Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “NATIONAL”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 505 records · Page 28

Wet and dry plastic deposition data for western US National Atmospheric Deposition Program sites (2017-2019)

Raw plastic counts and calculated plastic deposition rates for 11 National Atmospheric Deposition Program (NADP) sites in the western USA recorded from 2017-2019. Samples were collected to determine plastic deposition rates in remote locations and identify the potential sources of plastic to the atmosphere. Samples were collected using an Aerochem Metrics Wet and Dry sampler. Wet deposition refers to the material retained on a 0.45-micron filter. Dry deposition refers to the dry only deposition collected using a Dry Side Insert (DSI) (Brahney et al. 2020). Plastics are identified as either fibers or particles (includes small colored films). Wet deposition rates are recorded weekly and dry plastic deposition rates are based on monthly sampling intervals. Sites included are Grand Canyon National Park (AZ03), Joshua Tree National Park (CA67), Rocky Mountain National Park (CO98), Niwot Ridge (CO02), Ashley National Forest (UT95), East River SFA (CO10)), Craters of the Moon National Park (ID03), Great Basin National Park (NV05), Canyonlands National Park (UT09), Bryce Canyon Nationa Park (UT99), and Wind River Range (WY06). Data collection is being published in collaboration with the Department of Energy's research project, "Constraining physical understanding of aerosol loading, biogeochemistry, and snowmelt hydrology from hillslope to watershed scale in the East River Scientific Focus Areas.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

National Energy Efficiency Evaluation, Measurement and Verification (EM&V) Standard: Scoping Study of Issues and Implementation Requirements

This report is a scoping study that identifies issues associated with developing a national evaluation, measurement and verification (EM&V) standard for end-use, non-transportation, energy efficiency activities. The objectives of this study are to identify the scope of such a standard and define EM&V requirements and issues that will need to be addressed in a standard. To explore these issues, we provide and discuss: (1) a set of definitions applicable to an EM&V standard; (2) a literature review of existing guidelines, standards, and 'initiatives' relating to EM&V standards as well as a review of 'bottom-up' versus 'top-down' evaluation approaches; (3) a summary of EM&V related provisions of two recent federal legislative proposals (Congressman Waxman's and Markey's American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 and Senator Bingaman's American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009) that include national efficiency resource requirements; (4) an annotated list of issues that that are likely to be central to, and need to be considered when, developing a national EM&V standard; and (5) a discussion of the implications of such issues. There are three primary reasons for developing a national efficiency EM&V standard. First, some policy makers, regulators and practitioners believe that a national standard would streamline EM&V implementation, reduce costs and complexity, and improve comparability of results across jurisdictions; although there are benefits associated with each jurisdiction setting its own EM&V requirements based on their specific portfolio and evaluation budgets and objectives. Secondly, if energy efficiency is determined by the US Environmental Protection Agency to be a Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for avoiding criteria pollutant and/or greenhouse gas emissions, then a standard can be required for documenting the emission reductions resulting from efficiency actions. The third reason for a national EM&V standard is that such a standard is likely to be required as a result of future federal energy legislation that includes end-use energy efficiency, either as a stand-alone energy-efficiency resource standard (EERS) or as part of a clean energy or renewable energy standard. This study is focused primarily on this third reason and thus explores issues associated with a national EM&V standard if energy efficiency is a qualifying resource in federal clean energy legislation. Developing a national EM&V standard is likely to be a lengthy process; this study focuses on the critical first step of identifying the issues that must be addressed in a future standard. Perhaps the most fundamental of these issues is 'how good is good enough?' This has always been the fundamental issue of EM&V for energy efficiency and is a result of the counter-factual nature of efficiency. Counter-factual in that savings are not measured, but estimated to varying degrees of accuracy by comparing energy consumption after a project (program) is implemented with what is assumed to have been the consumption of energy in the absence of the project (program). Therefore, the how good is good enough question is a short version of asking how certain does one have to be of the energy savings estimate that results from EM&V activities and is that level of certainty properly balanced against the amount of effort (resources, time, money) that is utilized to obtain that level of certainty. The implication is that not only should energy efficiency investments be cost-effective, but EM&V investments should consider risk management principles and thus also balance the costs and value of information derived from EM&V (EM&V should also be cost-effective).

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Annual Report: National Risk Assessment Partnership (30 September 2012)

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) is conducting research to advance the science and engineering knowledge base for technologies that will accelerate the business case for CO 2 capture and storage, including prediction and quantification of risks that may relate to potential liabilities. As part of this effort, NETL, through its Office of Research and Development (ORD), is leading a multi-laboratory effort that leverages broad technical capabilities across the DOE complex: the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP). NRAP involves five DOE national laboratories: NETL, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). This team is working together to develop a science-based method for quantifying the likelihood of risks (and associated potential liabilities) for CO 2 storage sites. NRAP is an effort that harnesses the breadth of capabilities across the DOE National Laboratory (NL) system into a mission-focused platform that will develop the integrated science base that can be applied to risk assessment for long-term storage of CO 2 .

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Underground Radionuclide Inventory, 1951-1992: Accounting for Radionuclide Decay through September 30, 2012

This report is an update of report LA-13859-MS (Bowen et al., 2001). In that original report, the underground radionuclide inventory at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) was decay corrected to September 23, 1992, the date of the last underground nuclear test at the NNSS. In this report, the inventory is updated to account for the decay of radionuclides over two additional decades (1992-2012) and revised tritium, fission product and actinide inventory figures and tables are presented. The maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides were also updated to Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) (CFR, 2013). Also, a number of minor errata found in the original publication were corrected. An inventory of radionuclides produced by 828 underground nuclear tests conducted at the NNSS by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 includes tritium, fission products, actinides, and activation products. The inventory presented in this report provides an estimate of radioactivity remaining underground at the NNSS after nuclear testing. The original test inventory is decayed to September 30, 2012, and predictions of inventory decay over the subsequent 1000 years are presented. For the purposes of summary and publication, the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory authors of this report subdivided the inventory into five areas corresponding to the principal geographic test centers at the NNSS. The five areas roughly correspond to Underground Test Area “Corrective Action Units” (CAUs) for remediation of groundwater. In addition, the inventory is further subdivided for the Yucca Flat region by tests where the working point depth is more than 328 feet (100 meters) above the water table and tests that were detonated below that level. Water levels used were those from the U. S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (1997), now called the Nevada Field Office. Curie activities and atoms are reported as of September 30, 2012. This inventory is strictly a compilation of the residual radiologic inventory remaining from the underground nuclear tests conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Department of the Defense from 1951 to 1992 and does not include radioactivity from other types of nuclear testing (e.g., atmospheric, reactors, rocket engines). A companion classified report (Miller et al., 2002) contains test-specific data for each test performed at the NNSS. This work has been sponsored by the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Estimating the National Carbon Abatement Potential of City Policies: A Data-Driven Approach

Cities are increasingly taking actions such as building code enforcement, urban planning, and public transit expansion to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide in their communities and municipal operations. However, many cities lack the quantitative information needed to estimate policy impacts and prioritize city actions in terms of carbon abatement potential and cost effectiveness. This report fills this research gap by providing methodologies to assess the carbon abatement potential of a variety of city actions. The methodologies are applied to an energy use data set of 23,458 cities compiled for the U.S. Department of Energy City Energy Profile tool. The analysis develops a national estimate of the carbon abatement potential of realizable city actions in six specific policy areas encompassing the most commonly implemented city actions. The results of this analysis suggest that, in aggregate, cities could reduce nationwide carbon emissions by about 210 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (MMT CO2) per year in a 'moderate abatement scenario' by 2035 and 480 MMT CO2/year in a 'high abatement scenario' by 2035 through these common actions typically within a city's control in the six policy areas. The aggregate carbon abatement potential of these specific areas equates to a reduction of 3%-7% relative to 2013 U.S. emissions. At the city level, the results suggest the average city could reduce carbon emissions by 7% (moderate) to 19% (high) relative to current city-level emissions. In the context of U.S. climate commitments under the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21), the estimated national abatement potential of the city actions analyzed in this report equates to about 15%-35% of the remaining carbon abatement necessary to achieve the U.S. COP21 target. Additional city actions outside the scope of this report, such as community choice aggregation (city-level purchasing of renewable energy), zero energy districts, and multi-level governance strategies, could significantly augment the carbon abatement contributions of city actions toward national climate targets. The results suggest that cities may play a pivotal role in progress toward national climate targets. In addition to providing carbon and emissions estimates, this report estimates the national net economic impacts of policies for which cost and benefit data are available. Impact metrics include employment, worker earnings, and gross domestic product (GDP). For the policy areas studied, the economic analysis demonstrates that city carbon abatement may be achieved with only minimal and generally slightly positive economic impacts. Employment impacts range from 0.04% to 0.13% of U.S, employment during implementation and zero to 0.1% thereafter. GDP estimates show net impacts of 0.02% to 0.07% of GDP during implementation and impacts from -0.02% to zero thereafter. This report quantitatively demonstrates the material impact of a limited set of local policy areas on national carbon abatement potential. The magnitude of estimated carbon reductions from city policies, 3%-7% of national emissions by 2035, suggests an important role for city-led actions in reaching U.S. climate goals. Multi-level governance at the city, state, and national levels could augment the carbon abatement potential of city actions and make cities a key component of long-term U.S. climate strategies.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

2018 Annual Site Environmental Report Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration's Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. Activities at the site support research and development programs with a wide variety of national security missions, resulting in technologies for nonproliferation, homeland security, energy and infrastructure, and defense systems and assessments. DOE and its management and operating contractor for Sandia are committed to safeguarding the environment reassessing sustainability practices and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this Annual Site Environmental Report. This report summarizes the environmental protection and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, during calendar year 2018. Environmental topics include air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Sandia National Laboratories Annual Site Environmental Report, 2019: New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. Activities at the site support research and development programs with a wide variety of national security missions, resulting in technologies for nonproliferation, homeland security, energy and infrastructure, and defense systems and assessments. DOE and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this Annual Site Environmental Report. This report summarizes the environmental protection and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, during calendar year 2019. Environmental topics include air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting, and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Area 6 Control Point: An Architectural Survey of the Area 6 Control Point, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) proposes to demolish five buildings and five accessory resources in the Area 6 Control Point at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The demolition and removal of the buildings and accessories constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. The buildings and accessories were recorded in Identification and Evaluation of 14 Architectural Resources Scheduled for Demolition, Area 6 Control Point and Vicinity, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2020). The report found that the five buildings were not individually eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) but were potentially eligible as contributing elements to an unrecorded Area 6 Control Point district. The report also found that the five accessory resources were not individually eligible for the NRHP but they contributed to other historic properties, including the contributing elements to the unrecorded district. Finally, the report found that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect to historic properties. The State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings regarding the eligibility of the buildings and structures in the Area of Potential Effect (APE) and that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect (Reed 2020). The NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, then developed the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-21NA25543 Between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Demolition of Fourteen Buildings and Structures in Area 6 of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, hereafter referred to as the MOA. The MOA stipulates that a district boundary be delineated with an accompanying boundary report and supporting photographs (Stipulation III.A) followed by an architectural survey of the potential historic district (Stipulation III.B). The SHPO reviewed and concurred with the proposed district boundary and accompanying boundary report and photographs (O’Neill et al. 2021) on August 23, 2021, in fulfillment of Stipulation III.A (Reed 2021). This architectural survey report has been prepared in accordance with Stipulation III.B. It includes an NRHP evaluation of the district, identifies contributing and non-contributing elements, and is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms. The NRHP evaluation concludes that the Area 6 Control Point is recommended eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criterion A at the national level as the location of the command center and various support facilities directly related to timing and firing operations for nuclear testing on the NNSS from 1951 to 1992. It is also recommended eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characteristics of a nuclear command center in the context of the Cold War and as a significant and distinguishable entity. There are a total of 29 primary resources within the district boundary. Of these, 28 are recommended as contributing elements to the Area 6 Control Point Historic District and one is recommended as non-contributing.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2022 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. Activities at the site support research and development programs with a wide variety of national security missions, resulting in technologies for nonproliferation, homeland security, energy and infrastructure, and defense systems and assessments. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this annual site environmental report. This report summarizes the environmental protection and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, during calendar year 2022. Environmental topics include cultural resource management, chemical management, air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2023 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. Activities at the site support research and development programs with a wide variety of national security missions, resulting in technologies for nonproliferation, homeland security, energy and infrastructure, and defense systems and assessments. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this annual site environmental report. This report summarizes the environmental protection and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, during calendar year 2023. Environmental topics include cultural resource management, chemical management, air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and has been approved for public distribution.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Summary of the First Neutron Image Data Collected at the National Ignition Facility

A summary of data and results from the first neutron images produced by the National Ignition Facility (NIF), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, USA are presented. An overview of the neutron imaging technique is presented, as well as a synopsis of the data collected and measurements made to date. Data form directly driven, DT filled microballoons, as well as, indirectly driven, cryogenically layered ignition experiments are presented. The data presented show that the primary cores from directly driven implosions are approximately twice as large, 64 +/- 3 um, as indirect cores (25 +/- 4 and 29 +/- 4 um and more asymmetric, P2/P0 = 47% vs. -14% and -7%. Further, comparison with the size and shape of X-ray image data from on the same implosions show good agreement, indicating X-ray emission is dominated by the hot regions of the implosion. This work was performed for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration and by the National Ignition Campaign partners; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), University of Rochester -Laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE), General Atomics(GA), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). Other contributors include Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), England, and Commissariat `a l’ ´ Energie Atomique (CEA), France.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Investigation of Radiological Contamination at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area - 20350

In 2005, the National Park Service was notified that elevated radiation levels were detected at Great Kills Park during a baseline radiological mapping effort conducted by the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Energy. Great Kills Park is in the Staten Island Unit of the Gateway National Recreation Area. A records search determined that approximately 280 acres of the park was established over an area in which the New York City Department of Sanitation placed approximately 15.1 million cubic yards of waste fill from 1944 to 1948. Since 2005, a series of response actions and investigations were conducted on behalf of the National Park Service to mitigate risk to human health and the environment and to determine the nature of radiological contamination at Great Kills Park. The findings support that radiological contamination is related to certain components of waste fill, including incinerator residue from both on and offsite incinerators, coal ash from the historical use of coal-fired boilers for heating, and incidental radiological artifacts in the waste fill due to their historical use and subsequent disposal. A majority of the radiological artifacts were determined to contain radium-226 and included radioluminescent markers, radium impregnated switch board buttons, radium paint containers, and brachytherapy devices. The National Park Service has several other Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area that were established in areas with a similar history to Great Kills Park, and overlie waste fill historically placed during landfilling operations, including Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay. Over the last year, the National Park Service has performed additional radiological investigations at Great Kills Park as part of the ongoing Remedial Investigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. In addition, preliminary radiological investigations were performed at Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay Park in the Jamaica Bay Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. These investigation activities identified gamma radiation levels above the ambient level, several of which were attributable to radiological artifacts similar in nature to those recovered at Great Kills Park. Ongoing investigations at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area support an association between radiological contamination and historical landfilling practices that were common prior to the regulation and control of radioactive materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple missions. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Building 23-620, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory J-3 Office, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-620, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) J-3 Office Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15283) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. It has not been evaluated under Criteria B and D to date. As part of a larger modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-620 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-620 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-620 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Audit Report, "Fire Protection Deficiencies at Los Alamos National Laboratory"

The Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) maintains some of the Nation's most important national security assets, including nuclear materials. Many of Los Alamos' facilities are located in close proximity to one another, are occupied by large numbers of contract and Federal employees, and support activities ranging from nuclear weapons design to science-related activities. Safeguarding against fires, regardless of origin, is essential to protecting employees, surrounding communities, and national security assets. On June 1, 2006, Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS), became the managing and operating contractor for Los Alamos, under contract with the Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In preparation for assuming its management responsibilities at Los Alamos, LANS conducted walk-downs of the Laboratory's facilities to identify pre-existing deficiencies that could give rise to liability, obligation, loss or damage. The walk-downs, which identified 812 pre-existing fire protection deficiencies, were conducted by subject matter professionals, including fire protection experts. While the Los Alamos Site Office has overall responsibility for the effectiveness of the fire protection program, LANS, as the Laboratory's operating contractor, has a major, day-to-day role in minimizing fire-related risks. The issue of fire protection at Los Alamos is more than theoretical. In May 2000, the 'Cerro Grande' fire burned about 43,000 acres, including 7,700 acres of Laboratory property. Due to the risk posed by fire to the Laboratory's facilities, workforce, and surrounding communities, we initiated this audit to determine whether pre-existing fire protection deficiencies had been addressed. Our review disclosed that LANS had not resolved many of the fire protection deficiencies that had been identified in early 2006: (1) Of the 296 pre-existing deficiencies we selected for audit, 174 (59 percent) had not been corrected; and, (2) A substantial portion of the uncorrected deficiencies, 86 (49 percent) were considered by the walk-down teams to be significant enough to warrant compensatory actions until the deficiency was corrected or was tracked to closure through implementation of corrective actions. Further, we found that 32 of the significant deficiencies had been closed by the previous Los Alamos contractor, prior to LANS assuming responsibility for operation of the Laboratory, even though the deficiencies had not been corrected. A fire protection expert provided technical support during the audit. As an example of uncorrected problems, LANS had not resolved, by performing periodic tests, a deficiency identified in 2006 regarding a kitchen hood fire suppression system in a facility located within the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center. Such systems are required to be tested twice a year by the National Fire Protection Association standard, a standard that had been adopted by Department of Energy under DOE Order 420.1B. Yet, in 2006, the LANS walk-down team recognized that this system had not been inspected since May 2004 and noted that deficient suppression systems could result in significantly high levels of property damage and loss. After we brought this issue to management's attention on February 6, 2009, LANS officials stated that the Laboratory would correct this deficiency. As with the problems involving the fire suppression system, we observed that LANS had not always corrected life safety deficiencies involving building exits at one of its primary facilities. This included providing a secondary emergency exit for a building with occupants on multiple floor levels. LANS had removed personnel from the third floor and improved the sprinkler system of the facility, but it had still not provided a secondary exit for personnel on the second floor by the time we completed our review. NNSA has since stated that this fire protection issue will be completely addressed by relocating personnel from the second floor. Perhaps most serious, our testing revealed that a number of deficiencies were formally closed even though actual corrective action had not been completed. Notably, we observed that action had not been taken to resolve a recommendation to replace a fire alarm panel found to be unreliable. After the walk-down was conducted but prior to contract transition, the former contractor closed the recommendation in its action tracking database even though the panel had not been replaced. The walk-down team had categorized the fire alarm system as requiring replacement since it had been modified many times, was old and obsolete, and had very limited available spare parts. In fact, the walk-down team concluded that the panel 'must be considered to be unreliable and should have a very high priority for replacement'.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Architecture of Mercury - Nevada's Atomic Boom Town: An Architectural Survey of Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Rev. 1)

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the Mercury town site at the Nevada National Security Site in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans include anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury to be an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. §300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. Prior to the present survey, Mercury had not yet been systematically recorded, and therefore an area of approximately 364 hectares (900 acres) was surveyed for architectural resources by the Desert Research Institute. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A and C. It is unevaluated under Criteria B and D at this time. The Mercury Historic District contains 154 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, all except one are recommended as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the Nevada National Security Site was named the Nevada Test Site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Cross-national analysis of food security drivers: comparing results based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale and Global Food Security Index

Abstract The second UN Sustainable Development Goal establishes food security as a priority for governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs. These institutions track national-level food security performance with an array of metrics and weigh intervention options considering the leverage of many possible drivers. We studied the relationships between several candidate drivers and two response variables based on prominent measures of national food security: the 2019 Global Food Security Index (GFSI) and the Food Insecurity Experience Scale’s (FIES) estimate of the percentage of a nation’s population experiencing food security or mild food insecurity (FI ). We compared the contributions of explanatory variables in regressions predicting both response variables, and we further tested the stability of our results to changes in explanatory variable selection and in the countries included in regression model training and testing. At the cross-national level, the quantity and quality of a nation’s agricultural land were not predictive of either food security metric. We found mixed evidence that per-capita cereal production, per-hectare cereal yield, an aggregate governance metric, logistics performance, and extent of paid employment work were predictive of national food security. Household spending as measured by per-capita final consumption expenditure (HFCE) was consistently the strongest driver among those studied, alone explaining a median of 92% and 70% of variation (based on out-of-sample R 2 ) in GFSI and FI , respectively. The relative strength of HFCE as a predictor was observed for both response variables and was independent of the countries used for model training, the transformations applied to the explanatory variables prior to model training, and the variable selection technique used to specify multivariate regressions. The results of this cross-national analysis reinforce previous research supportive of a causal mechanism where, in the absence of exceptional local factors, an increase in income drives increase in food security. However, the strength of this effect varies depending on the countries included in regression model fitting. We demonstrate that using multiple response metrics, repeated random sampling of input data, and iterative variable selection facilitates a convergence of evidence approach to analyzing food security drivers.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Stories about ourselves: How national narratives influence the diffusion of large-scale energy technologies

Examining past examples of rapid, transformational changes in energy technologies could help governments understand the factors associated with such transitions. We used an existing dataset to assess government strategies to connect new energy technologies with national narratives. Analyzing the diffusion stories told by experts, we demonstrate how governments connected the new technologies with their national narratives. The United States government supported the development of nuclear power after World War II with the national narrative that the United States was destined to improve creation, increasing the potential of raw materials exponentially for the nation’s good (“atoms for peace,” electricity “too cheap to meter”). In Brazil, the development of sugar cane ethanol was supported by the government’s invoking the national narrative of suffering leading to knowledge and redemption, coupled with the quest for improved societal well-being (technological development to produce ethanol and employment for farmers). In Sweden, biomass energy was tied to the national narrative of local control, as well as love of nature and tradition (the use of natural products). We found strong evidence that the pairing of technological transformations with national narratives facilitated the successful development and implementation of these major energy technologies in the three cases analyzed here.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗