Lidar Sensors for Autonomous Precision Safe Landing
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Flash Lidar↗
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Exploration of Frameworks, SysML, LLMs and Data Analytics to Optimize Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Planning, Execution, and Evaluation for Safe and Successful Missions
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Safety↗
High Resolution Terrain Sensing Lidar for Precision Navigation and Safe Landing of Space and Aerial Vehicles
A 3-D imaging flash lidar sensor employing a resolution enhancement algorithm is being developed at NASA Langley Research Center for providing Terrain Relative Navigation and Hazard Avoidance capabilities onboard spacecraft landing on the Moon, Mars, and other planetary bodies. This lidar sensor, we refer to as Terrain Sensing Lidar (TSL), is a solution for future missions that require landing at pre-designated sites near high value resources or at areas of high scientific value, while avoiding hazardous terrain features, such as escarpments, craters, slopes, and rocks, or pre-deployed assets. TSL can also benefit terrestrial applications such as autonomous aerial vehicles without reliance on signals from Global Positioning System (GPS). The feasibility of the TSL concept has been shown through a series of drone, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopter flight tests. A prototype version of the TSL has been recently assembled for conducting another set of flight tests to demonstrate its readiness for upcoming landing missions. This paper describes the TSL, provides its performance parameters, and explains its operational concepts for landing missions.
Precision Navigation↗
Hermes Environment Risk Mitigation Executive System (HERMES): Applications for Safe Autonomous Aircraft Operations
This presentation discusses use of Core Flight Systems in NASA Langley Research Center's drone flight test environment for autonomy algorithms research.
Battery Prognostics↗
A Stellar Activity F-statistic for Exoplanet Surveys (SAFE)
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Parker H. Holzer↗
Conceptualizing UAM: Technologies and Methods for Safe and Efficient Urban Air Transportation
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Lidia Zewde↗
Development Progress in Phase 1 Fission Propulsion Systems
Phase 1 fission propulsion systems are those fission propulsion systems that are highly testable and require no development of nuclear fuels or materials. The systems can be developed without new or significantly modified facilities, have adequate performance for numerous missions of interest, and demonstrate technologies and programmatics that are traceable to Phase 2 and Phase 3 systems. Phase 1 fission propulsion systems focus on safety, cost and schedule. Phase 1 flight units can be tested at full thrust using resistance heaters to simulate heat from fission. The development and use of Phase 1 systems will help enable Phase 2 or Phase 3 fission propulsion systems capable of giving rapid, affordable access to any point in the solar system. A Phase 1 fission propulsion system under development at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in collaboration with individuals from Department of Energy Laboratories and industry is the Safe Affordable Fission Engine (SAFE). The propellant energy source of a 30 kW SAFE unit (SAFE-30) is being fabricated, and will begin testing at MSFC in FY00. The conceptual design of a 300 kW SAFE unit (SAFE-300)is nearing completion. Experiments have been performed on both SAFE-30 and SAFE-300 components. Module tests have confirmed the performance potential of the SAFE series of propulsion systems. This paper will report on the development status of the Phase 1 SAFE fission propulsion system.
Houts, Michael G.↗
Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field
For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying test bed to a safe landing on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging flash lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled instrument developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The flash lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision at 1 sigma. The flash lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Doppler Lidar system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The Doppler Lidar's measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter, also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the flash lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The Laser Altimeter measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the lidar suite and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. The flash lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide, however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to heated air from the Morpheus rocket plume which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The flash lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering on dust during the HRN phase which was created during launch and transported by the wind. The Doppler Lidar provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The Laser Altimeter, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.
Roback, Vincent E.↗
Lidar Sensor Performance in Closed-Loop Flight Testing of the Morpheus Rocket-Propelled Lander to a Lunar-Like Hazard Field
For the first time, a suite of three lidar sensors have been used in flight to scan a lunar-like hazard field, identify a safe landing site, and, in concert with an experimental Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) system, help to guide the Morpheus autonomous, rocket-propelled, free-flying lander to that safe site on the hazard field. The lidar sensors and GN&C system are part of the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project which has been seeking to develop a system capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The 3-D imaging Flash Lidar is a second generation, compact, real-time, aircooled instrument developed from a number of components from industry and NASA and is used as part of the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) to scan the hazard field and build a 3-D Digital Elevation Map (DEM) in near-real time for identifying safe sites. The Flash Lidar is capable of identifying a 30 cm hazard from a slant range of 1 km with its 8 cm range precision (1-s). The Flash Lidar is also used in Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) to provide position updates down to a 250m slant range to the ALHAT navigation filter as it guides Morpheus to the safe site. The Navigation Doppler Lidar (NDL) system has been developed within NASA to provide velocity measurements with an accuracy of 0.2 cm/sec and range measurements with an accuracy of 17 cm both from a maximum range of 2,200 m to a minimum range of several meters above the ground. The NDLâ€"TM"s measurements are fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The Laser Altimeter (LA), also developed within NASA, provides range measurements with an accuracy of 5 cm from a maximum operational range of 30 km down to 1 m and, being a separate sensor from the Flash Lidar, can provide range along a separate vector. The LA measurements are also fed into the ALHAT navigation filter to provide lander guidance to the safe site. The flight tests served as the culmination of the TRL 6 journey for the ALHAT system and included launch from a pad situated at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway, a lunar-like descent trajectory from an altitude of 250m, and landing on a lunar-like hazard field of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe sites 400m down-range just off the North end of the runway. The tests both confirmed the expected performance and also revealed several challenges present in the flight-like environment which will feed into future TRL advancement of the sensors. Guidance provided by the ALHAT system was impeded in portions of the trajectory and intermittent near the end of the trajectory due to optical effects arising from air heated by the rocket engine. The Flash Lidar identified hazards as small as 30 cm from the maximum slant range of 450 m which Morpheus could provide; however, it was occasionally susceptible to an increase in range noise due to scintillation arising from air heated by the Morpheus rocket engine which entered its Field-of-View (FOV). The Flash Lidar was also susceptible to pre-triggering, during the HRN phase, on a dust cloud created during launch and transported down-range by the wind. The NDL provided velocity and range measurements to the expected accuracy levels yet it was also susceptible to signal degradation due to air heated by the rocket engine. The LA, operating with a degraded transmitter laser, also showed signal attenuation over a few seconds at a specific phase of the flight due to the heat plume generated by the rocket engine.
Roback, V. Eric↗
A Software Safety Risk Taxonomy for Use in Retrospective Safety Cases
Safety standards contain technical and process-oriented safely requirements. The best time to include these requirements is early in the development lifecycle of the system. When software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, a retrospective safety case will need to be constructed for the software in the system. This can be a difficult task because there may be few to no art facts available to show compliance to the software safely requirements. The risks associated with not meeting safely requirements in a legacy safely-critical computer system must be addressed to give confidence for reuse. This paper introduces a proposal for a software safely risk taxonomy for legacy safely-critical computer systems, by specializing the Software Engineering Institute's 'Software Development Risk Taxonomy' with safely elements and attributes.
Hill, Janice L.↗
Helicopter Flight Test of a Compact, Real-Time 3-D Flash Lidar for Imaging Hazardous Terrain During Planetary Landing
A second generation, compact, real-time, air-cooled 3-D imaging Flash Lidar sensor system, developed from a number of cutting-edge components from industry and NASA, is lab characterized and helicopter flight tested under the Autonomous Precision Landing and Hazard Detection and Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project. The ALHAT project is seeking to develop a guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) and sensing system based on lidar technology capable of enabling safe, precise crewed or robotic landings in challenging terrain on planetary bodies under any ambient lighting conditions. The Flash Lidar incorporates a 3-D imaging video camera based on Indium-Gallium-Arsenide Avalanche Photo Diode and novel micro-electronic technology for a 128 x 128 pixel array operating at a video rate of 20 Hz, a high pulse-energy 1.06 μm Neodymium-doped: Yttrium Aluminum Garnet (Nd:YAG) laser, a remote laser safety termination system, high performance transmitter and receiver optics with one and five degrees field-of-view (FOV), enhanced onboard thermal control, as well as a compact and self-contained suite of support electronics housed in a single box and built around a PC-104 architecture to enable autonomous operations. The Flash Lidar was developed and then characterized at two NASA-Langley Research Center (LaRC) outdoor laser test range facilities both statically and dynamically, integrated with other ALHAT GN&C subsystems from partner organizations, and installed onto a Bell UH-1H Iroquois "Huey" helicopter at LaRC. The integrated system was flight tested at the NASA-Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on simulated lunar approach to a custom hazard field consisting of rocks, craters, hazardous slopes, and safe-sites near the Shuttle Landing Facility runway starting at slant ranges of 750 m. In order to evaluate different methods of achieving hazard detection, the lidar, in conjunction with the ALHAT hazard detection and GN&C system, operates in both a narrow 1deg FOV raster-scanning mode in which successive, gimbaled images of the hazard field are mosaicked together as well as in a wider, 4.85deg FOV staring mode in which digital magnification, via a novel 3-D superresolution technique, is used to effectively achieve the same spatial precision attained with the more narrow FOV optics. The lidar generates calibrated and corrected 3-D range images of the hazard field in real-time and passes them to the ALHAT Hazard Detection System (HDS) which stitches the images together to generate on-the-fly Digital Elevation Maps (DEM's) and identifies hazards and safe-landing sites which the ALHAT GN&C system can then use to guide the host vehicle to a safe landing on the selected site. Results indicate that, for the KSC hazard field, the lidar operational range extends from 100m to 1.35 km for a 30 degree line-of-sight angle and a range precision as low as 8 cm which permits hazards as small as 25 cm to be identified. Based on the Flash Lidar images, the HDS correctly found and reported safe sites in near-real-time during several of the flights. A follow-on field test, planned for 2013, seeks to complete the closing of the GN&C loop for fully-autonomous operations on-board the Morpheus robotic, rocket-powered, free-flyer test bed in which the ALHAT system would scan the KSC hazard field (which was vetted during the present testing) and command the vehicle to landing on one of the selected safe sites.
Roback, VIncent E.↗
Compendium of fracture mechanics problems
Fracture mechanics analysis results are presented from the following structures/components analyzed at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) between 1982 and 1989: space shuttle main engine (SSME), Hubble Space Telescope (HST), external tank attach ring, B-1 stand LOX inner tank, and solid rocket booster (SRB). Results from the SSME high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) second stage blade parametric analysis determine a critical flaw size for a wide variety of stress intensity values. The engine 0212 failure analysis was a time dependent fracture life assessment. Results indicated that the disk ruptured due to an overspeed condition. Results also indicated that very small flaws in the curvic coupling area could propagate and lead to failure under normal operating conditions. It was strongly recommended that a nondestructive evaluation inspection schedule be implemented. The main ring of the HST, scheduled to launch in 1990, was analyzed by safe-life and fail-safe analyses. First safe-life inspection criteria curves for the ring inner and outer skins and the fore and aft channels were derived. Afterwards the skins and channels were determined to be fail-safe by analysis. A conservative safe-life analysis was done on the 270 redesign external tank attach ring. Results from the analysis were used to determine the nondestructive evaluation technique required.
Stallworth, R.↗
Pre-flight risk assessment in Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopters
The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) industry has been the subject of several television and newspaper articles (Harvey and Jensen, 1987) which emphasized the negative aspects, (e.g., fatalities and high accident rates), rather than the life saving services performed. Until recently, the accident rate of the EMS industry has been five times as high as that of other civil helicopters. This high accident rate has been coupled with the dramatic rise in the number of programs. The industry has built from a single service at its inception in 1972, to over 180 in 1987 (Spray, 1987), to the point that 93 percent of the contiguous U.S. is now covered by some type of EMS service. These factors prompted the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to study the accidents that occurred between May 11, 1978 and December 3, 1986 (NTSB, 1988). The NTSB report concluded that 'Sound pilot judgment is central to safe flight operations.' They further stated that '... factors unique to EMS helicopter operations--such as the influence of the mission itself, program competition, and EMS program management perspectives--can drastically influence pilot judgment during the EMS mission.' One of the most difficult decisions that a pilot must make is whether to accept or decline a mission. A pre-flight risk assessment system (SAFE) was developed at NASA-Ames Research Center for civil EMS operations to aid pilots in making this decision objectively. The ability of the SAFE system to predict mission risk profiles was tested at an EMS facility. The results of this field study demonstrated that the usefulness of SAFE was highly dependent on the type of mission flown. SAFE is now being modified so that it can 'learn' with each mission flown. For example, after flying a mission to a particular site, an EMS pilot would input information about this mission into the system, such as new buildings, wires, or approach procedures. Then, the next time a pilot flew a similar mission or one to the same area, this additional information would be taken into account in computing a risk assessment.
Shively, R. J.↗
F-200(TM): The new solution for fire protection
For more than two decades, halon 1301 has been protecting personnel and valuable aircraft and aerospace equipment from the hazards of fire. Only halon 1301 offered the advantages of being clean, odorless, colorless, electrically non-conductive and safe for occupied areas. However, concerns about the depletion of stratospheric ozone and the resulting Montreal Protocol mandated the production phase-out of halon 1301 on December 31, 1993. Prior to this phase-out, Great Lakes Chemical Corporation, the world's leading manufacturer of halon, directed substantial research efforts toward the rapid development of a safe, clean, and effective halon replacement. Some of the criteria for the development of a clean agent included: that it be an effective fire extinguisher; that it be safe for personnel; that it be safe for the environment; that it be safe for valuable assets; that it be cost effective; and that it be able to withstand the rigors of independent approvals. As the result of this research, Great Lakes developed FM-200(TM) is 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3-hepta-fluoropropane. This paper discusses the physical properties of FM-200(TM) and its efficiency as an extinguishant.
Thornton, Alfred J.↗
Damage Tolerance Issues as Related to Metallic Rotorcraft Dynamic Components
In this paper issues related to the use of damage tolerance in life managing rotorcraft dynamic components are reviewed. In the past, rotorcraft fatigue design has combined constant amplitude tests of full-scale parts with flight loads and usage data in a conservative manner to provide "safe life" component replacement times. In contrast to the safe life approach over the past twenty years the United States Air Force and several other NATO nations have used damage tolerance design philosophies for fixed wing aircraft to improve safety and reliability. The reliability of the safe life approach being used in rotorcraft started to be questioned shortly after presentations at an American Helicopter Society's specialist meeting in 1980 showed predicted fatigue lives for a hypothetical pitch-link problem to vary from a low of 9 hours to a high in excess of 2594 hours. This presented serious cost, weight, and reliability implications. Somewhat after the U.S. Army introduced its six nines reliability on fatigue life, attention shifted towards using a possible damage tolerance approach to the life management of rotorcraft dynamic components. The use of damage tolerance in life management of dynamic rotorcraft parts will be the subject of this paper. This review will start with past studies on using damage tolerance life management with existing helicopter parts that were safe life designed. Also covered will be a successful attempt at certifying a tail rotor pitch rod using damage tolerance, which was designed using the safe life approach. The FAA review of rotorcraft fatigue design and their recommendations along with some on-going U.S. industry research in damage tolerance on rotorcraft will be reviewed.
Everett, R. A., Jr.↗
Space Fission Propulsion System Development Status
The world's first man-made self-sustaining fission reaction was achieved in 1942. Since then fission has been used to propel submarines, generate tremendous amounts of electricity, produce medical isotopes, and provide numerous other benefits to society. Fission systems operate independently of solar proximity or orientation, and are thus well suited for deep space or planetary surface missions. In addition, the fuel for fission systems (enriched uranium) is virtually non-radioactive. The primary safety issue with fission systems is avoiding inadvertent system start. Addressing this issue through proper system design is straight-forward. Despite the relative simplicity and tremendous potential of space fission systems, the development and utilization of these systems has proven elusive. The first use of fission technology in space occurred 3 April 1965 with the US launch of the SNAP-10A reactor. There have been no additional US uses of space fission systems. While space fission systems were used extensively by the former Soviet Union, their application was limited to earth-orbital missions. Early space fission systems must be safely and affordably utilized if we are to reap the benefits of advanced space fission systems. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, working with Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories, and others, has conducted preliminary research related to a Safe Affordable Fission Engine (SAFE). An unfueled core has been fabricated by LANL, and resistance heaters used to verify predicted core thermal performance by closely mimicking heat from fission. The core is designed to use only established nuclear technology and be highly testable. In FY01 an energy conversion system and thruster will be coupled to the core, resulting in an 'end-to-end' nuclear electric propulsion demonstrator being tested using resistance heaters to closely mimic heat from fission. Results of the SAFE test program will be presented. The applicability of a SAFE-powered electric propulsion system to outer planet science missions will also be discussed.
Houts, M.↗
Discrete Abstractions of Hybrid Systems: Verification of Safety and Application to User-Interface Design
Human interaction with a complex control system involves the user, the automation’s discrete mode logic, and the underlying continuous dynamics of the physical system. The user-interface of such systems always displays a reduced set of information about the entire system. Designing interfaces such that all the pertinent information is available and assuring that this information is correct is important for any user-interface, but especially so for safety-critical systems such as automotive systems and autopilots. Here we describe a methodology for the analysis of hybrid control systems that incorporate user interaction, with the goal of assuring that the information provided to the user is correct. That is, the user-interface must contain all information necessary to safely complete a desired procedure or task. We begin with a hybrid system model which incorporates discrete mode logic as well as nonlinear continuous dynamics. Using a hybrid computational tool for reachability, we find the largest region of the state-space in which we can guarantee the state of the system can always remain – this is the safe region of operation. By implementing a controller for safety which arises from this computation, we mathematically guarantee that this safe region is invariant, meaning that the system will always remain within the safe region if the determined controller is used on the boundary of the safe region. Verification within a hybrid framework allows us to account for the continuous dynamics underlying the discrete representations displayed to the user. Using the computed invariant regions as discrete states, we can abstract a discrete event system from this hybrid system with safety restrictions. This abstraction can be used to determine what information must be provided on the display. Furthermore, in cases in which an interface already exists, the abstraction provides the necessary input into existing interface verification methods. We provide two examples: a car traveling through a yellow light at an intersection and an aircraft autopilot in an automatic landing/go-around maneuver. The examples demonstrate the applicability of this methodology to hybrid systems that have operational constraints we can pose in terms of safety. This methodology differs from existing work in hybrid system verification in that we directly account for the user’s interactions with the system.
Meeko Oishi↗
Damage Tolerance Issues as Related to Metallic Rotorcraft Dynamic Components
In this paper issues related to the use of damage tolerance in life managing rotorcraft dynamic components are reviewed. In the past, rotorcraft fatigue design has combined constant amplitude tests of full-scale parts with flight loads and usage data in a conservative manner to provide "safe life" component replacement times. In contrast to the safe life approach over the past twenty years the United States Air Force and several other NATO nations have used damage tolerance design philosophies for fixed wing aircraft to improve safety and reliability. The reliability of the safe life approach being used in rotorcraft started to be questioned shortly after presentations at an American Helicopter Society's specialist meeting in 1980 showed predicted fatigue lives for a hypothetical pitch-link problem to vary from a low of 9 hours to a high in excess of 2594 hours. This presented serious cost, weight, and reliability implications. Somewhat after the U.S. Army introduced its six nines reliability on fatigue life, attention shifted towards using a possible damage tolerance approach to the life management of rotorcraft dynamic components. The use of damage tolerance in life management of dynamic rotorcraft parts will be the subject of this paper. This review will start with past studies on using damage tolerance life management with existing helicopter parts that were safe life designed. Also covered will be a successful attempt at certifying a tail rotor pitch rod using damage tolerance, which was designed using the safe life approach. The FAA review of rotorcraft fatigue design and their recommendations along with some on-going U.S. industry research in damage tolerance on rotorcraft will be reviewed. Finally, possible problems and future needs for research will be highlighted.
Everett, R. A., Jr.↗