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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 505 records · Page 28
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Improving Effective Mass Estimations in Pu-Metal Annuli

Determining the effective mass of 240 Pu in a plutonium metal item can be achieved through a number of destructive and non-destructive assay techniques. However, these techniques have one or more shortcomings. These include the need for large quantities of plutonium, long measurement time, or lack of sufficient accuracy. While efforts have been made to mitigate these issues by estimating 240 Pu quantities through neutron coincidence counting techniques, these estimates are subject to systematic bias, and their estimates are not well characterized when other factors of the annulus’ physical form and composition are accounted for. In this work, we expand upon these non-destructive assay techniques via the implementation of random forest machine learning models, which produce correction functions that augment and improve the effective mass estimates derived from classical leakage multiplication, singles, doubles, and triples multiplicity counting equations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

NWAL Validation Report for U Assay by Potentiometric Titration (Modified Davies and Gray Technique) and U and PU Assay by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry

SRNL Sensing & Metrology, previously Analytical Laboratory, is a member of the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories for Nuclear Material Measurement that is qualified to provide Uranium and Plutonium isotopic analysis of nuclear materials by Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry. As part of the membership, SRNL participated in the 2019 Nuclear Material Round Robin to maintain the qualification to provide isotopic analysis. SRNL also participated with the additional intent to qualify Uranium Assay by Potentiometric Titration (Davies and Gray method) and Uranium and Plutonium Isotope Dilution by Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry as part of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Network of Analytical Laboratories. The proficiency test exercise was conducted by the Office of Safeguards Analytical Services, Department of Safeguards.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Final Design for Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments using High 240 Pu Content Plutonium/Aluminum Zero Power Research Reactor Plates with Polyethylene Moderator (IER 520 Final Design CED-2 Report)

The US Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) convened a multinational Thermal Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) meeting in July of 2011 to discuss the data and experimental needs of criticality safety practitioners. The number one and two priority integral experiment data needs were for 239 Pu and 240 Pu, with special emphasis on cross section performance in the intermediate energy range (from 0.625 eV to 100 keV). LLNL measured five critical configurations with LANL for the plutonium test bed (IER-184) and published the experiments as International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project evaluation PUMET-MIXED-002. Modeling of the benchmark configurations using ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data showed significant overprediction of reactivity for configurations that had a large percentage of fissions in the intermediate energy regime. This report documents a variation on the TEX plutonium test bed to provide a test of 240 Pu cross sections, with sensitivity of the configuration to 240 Pu radiative capture and fission cross sections a priority for the design.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Actinides and Correlated Electron Materials

The Actinides and Correlated Electron Materials area of leadership spans Los Alamos National Laboratory competency in actinide materials research dating to the Manhattan Project as articulated in the Integrated Plutonium Science and Research Strategy and competency in strongly correlated electron systems dating back to at least the early 1980s. This area of leadership focuses on the goals of discovering, understanding, and controlling emergent electronic states and predictive performance of actinide materials. They are quintessentially linked by the fact that the physics of actinides—and plutonium in particular—are governed by strong electronic correlations. Not only is the electronic structure of actinides dictated by fine details of electron correlations, but chemical bonding and physical structure are as well. Hence, by addressing the first goal of this leadership area we can significantly accelerate progress on the second goal. To understand such matter requires probing the intertwined spin, charge, orbital, and lattice degrees of freedom with greater precision and developing models that accurately predict the consequences of these coupled degrees of freedom, on multiple length and time scales and including acute reactivity and effects of self-irradiation phenomena in these materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Performance Testing of Software Upgrade for SRNL CPC Instrument at the Nuclear Material Laboratory, Office of Safeguards Analytical Services, International Atomic Energy Agency

This report summarizes the performance testing for the Software upgrade for the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Controlled Potential Coulometry (CPC) instrument. This upgrade is specifically to meet the needs of the Nuclear Material Laboratory, Office of Safeguards Analytical Services, International Atomic Energy Agency at Seibersdorf, Austria. The instrument hardware was upgraded in 2010, but the software continued to operate on a Windows platform using a High Tech Basic (HT Basic) application. HT Basic usage is declining. The IAEA requested an upgrade to the existing coulometer software to Laboratory Virtual Instrument Engineering Workbench (LabVIEW), an object-oriented programming language in wide use and one the NML staff is familiar with. The software was developed by SRNL Software Engineer, with assistance from Electrical Engineer and Scientist. Once developed, the new LabVIEW software was validated, tested with Iron (surrogate for plutonium) and plutonium. Once testing was completed, the software was installed at the International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Material Laboratory (IAEA NML) coulometer, and SRNL provided hands on training to NML staff on using the new software.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Tale of Two Bomb Designs: Why were both Little Boy and Fat Man created?

Little Boy and Fat Man. Two types of nuclear weapons were developed at the Los Alamos wartime lab in an effort to help end World War II. Both would be released above Japan just days apart in August 1945, and just weeks after the Trinity test in the New Mexico desert. These weapons were, however, as different as their monikers imply. Little Boy was a uranium, gun-type weapon, whereas Fat Man was a plutonium, implosion-style weapon. Two types were needed because there was only enough uranium for one gun-type weapon and the U.S. government knew it would need to make more than one weapon. Also, the unattainable challenges of a plutonium gun-type design prompted the shift to the implosion-style weapon.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Final Design for Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) with Absorbers to Provide Validation Benchmarks for Y-12 Electrorefining Facility

One of the main goals of the Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) project is to use existing Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) assets to create critical experiment plutonium and uranium test beds for materials important to criticality safety that have insufficient benchmark evaluations. The plutonium test bed experiments were completed in 2018 and are published in the 2020 edition of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. The uranium test bed assemblies were measured in 2020, with benchmark preparation underway.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Integral Experiment Final Design for Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) using Highly Enriched Uranium with Polyethylene at Low Temperature (IER-479 CED-2 Report)

The goal of IER-479 is to design uranium critical experiments that can be used to validate low temperature cross sections and criticality safety analyses over multiple neutron energy regimes. Currently, there are no benchmarks in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) handbook at temperatures lower than room temperature (International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project Handbook, 2019). However, there are many needs for validation of criticality safety analysis at lower temperatures, including meeting transportation requirements and operations conducted outside or in unheated facilities. Additionally, NCSP has funded North Carolina State (NCSU) to generate new thermal scattering laws, including at lower temperatures, and the lack of integral benchmarks impedes data testing of these new cross sections. To address these needs, this report will present a critical experiment design covering various fission energy regimes with a goal temperature of -40°C (-40°F), which is based on the lower bound of expected non-cryogenic operational temperatures. The goal of the U.S. Nuclear Criticality Safety Program’s (NCSP) Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) is to design and conduct new critical experiments to address high priority nuclear data needs from the nuclear criticality safety and nuclear data communities. The TEX program includes two series of baseline experimental configurations, one based on plutonium fuel (plutonium-aluminum Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates) and the other based on uranium fuel (highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates), that are moderated with varying thickness of polyethylene to create assemblies which span the thermal, intermediate, and fast fission energy regimes. The configurations are designed to be easily modified (for example, to add diluent materials of interest) to allow for efficient generation of additional benchmark configurations and allow for added nuclear data testing utility when comparing modified configurations to baseline configurations. The goal of IER-479 is to use the TEX-HEU concept (stack of HEU plates and polyethylene moderators) to design a critical experiment that can be used to validate low temperature cross sections and criticality safety analyses.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear data covariances are critical input to determine upper sub-critical limits and to design experiments to increase it [Slides]

This presentation discusses how Upper Subcritical Limits (USL) are key parameters to determine operational limits in nuclear criticality safety evaluations. It also discusses an example of plutonium casting operation using tantalum at LANL PF-4. The Whisper tool at Los Alamos relies on many inputs, including covariance data, leading the presentation to ask if an existing benchmark data be used in Whisper to adjust nuclear data and covariances to justify a higher USL. If not, Whisper can be used to help design an optimal new benchmark experiment. The presentation also seeks to determine what the possible impacts are on USL and operational limits for plutonium casting. In conclusion, nuclear data covariances are used for by Whisper for: GSSL adjustment of nuclear data and covariances, identification of most similar existing benchmark experiments to application, simulation of Upper Subcritical Limit of application, and input to optimization techniques for designing most appropriate new benchmark experiment(s) to meet requirements. This requires a complete set of nuclear data covariances, benchmarks and k-effective sensitivity profiles (for both benchmarks and applications). The presentation concludes by asking if end users should trust results that depend on current covariance data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Property Measurements of the NaCl-PuCl 3 Molten Salt System

Thermal properties of several compositions of the binary NaCl-PuCl 3 salt were measured to confirm the eutectic composition and provide high quality data for use by MSR developers. The PuCl 3 was generated by reducing PuO 2 to plutonium metal in the presence of calcium metal and then chlorinating the metallic plutonium with NH 4 Cl. The resulting PuCl 3 was used to make seven binary NaCl-PuCl 3 compositions with between 59.9 mol % PuCl 3 (Salt 1) and 20.0 mol % PuCl 3 (Salt 7). The eutectic temperature was measured to be 457 ± 4 °C by onset determination in DSC analyses of the seven mixtures, which is consistent with the values in the literature. Additional transitions were observed at approximately 332 and 363 °C in analyses of the PuCl 3 -rich compositions (Salts 1-3) at about 376 and 439 °C in analyses the Na-rich compositions (Salts 4-7). The solid state heat capacity decreased with increasing PuCl 3 content. The liquid state heat capacity was measured for Salt 3 (37.4 mol % PuCl 3 ) and Salt 4 (38.3 mol % PuCl 3 ). A higher heat capacity was measured for Salt 4 and measurements with both salts showed a positive correlation with temperature between 520 and 730 °C. Cells fabricated from nickel and molybdenum for use in DSC measurements at high temperatures could not be adequately sealed because these materials are not sufficiently malleable, even after high temperature annealing. It is recommended that future development focus on corrosion-resistant materials that have mechanical and thermal properties similar to the commercially available gold cells, such as Pt-Rh (80–20) and pure platinum. Those materials are chemically inert, soft, and malleable like gold, but have melting temperatures higher than 1000 °C (Rakhtsaum, 2013). Use of the Pt-Rh alloy should be evaluated first based on superior machinability for making precision parts and its current use in commercial DSC high temperature crucibles. The commercial Pt-Rh cells are not hermetically sealable, but it is expected that cells made from thinner stock can be sealed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Updated Reference VTR Core for CD-1

A preliminary reference core design was previously developed for the Versatile Test Reactor. The main features are that it is a 300 MW th sodium-cooled fast reactor using ternary metallic fuel U-20Pu-10Zr and able to achieve peak fast fluxes (E n > 0.1 MeV) in excess of 4.0x10 15 n/cm 2 -s. The plutonium in the fuel was assumed to be “reactor grade”, with a fissile quality of about 72% (i.e., 239 Pu and 241 Pu comprise 72% of the plutonium isotopes), and the uranium was assumed to be low-enriched uranium with 5% 235 U. This preliminary core design has been used through the CD-0 phase of the VTR project. Progression of the work after CD-0 led to revising, updating and refining the reference VTR core design, based on considerations from the various VTR teams: fuel, experiment, safety, and plant design teams. The objective of this report is to summarize the various changes made and details added to the model, to provide a description of the updated reference VTR core design and of its performance characteristics. This includes the traditional reactor physics characteristics, fuel cycle details, reactivity coefficients, temperature distributions, control rod worths and shutdown requirements. All of these define the updated “reference VTR core” intended to be used through CD-1.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

A new TEVA-DGA chromatography procedure to separate Pu, Am, and Np from bulk U materials

Trace actinides present within uranium (U) material are diagnostic signatures of U processing history. For example, the emplacement of U material within the high neutron-flux environment of a nuclear reactor can cause neutron capture of U to form 241-plutonium ( 241 Pu). Plutonium-241 then decays to progeny isotopes 241-americium ( 241 Am) and 237-neptunium ( 237 Np); therefore, the presence and relative abundances of these trace actinides is indicative of the material’s production history and intended employment (Mayer et al., 2013). During a pre-detonation nuclear forensics investigation, measurement of trace actinide 241 Pu, 241 Am, and 237 Np concentrations by an analytical laboratory may be requested. However, chemically purifying these elements from bulk U is a challenging and involved procedure requiring several sequential chromatography columns across 4+ days. To expedite Pu-Am-Np separation from bulk U material, and to improve the yield recovery of these elements, this DHS Postdoc Fellowship has worked to create a new chromatography separation chemistry.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2023

New NBL Pu Isotopic Standards C137A and C136A as Working Reference Materials for Radiochronometry in Nuclear Forensics

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the NBL Program Office (NBL PO) are collaborating on production of purified sub-units of the former NBS 936, 937 and 938 plutonium isotopic reference materials, which will be certified for plutonium isotopic composition and sold as certified reference materials (CRMs) C136A, C137A, and C138A, respectively. These reference materials are used throughout the United States and international community as standards for isotopic measurement method calibration and quality control and were first produced over 50 years ago. To reduce quantities of in-grown daughter products and potentially enable their use as Pu radiochronometry reference materials, the materials undergo a two-stage anion exchange purification to significantly reduce the quantities of U, Am, and Np in the source material. The purified Pu is aliquoted into ~1 mg units in the nitrate form, which will facilitate easier shipping and use compared to the 0.25 g parent units. The production process has been completed for the high- and medium- burnup isotopic standards C137A and C136A and will soon be performed for the weapons-grade Pu standard C138A. This report describes the measurement of trace actinide progeny of the Pu isotopes ( 234 U, 235 U, 236U, 241 Am and 237 Np) in purified C137A and 136A isotopic standards to provide informational values and assess the possibility of their use as working reference materials for radiochronometry.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Criticality Experiments Research Center Futures: A Report of a Workshop held September 6-9, 2022, Los Alamos, NM, November, 2022

Experiments and training with critical assemblies and fissionable material (at or near the critical state) that explore reactivity phenomena are central to a number of national security challenges. From fission energy to nuclear weapons to a broad suite of scientific challenges, it is clear that additional capacity and capability are needed. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) marked 10 years of operations in 2021. This anniversary was an opportune time to celebrate our successes and progress, and to evaluate the remaining and emergent challenges. Against this backdrop, a workshop of approximately 140 national and international leaders in nuclear research was convened in Los Alamos, New Mexico to explore “NCERC Futures.” Therefore, the present workshop focused specifically on needed capabilities and tools to meet the research challenges in eight topical mission areas served by NCERC. As each Topical Group summarized their discussions in the out brief, it was recognized that key challenges could be met through enabling infrastructure investments and new critical assemblies. Enabling infrastructure includes staffing, additional space/buildings, developing an agile bounding safety basis, the ability to keep pace with technological advances in detectors and data acquisition systems (allowing use of those with Bluetooth™ and similar technologies), an expanded set of materials options (especially plutonium), a “Plug and Play” design and implementation mindset, and a facility that enabled free-field measurements. The new critical assemblies that were identified as having the most impact were a bare plutonium (Pu) Critical Assembly, a Horizontal Split Table (HST), a Super Comet, and a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly. NECRC is a unique, one-of-a-kind facility in the United States. If all the improvements were to be made, NCERC would enable the United States and its partners to address many important research questions related to criticality. These include but are not limited to: (1) Covering the entire neutron energy spectrum for both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pu in configurations for virtually all conceivable applications; (2) Performing multi-physics solution experiments and irradiations with a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly, which more closely resembles actual criticality accidents; (3) Conducting free-field experiments to make basic fission physics measurements and much cleaner benchmarks with various experimental observables; and (4) Providing more training classes and more experiments annually at greater cost efficiency enabled by additional buildings and machines and an agile, bounding, risk-balanced Safety Basis. In the end, workshop attendees enthusiastically concluded that NCERC Futures are bright and the workshop helped to identify a roadmap of capability gaps that need to be addressed. This report documents the results of those efforts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Pits 101: The four types of nuclear weapons modernization activities

We learned why we don’t need plutonium to make new pits in an earlier edition of Pits 101, but why do we need new pits from a national security standpoint? A plutonium pit, or the core of a nuclear weapon, is like a weapon’s battery. The pits that Los Alamos will make in coming years will be like new batteries for nuclear weapons in the existing stockpile. Pit production is mandated in order to meet Department of Defense (DOD) requirements by our primary customer, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy. NNSA’s mission is to “deliver safe, secure, reliable warheads for an effective nuclear deterrent.” As Marv Adams, head of NNSA Defense Programs, describes, it’s a mission that is simple to state, but challenging to deliver.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

Pits 101: The true meaning of deterrence

Mark Davis (ALDWP-COO) is the Chief Operation Officer for the Associate Laboratory Directorate of Weapons Production, where he focuses on ramping up operations in the Plutonium Facility in support of the directorate's programs, including the plutonium pit mission. Davis has had an accomplished career in the U.S. Navy that has compelled him to inspire those who support our nation's national security through sharing stories of our nation's history and the individuals who have been world-changers. He is passionate not only about our national security mission here at the Lab, but also about ensuring every employee understands that they play a key role in the mission, no matter their day job. In this special edition of the Pits 101 series, Public Affairs sat down with Davis to get his perspective on the meaning of credible and sustainable strategic deterrence, and why it matters today.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗