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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2020

2020 Annual Report of Available Drawdowns for Each Oil Storage Cavern in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

The Department of Energy maintains an up-to-date documentation of the number of available full drawdowns of each of the caverns owned by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This information is important for assessing the SPR's ability to deliver oil to domestic oil companies expeditiously if national or world events dictate a rapid sale and deployment of the oil reserves. Sandia was directed to develop and implement a process to continuously assess and report the evolution of drawdown capacity, the subject of this report. A cavern has an available drawdown if after that drawdown, the long-term stability of the cavern, the cavern field, or the oil quality are not compromised. Thus, determining the number of available drawdowns requires the consideration of several factors regarding cavern and wellbore integrity and stability, including stress states caused by cavern geometry and operations, salt damage caused by dilatant and tensile stresses, the effect of enhanced creep on wellbore integrity, and the sympathetic stress effect of operations on neighboring caverns. A consensus has now been built regarding the assessment of drawdown capabilities and risks for the SPR caverns. The process involves an initial assessment of the pillar-to-diameter (P/D) ratio for each cavern with respect to neighboring caverns. A large pillar thickness between adjacent caverns should be strong enough to withstand the stresses induced by closure of the caverns due to salt creep. The first evaluation of P/D includes a calculation of the evolution of P/D after a number of full cavern drawdowns. The most common storage industry standard is to keep this value greater than 1.0, which should ensure a pillar thick enough to prevent loss of fluids to the surrounding rock mass. However, many of the SPR caverns currently have a P/D less than 1.0 or will likely have a low P/D after one or two full drawdowns. For these caverns, it is important to examine the structural integrity with more detail using geomechanical models. Finite-element geomechanical models have been used to determine the stress states in the pillars following successive drawdowns. By computing the tensile and dilatant stresses in the salt, areas of potential structural instability can be identified that may represent "red flags" for additional drawdowns. These analyses have found that many caverns will maintain structural integrity even when grown via drawdowns to dimensions resulting in a P/D of less than 1.0. The analyses have also confirmed that certain caverns should only be completely drawn down one time. As the SPR caverns are utilized and partial drawdowns are performed to remove oil from the caverns (e.g., for occasional oil sales authorized by the Congress or the President), the changes to the cavern caused by these procedures must be tracked and accounted for so that an ongoing assessment of the cavern's drawdown capacity may be continued. A proposed methodology for assessing and tracking the available drawdowns for each cavern was presented in Sobolik et al. (2018). This report includes an update to the baseline drawdowns for each cavern, and provides an initial assessment of the evolution of drawdown expenditure for several caverns

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2020

Oscar Seborer: Father of the Soviet Atomic Bomb?

Seventy-five years after the end of World War II, atomic spies continue to captivate and revolt the American public. Theodore "Ted" Hall, Klaus Fuchs, and David Greenglass all committed espionage at Los Alamos during the war. It has also been conjectured that there was an unidentified spy known only by the code-name PERSEUS, but there is a growing consensus among scholars that PERSEUS never existed. However, in September 2019, historians Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes unmasked a fourth Los Alamos spy code-named GODSEND. His name: Oscar Seborer. When the New York Times reported the story of Seborer's treachery in November 2019, almost nothing was known about his work at the Laboratory. However, recently discovered documents in the National Security Research Center (NSRC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) offer some clues as to what GODSEND may have stolen for Stalin.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Long Range Community Planning Process for Fusion Sciences and Plasma Physics (Final Technical Report)

This grant facilitated the APS-DPP Community Planning Process (DPP-CPP) which was a strategic planning process with the goals of identifying scientific and technological opportunities in the fields of Plasma Physics and Fusion Energy Science, and making consensus recommendations for a strategy to address these opportunities to the DOE Office of Fusion Energy Science Advisory Committee (FESAC). The DPP-CPP was initiated by the APS-DPP executive committee in order to help FESAC fulfill a charge from DOE to develop a strategic plan for the DOE Office of Fusion Energy Science (FES). In this charge, the DOE Deputy Director for Science, Dr. Stephen Binkley, requests “that the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC) undertake a new long-range strategic planning activity for the Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) program. The strategic planning activity - to encompass the entire FES research portfolio (namely, burning plasma science and discovery plasma science) - should identify and prioritize the research required to advance both the scientific foundation needed to develop a fusion energy source, as well as the broader FES mission to steward plasma science.” The process as set out in the proposal (and below) was successful in meeting all of its stated goals culminating in the final report to the FESAC subcommittee given the charge.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of ASCE 4-16 and AISC 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant Structures, Systems, and Components

This report describes the assessment of ASCE Standards 4-16 and 43-18 (Draft) for use in the Risk-Informed Performance-Based (RIPB) seismic design of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) at nuclear power plants. This work was performed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Regulatory Research (RES), to support potential endorsement of these industry standards for the design of nuclear power plants based on the RIPB approach. Currently, the NRC endorses a deterministic design approach for demonstrating the design adequacy of SSCs based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) and NRC Regulatory Guides. In the RIPB approach, the design criteria are developed to achieve a target performance goal, which is defined by the annual frequency of occurrence of the design basis earthquake (i.e., Seismic Design Category) and the acceptable level of structural performance (i.e., Limit State) for the SSCs. ASCE 4-16 provides methods for performing a seismic analysis of structures to obtain the seismic response of these structures (e.g., building displacements, accelerations, in-structure response spectra) which are used in the design of the SSCs. It also provides methods for performing seismic analysis of SSCs to determine the seismic demands (e.g. member forces and displacements) needed to design individual SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provides the criteria for the seismic design of SSCs using the seismic demands developed in ASCE 4-16. The use of ASCE Standard 43-18 (Draft), along with ASCE 4-16, provides the criteria for the seismic design of the SSCs. ASCE 43-18 (DRAFT) relies on other consensus codes and standards such as ACI 349 for reinforced concrete, AISC/N690 for steel structures, ASME Section III for pressure-retaining mechanical components and Containments, and IEEE-344 for Class 1E equipment. The goal of this technical review was to assess the adequacy of the provisions in these standards for use by the NRC in developing regulatory guidance for design of SSCs in nuclear power plants, based on the RIPB approach. The research reported herein describes the basis for acceptance of the new standards and identifies areas where additional staff guidance is needed for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants. This technical review has determined that ASCE 4-16 and ASCE 43-18 (Draft) provide an appropriate framework for the seismic design of SSCs at nuclear power plants using a Risk-Informed Performance-Based approach. However, some of the criteria therein warrant exceptions, qualifications, and/or clarifications.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Pit Disassembly and Processing/Oxidation Capacity (PDP) for Disposition of Surplus Plutonium at Los Alamos (FY2021 Workshop 1) [Slides]

This workshop will establish NNSA/LANL consensus on the planning basis for: updating the 2017 Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) pre-conceptual estimate by identifying the specific scope elements that will be included; identifying the specific scope elements that will be included in the Line Item project; and identifying the preliminary agenda items for the next PDP workshop.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Crack Stability in Breached Fuel

This report describes the fracture mechanics formalism to evaluate the stability of cracks in a fuel cladding. Recognized consensus-body linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) was applied to identify the crack instability length, or the length at which unstable mechanical crack extension would occur, as a function of pellet swelling loading (radial strain and fraction conversion from UO 2 to U 3 O 8 ) at the local cracked cladding region for two postulated fracture toughness (K IC ) values of the cladding. The crack opening displacement (COD) and the crack opening area (COA) were also identified. This analysis informs evaluations for crack extension and the potential for pellet debris loss from the fuel rod for cases of pellet oxidation in dry storage canisters where inadvertent residual water may undergo radiolysis causing oxidizing conditions to pellets exposed to the canister environment through breached cladding.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Access Control

Cybersecurity for internet - connected Distributed Energy Resources (DER) is essential for the safe and reliable operation of the US power system. Many facets of DER cybersecurity are currently being investigated within different standards development organizations, research communities, and industry committees to address this critical need. This report covers DER access control guidance compiled by the Access Controls Subgroup of the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup. The goal of the group was to create a consensus - based technical framework to minimize the risk of unauthorized access to DER systems. The subgroup set out to define a strict control environment where users are authorized to access DER monitoring and control features through three steps: (a) user is identified using a proof-of-identity, (b) the user is authenticated by a managed database, (c) and the user is authorized for a specific level of access. DER access control also provides accountability and nonrepudiation within the power system control environment that can be used for forensic analysis and attribution in the event of a cyber-attack. This paper covers foundational requirements for a DER access control environment as well as offering a collection of possible policy, model, and mechanism implementation approaches for IEEE 1547-mandated communication protocols.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

GANpiler

Focal Area(s): Rather than augment or replace physical models with machine learning, we instead preserve the existing models and augment the underlying code with faster surrogate models created by generative adversarial networks (GAN). To leverage the performance optimization, we also propose a runtime system and user interfaces that allow prediction and tracking of accumulated error as well as dynamic, per-process decision making as to which model (if any) to use for each iteration. Science Challenge: This proposal sits at the nexus of two hard problems. First, climate models based on machine learning will be, by their nature, difficult to trust once their predictions begin diverging from the consensus. Second, compilers and hardware have been making only incremental performance gains for decades. GPGPUs have provided a welcome performance boost for codes that can take advantage of them, but there is no similar technology on the horizon to provide the next performance leap.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Subseasonal-to-seasonal Prediction of Atmospheric Rivers in the Western United States

Atmospheric rivers (ARs) account for a large portion of winter total precipitation (especially heavy precipitation) in the coastal states of western US (Dettinger et al., 2011; Rutz et al., 2014), but accurate subseasonal-to-seasonal predictions of ARs remain challenging. The challenge stems from relatively short observational records, the interactions of different climate modes and their nonlinear impacts on ARs, and uncertainties in AR activity due to AR detection methods (Huang et al., 2021). Important sources of AR prediction skill include different climate modes, such as the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Madden–Julian oscillation (MJO), and quasi-biennial oscillation (QBO) (DeFlorio et al., 2018, 2019; Mundhenk et al., 2018). Nevertheless, a lack of consensus on climate mode–AR relationship limits the subseasonal-to-seasonal predictive skills on ARs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Available Drawdowns for Each Oil Storage Cavern in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (2021 Annual Report)

The Department of Energy maintains an up-to-date documentation of the number of available full drawdowns of each of the caverns owned by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This information is important for assessing the SPRs ability to deliver oil to domestic oil companies expeditiously if national or world events dictate a rapid sale and deployment of the oil reserves. Sandia was directed to develop and implement a process to continuously assess and report the evolution of drawdown capacity, the subject of this report. A cavern has an available drawdown if after that drawdown, the long-term stability of the cavern, the cavern field, or the oil quality are not compromised. Thus, determining the number of available drawdowns requires the consideration of several factors regarding cavern and wellbore integrity and stability, including stress states caused by cavern geometry and operations, salt damage caused by dilatant and tensile stresses, the effect of enhanced creep on wellbore integrity, and the sympathetic stress effect of operations on neighboring caverns. A consensus has now been built regarding the assessment of drawdown capabilities and risks for the SPR caverns (Sobolik et al., 2014; Sobolik 2016). The process involves an initial assessment of the pillar - to - diameter (P/D) ratio for each cavern with respect to neighboring caverns. A large pillar thickness between adjacent caverns should be strong enough to withstand the stresses induced by closure of the caverns due to salt creep. The first evaluation of P/D includes a calculation of the evolution of P/D after a number of full cavern drawdowns. The most common storage industry standard is to keep this value greater than 1.0, which should ensure a pillar thick enough to prevent loss of fluids to the surrounding rock mass. However, many of the SPR caverns currently have a P/D less than 1.0 or will likely have a low P/D after one or two full drawdowns. For these caverns, it is important to examine the structural integrity with more detail using geomechanical models. Finite-element geomechanical models have been used to determine the stress states in the pillars following successive drawdowns. By computing the tensile and dilatant stresses in the salt, areas of potential structural instability can be identified that may represent red flags for additional drawdowns. These analyses have found that many caverns will maintain structural integrity even when grown via drawdowns to dimensions resulting in a P/D of less than 1.0. The analyses have also confirmed that certain caverns should only be completely drawn down one time. As the SPR caverns are utilized and partial drawdowns are performed to remove oil from the caverns (e.g., for occasional oil sales , purchases, or exchanges authorized by the Congress or the President), the changes to the cavern caused by these procedures must be tracked and accounted for so that an ongoing assessment of the caverns drawdown capacity may be continued. A proposed methodology for assessing and tracking the available drawdowns for each cavern was presented in Sobolik et al. (2018). This report is the latest in a series of annual reports, and it includes the baseline available drawdowns for each cavern, and the most recent assessment of the evolution of drawdown expenditure for several caverns .

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2021

Crack Stability in Breached Fuel

This report describes the fracture mechanics formalism to evaluate the stability of cracks in a fuel cladding. Recognized consensus-body linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) was applied to identify the crack instability length, or the length at which unstable mechanical crack extension would occur, as a function of pellet swelling loading (radial strain and fraction conversion from UO 2 to U 3 O 8 ) at the local cracked cladding region for two postulated fracture toughness (K IC ) values of the cladding. The crack opening displacement (COD) and the crack opening area (COA) were also identified. This analysis informs evaluations for crack extension and the potential for pellet debris loss from the fuel rod for cases of pellet oxidation in dry storage canisters where inadvertent residual water may undergo radiolysis causing oxidizing conditions to pellets exposed to the canister environment through breached cladding.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

International Interlaboratory Compilation of Trace Element Concentrations in the CUP-2 Uranium Ore Concentrate Standard

The accurate and precise analysis of impurities in uranium ore concentrates is an important aspect of nuclear forensics. Defensibility of analytical data requires the use of analytical reference materials as part of quality control. This report presents a compilation of the results of trace element concentration measurements of the CUP-2 Uranium Ore Concentration Standard from 11 different laboratories. Various dissolution methods, instrumental platforms, and analytical methods were employed. The resulting data set contains concentration of 66 impurities with up to 139 individual data points for each impurity. Consensus values have been assigned to each impurity following a statistical analysis of the data set.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

sCO 2 Brayton Energy Conversion Customer Discovery

All energy production systems need efficient energy conversion systems. Current Rankine cycles use water to generate steam at temperatures where efficiency is limited to around 40%. As existing fossil and nuclear power plants are decommissioned due to end of effective life and/or societies’ desire for cleaner generation options, more efficient energy conversion is needed to keep up with increasing electricity demands. Modern energy generation technologies, such as advanced nuclear reactors and concentrated solar, coupled to high efficiency sCO 2 conversion systems provide a solution to efficient, clean energy systems. Leading R&D communities worldwide agree that the successful development of sCO 2 Brayton power cycle technology will eventually bring about large-scale changes to existing multi-billion-dollar global markets and enable power applications not currently possible or economically justifiable. However, all new technologies face challenges in the path to commercialization and the electricity sector is distinctively risk averse. The Sandia sCO 2 Brayton team needs to better understand what the electricity sector needs in terms of new technology risk mitigation, generation efficiency, reliability improvements above current technology, and cost requirements which would make new technology adoption worthwhile. Relying on the R&D community consensus that a sCO 2 power cycle will increase the revenue of the electrical industry, without addressing the electrical industry’s concerns, significantly decreases the potential for adoption at commercial scale. With a clear understanding of the market perspectives on technology adoption, including military, private sector, and utilities customers, the Sandia Brayton Team can resolve industry concerns for smoother development and faster transition to commercialization. An extensive customer discovery process, similar to that executed through the NSF’s I-Corp program, is necessary in order to understand the pain points of the market and articulate the value proposition of Brayton systems in terms that engage decision makers and facilitate commercialization of the technology.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Corrosion Testing Proposal -1: Assessment of the Corrosion of Stainless Steel Subjected to an Aqueous Solution of Hydrochloric Acid

This corrosion-test proposal outlines the methods to promote rapid pitting corrosion on various pitting resistant stainless steels under controlled conditions. This study can be performed in-whole or in- part as the Corrosion Working Group (CWG) leadership of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) deems pertinent. This proposal is in response to CWG’s need to understand the mechanisms and the possible detrimental failure of the 316L SAVY (an acronym that represents the first initial of the four co-developers, Stone, Anderson, Veirs, Yarbro) 4000 container design currently in service. This detrimental failure evolved from a question that the CWG arrived to by consensus as “What is the critical pit depth that would comprise the design wall-strength of the SAVY-4000?”

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Workshop on Using a Git-based Repository for ASTM Committee Technical Knowledge Capture [Slides]

Consensus technical standards maintained by ASTM International rely on individual contributors to act as technical contacts, effectively stewards, for a particular standard. As a particular standard’s technical content evolves over time, the contact must update relevant tables, graphics, and supporting discussion. However, the details of the data sources and/or processes used to perform such updates may be separate enough from the standard such that expert knowledge is required to perform these updates. As a result of this need for expert knowledge, and the desire to capture that knowledge, subcommittee E10.05 (Nuclear Radiation Metrology) has experimented with using a git-based repository to capture data and processes to reproduce figures needed by E10.05 to maintain the ASTM standards under their jurisdiction. This workshop will provide an overview of the git-based repository site’s organization, operation, and outputs. It will then lead interested workshop participants through adding content, not yet already included in the repository to the site.

42 ENGINEERING↗