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At least 505 records · Page 28

Applicability of Developed Calculation Models to Predict Long-term Behavior of Metal Seals - Necessary Scope of Tests - 19311

The long-term sealing behavior of metal seals, assembled in the lid system of casks for transportation and storage of radioactive materials, has been investigated. For that purpose, phenomenological models describing the time- and temperature dependent behavior have been introduced by BAM since 2016, e.g. by using the time-temperature superposition principle. Results have shown that these models describe the relaxation behavior adequately and are suitable for extrapolations. In this work, the applicability of these models is checked by analyzing the necessary scope of tests, which must be carried out to get sufficient information about the long-term behavior of metal seals based on short-term tests. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Enhancing Risk Analysis of Accidental Release Using CFD Modeling and Machine Learning

This project report presents the results from the AU31 project that is entitled “Enhancing Risk Analysis of Accidental Release Using CFD Modeling and Machine Learning” performed between FY2021 and FY2022. The technical objective of this project is to enhance risk analysis of accidental release of radioactive materials and provide novel risk forecasting and capabilities for assessing unplanned hazardous chemical releases for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The approach includes a cross-platform finite element analysis of airborne chemical release, machine learning (ML) for simulation and forecasting, and a big data approach to data management, transformation and analysis capable of handling petabyte-scale unstructured and structured data. The outcome of these findings were assembled and accessible as a final output via an intuitive web hosted geospatial-based user interface for demonstration and general dissemination. These new results also provide a mechanism of combining this knowledge in a risk analysis framework tool. The geospatial analysis and output can utilize 5 years of qualified meteorological data to illustrate projected plume footprints that are generated from computational aspects of this study. Specifically, we show the development of a geospatial risk analysis capabilities to respond to and plan for accidental release of radioactive materials and to provide a risk forecasting tool for assessing hazardous chemical releases for the DOE. The focus of this effort is germane to common practices in risk analysis; and it is highly relevant to the timely and transparent release of information related to materials at risk including hazardous materials and chemical vapors and rapid assessment of the potential impacts on the workforce at active sites across the DOE complex.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Explicit Dynamic Impact Analysis of the Building 3525 Packages

The safe transport and handling of radioactive material containers is critical to ensure the protection of personnel, facilities, and the environment. Accidental drops during handling pose a significant hazard, necessitating robust design and analysis to mitigate potential consequences. This study presents an explicit dynamic impact analysis of two container designs, the Baby Sugarman and the Core Conduction Cooldown Test Facility (CCCTF) Tall Boy, used in Building 3525 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The analysis employed nonlinear finite element modeling in LS-DYNA to simulate free-fall impacts from a height of 16.5 ft across eight critical orientations. The study evaluated deformation, strain failure, and shielding integrity under these extreme conditions. Results demonstrated that both designs maintain structural integrity, with no breaches or loss of shielding under specified administrative controls. Notably, a maximum shielding loss of 10 lbs was observed during a top-corner drop, highlighting the need to limit drop heights to less than 1 ft for certain orientations. These findings underscore the effectiveness of engineering controls and design measures in preventing containment breaches and ensuring compliance with safety requirements. This work provides a comprehensive methodology for impact analysis, contributing valuable insights to the field of radioactive materials packaging and transportation safety.

Martinez, Oscar [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000181814046)↗

Development of a military-specific mesh-type computational phantom library and its application to internal dosimetry and in-field radiological triage screening

Estimates of organ-absorbed and committed doses to individuals exposed to radioactive materials via acute inhalation often rely on internal dose coefficients and detector responses from reference human computational models. To achieve more accurate dose assessments to United States Armed Forces service members exposed in-field, computational models with varying morphometric parameters representative of this population are necessary. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 145 provides detailed mesh reference computational phantoms (MRCPs) for adult males and females, with morphometric parameters matched to the 50th percentile. Previously, these phantoms were 2D and 3D scaled to match desired height, mass, and secondary anthropomorphic parameters in the creation of the University of Florida / Memorial Sloan Kettering (UF/MSK) computational phantom library. To achieve body fat percentage targets required for accession into the US Armed Forces, muscle and fat volumes were adjusted accordingly, thus, creating the UF/Department of Defence computational phantom library presented in this study. A comprehensive library of mesh-type computational human phantoms was created, including 57 adult males and 49 adult females with morphometric parameters aligned with United States Armed Forces service members. Phantoms were restricted to a body mass index between 19 and 27.5, with body fat percentages below 26% for males and 36% for females. Specific absorbed fractions were computed for selected source and target combinations, demonstrating how variations in height and body mass influence energy absorption in target regions relative to the ICRP MRCPs. Radiation detector responses were also computed, revealing that higher body masses resulted in decreased registered counts in the detection volume. These findings highlight the importance of incorporating morphometric variability in computational phantoms to achieve more accurate dose assessments and radiation detection responses for United States Armed Forces service members who inhale radioactive materials in-field.

computational phantoms↗

ASEDRA Evaluation Final Report.

The performance of the Advanced Synthetically Enhanced Detector Resolution Algorithm (ASEDRA) was evaluated by performing a blind test of 29 sets of gamma-ray spectra that were provided by DNDO. ASEDRA is a post-processing algorithm developed at the Florida Institute of Nuclear Detection and Security at the University of Florida (UF/FINDS) that extracts char-acteristic peaks in gamma-ray spectra. The QuickID algorithm, also developed at UF/FINDS, was then used to identify nuclides based on the characteristic peaks generated by ASEDRA that are inferred from the spectra. The ASEDRA/QuickID analysis results were evaluated with respect to the performance of the DHSIsotopeID algorithm, which is a mature analysis tool that is part of the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS). Data that were used for the blind test were intended to be challenging, and the radiation sources included thick shields around the radioactive materials as well as cargo containing naturally occurring radio-active materials, which masked emission from special nuclear materials and industrial isotopes. Evaluation of the analysis results with respect to the ground truth information (which was provided after the analyses were finalized) showed that neither ASEDRA/QuickID nor GADRAS could identify all of the radiation sources correctly. Overall, the purpose of this effort was primarily to evaluate ASEDRA, and GADRAS was used as a standard against which ASEDRA was compared. Although GADRAS was somewhat more accurate on average, the performance of ASEDRA exceeded that of GADRAS for some of the unknowns. The fact that GADRAS also failed to identify many of the radiation sources attests to the difficulty of analyzing the blind-test data that were used as a basis for the evaluation. This evaluation identified strengths and weaknesses of the two analysis approaches. The importance of good calibration data was also clear because the performance of both analysis methods was impeded by the inability to define the energy calibration accurately. Acronyms ACHIP adaptive chi-processed ASEDRA Advanced Synthetically Enhanced Detector Resolution Algorithm DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office DRFs Detector Response Functions FINDS Florida Institute of Nuclear Detection and Security FWHM full-width half-maximum GADRAS Gamma Detector Response Analysis Software GUI graphical user interface HEU highly enriched uranium HPGe high purity germanium ID identification NaI Sodium iodide NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials ppm parts per million SNL Sandia National Laboratories UF University of Florida WGPu weapons-grade plutonium

Mitchell, Dean J↗

Fall Protection Procedures for Sealing Bulk Waste Shipments by Rail Cars at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Sites - 13509

Rail-cars loaded with radioactive materials must be closed and fastened to comply with United States Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements before they shipped. Securing waste shipments in a manner that meets these regulations typically results in the use of a sealable rail-car liner. Workers accessing the tops of the 2.74 m high rail-cars to seal and inspect liners for compliance prior to shipment may be exposed to a fall hazard. Relatively recent revisions to the Fall Protection requirements in the Safety and Health Requirements Manual (EM385-1-1, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) have necessitated modifications to the fall protection systems previously employed for rail-car loading at Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. In response these projects have developed site-specific procedures to protect workers and maintain compliance with the improved fall protection regulations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Approaches for Communicating Technical Information - 16012

Projects within the nuclear industry are generally complex and associated with high hazards. To achieve success there is often a necessity to apply innovation or adopt longer term strategies and solutions. Because of these long timescales and the fact that some approaches revolve around allowing natural radioactive decay to take place prior to visible action, the industry is sometimes perceived to be technically unable to make progress with its environmental and waste management obligations. Work within the industry additionally takes on a high profile and invariably creates greater levels of anxiety and mistrust in the eyes of stakeholders than comparable projects from non-nuclear related industries. Many aspects of the industry are still seen as secretive, environmentally detrimental and 'risky' and all components of the nuclear life-cycle are therefore open to external scrutiny. Although communication and engagement has increased greatly over the years, especially in developed countries, there is still room for improvement in this field. Such improvement might relate to the frequency and level of engagement, the subject matter or the actual process itself. Communication with stakeholders is required throughout the various phases of the nuclear lifecycle whether the activity relates to mining/milling of uranium, fuel production, operational plant activities, decommissioning, remediation or waste management. The concerns and aspirations of stakeholders during these different activities will vary but need to be adequately addressed. Some organisations now have a basic engagement program and convince themselves that they are carrying out true engagement. But just ticking a box to say that an engagement program is in place does not provide evidence of its appropriateness or success as on many occasions' organisations might still not understand how to adequately engage and communicate technical information. It is not always the information we choose to communicate but that which might be withheld that is often perceived to be most relevant to the stakeholder community. Communicating technical information isn't as straightforward as it sounds, but still has to be undertaken, otherwise trust, understanding and acceptance of chosen options will not be achieved. I utilise what I call the 'ten principles of engagement' which I believe can help when communicating technical Information in relation to nuclear and radiological matters. These are; 1. Develop Trust. 2. Educating people and providing information in a transparent manner. 3. Develop an engagement process that is truly a two way process. 4. Openly discuss risk perception and risk communication. 5. Never try to trivialise risk. 6. Where possible, simplify the language you use. 7. Put background and naturally occurring radioactivity into context. 8. Explain how radioactive materials are often used in everyday life. 9. Try to demonstrate that you too are a member of the public. 10.Walk the talk - Try to undertake what you wish others to undertake. Further research is being undertaken to determine if Mental Models might assist with the communication of nuclear and radiological information. A mental model is an explanation of someone's thought process about how something works in the real world. The mental model approach aims to investigate the judgment and decision-making processes of both expert and lay groups, thus allowing a comparison and visualisation of the different views to be made. It is undoubtedly worthwhile keeping a watching brief on the outcome of such research as we strive to improve our communication with the general public. The aim of this paper is to highlight some simple principles and approaches that can assist with the communication of technical information. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

{sup 125}I Measurements for Occupational Exposure Assessment

Whenever there is a risk of occupational exposure to dispersible radioactive material, it is necessary to have a monitoring program to assess the effective dose arising from the intake of radionuclides by workers. In this paper we present our experience in bioassay measurements of {sup 125}I in urine samples of workers using high resolution gamma spectrometry. For a 24-hour excretion period, we found activity values of the order of one Bq and estimated the committed effective doses to be less than one {mu}Sv. Although very small, these values led to a re-evaluation and improvement of the laboratory safety conditions. We discuss the calibration procedure followed for the activity measurements, the estimation of the uncertainty in the excreted activity, the calculation of detection and quantification limits and estimation of performance indicators. Aspects regarding the spectral analysis, true coincidence summing and matrix effects are also considered.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

SU-E-T-388: Estimating the Radioactivity Inventory of a Cyclotron Based Pencil Beam Proton Therapy Facility

Purpose: Parts of the cyclotron and energy degrader are incidentally activated by protons lost during the acceleration and transport of protons for radiation therapy. An understanding of the radioactive material inventory is needed when regulatory requirements are assessed. Methods: First, the tumor dose and volume is used to determine the required energy deposition. For spot scanning, the tumor length along the beam path determines the number of required energy layers. For each energy layer the energy deposition per proton can be calculated from the residual proton range within the tumor. Assuming a typical layer weighting, an effective energy deposition per proton can then be calculated. The total number of required protons and the number of protons per energy layer can then be calculated. For each energy layer, proton losses in the energy degrader are calculated separately since its transmission efficiency, and hence the amount of protons lost, is energy dependent. The degrader efficiency also determines the number of protons requested from the cyclotron. The cyclotron extraction efficiency allows a calculation of the proton losses within the cyclotron. The saturation activity induced in the cyclotron and the degrader is equal to the production rate R for isotopes whose half-life is shorter that the projected cyclotron life time. R can be calculated from the proton loss rate and published production cross sections. Results: About 1/3 of the saturation activity is produced in the cyclotron and 2/3 in the energy degrader. For a projected case mix and a patient load of 1100 fractions per week at 1.8 Gy per fraction a combined activity of 180 mCi was estimated at saturation. Conclusion: Calculations were used to support to application of a radioactive materials license for the possession of 200 mCi of activity for isotopes with atomic numbers ranging from 1-83.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

RESULTS FOR THE THIRD QUARTER 2011 TANK 50 WAC SLURRY SAMPLE: CHEMICAL AND RADIONUCLIDE CONTAMINANT RESULTS

The Saltstone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. Low-level waste (LLW) streams from the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP), H-Canyon, and the decontaminated salt solution product from the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) Unit (ARP/MCU) process are stored in Tank 50 until the LLW can be transferred to the Saltstone Facility for treatment and disposal. The LLW must meet the specified waste acceptance criteria (WAC) before it is processed into saltstone. The specific chemical and radionuclide contaminants and their respective WAC limits are in the current Saltstone WAC. Waste Solidification Engineering (WSE) requested that Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) perform quarterly analysis on saltstone samples. The concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants are measured to ensure the saltstone produced during each quarter is in compliance with the current WAC. This report documents the concentrations of chemical and radionuclide contaminants for the 2011 Third Quarter samples collected from Tank 50 on July 7, 2011 and discusses those results in further detail than the previously issued results report.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Spectrophotometric and Calorimetric Studies of U(VI) Complexation with Sulfate at 25-70oC

Sulfate, one of the inorganic constituents in the groundwater of nuclear waste repository, could affect the migration of radioactive materials by forming complexes. Spectrophotometric and microcalorimetric titrations were performed to identify the U(VI)/sulfate complexes and determine the equilibrium constants and enthalpy of complexation at 25-70 C. Results show that U(VI) forms moderately strong complexes with sulfate, i.e., UO{sub 2}SO{sub 4}(aq) and UO{sub 2}(SO{sub 4}){sub 2}{sup 2-}, in this temperature range and the complexes become stronger as the temperature is increased: 2-fold and 10-fold increases in the stability constants of UO{sub 2}SO{sub 4}(aq) and UO{sub 2}(SO{sub 4}{sub 2}{sup 2-}), respectively, when the temperature is increased from 25 C to 70 C. The complexation is endothermic and entropy-driven, showing typical characteristics of inner-sphere complexation and 'hard acid'/'hard base' interactions. The thermodynamic trends are discussed in terms of dehydration of both the cation (UO{sub 2}{sup 2+}) and the anion (SO{sub 4}{sup 2-}) as well as the effect of temperature on the structure of water.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Evaluation of Low-Level Waste Disposal Receipt Data for Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility - Fiscal Year 2011

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) generates radioactive waste as a result of various activities. Operational or institutional waste is generated from a wide variety of research and development activities including nuclear weapons development, energy production, and medical research. Environmental restoration (ER), and decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) waste is generated as contaminated sites and facilities at LANL undergo cleanup or remediation. The majority of this waste is low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and is disposed of at the Technical Area 54 (TA-54), Area G disposal facility. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 (DOE, 2001) requires that radioactive waste be managed in a manner that protects public health and safety, and the environment. To comply with this order, DOE field sites must prepare and maintain site-specific radiological performance assessments for LLW disposal facilities that accept waste after September 26, 1988. Furthermore, sites are required to conduct composite analyses that account for the cumulative impacts of all waste that has been (or will be) disposed of at the facilities and other sources of radioactive material that may interact with the facilities. Revision 4 of the Area G performance assessment and composite analysis was issued in 2008 (LANL, 2008). These analyses estimate rates of radionuclide release from the waste disposed of at the facility, simulate the movement of radionuclides through the environment, and project potential radiation doses to humans for several on-site and off-site exposure scenarios. The assessments are based on existing site and disposal facility data and on assumptions about future rates and methods of waste disposal. The accuracy of the performance assessment and composite analysis depends upon the validity of the data used and assumptions made in conducting the analyses. If changes in these data and assumptions are significant, they may invalidate or call into question certain aspects of the analyses. For example, if the volumes and activities of waste disposed of during the remainder of the disposal facility's lifetime differ significantly from those projected, the doses projected by the analyses may no longer apply. DOE field sites are required to implement a performance assessment and composite analysis maintenance program. The purpose of this program is to ensure the continued applicability of the analyses through incremental improvement of the level of understanding of the disposal site and facility. Site personnel are required to conduct field and experimental work to reduce the uncertainty in the data and models used in the assessments. Furthermore, they are required to conduct periodic reviews of waste receipts, comparing them to projected waste disposal rates. The radiological inventory for Area G was updated in conjunction with Revision 4 of the performance assessment and composite analysis (Shuman, 2008). That effort used disposal records and other sources of information to estimate the quantities of radioactive waste that have been disposed of at Area G from 1959, the year the facility started receiving waste on a routine basis, through 2007. It also estimated the quantities of LLW that will require disposal from 2008 through 2044, the year in which it is assumed that disposal operations at Area G will cease. This report documents the fourth review of Area G disposal receipts since the inventory was updated and examines information for waste placed in the ground during fiscal years (FY) 2008 through 2011. The primary objective of the disposal receipt review is to ensure that the future waste inventory projections developed for the performance assessment and composite analysis are consistent with the actual types and quantities of waste being disposed of at Area G. Toward this end, the disposal data that are the subject of this review are used to update the future waste inventory projections for the disposal facility. These projections are compared to the future inventory projections that were developed for Revision 4 of the performance assessment and composite analysis. The approach used to characterize the FY 2008 through 2011 waste is generally the same as that used to characterize the inventory for the Revision 4 analyses (Shuman, 2008). This methodology is described in Section 2. The results of the disposal receipt review are presented in Section 3 and discussed in terms of their significance to the Area G analyses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Commercial sealed sources and timely disposal: Challenges and incentives - 15456

It is widely accepted as a radioactive material management best-practice that storage of disused sealed sources should be a temporary measure. Effective end-of-life management, including timely disposition of disused and unwanted sealed sources, is an important way to address national security, public health, and safety concerns presented by long-term storage of disused sealed sources. However, significantly increased disposal access since 2012 has not led commercial sealed source generators in the U.S. to dispose of their disused and unwanted sources as quickly as many had expected. As a result, policy-makers and non-government stakeholders are considering ways to incentivize sealed source generators to make more timely decisions regarding the disposition of their disused and unwanted sources. To help ensure that ongoing efforts to develop sealed source management and disposal incentives are efficient and effective, NNSA/GMS is engaging both public and private sector partners to better understand generator considerations, motivations, and challenges with regard to sealed source management and disposal decisions. The results of these engagements to date indicate potentially effective ways to encourage sealed source waste generators to disposition their sources in a timely fashion. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Joint Convention, Its Global Impact and U.S Continuing Involvement - 16645

The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (hereafter called the Joint Convention) is an international convention, conducted under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is one of a suite of international instruments dealing with nuclear safety and physical security, which serve to promote a global culture for the safe use of radioactive materials. Unlike other safety or security conventions, however, the Joint Convention deals exclusively with the end of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Joint Convention focuses on the lessons to be learned from past experience and existing facility operations, which can be implemented in the policies and designs for future operating facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. The U.S. has participated fully in the review process, as well as setting forth initiatives to sponsor increased ratification. The U.S. holds the current Joint Convention presidency for the Fifth Review Cycle. Because of the important benefits associated with active participation, the U.S. has strongly supported a Regional Conference Initiative outreach program to increase membership. We also provided an expert for each of the conferences to assist in advancing the message to non-Member States, in particular developing nations considering ratification. The Joint Convention process also provides opportunities to identify future areas of bilateral and multilateral technical and regulatory cooperation with other Parties. Furthermore, the Joint Convention is consistent with U.S. foreign policy considerations to support, as a priority, the strengthening of the worldwide safety culture in the use of nuclear energy. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

French management model for sustainable transportation of used fuel - 15376

Safe and efficient transportation of radioactive material is key to the success of our industry. Used fuel transports are inherently complex due to the nature of the material and the high visibility. Only a few countries have developed comprehensive used fuel transportation systems that require a wide range of equipment, services and expertise. In the many countries, such as the Unites States, where interim consolidated storage, recycling or geological repository are not available yet, similar systems will have to be implemented. For more than 50 years AREVA TN has safely shipped more than 7,000 used fuel transport casks. The transportation system that was initially developed in the 1970's has been adapted and enhanced over the years to meet more restrictive regulatory requirements and evolving customer needs, and to address public concerns. The numerous 'lessons learned' have offered data and guidance that have allowed for also efficient and consistent improvement over the decades. Based on AREVA TN extensive expertise, this paper will describe the different phases and milestones that need to be met to set up, license and operate a successful used fuel transportation management system. Transportation of spent fuel in France could not be performed effectively and efficiently without strong collaboration with Electricite de France (EDF) who plays a critical role as the shipper. EDF will provide a nuclear operator's perspective on the most critical aspects of a successful used fuel transportation program. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The study of equivalent dose of uranium in long bean (V. U. Sesquipedalis) and the effect on human

In the case of accidental release of Uranium-238 ({sup 238}U) radionuclides in a nuclear facility or in the environment, internal contamination by either acute or chronic exposure has the potential to induce both radiological and chemical toxic effects. A study was conducted to estimate the {sup 238}U radionuclide concentration in the long beans using Induced Coupled Mass Plasma-Spectrometry (ICP-MS). {sup 238}U radionuclide is a naturally occurring radioactive material that can be found in soil and can be transferred to the long bean (Vigna unguiculata subsp. Sesquapedalis) directly or indirectly via water or air. Kidney and liver are the major sites of deposition of {sup 238}U radionuclide. The obtained dose exposed in the liver and kidney is used to assess the safety level for public intake of {sup 238}U radionuclide from the consumption of long beans. The concentration of {sup 238}U radionuclide measured in long bean samples was 0.0226 ± 0.0009 mg/kg. Total activity of {sup 238}U radionuclide was 0.0044 ± 0.0002 Bq/day with the daily intake of 0.3545 ± 0.0143 µg/day and the annual committed effective dose due to ingestion of {sup 238}U radionuclide in long beans was 0.2230 ± 0.0087 µSv/year. The committed equivalent dose of {sup 238}U radionuclide from the assessment in the liver and kidney are 0.4198 ± 0.0165 nSv and 10.9335 ± 0.4288 nSv. The risk of cancer of {sup 238}U radionuclide was determined to be (86.0466 ± 3.3748) × 10-9. Thus, the results concluded that {sup 238}U radionuclide in local long beans was in the permitted level and safe to consume without posing any significant radiological threat to population.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2014

This Nevada Nuclear Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts.This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2014 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is responsible for the oversight of these ER projects, and the Sandia Field Office of NNSA (NNSA/SFO) has oversight of all other TTR and NTTR activities. NNSA/SFO produces the TTR annual environmental report, which is available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.Major Site Programs and Facilities NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. The six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for weapons experimentation and nuclear test readiness. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site (known as the T-1 Site), Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

REGULATORY TESTING AND POSTTEST ANALYSIS OF THE DPP-3 TYPE B SHIPPING CONTAINER FOR NCT AND HAC TESTS

The safe transportation of radioactive material using appropriately designed and certified transportation packages is important to protect the public and environment. Therefore, a comprehensive and rigorous system of packaging requirements are required. The purpose of this test protocol is to determine the effects of drop testing on package performance in a Type B shipping package (DPP-3). Required physical tests for the DPP-3 package include normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions test requirements. The preparation, regulatory testing, and post-test evaluation of a Type B shipping package tested to the 10 CFR 71.71 and 10 CFR 71.73 requirements will be presented. Six packages were tested and the responses when subjected to the HAC sequence of free drop, puncture, and thermal tests according to 10 CFR 71.73 were measured. The posttest helium leak test showed a leak rate less than 1 × 10-7 He-cc/sec which means that the containment boundary was maintained after the regulatory testing, therefore maintaining a leak tight environment. To determine the amount of change in the package performance measurements, statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 26. The null hypothesis of the testing was that there would not be a change in the measurements from pre to post-testing large enough to find statistical significance. Therefore, a finding of statistical significance indicated too much variability in the package design and was deemed an unfavorable finding. A repeated measures t-test was used to analyze the drum lids and CV torques. A one-way ANOVA was used to analyze height and diameter packages. Results of the repeated measures t-test indicated that all six containment vessel lid torques were statistically significant. However only three out of the six drum lid torques were statistically significant. Therefore, design of the lids caused more variability than necessary when subjected to the following drop tests: 1.) horizontal and cold; 2.) vertical lid down; and 3.) corner with lid up. Results of the one-way ANOVA analysis on height indicated that four out of the six CTUs were statistically significant. Thus, design of the CTUs caused more variability then necessary when subjected to the following drop tests: 1.) horizontal hot; 2.) horizontal cold; 3.) corner lid up; and 4.) corner lid down. Results of the one-way ANOVA analysis on diameter indicated that all six CTUs were statistically significant. Thus, design of the CTUs caused more variability then necessary when subjected to all of the tests. The DPP-3 design has been shown to be an acceptable design for the transport of radioactive materials. However, results of the statistical analysis reveal a possible improvement in package and test design to reduce variability in package performance measurement before and after testing.

Martinez, Oscar↗