 3, all DFI gages are to be deleted, and only OFI and OEI will be used for subsequent flights. This report deals specifically with debris prevention and hazards concernig the STS-26 flight DFI configuration only. Continued analysis is being done that will adequately address the debris hazards associated with the STS-27 and subsequent flight DFI configurations.

Richi, Glen A.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The Orion Exploration Flight Test Post Flight Solid Particle Flight Environment Inspection and Analysis

Orbital debris in the millimeter size range can pose a hazard to current and planned spacecraft due to the high relative impact speeds in Earth orbit. Fortunately, orbital debris has a relatively short life at lower altitudes due to atmospheric effects; however, at higher altitudes orbital debris can survive much longer and has resulted in a band of high flux around 700 to 1,500 km above the surface of the Earth. While large orbital debris objects are tracked via ground based observation, little information can be gathered about small particles except by returned surfaces, which until the Orion Exploration Flight Test number one (EFT-1), has only been possible for lower altitudes (400 to 500 km). The EFT-1 crew module backshell, which used a porous, ceramic tile system with surface coatings, has been inspected post-flight for potential micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage. This paper describes the pre- and post-flight activities of inspection, identification and analysis of six candidate MMOD impact craters from the EFT-1 mission.

Miller, Joshua E.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Insulation Activation and Contamination in Low-Power Experiments

Among the diverse advanced nuclear reactor concepts being developed are designs that expect to operate at much higher temperatures than conventional light-water reactors, and therefore require alternative materials for components capable of withstanding these extreme temperatures. Insulation is one such component where alternative high-temperature industrial composites are being considered. Low-power experiments can provide an opportunity for advancing our understanding of material behavior under irradiation; however, these experiments are not without occupational hazards. The focus of this paper is the potential for activation of insulating composites when exposed to neutron fluence during reactor experiments, and to discuss the subsequent contamination of the testing area. This paper will also discuss practical measures for preventing the creation and inhalation of activated particulate matter (i.e., dust), such as engineering and administrative controls and personal protective equipment. This paper evaluates the suitability of several insulation materials for use in reactor experiments based on their activation from neutron irradiation. The materials considered are Pyrogel XTE by Aspen Aerogel, Cerablanket and Kaowool by Morgan Advanced Materials, Thermo-12 Gold by Johns Manville, and Maxsil CF6-2000 by McAllister Mills. Although these materials are not yet widely used in the nuclear industry, they are common in other industries due to their thermal insulating properties. These materials produce dust while handling that can pose health and safety hazards, which could be further exacerbated by activation. The analysis presented in this paper utilizes a deterministic method developed to predict the activation source term of the provided insulation materials. The method calculates the atomic density of each element within the composites and simulates their exposure to a specified neutron flux density representative of low power experimental conditions. During the irradiation phase and throughout the extensive cooling period, neutron absorptions and nuclear decays are tracked for relevant isotopes. The residual activity within each composite is then assessed to identify the material with the lowest potential radiological hazard to workers. Dust will be created during installation and removal of insulating materials and may also be generated during the experiment. Contamination of surrounding surfaces due to dispersion is highly likely unless preventative measures are taken. The results of this analysis are used to estimate an internal dose from inhalation of activated dust, which is significantly lower than the allowable whole-body dose. However, the risk of internal exposure may increase if the dust becomes a transport vector for nuclear material. The goals of this paper are to enhance the understanding of the potential activation and contamination hazards from the use of these insulating materials in low-power nuclear experiments and to foster safer work environments through informed decision-making and strategic planning. This work ultimately contributes to a broader understanding of how new non-nuclear materials for advanced reactors impact the radiological safety of co-located workers, helping to ensure the responsible management of radioactive materials during installation and decommissioning activities.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

DOE OSTI2022

APPLICATION OF OBJECTIVES-DRIVEN ASSURANCE CASES TO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING ACQUISITION MODEL

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Database-wide hazard modelling of the onset of DIII-D tearing modes with field features

The rate of onset (hazard) of tearing modes is modelled probabilistically using statistical learning algorithms. Axisymmetric energy-density equilibrium fields are taken as raw high-dimensional input features which are reduced with principal component analysis. Signal processing of non-axisymmetric magnetics fluctuation array data provides the target information from which to learn. Model selection, visualization and calibration assessment procedures are detailed. Here, the analysis is deployed at large scale across the DIII-D tokamak database. Standard model selection criteria suggest that the energy-density post-processed feature is a better choice for modelling the onset rate compared to the non-processed equilibrium reconstruction solution. Two example applications of the learned rate function are demonstrated: (i) proximity-to-onset discharge monitoring and (ii) database analysis showing an (expected) observational global trend that the general hazard increases as a plasma performance metric increases. An important connection between the hazard function and its use as a conditional probability generator is reviewed in the Appendix.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Textual and Network Analysis of Title 14 CFR Part107 Waivers

Context: The management of hazards in small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) operations is not as well defined as today's commercial operations despite sUAS widespread use. FAA Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107 waived operations' provisions, which manage hazards for higher risk operations that require approval, can offer insight to organizations establishing UAS Programs in managing their own operation hazards. Aim: We seek to understand how the Title 14 CFR Part 107 waived operations manage hazards. Method: We used the constant comparative method to identify hazard mitigation textual categories from provisions and use networks to assess the dispersion of provisions and the identified categories across issued waivers. Results: Eight mitigation categories and twenty-four sub-categories were identified. Most provisions present in waivers are mostly reused in one waiver. Conclusion: While there is a broad range of provisions to control for hazard mitigations in the Title 14 CFR Part 107 issued waivers analyzed regulations, they require case-by-case modifications.

Urban Air Mobility↗

NASA NTRS2006

Passive imaging based multi-cue hazard detection spacecraft safe landing

Accurate assessment of potentially damaging ground hazards during the spacecraft EDL (Entry, Descent and Landing) phase is crucial to insure a high probability of safe landing. A lander that encounters a large rock, falls off a cliff, or tips over on a steep slope can sustain mission ending damage. Guided entry is expected to shrink landing ellipses from 100-300 km to -10 km radius for the second generation landers as early as 2009. Regardless of size and location, however, landing ellipses will almost always contain hazards such as craters, discontinuities, steep slopes, and large rocks. It is estimated that an MSL (Mars Science Laboratory)-sized lander should detect and avoid 16- 150m diameter craters, vertical drops similar to the edges of 16m or 3.75m diameter crater, for high and low altitude HAD (Hazard Detection and Avoidance) respectively. It should also be able to detect slopes 20' or steeper, and rocks 0.75m or taller. In this paper we will present a passive imaging based, multi-cue hazard detection and avoidance (HDA) system suitable for Martian and other lander missions. This is the first passively imaged HDA system that seamlessly integrates multiple algorithm-crater detection, slope estimation, rock detection and texture analysis, and multicues- crater morphology, rock distribution, to detect these hazards in real time.

hazard detection↗

DOE OSTI2020

Drying Wet Stored and Corroded Magnox Fuel for Interim Dry Storage - 20187

To investigate the feasibility of drying corroded Magnesium alloy clad nuclear fuel, the corrosion products of inactive and unirradiated Magnox simulant dry corrosion product and dried corroded Magnox sludge were characterised by X-ray diffraction and thermogravimetric analysis. XRD identified brucite in the dried corrosion product and both brucite and hydromagnesite in the sludge. TGA identified mass loss on dehydration of ∼9.1% up to 250 deg. C and 27.9% from dehydroxylation up to 440 deg. C, with total mass loss of 41.9% up to 800 deg. C for the dried corrosion product. The sludge TGA showed 8.3% mass loss up to 250 deg. C from dehydration, 7.5% up to 330 deg. C from dehydroxylation and 31.4% mass loss up to 47.2% for decarbonation, with total mass loss of 49.2% up to 800 deg. C. Water removal up to 1.8 g was performed by cold vacuum drying (40 deg. C-120 deg. C) on a ≅14.8 g (wet) corroded Magnox sample. The process was monitored by observing pressure, dew point, temperature and gas flow changes supported by measuring the sample mass loss as water is removed. From these tests, it was observed that the dried corroded Magnox displayed some hygroscopic capacity which has implications for water retention following vacuum drying and the length of exposure required to achieve the desired dryness. Whilst at higher temperatures the water was removed faster, the increased temperature also risks the fuel cladding undergoing unwanted chemical reactions with the residual water during the process. However, at lower temperatures the achievable levels of dryness were reduced. Therefore, from these observations this work has identified that there is a temperature balance that may be necessary to optimise the drying process with respect to allowing the greatest level of dryness whilst restricting unwanted chemical reactions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of implant loss risk factors after simultaneous guided bone regeneration: A retrospective study of 5404 dental implants

Abstract Purpose The purpose was to analyze the risk factors for implant loss after simultaneous guided bone regeneration (GBR). Materials and Methods Patients who underwent implant placement with simultaneous GBR between January 2011 and December 2018 were screened for this study. The cumulative survival rate (CSR) was calculated using the life table method. Log‐rank test and Kaplan–Meier survival estimates were used to identify potential risk factors for implant loss. The association between the investigated variables and implant loss was determined using hazard ratios (HRs) obtained from a multivariate Cox regression analysis. Results A total of 3973 patients with 5404 implants were included in this study. The CSRs of the implants at 1, 5, and 10 years were 99.6%, 98.9%, and 98.7%, respectively. Male patient (HR = 2.94, 95% CI: 1.41–6.14), periodontitis (HR = 4.26, 95% CI: 2.05–9.86), tissue‐level implants (HR = 3.02, 95% CI: 1.30–6.98), narrow implants (HR = 2.71, 95% CI: 1.12–6.57), and implant length ≤10 mm (HR = 2.91, 95% CI: 1.41–6.02) significantly increased the risk of implant loss ( p < 0.05). The risk of implant loss was significantly higher in the maxillary posterior region (HR = 2.26, 95% CI: 1.04–4.90) than in the maxillary anterior region ( p < 0.05). Compared to Straumann, Nobel (HR = 4.07, 95% CI: 1.75–9.44) and other implant systems (HR = 14.23, 95% CI: 4.32–46.85) showed a significantly higher risk of implant loss ( p < 0.05). Conclusion Male patient, periodontitis, maxillary posterior region, Nobel implant system, other implant systems, tissue‐level implants, narrow implants, and implant length ≤10 mm were considered risk factors for implant loss after simultaneous GBR.

Shen, Xiaoting↗

DOE OSTI2023

Effect of radiation exposure on survival after first solid cancer diagnosis in A-bomb survivors

Comparison of the estimated effect of atomic bomb radiation exposure on solid cancer incidence and solid cancer mortality in the RERF Life Span Study (LSS) reveals a difference in the magnitude and shape of the excess relative risk dose response. A possible contributing factor to this difference is pre-diagnosis radiation effect on post-diagnosis survival. Pre-diagnosis radiation exposure theoretically could influence post-diagnosis survival by affecting the genetic makeup and possibly aggressiveness of cancer, or by compromising tolerance for aggressive treatment for cancer. We analyze the radiation effect on post-diagnosis survival in 20,463 LSS subjects diagnosed with first-primary solid cancer between 1958 and 2009 with particular attention to whether death was caused by the first-primary cancer, other cancer, or non-cancer diseases. From multivariable Cox regression analysis of cause-specific survival, the excess hazard at 1 Gy (EH 1Gy ) for death from the first primary cancer was not significantly different from zero – p = 0.23, EH 1Gy = 0.038 (95 % CI: –0.023, 0.104). Death from other cancer and death from non-cancer diseases both were significantly associated with radiation dose: other cancer EH 1Gy = 0.38 (95 % CI: 0.24, 0.53); non-cancer EH 1Gy = 0.24 (95 % CI: 0.13, 0.36), both p < 0.001. There is no detectable large effect of pre-diagnosis radiation exposure on post-diagnosis death from the first primary cancer in A-bomb survivors. A direct effect of pre-diagnosis radiation exposure on cancer prognosis is ruled out as an explanation for the difference in incidence and mortality dose response in A-bomb survivors.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗