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A Microphone Phased Array for Launch Acoustics Application

A new, portable, phased array of microphones is built at NASA Ames Research Center specifically for the harsh environment encountered in launch pads of rocket vehicles. It uses 70 rugged, piezo-electric, dynamic pressure sensors optimally distributed on a 10.5ft diameter open frame dome structure. The open frame is light yet robust to sustain the high wind load of typical seaside launch pads, and the blast and acoustic loads from the launch. A 200-ft long cable bundle carries the microphone signals to a weather-protected electronic cabinet containing the data acquisition system, computers, and other equipment. The array is equipped with an infra-red camera and a visible wavelength camera for imaging the launch site. The beamformed noise maps will be superimposed on the video footages collected by the cameras for correct identification of the noise sources. The array is tested with very loud noise sources to determine the beamforming ability. Multiple mathematical models, such as the conventional beamforming, orthogonal-functional beamforming, spectral element method etc. are used to determine the minimum spatial resolution of the sound sources that can be measured at different frequencies. Additionally, the array hardware is being tested for different environmental conditions and electro-magnetic compliance. The goal is to use the array for NASA’s Artemis/SLS vehicle that will be launched from a newly built Mobile Launch platform and a modified launch pad. Data from a couple of validation tests will be presented in this paper. The first test involves an outdoor setup where the array was placed on a crane at several different heights and distances from a pair of very loud noise sources. The second test from the static firing of the RS25 engines in an outdoor test stand.

Acoustics↗

2007 Research and Engineering Annual Report

Selected research and technology activities at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center are summarized. These following activities exemplify the Center's varied and productive research efforts: Developing a Requirements Development Guide for an Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System; Digital Terrain Data Compression and Rendering for Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance Systems; Nonlinear Flutter/Limit Cycle Oscillations Prediction Tool; Nonlinear System Identification Using Orthonormal Bases: Application to Aeroelastic/Aeroservoelastic Systems; Critical Aerodynamic Flow Feature Indicators: Towards Application with the Aerostructures Test Wing; Multidisciplinary Design, Analysis, and Optimization Tool Development Using a Genetic Algorithm; Structural Model Tuning Capability in an Object-Oriented Multidisciplinary Design, Analysis, and Optimization Tool; Extension of Ko Straight-Beam Displacement Theory to the Deformed Shape Predictions of Curved Structures; F-15B with Phoenix Missile and Pylon Assembly--Drag Force Estimation; Mass Property Testing of Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed Hardware; ARMD Hypersonics Project Materials and Structures: Testing of Scramjet Thermal Protection System Concepts; High-Temperature Modal Survey of the Ruddervator Subcomponent Test Article; ARMD Hypersonics Project Materials and Structures: C/SiC Ruddervator Subcomponent Test and Analysis Task; Ground Vibration Testing and Model Correlation of the Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed; Phoenix Missile Hypersonic Testbed: Performance Design and Analysis; Crew Exploration Vehicle Launch Abort System-Pad Abort-1 (PA-1) Flight Test; Testing the Orion (Crew Exploration Vehicle) Launch Abort System-Ascent Abort-1 (AA-1) Flight Test; SOFIA Flight-Test Flutter Prediction Methodology; SOFIA Closed-Door Aerodynamic Analyses; SOFIA Handling Qualities Evaluation for Closed-Door Operations; C-17 Support of IRAC Engine Model Development; Current Capabilities and Future Upgrade Plans of the C-17 Data Rack; Intelligent Data Mining Capabilities as Applied to Integrated Vehicle Health Management; STARS Flight Demonstration No. 2 IP Data Formatter; Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS) Flight Demonstration No. 2 Range User Flight Test Results; Aerodynamic Effects of the Quiet Spike(tm) on an F-15B Aircraft; F-15 Intelligent Flight Controls-Increased Destabilization Failure; F-15 Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Improved Adaptive Controller; Aeroelastic Analysis of the Ikhana/Fire Pod System; Ikhana: Western States Fire Missions Utilizing the Ames Research Center Fire Sensor; Ikhana: Fiber-Optic Wing Shape Sensors; Ikhana: ARTS III; SOFIA Closed-Door Flutter Envelope Flight Testing; F-15B Quiet Spike(TM) Aeroservoelastic Flight Test Data Analysis; and UAVSAR Platform Precision Autopilot Flight Results.

Stoliker, Patrick↗

Carolina Coastal Plain Ecological Forecasting: Utilizing NASA Earth Observations to Map Suitable Venus Flytrap Habitat in an Effort to Inform Conservation, Seed Banking, and Reintroduction in the Carolina Coastal Plain and Sandhills Regions

Although the carnivorous plant Venus flytrap (Dionaea muscipula) is recognized globally, its native range is restricted to a small portion of the North and South Carolina Coastal Plain and Sandhills. Within this limited range, Venus flytrap populations are threatened by habitat loss, fire suppression, and poaching. NASA DEVELOP partnered with the North Carolina Botanical Garden (NCBG), the University of North Carolina Herbarium (NCU), and the North Carolina Natural Heritage Program (NCNHP) to support Venus flytrap conservation. The team developed models based on species presence data and environmental variables using the Software for Assisted Habitat Modeling (SAHM) to create a 2021 habitat suitability map for Venus flytrap. These models incorporated Earth observations collected by Landsat 8 Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS), Terra Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS), Advanced Land Observation Satellite (ALOS) Phased Array type L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (PALSAR), and Sentinel-2 Multispectral Instrument (MSI). To predict areas at high risk of development, the team produced a 2050 land-use change map using TerrSet Land Change Modeler. The team found potential areas of conflict between predicted habitat and forecasted future development. Many areas of suitable habitat were concentrated along the coast where development was likely to occur, placing populations there at risk of extirpation. Overlaying suitable habitat with forecasted land change also identified suitable habitats with minimal risk of development, which may serve as lasting Venus flytrap habitat. These results can inform the NCBG and NCNHP’s conservation decision-making, including targeted seed banking, reintroduction, and prioritization of enduring habitats for protection and management.

Monika Rock↗

Carolina Coastal Plain​ Ecological Forecasting

Although the carnivorous plant Venus flytrap (Dionaea muscipula) is recognized globally, its native range is restricted to a small portion of the North and South Carolina Coastal Plain and Sandhills. Within this limited range, Venus flytrap populations are threatened by habitat loss, fire suppression, and poaching. NASA DEVELOP partnered with the North Carolina Botanical Garden (NCBG), the University of North Carolina Herbarium (NCU), and the North Carolina Natural Heritage Program (NCNHP) to support Venus flytrap conservation. The team developed models based on species presence data and environmental variables using the Software for Assisted Habitat Modeling (SAHM) to create a 2021 habitat suitability map for Venus flytrap. These models incorporated Earth observations collected by Landsat 8 Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS), Terra Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS), Advanced Land Observation Satellite (ALOS) Phased Array type L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (PALSAR), and Sentinel-2 Multispectral Instrument (MSI). To predict areas at high risk of development, the team produced a 2050 land-use change map using TerrSet Land Change Modeler. The team found potential areas of conflict between predicted habitat and forecasted future development. Many areas of suitable habitat were concentrated along the coast where development was likely to occur, placing populations there at risk of extirpation. Overlaying suitable habitat with forecasted land change also identified suitable habitats with minimal risk of development, which may serve as lasting Venus flytrap habitat. These results can inform the NCBG and NCNHP’s conservation decision-making, including targeted seed banking, reintroduction, and prioritization of enduring habitats for protection and management.

Monika Rock↗

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility

It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.

08 HYDROGEN↗

JSC Orbital Debris Website Description

Purpose: The website provides information about the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office at JSC, which is the lead NASA center for orbital debris research. It is recognized world-wide for its leadership in addressing orbital debris issues. The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has taken the international lead in conducting measurements of the environment and in developing the technical consensus for adopting mitigation measures to protect users of the orbital environment. Work at the center continues with developing an improved understanding of the orbital debris environment and measures that can be taken to control its growth. Major Contents: Orbital Debris research is divided into the following five broad efforts. Each area of research contains specific information as follows: 1) Modeling - NASA scientists continue to develop and upgrade orbital debris models to describe and characterize the current and future debris environment. Evolutionary and engineering models are described in detail. Downloadable items include a document in PDF format and executable software. 2) Measurements - Measurements of near-Earth orbital debris are accomplished by conducting ground-based and space-based observations of the orbital debris environment. The data from these sources provide validation of the environment models and identify the presence of new sources. Radar, optical and surface examinations are described. External links to related topics are provided. 3) Protection - Orbital debris protection involves conducting hypervelocity impact measurements to assess the risk presented by orbital debris to operating spacecraft and developing new materials and new designs to provide better protection from the environment with less weight penalty. The data from this work provides the link between the environment defined by the models and the risk presented by that environment to operating spacecraft and provides recommendations on design and operations procedures to reduce the risk as required. These data also help in the analysis and interpretation of impact features on returned spacecraft surfaces. 4) Mitigation - Controlling the growth of the orbital debris population is a high priority for NASA, the United States, and the major space-faring nations of the world to preserve near-Earth space for future generations. Mitigation measures can take the form of curtailing or preventing the creation of new debris, designing satellites to withstand impacts by small debris, and implementing operational procedures ranging from utilizing orbital regimes with less debris, adopting specific spacecraft attitudes, and even maneuvering to avoid collisions with debris. Downloadable items include several documents in PDF format and executable software.and 5) Reentry - Because of the increasing number of objects in space, NASA has adopted guidelines and assessment procedures to reduce the number of non-operational spacecraft and spent rocket upper stages orbiting the Earth. One method of postmission disposal is to allow reentry of these spacecraft, either from orbital decay (uncontrolled entry) or with a controlled entry. Orbital decay may be achieved by firing engines to lower the perigee altitude so that atmospheric drag will eventually cause the spacecraft to enter. However, the surviving debris impact footprint cannot be guaranteed to avoid inhabited landmasses. Controlled entry normally occurs by using a larger amount of propellant with a larger propulsion system to drive the spacecraft to enter the atmosphere at a steeper flight path angle. It will then enter at a more precise latitude, longitude, and footprint in a nearly uninhabited impact region, generally located in the ocean.

Johnson, Nicholas L.↗

Emergency Response Manual

Safety and security is very important at NASA. The Security Management and Safeguards Office goal is ensure safety and security for all NASA Lewis and Plum Brook Station visitors and workers. The office protects against theft, sabotage, malicious damage, espionage, and other threats or acts of violence. There are three types of security at NASA: physical, IT, and personnel. IT is concerned with sensitive and classified information and computers. Physical security includes the officers who check visitors and workers in and patrol the facility. Personnel security is concerned with background checks during hiring. During my internship, I met people from and gained knowledge about all three types of security. I primarily worked with Dr. Richard Soppet in physical security. During my experience with physical security, I observed and worked with many aspects of it. I attended various security meetings at both NASA Lewis and Plum Brook. The meetings were about homeland security and other improvements that will be made to both facilities. I also spent time with a locksmith. The locksmith makes copies of keys and unlocks doors for people who need them. I rode around in a security vehicle with an officer as he patrolled. I also observed the officer make a search of a visitor s vehicle. All visitors vehicles are searched upon entering NASA. I spent time and observed in the dispatch office. The officer answers calls and sends out officers when needed. The officer also monitors the security cameras. My primary task was completing an emergency response manual. This manual would assist local law enforcement and fire agencies in case of an emergency. The manual has pictures and descriptions of the buildings. It also contains the information about hazards inside of the buildings. This information will be very helpul to law enforcement so that when called upon during an emergency, they will not create an even bigger problem with collateral damage.

Barnett, Traci M.↗

Depowering of Batteries to Reduce Cost of Ownership

(1) Executive Summary: End of life batteries (EOLBs) present a cost and safety liability for their owners and stakeholders. This is due flammability, energy, and power with EOLBs. Current approaches include cumbersome, expensive packaging, specialized shipping, regulated storage, and they are responsible for over half of the cost of recycling. They all expensively and inadequately address symptoms. OnTo has developed and proven a simple way to resolve the problem systemically, through depowering of lithium-ion batteries (and most any battery other than lead). The low-cost process removes flammability, power, and energy in EOLBs through non-toxic chemical processing. The opportunity for commerce of inert scrap is at least $5 billion greater than the commerce in hazardous scrap, all made possible through OnTo’s technology for efficiency and safety. (2) Depowering Improves Safety and Decreases Cost of Battery Ownership: OnTo’s depowering technology will remove half of the cost of EOLB management and recycling. Without this technology, EOLB recycling will always be a liability. EOLB is hazardous due to inherent flammability of electrolyte and lithium. The shipping and commerce of EOLBs is costly and dangerous all along the chain of custody from owner, dealership/shop, shipper, second-life sorter, (shipper again), and finally to the destination facility recycler. OnTo’s depowering service renders inert most any EOLB packs, modules, and cells. The technology uses a brief, non-toxic treatment applicable to most any chemistry. The industry needs a safe, simple, modular, and inexpensive method to render EOLBs as inert scrap. OnTo’s deactivation system is scalable to the needs of any customer along the EOLB chain of custody. (3) Evidence of Successful Depowering: Untreated batteries will catch fire and explode under abuse conditions such as heat or crush. Slide 2 below shows that untreated batteries will blow-up and expel their internal components with heating, after OnTo’s depowering treatment, the same battery is inert with the same heat treatment (Fig. 7 in the slide). Depowering also removes electrolyte reactivity, eliminating the production of HF and other toxins (Fig 6. in the slide) The depowering process is applicable to large, 26 Ah cells. Fig. 5 in the slide shows the removal of all the electrolyte from whole cells. Removal of flammable material from an EOLB contributes to the inert behavior. OnTo developed this technology through a project supported by the US Department of Energy EERE program, with partners including Seattle King County Metro Transit. While OnTo has generated evidence of successful depowering of batteries, in 2020, a follow-on voucher opportunity for third party analysis of depowered cells and materials was approved through CalTestBed. The expertise of the battery and materials research groups at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory will characterize these depowered cells to provide better understanding of the materials level changes in depowering. (4) Pilot Plant for Depowering EOLBs: Making the spoke work in hub-and-spoke While other companies are marketing the hub-and-spoke approach for recycling EOLBs, they rely on dangerous, expensive shredding methods with flimsy IP protection. OnTo offers the only patented, proven ability to depower EOLBs from most any chemistry – at half of the capital cost required for shredding, while eliminating the liability, danger, and waste streams inherent with shredding. The proposed commercial pilot facility is (5) OnTo Technology LLC Company: OnTo develops advanced battery recycling innovations that produce manufacturing quality electrode materials from recycled batteries. Their patented Cathode-healing™ and Deactivation/Depowering processes improve safety and reduce the cost of recycling. OnTo’s breakthrough technologies produce advanced materials for manufacturing batteries useful in applications from portable power to electric vehicles. Contact: Steve Sloop OnTo Technology LLC, 63221 Service Road, STE F, Bend, OR 97703, ssloop@onto-technology.com , 541-389-7897

deactivation↗

Wastewater Recycling Using a Hygroscopic Cooling System

This project by the Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC), Baltimore Aircoil Company (BAC), and Great River Energy (GRE) evaluated the concept of recycling wastewater at a coal-fired power plant using a hygroscopic cooling system, which is an evaporative cooling technology analogous to conventional cooling towers, except that sparingly soluble dissolved solids are precipitated and removed as waste solids instead of purging them with a liquid blowdown stream. This technology can maximize the use of plant makeup water by obtaining useful evaporative cooling from wastewater while minimizing the volume of wastes needing disposal. Experimental activities were conducted in two phases, a laboratory-based evaluation of the properties of wastewater from the host site, GRE’s Coal Creek Station near Underwood, North Dakota, and a field test of a small pilot hygroscopic cooling system at the host site power plant. Findings from the laboratory study informed the design of the pilot system and the system’s field test performance served as the basis for a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of the hygroscopic recycling concept. At the preferred operating conditions identified during the TEA, the wet-bulb approach temperature of the tower was 7.3°C (13°F) and the volume of blowdown produced by the plant was reduced to 5.4% of its incoming volume. Waste solids produced during field testing were classified as nonhazardous waste based on the measured hazardous element content and evaluation of their leaching potential. However, to qualify as a solid for landfill disposal i.e., as determined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s paint filter test, it appears that a dewatering step beyond hydrocyclone separation is needed. The baseline levelized cost of wastewater disposal (LCWD) for hygroscopic wastewater recycling was estimated to be $\$ $3.69–$\$ $3.72 per m3 of plant blowdown. Capital cost was estimated to contribute over 54% to the LCWD, and parameters that impact capital cost such as the heat exchange coil material of construction and the tower’s wet-bulb approach temperature were identified as having the greatest impact on overall LCWD. A LCWD estimate prepared for the same application but using thermomechanical brine evaporation was almost 40% higher than that calculated for hygroscopic cooling, despite recovering distilled-quality water for reuse, while the LCWD for disposal-only, deep well injection was estimated to be 30% lower compared to hygroscopic wastewater recycling.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

A Machine Learning Framework for Error Compensation in Radiative Transfer Calculations

Radiative heat transfer influences the amount of heat flux transferred to the surface of the hypersonic vehicle, which is essential to evaluate the performance of thermal protection systems. The radiative heat flux is found to be computationally prohibitive while accounting for the variation in spatial, angular, and spectral domains. A new methodology has been recently developed to alleviate the cost of computation in the spectral domain by constructing flow-agnostic reduced-order models (ROMs). The developed spectral ROM databases provide grouping strategies that account for non-equilibrium absorption and emission as well as interaction between disparate species due to spectral overlap in associated radiative processes. However, the developed ROMs need to be optimized for a specific combination of interacting gas species and would need to re-calibrated in case individual species are added/omitted. In this work, we use various machine learning (ML) techniques to approximate the radiative intensities determined by a ROM optimized for a specific gas mixture. The ML model relies on the ROM databases developed for a single species which ignores any spectral overlap. Thus, radiation evaluation starts with a simple summation of radiative intensities predicted using these non-calibrated ROMs for the contributing species. The ML framework then provides a correction to account for the interplay in the frequency, i.e., emission of photons by one species and absorption by another, and yields mixture-specific radiation fields. Once trained on the individual ROM databases, the ML framework offers instantaneous corrections that serves as a time/cost effective alternative to the optimization of ROMs for a specific gas mixture. The ML framework is trained on both the high fidelity and ROM evaluated line of sight (LOS) data from Orion, Stardust, and FIRE II cases to obtain a general purpose correction model for earth re-entry scenarios when radiation contributions from both atomic nitrogen and atomic oxygen are considered. A geometric length scale parameter is used in the training process to account for errors introduced in the ROM databases as a consequence of high optical thickness. The efficacy of the ML framework is underscored through extensive analysis of train and test errors with respect to all the re-entry scenarios. The applicability of such an ML framework was further corroborated by embedding it in a state-of-the-art US3D - NERO system for determining the radiative heat flux transferred to the hypersonic vehicle surface.

Radiation↗

Vibration Isolation Technology (VIT) ATD Project

A fundamental advantage for performing material processing and fluid physics experiments in an orbital environment is the reduction in gravity driven phenomena. However, experience with manned spacecraft such as the Space Transportation System (STS) has demonstrated a dynamic acceleration environment far from being characterized as a 'microgravity' platform. Vibrations and transient disturbances from crew motions, thruster firings, rotating machinery etc. can have detrimental effects on many proposed microgravity science experiments. These same disturbances are also to be expected on the future space station. The Microgravity Science and Applications Division (MSAD) of the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications (OLMSA), NASA Headquarters recognized the need for addressing this fundamental issue. As a result an Advanced Technology Development (ATD) project was initiated in the area of Vibration Isolation Technology (VIT) to develop methodologies for meeting future microgravity science needs. The objective of the Vibration Isolation Technology ATD project was to provide technology for the isolation of microgravity science experiments by developing methods to maintain a predictable, well defined, well characterized, and reproducible low-gravity environment, consistent with the needs of the microgravity science community. Included implicitly in this objective was the goal of advising the science community and hardware developers of the fundamental need to address the importance of maintaining, and how to maintain, a microgravity environment. This document will summarize the accomplishments of the VIT ATD which is now completed. There were three specific thrusts involved in the ATD effort. An analytical effort was performed at the Marshall Space Flight Center to define the sensitivity of selected experiments to residual and dynamic accelerations. This effort was redirected about half way through the ATD focusing specifically on the sensitivity of protein crystals to a realistic orbital environment. The other two thrusts of the ATD were performed at the Lewis Research Center. The first was to develop technology in the area of reactionless mechanisms and robotics to support the eventual development of robotics for servicing microgravity science experiments. This activity was completed in 1990. The second was to develop vibration isolation and damping technology providing protection for sensitive science experiments. In conjunction with the this activity, two workshops were held. The results of these were summarized and are included in this report.

Lubomski, Joseph F.↗

Geographic Information System Based Emergency Response Training Assessments for DOE Radioactive Materials Transport - 20027

Safety and security are priorities of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) radioactive materials shipping campaigns. In the more than 70-year history of domestic transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), there has never been a transportation-related radiological injury. To support transportation planning, among the tools that DOE uses is the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). START contains geospatial data and transportation route analyses capabilities designed to support a range of DOE transportation planning initiatives. One of those functions is the capability to support emergency response planning and training for State and Tribal jurisdictions located on routes used for DOE shipments of radioactive materials. As part of the Department's commitment to public safety, DOE provides federally-funded radiological response training to emergency responders along DOE radioactive materials transportation corridors through its Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP). START contains spatial data representing the locations and emergency-response capabilities of fire departments, police, hospitals, State emergency response centers, and where TEPP-trained personnel are based. The START tool supports State and Tribal users' ability to evaluate emergency-response coverage on active and potential DOE radioactive materials transport routes through their jurisdictions, provide expected response times to reach the scene of an incident, identify equipment available to support a response, and identify the number of response personnel and their respective training levels. In addition, START can be used to identify gaps in coverage along a transportation corridor where additional radiological emergency response training may be needed. This paper describes the data, features, and functionality DOE uses to provide a resource for emergency response training needs assessments for States and Tribes along active and potential routes for transporting radioactive materials, and illustrates its use. It also discusses future plans to integrate TEPP and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) radiological training data to provide a more comprehensive source of geospatial information on personnel who have received equivalent radiological response training. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development and Testing of Pulse Guns for Combustion Instability Testing

To test liquid rocket engines (LREs) for combustion instabilities, devices such as bombs are often used to create pressure wave disturbances. Bombs, while effective, are inherently dangerous, expensive, and difficult to procure. Over the years, pulse guns have been used as a safer and more cost-effective way to generate controlled pressure disturbances in engine chambers. In anticipation of the need for stability testing of prototype LREs at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), a set of pulse guns have been designed, fabricated, tested, and characterized. The pulse gun program is funded by the RS-25 Engine Program managed out of MSFC and funded by NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) through the MSFC Liquid Engines Office (LEO). A pulse gun is a simple device – like a traditional gun, it has a breech and barrel section. However, unlike a traditional gun, there is no bullet, as the purpose of the pulse gun is strictly to fire a high pressure pulse. Instead of a firing pin and primer that would normally be used in a traditional gun, an initiator is used to activate the gun powder. The initiator is a highly reliable pyrotechnic initiator. For this study, clone versions of the NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) were used. The initiator is used to ignite a pre-measured amount of gun powder loaded into the breech. When the pressure of the burnt gun powder exceeds the set point of a downstream burst disk, the disk ruptures, allowing the high pressure pulse to travel downstream through the barrel section. A ballistic pressure transducer located in the breech section is used to measure the short duration, high pressure pulse. Some configurations of the pulse gun have barrel sections that include one or more additional ballistic pressure transducers. These additional pressure measurements help track the degradation and damping of the pulse as it travels out of the barrel section. The measurements may also be used to determine the velocity of pulse. The objective of this paper is to present the different variants of this newly-developed pulse gun and characterize performance over a range of parameters. The parameters include breech diameter, barrel length, amount of gun powder used, the way the gun powder is packed, and the pressure setting of the burst disk. There are a total of six pulse guns: three with the 0.25 inch breech and three different length barrels, and three with the 0.40 inch breech and three different length barrels. For both breech sizes, the associated barrels are referred to as standard, one-port, and two-port barrels. The standard barrel has no instrumentation and is likely the barrel that will be used for engine stability testing. The one- and two-port barrels were designed specifically for pulse gun component testing to allow measurements of the magnitude and timing of the high pressure pulse as it makes its way through the pulse gun. The burst disks tested were commercially-available burst disks designed to rupture at 8,000, 16,000, and 24,000 psid. Testing was accomplished by firing the pulse gun into a test chamber pressurized with nitrogen at about 2300 psig. A total of four Model 113B23 High frequency ICP® pressure sensors (10k psi) were mounted in the test chamber, in the same plane as the pulse gun. Two of the sensors had “trimmed” adapters, and two did not. Given the symmetrical configuration of the sensors within the test chamber, different amplitudes of pressure measurements are attributed to the use of trimmed versus untrimmed adapters. The untrimmed adapters, with their narrower passages, tended to amplify the pressure amplitudes by as much as 50%. In total, 41 pulse gun tests have been conducted.Data are still being analyzed, but some trends are apparent. For example, measurements taken within the pulse gun are shown in Figures 3 and 4 for Hot-fires (HFs) # 11 and 39, respectively. Both tests were identical in that the 0.40 inch ID breech, two-port barrel, 8,000 psid burst disk, and same amount of gunpowder (6.639 grains for HF# 11, and 6.576 grains for HF# 39) were used, and the back pressure in the nitrogen test chamber was ~2300 psig. Despite keeping all these variables constant, the results from these two tests look quite different. For both tests, the first pressure peak shown in the P2111 trace within the breech is the firing of the initiator. The second peak and any subsequent peaks are from the combustion of the gunpowder. It should be noted that because the sensors are dynamic, the ~2300 psig baseline static pressure is not shown in the figures. For HF# 11, the burst disk clearly ruptured in a little over 0.1 ms from the time the initiator was fired. This is evident from the abrupt rise in pressure for P2112 followed by another abrupt rise in pressure for P2113. The sensors track the movement of the high pressure pulse through the pulse gun. For HF# 39, however, there was nearly 1 ms delay between the initiator firing and the burst disk rupturing. The only difference between these two tests was the way in which the gunpowder was packed within the breech. For HF# 11, the gunpowder was poured directly into the breech, atop the initiator, and held in place with a vegetable fiber wad appropriately sized for the barrel diameter. Once in place, the wad firmly held the gunpowder in place. For HF# 39, the gunpowder was rolled within cigarette paper with the ends of the paper twisted. The rolled gunpowder was gently pushed down into the breech, toward the initiator, and no wad was used. This method of loading the gunpowder consistently produced longer delays in the rupture of the burst disk, presumably because there was a steady, fuller burning of the gunpowder. The burst disk was rated for 8,000 psid, which means that the burst disk should not have opened until the pressure in the breech reached ~10,300 since there was ~2300 psig back pressure in the test chamber. In the case of HF# 11, the breech pressure only reached roughly 4200 psi before there was leakage either through or past the burst disk, but for HF#39, the breech pressure reached 10,600 psi prior to the burst disk opening. The temperature of the burst disk is certainly a factor in determining when the burst disk will rupture. A sharp rise in the burst disk temperature could weaken it and cause it to stray from the designed set point burst pressure. The burst disks are manufactured of Inconel to try to reduce their sensitivity to temperature, but how the burst disks perform above 900°F is not documented. All burst disks were engineered and tested by the manufacturer for ambient temperature conditions. One theory for why rolling the gunpowder in cigarette paper may produce better results is related to a more controlled temperature environment. The cigarette paper may act as a sheath that protects the burst disk from excessive temperatures during the rapid buildup of pressure in the breech. The ultimate benefit of not breeching the burst disk prematurely is shown in Figures 5 and 6, which graphs the resultant pressure pulse produced in the test chamber. For HF #11, the peak pressure on the P2123 trimmed adapter is about 270 psi, while for HF# 39 it is 343 psi, which is about 1.27 times greater in magnitude. In either case, the pressure pulse is ~20 μs in width once it reaches the test chamber. Another pressure rise about 100 μs later can be seen on the sensors located across from the pulse gun port, P2124 and P2121. These pressures are lower due to attenuation of the pressure wave as it moves across the test chamber. After the wave encounters the wall, it reflects back and forth within the chamber until it completely dissipates.

Pulse Gun↗

MULTIPHYSICS-MODELING OF FIRE-INDUCED URANIUM AEROSOL FORMATION – A-POSTERIORI BENCHMARKING OF EXPERIMENTS

The formulation and solution of a model that properly described the temperature profiles of uranium in fire conditions was prepared, verified and validated, to support a-posteriori benchmarking of historical experiments. Data from the multi-physics model combined with data regression from the experiments provides a useful tool for exploring sources of potential bias in historical experiments. The approaches used are augmented by visual observations and photographic evidence allowing for correlations between various phenomena, independent of whether or not that specific phenomena are part of the validated model. In this manner, the validated model is a tool for a-posteriori benchmarking, and not a model designed to replicate the experimental output exactly for any specific experiment. For experiments like the Clark (2015) experiments, this integrated model (including chemistry) demonstrated that the largest bias was associated in the metallurgy of the coupons. The model developed does serve as a basis for defending which of the historical alloys tested are the most appropriate for any other alloy being considered (e.g., one that has not yet been tested). The model identifies key reactions that impact uranium chemistry and can significantly bias experimental results. Through use of the model and energy balances, data from historical experiments by Elder and Tinkle (1980) were regressed and benchmarked. This study identifies that all uranium alloys are not equal and that there are distinct differences between the dominant alloys representing distinct metallurgical phases.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radiation Hardened Foam Cold Test Plan – Phase-I: Foam Adhesion, Contamination Fixation, Moisture Stresses, Pipe Cutting, and Thermal Profile Testing

This document outlines the Phase-I test objectives and implementation plan for a down-selective foam fixative technology intended to facilitate activities in support of the Savannah River Site (SRS) F/H labs deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) efforts. It is a collaborative effort between Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Florida International University (FIU), and the SRS F/H labs team intended to test and evaluate the potential of an intumescent, fire-retardant foam in mitigating the release of contamination during dismantling operations on radioactively contaminated piping in legacy facilities. The cold test plan addresses specific requirements highlighted by site and safety personnel and will be executed in FIU’s Outdoor Test and Evaluation Facility using a mock-up that replicates the operational conditions at the proposed hot test location at F/H labs. Results from the cold test plan will inform the hot test at F/H labs, which will use the foam fixative to confine and/or isolate residual contamination within a 3-dimensional void space of Hastelloy C-22 piping designated for removal from the site and transported to a proper disposal facility. Phase-I testing will address eight test objectives: (1) evaluation of the adhesion and bonding properties of foam fixative in piping, (2) evaluation of the adhesion of the foam fixative in piping under varying moisture conditions, (3) determination of the heat profile of the foam fixative during curing, (4) determination of the relationship between pipe diameter and foam fixative quantity, (5) determination of the internal pipe pressure after foam deployment and curing, (6) development of a leak test standard operating procedure to test for the effectiveness of the foam plug, (7) initiation of a literature review to determine if using a hot tap is a viable method to deliver foam into piping, and (8) initiation of a 10-foot mock up test that will be used in Phase-II cold testing. The cold test will be conducted at FIU and all testing activities will comply with SRNL Conduct of R&D Protocols (SRNL-IM-2020-00019).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗

Retrofitting Holcim Ste. Genevieve Cement Plant with CO2 Capture Plant Using Air Liquide Cryocap™ FG Technology

The global cement manufacturing industry is a major contributor to carbon dioxide emissions. The International Energy Agency's "Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario" identifies CCS as a major strategy for meeting that goal. This project is among the first attempts to transfer capture technology developed at coal-fired power plants to the cement industry. The main objective of the project is to execute and complete a front-end engineering and design (FEED) studies for commercial-scale, carbon capture projects that separates 95% of the total CO2 emissions at the Holcim (US) Ste. Genevieve cement manufacturing facility using Air Liquide’s Pressure Swing Adsorption system (PSA) assisted Cryocap™ technology. The Holcim Ste. Genevieve cement plant in Missouri, US, boasts one of the largest single cement production lines in the world, with a capacity of approximately 12,000 t/day. The plant currently uses traditional fuels, namely coal and petcoke. The captured CO2 will be pipeline and geological storage grade. The industrial host site emits approximately 3.0 million tonne CO2/yr. Air Liquide’s Cryocap™ technology has been developed over the last 18+ years for CO2 capture applications. It has been shown to be applicable to a variety of industrial applications (e.g., steel, cement, SMR, Fluidized Catalytic Crackers (FCCs)). Cryocap™ FG consists of a Pressure Swing Adsorption (PSA) unit coupled with a Cryogenic System. The PSA pre-concentrates the CO2 from the flue gas, while the cryogenic unit enables the CO2 purity to be increased to the desired level. The project team is led by the Prairie Research Institute at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The tasks include: complete FEED study for retrofitting the industrial facility with a carbon capture system to support developing a detailed cost estimate; business case analysis outlining the anticipated revenue and credits if projects was built and operated; technoeconomic analysis (TEA) outlining how capture system achieves DOE capture goals; and life cycle (LCA) analysis demonstrating zero net carbon emissions. The FEED study was successfully completed. This includes completing the process basis of design; preliminary engineering; outside battery limits (OSBL) detailed engineering including a Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) wastewater treatment system; inside battery limits (ISBL) detailed engineering [1]. An overall project capital cost estimate within a -20%/+30% accuracy was developed. The major contributors to the Total Plant Cost (TPC), by system, are the costs associated with the Outside Battery Limit (OSBL) section of the plant which includes a new river water intake structure and a Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) system. By cost category, the major contributors to the TPC are equipment and subcontractor costs, followed closely by engineering, construction management, home office and contractor fees. The TEA has been created to reflect the findings of the project. It analyzes the economic performance of the Cryocap™ technology by reviewing the estimated capital costs, operating cost, and revenue. The Cost of Capture (COC) associated with the Cryocap™ technology for 95% CO2 capture, when considering NETL 2018 economic assumptions (42/58 debt/equity ratio, 5.15% interest on debt and 1.42% return on equity in real dollars) and 2022 economic assumptions (42/58 debt/equity ratio, 8.82% interest on debt and 4.90% return on equity in real dollars) was found to be much lower than that for the DOE-NETL’s base-line cases. The highest contributors to the COC are annualized capital expenditures (CAPEX) and electricity consumption which can be offset by using lower cost renewable sources. The LCA was conducted using OpenLCA which is an open-source software that is recommended by NETL. The database utilized for this study was a modified version of TRACI 2.1 (developed by the US. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Risk Management Research Laboratory and modified by NETL). The Cryocap™ FG technology does not consume fuels in significant quantities and does not utilize specialized chemical solvents subject to decomposition, such as those utilized in amine-based carbon capture systems. The Cryocap™ FG technology mainly utilizes electricity as its energy input; hence, its calculated emissions are mainly associated with the generation of electricity offsite and are dependent on the energy matrix of the grid at the time of project implementation. The water consumption impact of the Cryocap™ FG is mostly for makeup of the water lost by evaporation in the cooling tower; however, the carbon capture plant will be equipped with a ZLD system to avoid effluent streams and minimize water consumption. The successful construction and operation of this plant based on this study results will provide a means to demonstrate an economically attractive and transformational capture technology that can be used to retrofit existing plants and be deployed at new plants.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

22 N HPGP Thruster Life Testing

In the ever-changing paradigm of efficient and capable spacecraft design, scientific missions continue pushing the envelope enabling spacecraft subsystems to deliver effective solutions to meet challenging new mission/spacecraft needs. From an in-space storable liquid chemical propulsion perspective, monopropellant hydrazine has been, and continues to be, a dependable propellant with considerable flight heritage, a variety of engine thrust classes available from multiple vendors, with repeatable and reliable performance. Additionally, the space propulsion industry has learned to successfully handle hydrazine, its regulations, the safety protocols, the personnel protective equipment, and the unique training standards–all requisite for loading spacecraft propulsion systems with toxic hypergolic hydrazine. The question now arises as to “what is next for in-space chemical propulsion?” Further, with the evolution and concrete advancements in innovative in-space green propellant technologies, capable of providing realizable benefits to scientific missions, concern over the reliability and availability of this higher performing and safer to handle class of propellants is waning. As science missions move forward with the potential flight in fusion of High Performance Green Propulsion (HPGP), NASA and its industry partners are working to address any gaps in system reliability, performance, or unique operational considerations. Propellant technology that offers both higher performance and significant reduction in personnel hazards compared to hydrazine presents an attractive propulsion subsystem design opportunity. Increased propulsion subsystem performance can result in lower spacecraft launch mass, larger scientific payloads, or extended on-orbit lifetimes. Mission trades using green propulsion technologies have been documented on multiple NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) mission classes, examining various parameters and requirements to support mission architectures in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), High Earth Orbit (HEO), geostationary, lunar, planetary, and Quasi-halo orbit around Sun-Earth Lagrange point (L2). The results of these trade studies show promising, attainable benefits. The perceived programmatic risk of flying a newer propulsion technology has, unfortunately, not outweighed the benefits to date. To take advantage of the improved performance and mitigate programmatic risk, HPGP engines must demonstrate life testing at higher propellant throughputs than have currently been demonstrated. In an effort to proactively address the challenges with technology infusion into a risk-averse community, NASA and the Swedish National Space Agency (SNSA) outlined a collaborative Implementing Arrangement (IA) for the respective agencies to pursue increased HPGP technology maturation. This initial IA effort began in 2013, fresh off the heels of the successful PRISMA HPGP technology demonstration mission. The IA targeted objective is to reduce risk to potential future HPGP missions and fully characterize the LMP-103S propellant and associated engine performance. Over the past eight years, HPGP has flown in propulsion systems on twenty-five(25) spacecraft from seven(7) different Launch Ranges around the globe and on seven (7) different Launch Vehicles. Six(6) of these launches involved multiple loading operations for multiple spacecraft. For U.S. Range operations, nine (9) HPGP systems have been processed at Vandenberg Space Force Base(VSFB):six(6) in 2017, and three (3) in 2018. Six (6) more have been processed at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS)in May 2020, with three (3) systems launched in June 2020 and the remaining three (3) system were left loaded and ready until their launch in August of 2020. Three (3) more systems have been processed at Wallops Flight Facility(WFF)and launched in June 2021. In addition, these propulsion subsystems employed heritage propulsion subsystem component such as valves, filters, and pressure transducers, and have further demonstrated nominal functionality in both diaphragm and Propellant Management Device (PDM) propellant tanks. Based on these successes, HPGP technology continues to be considered for NASA Science Mission Directorate missions at GSFC. The work presented herein represents many years of development and collaborative efforts to successfully align higher performance, low toxicity hydrazine alternatives into scientific missions. NASA GSFC Propulsion Engineering, in collaboration with Bradford ECAPS, has developed mission specific thruster design and testing requirements to establish GSFC’s desired test conditions and firing sequences.In2017, the first flight-like 22N HPGP thruster Engineering Qualification Model (EQM-1)was designed and built by Bradford ECAPS to prove out the thruster design, materials, build process, and test campaign with respect to NASA GSFC critical component and mission requirements. This test program was developed to comprehensively test the thruster, the technology, and ultimately increase the 22N HPGP Technology Readiness Level(TRL). EQM-1was tested to environmental qualification levels prior to hot fire performance testing to represent the relevant end-to-end environment (launch to on-orbit operation)with required margin. This thruster demonstrated steady-state and pulse mode operational capability with propellant thruster throughput up to~53kg.At this throughput level, the EQM-1 engine began to present off-nominal performance and the test campaign was halted to allow for non-destructive testing and identify the root cause for the an omalous performance. Capitalizing on the successful elements of the EQM-1 campaign, an upgraded 22N HPGP EQM-2 has been manufactured by Bradford ECAPS to meet the complete GSFC requirements. The EQM-2 thruster’s test campaign has further demonstrated the robustness of the HPGP propulsion technology and increased the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) by undergoing a full acceptance test program, then proceeding into qualification, including environmental testing (vibration and shock to qualification levels),as well as hot-fire life testing, operating at steady-state and pulse modes with increased propellant thruster throughput to~150kg. The HPGP thruster performance testing enables effective HPGP thruster readiness evaluation to meet NASA candidate mission requirements in the future.

High↗