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At least 505 records · Page 28

The prospect of uranium nitride (UN) and mixed nitride fuel (UN-PuN) for pressurized water reactor

Design study of small Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) core loaded with uranium nitride fuel (UN) and mixed nitride fuel (UN-PuN), Pa-231 as burnable poison, and Americium has been performed. Pa-231 known as actinide material, have large capture cross section and can be converted into fissile material that can be utilized to reduce excess reactivity. Americium is one of minor actinides with long half life. The objective of adding americium is to decrease nuclear spent fuel in the world. The neutronic analysis results show that mixed nitride fuel have k-inf greater than uranium nitride fuel. It is caused by the addition of Pu-239 in mixed nitride fuel. In fuel fraction analysis, for uranium nitride fuel, the optimum volume fractions are 45% fuel fraction, 10% cladding and 45% moderator. In case of UN-PuN fuel, the optimum volume fractions are 30% fuel fraction, 10% cladding and 60% coolant/ moderator. The addition of Pa-231 as burnable poison for UN fuel, enrichment U-235 5%, with Pa-231 1.6% has k-inf more than one and excess reactivity of 14.45%. And for mixed nitride fuel, the lowest value of reactivity swing is when enrichment (U-235+Pu) 8% with Pa-231 0.4%, the excess reactivity value 13,76%. The fuel pin analyze for the addition of Americium, the excess reactivity value is lower than before, because Americium absorb the neutron. For UN fuel, enrichment U-235 8%, Pa-231 1.6% and Am 0.5%, the excess reactivity is 4.86%. And for mixed nitride fuel, when enrichment (U-235+Pu) 13%, Pa-231 0.4% and Am 0.1%, the excess reactivity is 11.94%. For core configuration, it is better to use heterogeneous than homogeneous core configuration, because the radial power distribution is better.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Growth and device processing of hexagonal boron nitride epilayers for thermal neutron and deep ultraviolet detectors

Solid-state neutron detectors with high performance are highly sought after for the detection of fissile materials. However, direct-conversion neutron detectors based on semiconductors with a measureable efficiency have not been realized. We report here the first successful demonstration of a direct-conversion semiconductor neutron detector with an overall detection efficiency for thermal neutrons of 4% and a charge collection efficiency as high as 83%. The detector is based on a 2.7 μm thick {sup 10}B-enriched hexagonal boron nitride (h-BN) epitaxial layer. The results represent a significant step towards the realization of practical neutron detectors based on h-BN epilayers. Neutron detectors based on h-BN are expected to possess all the advantages of semiconductor devices including wafer-scale processing, compact size, light weight, and ability to integrate with other functional devices.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

The Belgian R and D feasibility programme on the geological disposal of high-level and long-lived radioactive waste

ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, considers geological disposal in poorly indurated clay as the reference solution for the long-term management of high-level waste (HLW) and intermediate and low level waste, long-lived (ILLW-LL). The disposal concept entails the post-conditioning of the waste in disposal packages and the subsequent disposal of these packages in an underground repository. The R and D feasibility programme on geological disposal aims at demonstrating, at a conceptual level, that the proposed disposal system can be constructed, operated and closed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear fuel assemblies and fuel debris monitor for characterization of fuel assemblies for final storage

NUKEM monitor FAMOS is designed to measure the burn up of fuel assemblies (FA's) and allows the calculation of the content of fissile material and other actinides. The knowledge of the isotopic composition and activities of FA's is required for a safe handling and storage of the elements. The monitor analyses the measurement results on the basis of burn up calculations which improve the quality of the results, with respect to previous systems, which did not use those. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The long-term safety and performance analyses of the surface disposal facility for the Belgian category a waste at Dessel

ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, and its partners have developed long-term safety and performance analyses in the framework of the license application for a surface disposal facility for low level radioactive waste (category A waste) at Dessel, Belgium. This paper focusses on the methodology of the safety assessments and on key results from the application of this methodology. An overview is given (1) of the performance analyses for the containment safety function of the disposal system and (2) of the radiological impact analyses confirming that radiological impacts are below applicable reference values and constraints and leading to radiological criteria for the waste and the facility. In this discussion, multiple indicators for performance and safety are used to illustrate the multi-faceted nature of long-term performance and safety of the surface disposal. This contributes to the multiple lines of reasoning for confidence building that a positive decision to proceed to the next stage of construction is justified. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The design methodology and the safety concept of the surface disposal facility for the Belgian category A waste at Dessel

The paper describes the design methodology that ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, has developed and applied in the framework of the surface disposal facility for category A waste, i.e. solid conditioned low level radioactive waste that contains a limited amount of long lived radionuclides, at Dessel. The proposed disposal facility supporting the submitted construction and operation license application [1, 2] is also presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

General approach to the long-term management at a former radium production site in Olen, Belgium

The paper describes the methodology that ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, in consultation with the metallurgical company who aims the Olen-site, is developing and wants to apply to arrive at a safe and sustainable long-term solution in Olen. The complex problematic in Olen and how this does fit in the legal missions of ONDRAF/NIRAS is also presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Belgian program for low and intermediate short lived waste management: from 1985 to license application

On 31 January 2013, ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, has introduced the construction and operation license application for the surface disposal facility for category A waste at Dessel. The objective of this paper is to present the development of this national programme. First the key milestones and their impact on the development of the project will be highlighted. This includes in particular: 1) the turning point in 1994, when ONDRAF/NIRAS converts its purely technic-scientific work method into an approach of participation that allows for societal aspects to be taken into account and 2) the decision of the government in 2006 in favour of the surface disposal of category A waste in Dessel. Then the paper presents the pillars of the long-term safety of a surface disposal and the principles for site selection and how they were applied to the surface disposal facility for category A waste at Dessel. The pillars of the long-term safety of a surface disposal are: (1) the passive confinement and isolation provided by the Engineering Barrier System (2) the contribution to this passive isolation and confinement by the site (3) the limitation of the radioactive source term, and (4) the control and monitoring measures. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Third national inventory of nuclear liabilities - main findings, lessons learned

The safe management of a country's radioactive substances in both the short and the long term implies a cost to its present society and necessitates financial resources to cover these costs. Once they are needed, these financial resources may prove to be insufficient or even completely lacking, leading to a nuclear liability. By virtue of article 9 of the Belgian law of 12 December 1997, the Belgian Government wishes to avoid the occurrence of such nuclear liabilities. This law charges ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials with the mission to draw up a register of the localisation and the state of all nuclear sites and all sites containing radioactive substances, to estimate the costs of their decommissioning and remediation, to evaluate the existence and adequacy of the provisions for financing these future or current operations and to update the resulting inventory of nuclear liabilities on a five-yearly basis. This paper outlines the methodology put in place by ONDRAF/NIRAS to accomplish this assignment and highlights some of the results of this third inventory. It then focuses on the main recommendations ONDRAF/NIRAS made to the Belgian Government on the field of avoiding potential nuclear liabilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

SU-CD-PinS Room/Hall E-00: HAZMAT Training for the Medical Physicist - Part I

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two-year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-CD-PinS Room/Hall E-01

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two-year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Time features of delayed neutrons and partial emissive-fission cross sections for the neutron-induced fission of {sup 232}Th nuclei in the energy range 3.2-17.9 MeV

The energy dependence of the relative abundances of delayed neutrons and the energy dependence of the half-lives of their precursors in the neutron-induced fission of {sup 232}Th nuclei in the energy range 3.2-17.9 MeV were measured for the first time. A systematics of the time features of delayed neutrons is developed. This systematics makes it possible to estimate the half-life of delayed-neutron precursors as a function of the nucleonic composition of fissile nuclei by using a single parameter set for all nuclides. The energy dependence of the partial cross sections for emissive fission in the reaction {sup 232}Th(n, f) was analyzed on the basis of data obtained for the relative abundances of delayed neutrons and the aforementioned half-lives and on the basis of the created systematics of the time features of delayed neutrons. It was shown experimentally for the first time that the decrease in the cross section after the reaction threshold in the fission of {sup 232}Th nuclei (it has a pronounced first-chance plateau) is not an exclusion among the already studied uranium, plutonium, and curium isotopes and complies with theoretical predictions obtained for the respective nuclei with allowance for shell, superfluid, and collective effects in the nuclear-level density and with allowance for preequilibrium neutron emission

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Tokamak DEMO-FNS: Concept of magnet system and vacuum chamber

The level of knowledge accumulated to date in the physics and technologies of controlled thermonuclear fusion (CTF) makes it possible to begin designing fusion—fission hybrid systems that would involve a fusion neutron source (FNS) and which would admit employment for the production of fissile materials and for the transmutation of spent nuclear fuel. Modern Russian strategies for CTF development plan the construction to 2023 of tokamak-based demonstration hybrid FNS for implementing steady-state plasma burning, testing hybrid blankets, and evolving nuclear technologies. Work on designing the DEMO-FNS facility is still in its infancy. The Efremov Institute began designing its magnet system and vacuum chamber, while the Kurchatov Institute developed plasma-physics design aspects and determined basic parameters of the facility. The major radius of the plasma in the DEMO-FNS facility is R = 2.75 m, while its minor radius is a = 1 m; the plasma elongation is k{sub 95} = 2. The fusion power is P{sub FUS} = 40 MW. The toroidal magnetic field on the plasma-filament axis is B{sub t0} = 5 T. The plasma current is I{sub p} = 5 MA. The application of superconductors in the magnet system permits drastically reducing the power consumed by its magnets but requires arranging a thick radiation shield between the plasma and magnet system. The central solenoid, toroidal-field coils, and poloidal-field coils are manufactured from, respectively, Nb{sub 3}Sn, NbTi and Nb{sub 3}Sn, and NbTi. The vacuum chamber is a double-wall vessel. The space between the walls manufactured from 316L austenitic steel is filled with an iron—water radiation shield (70% of stainless steel and 30% of water).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

The attractiveness of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles for various proliferation and theft scenarios

This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PLUTONIUM SOLUBILITY IN HIGH-LEVEL WASTE ALKALI BOROSILICATE GLASS

The solubility of plutonium in a Sludge Batch 6 (SB6) reference glass and the effect of incorporation of Pu in the glass on specific glass properties were evaluated. A Pu loading of 1 wt % in glass was studied. Prior to actual plutonium glass testing, surrogate testing (using Hf as a surrogate for Pu) was conducted to evaluate the homogeneity of significant quantities of Hf (Pu) in the glass, determine the most appropriate methods to evaluate homogeneity for Pu glass testing, and to evaluate the impact of Hf loading in the glass on select glass properties. Surrogate testing was conducted using Hf to represent between 0 and 1 wt % Pu in glass on an equivalent molar basis. A Pu loading of 1 wt % in glass translated to {approx}18 kg Pu per Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister, or about 10X the current allowed limit per the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (2500 g/m{sup 3} of glass or about 1700 g/canister) and about 30X the current allowable concentration based on the fissile material concentration limit referenced in the Yucca Mountain Project License Application (897 g/m{sup 3}3 of glass or about 600 g Pu/canister). Based on historical process throughput data, this level was considered to represent a reasonable upper bound for Pu loading based on the ability to provide Pu containing feed to the DWPF. The task elements included evaluating the distribution of Pu in the glass (e.g. homogeneity), evaluating crystallization within the glass, evaluating select glass properties (with surrogates), and evaluating durability using the Product Consistency Test -- Method A (PCT-A). The behavior of Pu in the melter was evaluated using paper studies and corresponding analyses of DWPF melter pour samples.The results of the testing indicated that at 1 wt % Pu in the glass, the Pu was homogeneously distributed and did not result in any formation of plutonium-containing crystalline phases as long as the glass was prepared under 'well-mixed' conditions. The incorporation of 1 wt % Pu in the glass did not adversely impact glass viscosity (as assessed using Hf surrogate) or glass durability. Finally, evaluation of DWPF glass pour samples that had Pu concentrations below the 897 g/m{sup 3} limit showed that Pu concentrations in the glass pour stream were close to targeted compositions in the melter feed indicating that Pu neither volatilized from the melt nor stratified in the melter when processed in the DWPF melter.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

FY2010 Annual Report for the Actinide Isomer Detection Project

This project seeks to identify a new signature for actinide element detection in active interrogation. This technique works by exciting and identifying long-lived nuclear excited states (isomers) in the actinide isotopes and/or primary fission products. Observation of isomers in the fission products will provide a signature for fissile material. For the actinide isomers, the decay time and energy of the isomeric state is unique to a particular isotope, providing an unambiguous signature for Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). Future work will include a follow-up measurement scheduled for December 2010 at LBNL. Lessons learned from the July 2010 measurements will be incorporated into these new measurements. Analysis of both the July and December experiments will be completed in a few months. A research paper to be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal will be drafted if the conclusions from the measurements warrant publication.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Inclusion of Scatter in HADES: Final Report

Covert nuclear attack is one of the foremost threats facing the United States and is a primary focus of the War on Terror. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is chartered to develop, and improve domestic systems to detect and interdict smuggling for the illicit use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material or radiologica1 material. The CAARS (Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System) program is a major part of the DHS effort to enhance US security by harnessing cutting-edge technologies to detect radiological and nuclear threats at points of entry to the United States. DNDO has selected vendors to develop complete radiographic systems. It is crucial that the initial design and testing concepts for the systems be validated and compared prior to the substantial efforts to build and deploy prototypes and subsequent large-scale production. An important aspect of these systems is the scatter which interferes with imaging. Monte Carlo codes, such as MCNP (X-5 Monte Carlo Team, 2005 Revision) allow scatter to be calculatied, but these calculations are very time consuming. It would be useful to have a fast scatter estimation algorithm in a fast ray tracing code. We have been extending the HADES ray-tracing radiographic simulation code to model vendor systems in a flexible and quick fashion and to use this tool to study a variety of questions involving system performance and the comparative value of surrogates. To enable this work, HADES has been linked to the BRL-CAD library (BRL-CAD Open Source Project, 2010), in order to enable the inclusion of complex CAD geometries in simulations, scanner geometries have been implemented in HADES, and the novel detector responses have been included in HADES. A major extension of HADES which has been required by this effort is the inclusion of scatter in these radiographic simulations. Ray tracing codes generally do not easily allow the inclusion of scatter, because these codes define a source and a grid of detector pixels and only compute the attenuation along rays between these points. Scatter is an extremely complex set of processes which can involve rays which change directions many times between the source and detector. Scatter from outside the field of view of the imaging system, as well as within the field of view, can have an important role in image formation. In this report, we will describe how we implemented a treatment of scatter in HADES. We begin with a discussion of how we define scatter in Section 2, followed by a description of how single Compton scatter is now included in HADES in Section 3. In Section 4 we report a set of verification tests against MCNP and tests of how the technique scales with image size, number of scatters allowed and number of processors used in the calculations. In Section 5, we describe how we plan to extend this approach to other forms of scatter and conclude in Section 6. It should be emphasized that the purpose of this report is to show that a form of scatter has been implemented in HADES and has been verified against MCNP. Validation, the process of comparing simulation and experiment, is a future task.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗