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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 505 records · Page 28
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Safe, High Power / Voltage Battery Design Challenges

NASA seeks safe, high performing battery module designs that can deliver 3C discharge rates continuously, achieve 160 Wh/kg, and is passively propagation resistant to a single cell thermal runaway event. One solution is presented that uses a patented oscillating heat pipe technology for thermal management. Combined with light weight packaging and a new commercially available gas permeable vent port, all 5 preliminary safety tests results performed to date are showing ample margins.

High power↗
NASA NTRS1999

Fabrication and Testing of Ceramic Matrix Composite Rocket Propulsion Components

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is pursuing using ceramic matrix composites (CMC) as primary structural components for advanced rocket engines. This endeavor is due to the requirement of increasing safety by two orders of magnitude and reducing costs from $10,000/lb to $1,000/lb both within ten years. Out year goals are even more aggressive. Safety gains, through using CMCS, will be realized by increasing temperature margins, tolerance for extreme thermal transients, and damping capability of components and systems, by using components with lower weight and thermal conductivity, etc. Gains in cost reduction, through using CMCS, are anticipated by enabling higher performance systems, using lighter weight components and systems, enabling 100 mission reusability without system refurbishment, greatly reducing cooling requirements and erosion rates, selecting safe fabrication processes that are ideally cost competitive with metal processes at low volume production, etc. This philosophy contrasts the previous philosophy of rocket engine development focused largely on achieving the highest performance with metals and ablatives -- cost and safety were not the focal point of the initial design. Rocket engine components currently being pursued, largely C/SiC and SiC/SiC, include blisks or rotors, 10 foot by 8 foot nozzle ramps, gas generators, thrust chambers, and upperstage nozzles. The Simplex Turbopump CMC blisk effort has just successfully completed a 4.5 year development and test program. The other components mentioned are in the design or fabrication stage. Although the temperature limits of the CMC materials are not quantified in a realistic environment yet, CMC materials are projected to be the only way to achieve significant safety risks mitigation and cost reductions simultaneously. We, the end-users, material fabricators, technology facilitators, and government organizations are charged with developing and demonstrating a much safer and a lot less costly Earth-to-Orbit full-scale propulsion system by 2005.

Effinger, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2020

S/U Comparison Study with a Focus on USLs

Under a DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) task involving Analytical Methods, three Laboratories collaborated in a comparison of results obtained from Sensitivity/Uncertainty (S/U) packages relevant to validation of transport codes. The task involves Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) comparing results of MORET 5/MACSENS V3.0, MCNP6.2/Whisper-1.1, and SCALE 6.2.3/TSUNAMI/USLSTATS respectively. All Monte Carlo transport code results utilize ENDF/B-VII.1. Four cases from the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook) were selected as application models: HEU-MET-FAST-013-001, HEU-SOL-THERM 001-008, PU-MET-FAST-022-001, and PU-SOL-THERM 001-001. Ultimately, comparison is made between Upper Subcritical Limits (USLs) obtained using each code package for each application case. Since differences exist in whether packages take into account margin of subcriticality (MOS), the USL may be computed using bias and bias uncertainty, also known as the calculational margin (CM) in ANSI/ANS 8.24. Application of portions of MOS to the USL for nuclear data uncertainty of and potential code margin is referred to as USL herein. In either case, additional MOS is considered for actual application cases.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

VADER: A Tool for Criticality Safety Validation

The purpose of criticality safety is to prevent any inadvertent criticality from occurring during the handling or storage of fissile material. Calculations are frequently used to demonstrate that a sufficient subcritical margin exists. Validation is a key aspect of the evaluation process, establishing the suitability, accuracy, and associated uncertainty of the computational method and data to be used for the intended application. The validation process is performed by comparing the results of critical experiments with the calculated results from models of the experiments using the computational method to be validated. Laboratory critical experiments are controlled systems that achieve a k eff of approximately 1 in order to investigate the parameters at which such a critical condition is achieved. The validation parameters that are traditionally applied to safety analysis calculations are the bias and the bias uncertainty . The bias is the deviation of the average k eff of the validation suite from unity. The bias uncertainty accounts for the statistical uncertainty in the bias based on the standard deviation, sample size, and distribution of k eff values of the validation suite. The values of bias and bias uncertainty ensure that the systems predicted to be subcritical by the computational method will indeed be subcritical. The bias and bias uncertainty are often combined to determine an upper subcritical limit (USL) or computational margin that can then be applied to safety analysis calculations. Many methods have been developed by different organizations to calculate the bias and bias uncertainty for various types of criticality analyses. Each of these methods typically requires that the validity of various underpinning statistical assumptions be confirmed to demonstrate that the method is appropriate for the analysis of a given validation suite. An example of the validation decision making flow is shown in Fig.1. As shown in Fig. 1, the analyst performing the validation fits a trend line to the data and performs a test to determine if the trend was a statistically better representation of the data than if it were treated as an uncorrelated sample. If the trend line is a better representation of the data, then the analyst uses any one of a number of trending techniques to determine the bias and bias uncertainty. If a trend is not an appropriate representation of the data, then the analyst proceeds to perform a normality assessment for the data. If the normal assumption can be shown to be acceptable, then the analyst calculates the bias and bias uncertainty with the parametric technique. If the assumption of normality cannot be justified, then the nonparametric technique is used. Once the decision flow has been followed and the appropriate technique has been selected, the bias and bias uncertainty is typically combined with an administrative margin to determine a USL below which calculated values of k eff for safety analysis models can be considered subcritical. The calculations used in each decision are often performed with spreadsheets or with small programs available at various sites performing criticality analyses. Expertise in understanding and interpreting the results must be maintained to perform these calculations. This can often be an error-prone process. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently developing the Validation and Data Evaluation Resource (VADER) to simplify and automate the criticality safety validation process and to provide a software quality assurance pedigree to the calculational methods used. This paper discusses the use of the Fulcrum user interface with VADER, the anticipated initial capabilities of VADER to perform validation analyses, and the output from the code.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRS1987

An assessment and validation study of nuclear reactors for low power space applications

The feasibility and safety of six conceptual small, low power nuclear reactor designs was evaluated. Feasibility evaluations included the determination of sufficient reactivity margins for seven years of full power operation and safe shutdown as well as handling during pre-launch assembly phases. Safety evaluations were concerned with the potential for maintaining subcritical conditions in the event of launch or transportation accidents. These included water immersion accident scenarios both with and without water flooding the core. Results show that most of the concepts can potentially meet the feasibility and safety requirements; however, due to the preliminary nature of the designs considered, more detailed designs will be necessary to enable these concepts to fully meet the safety requirements.

Klein, A. C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

MARGInS: Model-Based Analysis of Realizable Goals in Systems

Under NASAs Constellation effort, the Exploration Technology Development Program funded research toward a system validation capability that applied machine learning and test-case generation techniques to the analysis of black-box system behavior. The behavior analysis capability scaled to spaces of hundreds of input parameters and tens of thousands of test cases. Aerospace systems at the vehicle level, especially those systems which contain some level of autonomy, are best described by hybrid and non-linear mathematics. Even simplified models of such systems need parameter dimensionalities in the hundreds or thousands of parameters in order to capture sufficient fidelity. The System Safety Assessments (such as those described in the SAE ARP 4761A Safety Assessment Process guidelines) for these systems are prone to errorinteractions between the vehicles subsystems are complex, and can display emergent behaviors. NASA captured this new analysis in the Model-based Analysis of Realizable Goals in Systems (MARGInS) tool and applied it to the Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) simulation as part of the independent validation and verification cycle before the PA-1 flight test in May of 2010. MARGInS evaluated the adherence of the high-fidelity simulation to its requirements, and deter- mined the margins to failure from the expected nominal input conditions. Following the PA-1 test, the capabilities within the MARGInS framework have been extended with sophisticated statistical and white-box test case generation techniques and applied to other NASA missions. The frame- work now includes a critical factors analysis that was applied to NASAs Orion simulation and design. NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) leveraged the existing MARGInS framework for work on aviation safety for civil transport vehicles and for research on autonomy issues. The NASA ARMD effort created a time series output prediction capability that has been used to characterize trajectories for a plane with an adaptive control system, and a safety boundary detection capability that has been applied to an air traffic control concept of operation for the Federal Aviation Administration. The statistical and machine- learning based techniques within MARGInS have been successfully combined with concolic execution to improve the coverage of a critical unit by driving system-level inputs. The use case driving the concolic execution and MARGInS integration was inspired by the Air France 447 disaster in which the loss of a critical functionality (the airspeed calculation from the pitot tubes) led to loss of the entire plane with the people aboard. To illustrate capabilities and limitations, we will highlight the analyses for the applications listed above. We will then discuss the future plans for MARGInS and its interfaces with other tools.

Validation↗
NASA NTRS2009

Design and Analysis of the International X-Ray Observatory Mirror Modules

The Soft X-Ray Telescope (SXT) modules are the fundamental focusing assemblies on NASA's next major X-ray telescope mission, the International X-Ray Observatory (IXO). The preliminary design and analysis of these assemblies has been completed, addressing the major engineering challenges and leading to an understanding of the factors effecting module performance. Each of the 60 modules in the Flight Mirror Assembly (FMA) supports 200-300 densely packed 0.4 mm thick glass mirror segments in order to meet the unprecedented effective area required to achieve the scientific objectives of the mission. Detailed Finite Element Analysis (FEA), materials testing, and environmental testing have been completed to ensure the modules can be successfully launched. Resulting stress margins are positive based on detailed FEA, a large factor of safety, and a design strength determined by robust characterization of the glass properties. FEA correlates well with the results of the successful modal, vibration, and acoustic environmental tests. Deformation of the module due to on-orbit thermal conditions is also a major design driver. A preliminary thermal control system has been designed and the sensitivity of module optical performance to various thermal loads has been determined using optomechanical analysis methods developed for this unique assembly. This design and analysis furthers the goal of building a module that demonstrates the ability to meet IXO requirements, which is the current focus of the IXO FMA technology development team.

McClelland, Ryan S.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Propulsion system advances that enable a reusable Liquid Fly Back Booster (LFBB)

This paper provides an overview of the booster propulsion system for the Liquid Fly Back Booster (LFBB). This includes, system requirements, design approach, concept of operations, reliability, safety and cost assumptions. The paper summarizes the findings of the Boeing propulsion team that has been studying the LFBB feasibility as a booster replacement for the Space Shuttle. This paper will discuss recent advances including a new generation of kerosene and oxygen rich pre-burner staged combustion cycle main rocket engines. The engine reliability and safety is expected to be much higher than current standards by adding extra operating margins into the design and normally operating the engines at 75% of engine rated power. This allows for engine out capability. The new generation of main engines operates at significantly higher chamber pressure than the prior generation of gas generator cycle engines. The oxygen rich pre-burner engine cycle, unlike the fuel rich gas generator cycle, results in internally self-cleaning firings which facilitates reusability. Maintenance is further enhanced with integrated health monitoring to improve safety and turn-around efficiency. The maintainability of the LFBB LOX/kerosene engines is being improved by designing the vehicle/engine interfaces for easy access to key engine components.

Keith, E. L.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Propulsion System Advances that Enable a Reusable Liquid Fly Back Booster (LFBB)

This paper provides an overview of the booster propulsion system for the Liquid Fly Back Booster (LFBB). This includes, system requirements, design approach, concept of operations, reliability, safety and cost assumptions. The paper summarizes the findings of the Boeing propulsion team that has been studying the LFBB feasibility as a booster replacement for the Space Shuttle. This paper will discuss recent advances including a new generation of kerosene and oxygen rich pre-burner staged combustion cycle main rocket engines. The engine reliability and safety is expected to be much higher than current standards by adding extra operating margins into the design and normally operating the engines at 75% of engine rated power. This allows for engine out capability. The new generation of main engines operates at significantly higher chamber pressure than the prior generation of gas generator cycle engines. The oxygen rich pre-burner engine cycle, unlike the fuel rich gas generator cycle, results in internally self-cleaning firings which facilitates reusability. Maintenance is further enhanced with integrated health monitoring to improve safety and turn-around efficiency. The maintainability of the LFBB LOX / kerosene engines is being improved by designing the vehicle/engine interfaces for easy access to key engine components.

Keith, Edward L.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Fuel Salt Qualification and Associated Fuel Cycle Opportunities & Issues

NRC staff have defined fuel qualification as a process which provides high confidence that the physical and chemical behavior of fuel is sufficiently understood so that it can be adequately modeled for both normal and accident conditions, reflecting the role of the fuel design in the overall safety of the facility. Uncertainties are defined so that calculated fission product releases include the appropriate margins to ensure conservative calculation of radiological dose consequences. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) has accepted the methodology described in NUREG/CR-7299 as an acceptable method for fuel qualification for molten salt reactors. The fuel salt qualification process described in NUREG/CR-7299 is based upon understanding the role that the fuel salt plays in achieving the fundamental safety functions, which in-turn is based on the fuel salt thermophysical and thermochemical properties.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS1993

Evaluation of the national launch system as a booster for the HL-20

The capability of a proposed national launch system (NLS) to boost the personnel launch system (PLS) manned vehicle has been examined. A reference NLS configuration, the NLS-2 1.5 stage vehicle, and a reference HL-20 PLS configuration were used for the study. Performance has been analyzed for several PLS insertion orbits to support the Space Station Freedom resupply mission. The reliability of the NLS launch vehicle and its contribution to crew safety requirements have been determined. The launch-processing and launch facility requirements of these combined systems were also analyzed. Previous studies of these two systems have focused on either the PLS manned element or NLS launch vehicle. This paper combines the results of prior studies in an analysis of the integrated NLS/PLS configuration. This analysis has found the proposed NLS 1.5 stage launch vehicle to be an excellent booster for the PLS. Predicted performance margins for this launch-vehicle configuration are more than adequate, and acceptable reliability and safety levels are anticipated. Integration of this NLS/PLS configuration into NASA mixed-fleet launch architectures is feasible.

Duffy, James B.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Aerospace safety advisory panel

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) monitored NASA's activities and provided feedback to the NASA Administrator, other NASA officials and Congress throughout the year. Particular attention was paid to the Space Shuttle, its launch processing and planned and potential safety improvements. The Panel monitored Space Shuttle processing at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and will continue to follow it as personnel reductions are implemented. There is particular concern that upgrades in hardware, software, and operations with the potential for significant risk reduction not be overlooked due to the extraordinary budget pressures facing the agency. The authorization of all of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Block II components portends future Space Shuttle operations at lower risk levels and with greater margins for handling unplanned ascent events. Throughout the year, the Panel attempted to monitor the safety activities related to the Russian involvement in both space and aeronautics programs. This proved difficult as the working relationships between NASA and the Russians were still being defined as the year unfolded. NASA's concern for the unique safety problems inherent in a multi-national endeavor appears appropriate. Actions are underway or contemplated which should be capable of identifying and rectifying problem areas. The balance of this report presents 'Findings and Recommendations' (Section 2), 'Information in Support of Findings and Recommendations' (Section 3) and Appendices describing Panel membership, the NASA response to the March 1994 ASAP report, and a chronology of the panel's activities during the reporting period (Section 4).

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

Validation and Independent Uncertainty Analysis of the MIX-SOL-THERM-003 ICSBEP Benchmark

The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) was started in 1992 by the United States Department of Energy and later in 1995 became an international project with contributions from 22 countries. The project is now organized by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). In its most recent iteration, the ICSBEP handbook contains over five thousand evaluations of critical, near-critical, and subcritical experiments conducted in facilities all around the world. These benchmarks serve as valuable information for criticality safety engineers who can use them to validate calculation techniques and establish minimum subcritical margins for operations with fissionable materials. The benchmarks in the handbook are categorized by their fissile material composition, material form (oxide, solution, or metal), and fission energy spectra. This is especially useful for those looking for benchmarks similar to a system they are working on to compare methods and identify trends. The ICSBEP Handbook Uncertainty Guide is document outlining recommended practices and methods for determining uncertainties in these benchmarks. Quantifying these uncertainties thoroughly is crucial as it allows a higher degree of confidence that data used from them is valid and relevant. The guide stresses the importance of a thorough and well documented uncertainty analysis when evaluating an experiment. All measured values of a system, whether they be dimensions or material compositions, have a certain amount of uncertainty associated with them and can be analyzed one by one to determine their effects on the system. Many evaluated benchmarks in the handbook present this in detail, however some do not, mostly earlier evaluations performed in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. Recently at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD) of LANL has been validating MCNP6.2 ® input files of criticality benchmarks for use by Whisper, a criticality safety code developed at LANL. This effort is also part of the OECD NEA Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Co-operation (WPEC) Subgroup 45, also known as Validation of Nuclear Data Libraries (VaNDaL). The goal of VaNDaL is to compile a set of validated simulation inputs for use in validating nuclear data and simulation codes. As part of these efforts, one of the benchmarks reviewed was the MIX SOL-THERM-003 ICSBEP benchmark. This paper provides an independent uncertainty analysis of this benchmark experiment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS1991

Advanced technologies for rocket single-stage-to-orbit vehicles

A single-stage-to-orbit vertical takeoff/horizontal landing rocket vehicle was studied to determine the benefits of advanced technology. Advanced technologies that were included in the study were variable mixture ratio oxygen/hydrogen rocket engines and materials, structures, and subsystem technologies currently being developed in the National Aero-Space Plane Program. The application of advanced technology results in an 85 percent reduction in vehicle dry weight. With advanced materials, an external thermal protection system, like the Space Shuttle tiles, was not required. Compared to an all-airbreathing horizontal takeoff/horizontal landing vehicle using the same advanced technologies and mission requirements, the rocket vehicle is lighter in dry weight and has fewer subsystems. To increase reliability and safety, operational features were included in the rocket vehicle-robust subsystems, 5 percent additional margin, no slush hydrogen, fail-operational with an engine out, and a crew escape module. The resulting vehicle grew in dry weight and was still lower in dry weight than the airbreathing vehicle.

Wilhite, Alan W.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Reactor and fuel cycle performance of light water reactor fuel with 235 U enrichments above 5%

Recent advances in nuclear fuel materials research, particularly on the topic of accident-tolerant fuels, have brought up potential opportunities for expanding the operating envelope of existing light water reactors. As many of the performance improvements offered by these technologies may be most fully realized by increasing fuel enrichment beyond the standard 5% limit, this paper examines the potential reactor performance and fuel cycle performance of low-enriched uranium oxide fueled light water reactors by generically considering pressurized water reactors with 235 U enrichment from 5 to 7%. Advanced cladding, including accident-tolerant cladding, has the potential to increase fuel burnup limits related to hydrogen in the cladding that coincide with those limits associated with end-of-life reactivity. Therefore, higher enrichment will be necessary in order to realize the higher fuel burnups. This work includes evaluation of the fuel cycle length, discharge burnup, reactivity coefficients, and fuel cycle performance, including radioactive waste and environmental impact metrics per unit energy generated. The analysis was performed using the evaluation metrics from the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Evaluation and Screening Study. The reactor performance and safety analysis show that enrichments between 5 and 7% would have similar fuel temperature and moderator temperature coefficients. However, the soluble boron coefficient would decrease in magnitude, requiring more corrosive boric acid in the coolant or other methods of reactivity control during the fuel cycle. At these higher enrichments the maximum burnup at the rim of the fuel pellet would increase by almost a factor of two, which is expected to impact the formation of high-burnup structure in the fuel and the corresponding thermo-mechanical fuel properties. The fuel cycle performance assessment shows that increasing enrichment reduces the quantity of high-level waste disposed per unit energy generated, but it increases the natural resource requirements normalized to a gigawatt-electricity-per-year basis. Another impact is the slightly higher discharge burnup, resulting in somewhat different activity levels of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste radioactivity at 100 and 100,000 years after fuel discharge. The environmental impacts—including land use, water use, carbon emission, and radiological exposure—are of the same magnitude per unit energy generated. Finally, however, the impacts are distributed differently. Less than 5% enrichment has marginally more impact on the back-end of the fuel cycle, and greater than 5% enrichment has marginally more impact on the front-end of the fuel cycle. Ultimately, no neutronic or reactor safety hindrances to employing light water reactor fuel with enrichments greater than 5% are identified; given the achievable reactor performance benefits with advanced fuels, further practical exploration of increased enrichment fuel is recommended.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2023

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 23-01: Including Key Design Features in Safety-Critical Pyrotechnic Firing Circuits

Pyrotechnic systems often fall into a unique category in that inadvertent activation of these systems resulting from a fault and/or lack of safe margins can lead directly to loss of crew. For example, untimely activation of pyrotechnics used for a flight termination system could override an abort capability. Over the years, NASA and the military have learned lessons about safe pyrotechnic circuit design and test, many of which are codified. However, with NASA’s recent efforts to move toward a development model than leans more heavily on Commercial Partners these requirements have not always been directly levied on projects and in some cases been misinterpreted. This bulletin describes key safety features of pyrotechnic firing circuit design and provides rationale for inclusion of each feature.

Pyrotechnic Firing Curcuits↗
DOE OSTI2024

Chlorine Validation through Critical Integral Experiments

An increased interest in the validation of chlorine nuclear data, specifically 35Cl, in recent years has led to the prioritization of conducting chlorine critical experiments for nuclear data validation and criticality safety evaluations. A previous experiment was conducted with PVC and CPVC (chlorinated polyvinyl chloride) to reduce the margin of subcriticality for PF-4 operations with aqueous plutonium chloride solutions. Challenges in determining the composition of specific polymers, namely the CPVC, made it difficult to characterize, and therefore benchmark. Additional materials that were utilizable for chlorine validation were not immediately clear, as form, strength, purity, and composition are all important. A series of possible absorber materials were identified and studied, but ultimately granular sodium chloride was chosen. In addition to the needs of LANL’s PF-4 other industry collaborators have brought attention to the need for chlorine validation. Specifically, the need for HEU electrorefining with LiCl salts at Y-12 was taken into consideration for this experiment, with the experimental configurations being finely tuned to best meet their needs. Needs for validation were also presented by Idaho National Lab (INL) and TerraPower for validation of their Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE) and Molten Chloride Fast Reactor (MCFR) and have also been considered.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗