Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “corrective actions”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

501 records · Page 28

A study of the second and third order closure models of turbulence for prediction of separated shear flows

The hybrid model of the Reynolds-stress turbulence closure is tested for the computation of the flows over a step and disk. Here it is attempted to improve the redistributive action of the turbulence energy among the Reynolds stresses. By evaluating the existing models for the pressure-strain correlation, better coefficients are obtained for the prediction of separating shear flows. Furthermore, the diffusion rate of the Reynolds stresses is reevaluated adopting several algebraic correlations for the triple-velocity products. The models of Cormack et al., Daly-Harlow, Hanjalic-Launder, and Shir were tested for the reattaching shear flows. It was generally observed that all these algebraic models give considerably low values of the triple-velocity products. This is attributed to the fact that none of the algebraic models can take the convective effect of the triple-velocity products into account in the separating shear flows, thus resulting in much lower diffusion rate than Reynolds stresses. In order to improve the evaluation of these quantities correction factors are introduced based on the comparison with some experimental data.

Amano, R. S.↗

Errors in Aviation Decision Making: Bad Decisions or Bad Luck?

Despite efforts to design systems and procedures to support 'correct' and safe operations in aviation, errors in human judgment still occur and contribute to accidents. In this paper we examine how an NDM (naturalistic decision making) approach might help us to understand the role of decision processes in negative outcomes. Our strategy was to examine a collection of identified decision errors through the lens of an aviation decision process model and to search for common patterns. The second, and more difficult, task was to determine what might account for those patterns. The corpus we analyzed consisted of tactical decision errors identified by the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) from a set of accidents in which crew behavior contributed to the accident. A common pattern emerged: about three quarters of the errors represented plan-continuation errors, that is, a decision to continue with the original plan despite cues that suggested changing the course of action. Features in the context that might contribute to these errors were identified: (a) ambiguous dynamic conditions and (b) organizational and socially-induced goal conflicts. We hypothesize that 'errors' are mediated by underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan. Stressors may further contribute to these effects. Suggestions for improving performance in these error-inducing contexts are discussed.

Orasanu, Judith↗

Earth Observation from Space - The Issue of Environmental Sustainability

Remote sensing scientists work under assumptions that should not be taken for granted and should, therefore, be challenged. These assumptions include the following: 1. Space, especially Low Earth Orbit (LEO), will always be available to governmental and commercial space entities that launch Earth remote sensing missions. 2. Space launches are benign with respect to environmental impacts. 3. Minimization of Type 1 error, which provides increased confidence in the experimental outcome, is the best way to assess the significance of environmental change. 4. Large-area remote sensing investigations, i.e. national, continental, global studies, are best done from space. 5. National space missions should trump international, cooperative space missions to ensure national control and distribution of the data products. At best, all of these points are arguable, and in some cases, they're wrong. Development of observational space systems that are compatible with sustainability principles should be a primary concern when Earth remote sensing space systems are envisioned, designed, and launched. The discussion is based on the hypothesis that reducing the environmental impacts of thedata acquisition step,which is at the very beginning of the information streamleading to decision and action, will enhance coherence in the information streamand strengthen the capacity of measurement processes to meet their stated functional goal, i.e. sustainable management of Earth resources. We suggest that unconventional points of view should be adopted and when appropriate, remedial measures considered that could help to reduce the environmental footprint of space remote sensing and of Earth observation and monitoring systems in general. This article discusses these five assumptions inthe contextof sustainablemanagementof Earth's resources. Takingeachassumptioninturn,we find the following: (1) Space debris may limit access to Low Earth Orbit over the next decades. (2) Relatively speaking, given that they're rare event, space launches may be benign, but study is merited on upper stratospheric and exospheric layers given the chemical activity associated with rocket combustion by-products. (3) Minimization of Type II error should be considered in situations where minimization of Type I error greatly hampers or precludes our ability to correct the environmental condition being studied. (4) In certain situations, airborne collects may be less expensive and more environmentally benign, and comparative studies should be done to determine which path is wisest. (5) International cooperation and data sharing will reduce instrument and launch costs and mission redundancy. Given fiscal concerns of most of the major space agencies e e.g. NASA, ESA, CNES e it seems prudent to combine resources.

Earth observation systems↗

Decision Making In A High-Tech World: Automation Bias and Countermeasures

Automated decision aids and decision support systems have become essential tools in many high-tech environments. In aviation, for example, flight management systems computers not only fly the aircraft, but also calculate fuel efficient paths, detect and diagnose system malfunctions and abnormalities, and recommend or carry out decisions. Air Traffic Controllers will soon be utilizing decision support tools to help them predict and detect potential conflicts and to generate clearances. Other fields as disparate as nuclear power plants and medical diagnostics are similarly becoming more and more automated. Ideally, the combination of human decision maker and automated decision aid should result in a high-performing team, maximizing the advantages of additional cognitive and observational power in the decision-making process. In reality, however, the presence of these aids often short-circuits the way that even very experienced decision makers have traditionally handled tasks and made decisions, and introduces opportunities for new decision heuristics and biases. Results of recent research investigating the use of automated aids have indicated the presence of automation bias, that is, errors made when decision makers rely on automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing. Automation commission errors, i.e., errors made when decision makers inappropriately follow an automated directive, or automation omission errors, i.e., errors made when humans fail to take action or notice a problem because an automated aid fails to inform them, can result from this tendency. Evidence of the tendency to make automation-related omission and commission errors has been found in pilot self reports, in studies using pilots in flight simulations, and in non-flight decision making contexts with student samples. Considerable research has found that increasing social accountability can successfully ameliorate a broad array of cognitive biases and resultant errors. To what extent these effects generalize to performance situations is not yet empirically established. The two studies to be presented represent concurrent efforts, with student and professional pilot samples, to determine the effects of accountability pressures on automation bias and on the verification of the accurate functioning of automated aids. Students (Experiment 1) and commercial pilots (Experiment 2) performed simulated flight tasks using automated aids. In both studies, participants who perceived themselves as accountable for their strategies of interaction with the automation were significantly more likely to verify its correctness, and committed significantly fewer automation-related errors than those who did not report this perception.

Mosier, Kathleen L.↗

Cloudy with a Chance of Solar Flares: The Sun as a Natural Hazard

Space weather is a naturally occurring phenomenon that represents a quantifiable risk to space- and ground-based infrastructure as well as society at large. Space weather hazards include permanent and correctable faults in computer systems, Global Positioning System (GPS) and high-frequency communication disturbances, increased airline passenger and astronaut radiation exposure, and electric grid disruption. From the National Space Weather Strategy, published by the Office of Science and Technology Policy in October 2015, space weather refers to the dynamic conditions of the space environment that arise from emissions from the Sun, which include solar flares, solar energetic particles, and coronal mass ejections. These emissions can interact with Earth and its surrounding space, including the Earth's magnetic field, potentially disrupting technologies and infrastructures. Space weather is measured using a range of space- and ground-based platforms that directly monitor the Sun, the Earth's magnetic field, the conditions in interplanetary space and impacts at Earth's surface, like neutron ground-level enhancement. The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Space Weather Research Center and their international collaborators in government, industry, and academia are working towards improved techniques for predicting space weather as part of the strategy and action plan to better quantify and mitigate space weather hazards. In addition to accurately measuring and predicting space weather, we also need to continue developing more advanced techniques for evaluating space weather impacts on space- and ground-based infrastructure. Within the Earth's atmosphere, elevated neutron flux driven by atmosphere-particle interactions from space weather is a primary risk source. Ground-based neutron sources form an essential foundation for quantifying space weather impacts in a variety of systems.

neutron flux↗

Satellite and Ground System Solutions at Your Fingertips

In the summer of 1998, the blockbuster action movie Armageddon captivated audiences with a thrilling doomsday plot about a meteor the size of Texas that was racing towards the Earth. Though the premise of the movie was purely fictional, the unfortunate reality is that near-Earth asteroids such as the one portrayed in the film do exist. On December 23, 2004, NASA announced that an asteroid it anticipated to pass near the Earth on April 13, 2029, had been assigned the highest score to date on the universally used Torino Impact Hazard Scale. At first, the flyby distance for the asteroid, dubbed MN4, was uncertain and an Earth impact could not be ruled out. The odds of impact were initially believed to be 1 in 300, high enough to merit special monitoring by astronomers around the world, but were then escalated to 1 in 37 on December 27. NASA officials noted, however, that these odds should not be of public concern, since they were likely to change on a day-to-day basis as new data were received. The officials were correct in their assertion, as any chances of an impact with Earth in 2029 were completely ruled out later that same day. Integral Systems, Inc., a leading provider of satellite ground systems and the first company to offer an integrated suite of commercial-off-the-shelf software products for satellite command and control, is helping NASA keep a careful watch for any close-encountering asteroids with its tracking technology. The company supported the first NASA Discovery mission, the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) program, back in 1996, and has expanded its business by building more ground systems for a greater variety of satellites than any other company in the world. (NASA has since launched seven more Discovery missions, with the eighth lifting off earlier this year.) The experience gained from the company s participation in developing satellite command and control ground systems for the NEAR program has bolstered its flagship product line, the EPOCH Integrated Product Suite (IPS), first featured in Spinoff 1997, and led to the creation of its latest product, the Skylight Direct Broadcast Ground Terminal.

Source record↗

Virtual Reality Simulation of the International Space Welding Experiment

Virtual Reality (VR) is a set of breakthrough technologies that allow a human being to enter and fully experience a 3-dimensional, computer simulated environment. A true virtual reality experience meets three criteria: (1) It involves 3-dimensional computer graphics; (2) It includes real-time feedback and response to user actions; and (3) It must provide a sense of immersion. Good examples of a virtual reality simulator are the flight simulators used by all branches of the military to train pilots for combat in high performance jet fighters. The fidelity of such simulators is extremely high -- but so is the price tag, typically millions of dollars. Virtual reality teaching and training methods are manifestly effective, and we have therefore implemented a VR trainer for the International Space Welding Experiment. My role in the development of the ISWE trainer consisted of the following: (1) created texture-mapped models of the ISWE's rotating sample drum, technology block, tool stowage assembly, sliding foot restraint, and control panel; (2) developed C code for control panel button selection and rotation of the sample drum; (3) In collaboration with Tim Clark (Antares Virtual Reality Systems), developed a serial interface box for the PC and the SGI Indigo so that external control devices, similar to ones actually used on the ISWE, could be used to control virtual objects in the ISWE simulation; (4) In collaboration with Peter Wang (SFFP) and Mark Blasingame (Boeing), established the interference characteristics of the VIM 1000 head-mounted-display and tested software filters to correct the problem; (5) In collaboration with Peter Wang and Mark Blasingame, established software and procedures for interfacing the VPL DataGlove and the Polhemus 6DOF position sensors to the SGI Indigo serial ports. The majority of the ISWE modeling effort was conducted on a PC-based VR Workstation, described below.

Phillips, James A.↗

Analysis, Repair, and Management of the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer Database

In the ensuing period we were able to demonstrate that the origin of these filamentous patterns resulted from the action of synoptic-scale vortical velocity field on the global-scale background gradient of ozone concentration in the meridional direction. Hyperbolic flow patterns between long-lived atmospheric vortices bring together air parcels from different latitudes, thus creating large gradients along the separatrices leaving the hyperbolic (stagnation) point. This result is further confirmed by the KL analysis of the ozone field in the equatorial region, where the background concentration gradient vanishes. The spectral slope in this region has been found to lie close to -1, in agreement with Batchelor's prediction. Another outcome of this result is that it at least provides indirect evidence about the kinetic energy spectrum of the atmospheric turbulence in the range of scales approximately 200 to 2000 km. Namely, Batchelor's analysis is based on the assumption that the velocity field is large-scale, that is the kinetic energy spectrum decays as O(k(sup -3)) or steeper. Since the scalar spectrum is confirmed, this also supports this form of the kinetic energy spectrum. The study of equatorial regions of TOMS data revealed the efficiency of the KL method is in detecting and separating a wave-like measurement artifact inherently present in the dataset due to the non-perfect correction for cross-track bias. Just two to three eigenfunctions represent the error, which makes it possible to enhance the data by reconstituting it from the data by eliminating the subspace of artifactual eigenfunctions. This represents a highly efficient means for achieving an improved rendering of the data. This has been implemented on the database. A wide range of techniques and algorithms have been developed for the repair and extension of the TOMS database.

Sirovich, Lawrence↗

MSFC-TVC | TB-03: Derivation of Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Actuator-Force / Gimbal-Torque Transformation Matrix

Thrust vector control (TVC) systems for rocket engine propulsion traditionally use a simple linear relationship to convert between actuator forces and torques about the engine gimbal’s center-of-rotation (COR). As shown in Equation (1), the torque about the gimbal COR is proportional to the applied actuator force and the TVC moment arm (MA)—the perpendicular distance between the TVC actuator’s line-of-action (LOA) and the engine gimbal’s COR. While this fundamental relationship remains valid and accurate in a two-dimensional (2D), one-degree-of-freedom (1-DOF) context—particularly in its non-linear formulation as described in the ER63 Technical Bulletin TB-02 (Derivation of Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Engine-Gimbal / Actuator Moment-Arm Geometry)—it becomes limited when extended to three-dimensional (3D), two-degree-of-freedom (2-DOF) analyses. In 3D, out-of-plane angular displacements can arise, causing the gimbaled engine plane-of-motion to become non-coplanar with the respective actuator plane-of-motion. Such misalignments occur due to the rod-end (RE) and/or tail-stock (TE) mounting geometry of individual TVC actuators. These geometric complexities lead to inaccuracies in calculating engine torques and corresponding actuator forces if only the traditional TVC MA relationship is employed. For higher gimbal angular displacements (e.g., greater than 5 degrees), these inaccuracies become more pronounced, necessitating a more robust mathematical framework. This document presents a comprehensive 3D (2-DOF) derivation of a transformation matrix that accurately converts between gimbaled engine torques and TVC actuator forces. By incorporating the necessary geometric and rotational considerations, this new approach corrects the limitations of the traditional TVC MA method. Subsequent sections compare the newly formulated approach to the traditional method, demonstrating its enhanced accuracy and reliability for a broad range of gimbaled engine conditions.

Thrust Vector Control↗

General purpose architecture for intelligent computer-aided training

An intelligent computer-aided training system having a general modular architecture is provided for use in a wide variety of training tasks and environments. It is comprised of a user interface which permits the trainee to access the same information available in the task environment and serves as a means for the trainee to assert actions to the system; a domain expert which is sufficiently intelligent to use the same information available to the trainee and carry out the task assigned to the trainee; a training session manager for examining the assertions made by the domain expert and by the trainee for evaluating such trainee assertions and providing guidance to the trainee which are appropriate to his acquired skill level; a trainee model which contains a history of the trainee interactions with the system together with summary evaluative data; an intelligent training scenario generator for designing increasingly complex training exercises based on the current skill level contained in the trainee model and on any weaknesses or deficiencies that the trainee has exhibited in previous interactions; and a blackboard that provides a common fact base for communication between the other components of the system. Preferably, the domain expert contains a list of 'mal-rules' which typifies errors that are usually made by novice trainees. Also preferably, the training session manager comprises an intelligent error detection means and an intelligent error handling means. The present invention utilizes a rule-based language having a control structure whereby a specific message passing protocol is utilized with respect to tasks which are procedural or step-by-step in structure. The rules can be activated by the trainee in any order to reach the solution by any valid or correct path.

Loftin, R. Bowen↗

Setting the Bar for the Replacement of the Probability of Collision Metric

To date, satellite conjunction assessment (CA) risk analysis has largely embraced the probability of collision (Pc) as the omnibus metric to evaluate collision likelihood, and its use in such assessments has mostly been straightforward: at the point at which a conjunction mitigation decision is required, the calculated Pc is compared to a threshold; and if the calculated Pc exceeds that threshold, then a mitigation action is warranted. With only minor variation, this approach is employed by major CA risk assessment centers (e.g., NASA, EUSST, CNES, JAXA) and is advanced as the preferred method in the published CA best practices handbooks. Despite this near unanimity of operational practice, there is a major strain of secondary literature critical of the Pc and willing to propose alternatives. Alfano (2005) pointed out the ability of the Pc to underrepresent the risk in certain situations and counselled a maximum Pc construct. Carpenter (2017, 2019) reiterated this criticism and proposed using instead a confidence interval on the miss distance. Balch et al. (2019) identified what they argued was a defect in the entire Bayesian Pc construct and believed that the use of a more conservative methodology based on covariance ellipsoid overlap was necessary. Delande (2022) introduced the framework of collision “plausibility” to the risk assessment process and sketched out how this might be used operationally. Elkantassi (2022) published a full development of the miss distance confidence interval approach and applied it to several worked examples. While these different approaches to collision risk assessment do differ in their details, they all converge on two central points: first, the Pc’s failure to give an adequate expression of the risk in dilution region situations is a fatal flaw; and second, a conjunction should be presumed risky and in need of mitigation until the evidence of the situation can establish otherwise. These criticisms, if correct, would counsel a number of modifications to current CA operational practice; as such, they force a re-examination of fundamental aspects of the CA problem, including the following: 1. Is the CA risk assessment a probability problem, a statistics problem, or something else? 2. If it is a statistics problem, does it lend itself naturally to a hypothesis test construction? 3. If it can be construed as a hypothesis test, what form should the null hypothesis take, to wit: what constraints exist on the choice of the null hypothesis, what selections are in best alignment with all of the attendant parameters of the problem, and what is implied philosophically by different choices? 4. What are the implications of using the different proposed risk assessment parameters for CA? This question should be answered both in determining how frequently the dilution region situation cited by the critics of the Pc actually appears in an operationally significant manner and the missed detection and false alarm rates of all of the proposed risk assessment metrics, compared both to the Pc and to each other. This paper explores and offers preliminary answers to the above questions, presenting a researched treatment of the philosophical nature of the CA problem and the null hypothesis choice that achieves the greatest consistency with all of the different aspects of operational CA conduct. It then profiles all of the different proposed risk assessment metrics enumerated in the earlier paragraph against an extremely large database of conjunction events at both the 550km and 700km altitudes. The combination of the philosophical exploration of the CA problem and the results of the profiling activity articulates what a risk assessment metric will need to demonstrate, in terms of both innate construction and performance, in order to be a true competitor to the Pc.

conjunction assessment↗

Predicting the Earth encounters of (99942) Apophis

Arecibo delay-Doppler measurements of (99942) Apophis in 2005 and 2006 resulted in a five standard-deviation trajectory correction to the optically predicted close approach distance to Earth in 2029. The radar measurements reduced the volume of the statistical uncertainty region entering the encounter to 7.3% of the pre-radar solution, but increased the trajectory uncertainty growth rate across the encounter by 800% due to the closer predicted approach to the Earth. A small estimated Earth impact probability remained for 2036. With standard-deviation plane-of-sky position uncertainties for 2007-2010 already less than 0.2 arcsec, the best near-term ground-based optical astrometry can only weakly affect the trajectory estimate. While the potential for impact in 2036 will likely be excluded in 2013 (if not 2011) using ground-based optical measurements, approximations within the Standard Dynamical Model (SDM) used to estimate and predict the trajectory from the current era are sufficient to obscure the difference between a predicted impact and a miss in 2036 by altering the dynamics leading into the 2029 encounter. Normal impact probability assessments based on the SDM become problematic without knowledge of the object's physical properties; impact could be excluded while the actual dynamics still permit it. Calibrated position uncertainty intervals are developed to compensate for this by characterizing the minimum and maximum effect of physical parameters on the trajectory. Uncertainty in accelerations related to solar radiation can cause between 82 and 4720 Earth-radii of trajectory change relative to the SDM by 2036. If an actionable hazard exists, alteration by 2-10% of Apophis' total absorption of solar radiation in 2018 could be sufficient to produce a six standard-deviation trajectory change by 2036 given physical characterization; even a 0.5% change could produce a trajectory shift of one Earth-radius by 2036 for all possible spin-poles and likely masses. Planetary ephemeris uncertainties are the next greatest source of systematic error, causing up to 23 Earth-radii of uncertainty. The SDM Earth point-mass assumption introduces an additional 2.9 Earth-radii of prediction error by 2036. Unmodeled asteroid perturbations produce as much as 2.3 Earth-radii of error. We find no future small-body encounters likely to yield an Apophis mass determination prior to 2029. However, asteroid (144898) 2004 VD17, itself having a statistical Earth impact in 2102, will probably encounter Apophis at 6.7 lunar distances in 2034, their uncertainty regions coming as close as 1.6 lunar distances near the center of both SDM probability distributions.

Orbit determination↗

Model for Simulating a Spiral Software-Development Process

A discrete-event simulation model, and a computer program that implements the model, have been developed as means of analyzing a spiral software-development process. This model can be tailored to specific development environments for use by software project managers in making quantitative cases for deciding among different software-development processes, courses of action, and cost estimates. A spiral process can be contrasted with a waterfall process, which is a traditional process that consists of a sequence of activities that include analysis of requirements, design, coding, testing, and support. A spiral process is an iterative process that can be regarded as a repeating modified waterfall process. Each iteration includes assessment of risk, analysis of requirements, design, coding, testing, delivery, and evaluation. A key difference between a spiral and a waterfall process is that a spiral process can accommodate changes in requirements at each iteration, whereas in a waterfall process, requirements are considered to be fixed from the beginning and, therefore, a waterfall process is not flexible enough for some projects, especially those in which requirements are not known at the beginning or may change during development. For a given project, a spiral process may cost more and take more time than does a waterfall process, but may better satisfy a customer's expectations and needs. Models for simulating various waterfall processes have been developed previously, but until now, there have been no models for simulating spiral processes. The present spiral-process-simulating model and the software that implements it were developed by extending a discrete-event simulation process model of the IEEE 12207 Software Development Process, which was built using commercially available software known as the Process Analysis Tradeoff Tool (PATT). Typical inputs to PATT models include industry-average values of product size (expressed as number of lines of code), productivity (number of lines of code per hour), and number of defects per source line of code. The user provides the number of resources, the overall percent of effort that should be allocated to each process step, and the number of desired staff members for each step. The output of PATT includes the size of the product, a measure of effort, a measure of rework effort, the duration of the entire process, and the numbers of injected, detected, and corrected defects as well as a number of other interesting features. In the development of the present model, steps were added to the IEEE 12207 waterfall process, and this model and its implementing software were made to run repeatedly through the sequence of steps, each repetition representing an iteration in a spiral process. Because the IEEE 12207 model is founded on a waterfall paradigm, it enables direct comparison of spiral and waterfall processes. The model can be used throughout a software-development project to analyze the project as more information becomes available. For instance, data from early iterations can be used as inputs to the model, and the model can be used to estimate the time and cost of carrying the project to completion.

Mizell, Carolyn↗

Modeling in the State Flow Environment to Support Launch Vehicle Verification Testing for Mission and Fault Management Algorithms in the NASA Space Launch System

Analysis methods and testing processes are essential activities in the engineering development and verification of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS). Central to mission success is reliable verification of the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the SLS launch vehicle (LV) flight software. This is particularly difficult because M&FM algorithms integrate and operate LV subsystems, which consist of diverse forms of hardware and software themselves, with equally diverse integration from the engineering disciplines of LV subsystems. M&FM operation of SLS requires a changing mix of LV automation. During pre-launch the LV is primarily operated by the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) organization with some LV automation of time-critical functions, and much more autonomous LV operations during ascent that have crucial interactions with the Orion crew capsule, its astronauts, and with mission controllers at the Johnson Space Center. M&FM algorithms must perform all nominal mission commanding via the flight computer to control LV states from pre-launch through disposal and also address failure conditions by initiating autonomous or commanded aborts (crew capsule escape from the failing LV), redundancy management of failing subsystems and components, and safing actions to reduce or prevent threats to ground systems and crew. To address the criticality of the verification testing of these algorithms, the NASA M&FM team has utilized the State Flow environment6 (SFE) with its existing Vehicle Management End-to-End Testbed (VMET) platform which also hosts vendor-supplied physics-based LV subsystem models. The human-derived M&FM algorithms are designed and vetted in Integrated Development Teams composed of design and development disciplines such as Systems Engineering, Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), liquid engines, and the astronaut crew office. Since the algorithms are realized using model-based engineering (MBE) methods from a hybrid of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), SFE methods are a natural fit to provide an in depth analysis of the interactive behavior of these algorithms with the SLS LV subsystem models. For this, the M&FM algorithms and the SLS LV subsystem models are modeled using constructs provided by Matlab which also enables modeling of the accompanying interfaces providing greater flexibility for integrated testing and analysis, which helps forecast expected behavior in forward VMET integrated testing activities. In VMET, the M&FM algorithms are prototyped and implemented using the same C++ programming language and similar state machine architectural concepts used by the FSW group. Due to the interactive complexity of the algorithms, VMET testing thus far has verified all the individual M&FM subsystem algorithms with select subsystem vendor models but is steadily progressing to assessing the interactive behavior of these algorithms with LV subsystems, as represented by subsystem models. The novel SFE applications has proven to be useful for quick look analysis into early integrated system behavior and assessment of the M&FM algorithms with the modeled LV subsystems. This early MBE analysis generates vital insight into the integrated system behaviors, algorithm sensitivities, design issues, and has aided in the debugging of the M&FM algorithms well before full testing can begin in more expensive, higher fidelity but more arduous environments such as VMET, FSW testing, and the Systems Integration Lab7 (SIL). SFE has exhibited both expected and unexpected behaviors in nominal and off nominal test cases prior to full VMET testing. In many findings, these behavioral characteristics were used to correct the M&FM algorithms, enable better test coverage, and develop more effective test cases for each of the LV subsystems. This has improved the fidelity of testing and planning for the next generation of M&FM algorithms as the SLS program evolves from non-crewed to crewed flight, impacting subsystem configurations and the M&FM algorithms that control them. SFE analysis has improved robustness and reliability of the M&FM algorithms by revealing implementation errors and documentation inconsistencies. It is also improving planning efficiency for future VMET testing of the M&FM algorithms hosted in the LV flight computers, further reducing risk for the SLS launch infrastructure, the SLS LV, and most importantly the crew.

Trevino, Luis↗

Monitoring Airspace Complexity and Determining Contributing Factors

The national airspace has evolved over many years to accommodate increased traffic demand [1] while simultaneously maintaining one of the safest forms of transportation [2], [3]. One of the reasons for this success is the ability of the system and the operators to adapt and accommodate to situations that routinely disrupt optimal operations. These situations may include: adverse weather, delays, early arrivals, equipment outages, and other factors that are outside the operators ability to control. These factors can lead to states where automation is unable to properly handle these issues and therefore air traffic controllers and pilots have to intervene, ultimately increasing communication between operators resulting in higher workload. As controller workload increases to handle sub-optimal operating conditions this can be viewed as an increase in complexity. The reasoning for this is because humans are now required to make tactical decisions in response to external factors, resulting in a departure from the strategic plan where operations would be more efficiently managed. Human operators control airspace complexity under rigid regulations that are constantly changing. The airspace is divided into sectors and the number of aircraft assigned to each controller is limited for safe handling. There has been past work that devised airspace complexity metrics in commercial aviation and related these metrics to controller workload (e.g., [4],[5]). The upper bounds on the system load are pre-determined. Such bounds on complexity make for a safe system, but the system cannot scale and adapt to autonomous, dense, and heterogeneous traffic, including the many types of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) envisioned to be added to the operations. We hypothesize that, as traffic density and heterogeneity grow, and other key metrics change, there will be phase transitions at which the way traffic should be managed changes significantly [6]. We offer a method for in-time detection of contributing factors that lead to phase transitions, characterized by increased complexity. To the best of our knowledge, there is no tool similar to our proposed effort that identifies such contributing factors or precursor patterns. To define the scope we are proposing to measure complexity from the viewpoint of the Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities (TRACON) controller’s perspective. In particular we are analyzing arrivals into KSFO. With safety as the top concern for airspace operators, it is important to recognize that as density and heterogeneity grow, the focus of the system will change. Times of the day when the airspace has low density and heterogeneity, the flights will follow more efficient paths where the aircraft move on established routes that are more or less directly to the destination. However, when density and heterogeneity increases, the system will begin changing focus to avoiding conflicts and collisions and route the flights in a more flexible way. Higher flexibility requires more communication and coordination between controllers and pilots which the current automation is unable to handle. This paper proposes a novel approach that monitors airspace complexity at multiple scales, uses a Machine Learning-based tool that predicts when operations will transition to a regime of greater complexity, and identifies actions that can reduce the complexity while still maintaining efficient and safe operations. We demonstrate our proposed approach using data from multiple complementary sources. This includes, but is not limited to: historical aircraft surveillance data from NASA’s Sherlock Data Warehouse [7], METAR weather data, and airport configuration data from Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM). The surveillance data flight paths are sampled at a variable sample rate — increasing as the aircraft approaches the airport. This is due to how Sherlock manages flight track stitching between different radar facilities which have different sampling rates. The weather and performance data are logged at defined intervals throughout the day at a courser refresh rate. In addition to the logged data and metrics, we leverage pre-defined Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs) procedures to characterize the path of each flight. Each flight files for one of these routes in the flight plan well before entering the terminal airspace, and approximately follows the route until it leaves the STAR, typically on the final fix of a runway transition. However, most flights do not always fly the full STAR procedure to completion [8], but the majority do adhere to the fixes within the common route of the procedure. Our approach leverages fixes in the common route of each of the STARs to build a reference path to the airport. This allows us to characterize the flight paths in what we are defining as the “maneuvering area” (the airspace between the STAR and before the flight is lined up on the runway’s final approach) to determine how off nominal the flights are to calculate its complexity score. Determining airspace complexity is a concept that does not have a concrete answer. In designing this metric, we consider what increases the workload for the air traffic controllers. Consequently more specialized vectoring maneuvers results in higher workload. Accordingly, we start with a theory: each flight has a direct path it takes from the STAR’s common route to the final approach’s outer marker fix for the flight’s landing runway. It is important to note that the direct path is only used as a reference. If the majority of the flights have a large consistent offset as compared to other routes it does not necessarily mean that those flights have higher complexity. We are merely building a distribution based on this direct path for that particular STAR and runway pair to determine the normal mode of operations for that route. Flights that are in the upper tail of these distributions will result in higher complexity scores and flights that fly in the median will represent the normal mode of operations and therefore will have lower complexity scores. Since flights following each STAR route take different paths to the airport, we have a different distribution for each STAR route and therefore can model these distributions to compute a complexity score from their respective normalized distributions. To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed airspace complexity metric we will compare against an established approach based on trajectory clustering [9]. This unsupervised learning technique consists of the following steps: (1) identify the general maneuvering areas (waypoints) by performing $\kappa$-means or DBSCAN clustering on locations where aircraft frequently turn based on the surveillance radar track data, (2) map flight trajectories onto sequences of waypoints, and (3) cluster the sequences based on their common subsequences. From a high-level perspective, this baseline model learns nominal operations in the airspace through the sequence of waypoints that are representative of where aircraft change direction and defines deviations from the nominal operations as “complex.” Therefore, more deviations from the nominal operations correspond to higher complexity values. For our validation, we re-implemented this technique and tune model hyper-parameters to correctly detect waypoints for the arrival traffic into the San Francisco bay area. We will compute the complexity measure over a one-year period using our proposed technique as well as the baseline. Our validation will be based on each technique’s ability to detect a set of undesirable outcomes (e.g., go-arounds, holding patterns, average time in the airspace, etc.). Since our current complexity metric is derived from the offset from the direct reference path, it’s important to understand what causes these offsets. In many of the flights with high offset distance, flights performing holding patterns and S turns can be observed. These maneuvering tactics are utilized to add distance between the aircraft and the destination runway to prevent multiple flights from having conflicting arrival times. In order to predict a rise in complexity (or the precursor to complexity), it’s necessary to be able to identify these potential conflicts (which in turn, result in higher offsets). To do this, we define a “representative flight” for each STAR route and runway pair. This flight is approximately the path the flight would take if there was a clear path with no other flights in the airspace — including the time remaining to the airport. We first identify the flights for a given STAR runway pair using the offset to the reference path distributions that fall between the 44-55 percentiles. This yields the flights that conform to the most normal mode of operation. Each of these flights is partitioned based on the percent complete from the entry point into the maneuvering areas from 0\% – 100\% complete. Then for each percent “bin”, we take the median value of the flight’s latitude/longitude coordinates, airspeed, and (non causal) time remaining to the airport to construct a lookup table for each percent complete bin on a given route. As a flight enters the maneuvering area, we can find the estimated arrival time of a flight to the airport by finding the closest point to the representative path’s percent complete bin (relative to the flight’s current position at any snapshot in the airspace) and therefore retrieve the corresponding remaining time left on the “representative path”. We assume that the flight will follow the representative path to completion when deriving these estimates. We can then compare these estimated arrival times against other flights for the same snapshot in time to identify potential conflicts. If more flights are estimated to arrive within a tolerance window than there are runways available, then we have a potential conflict. We can use this derived measure along with other factors expected to add disruption to the operation such as weather and runway configuration changes as an input to machine learning tools to detect precursors that increases in our complexity measure. This novel method will assist in uncovering insights into the contributing factors that lead to increased complexity that may allow for in-time responses to avoid reaching a high complexity state in the airspace.

complexity↗