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EPRI/DOE High Burnup Fuel Sister Pin Test Plan Simplification and Visualization

The EPRI/DOE High Burnup Confirmatory Data Project (herein called the "Demo") is a multi-year, multi-entity confirmation demonstration test with the purpose of providing quantitative and qualitative data to show how high-burnup fuel ages in dry storage over a ten-year period. The Demo involves obtaining 32 assemblies of high-burnup PWR fuel of four common cladding alloys from the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant, drying them according to standard plant procedures, and then storing them in an NRC-licensed TN-3 2B cask on the North Anna dry storage pad for ten years. After the ten-year storage time, the cask will be opened and the rods will be examined for signs of aging. Twenty-five rods from assemblies of similar claddings, in-reactor placement, and burnup histories (herein called "sister rods") have been shipped from the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant and are currently being nondestructively tested at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. After the non-destructive testing has been completed for each of the twenty-five rods, destructive analysis will be performed at ORNL, PNNL, and ANL to obtain mechanical data. Opinions gathered from the expert interviews, ORNL and PNNL Sister Rod Test Plans, and numerous meetings has resulted in the Simplified Test Plan described in this document. Some of the opinions and discussions leading to the simplified test plan are included here. Detailed descriptions and background are in the ORNL and PNNL plans in the appendices . After the testing described in this simplified test plan h as been completed , the community will review all the collected data and determine if additional testing is needed.

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EPRI/DOE High-Burnup Fuel Sister Rod Test Plan Simplification and Visualization

The EPRI/DOE High-Burnup Confirmatory Data Project (herein called the “Demo”) is a multi-year, multi-entity test with the purpose of providing quantitative and qualitative data to show if high-burnup fuel mechanical properties change in dry storage over a ten-year period. The Demo involves obtaining 32 assemblies of high-burnup PWR fuel of common cladding alloys from the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant, loading them in an NRC-licensed TN-32B cask, drying them according to standard plant procedures, and then storing them on the North Anna dry storage pad for ten years. After the ten-year storage time, the cask will be opened and the mechanical properties of the rods will be tested and analyzed.

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Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators

Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

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Chemical Analysis of Canister Surface Samples

Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. (EPRI) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) collaborated to analyze dust and surface deposits on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canisters at interim storage sites. The U.S. currently has no clear pathway for the ultimate disposition of spent fuel, so spent fuel will continue to be stored in dry casks for an extended period of time, likely well beyond the current license period of 60 years. Data on the behavior of dry storage systems and the spent fuel inside them after some period of dry storage, particularly extended storage, are limited. Potential degradation mechanisms for the canisters and fuel need to be identified and addressed for extended storage of spent fuel in dry casks past the renewal period and beyond 60 years.

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Array Detector Modules for Spent Fuel Verification

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) proposes to evaluate the arrays of position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid (VFG) detectors for passive gamma-ray emission tomography (ET) to verify the spent fuel in storage casks before storing them in geo-repositories. Our primary objective is to conduct a preliminary analysis of the arrays capabilities and to perform field measurements to validate the effectiveness of the proposed array modules. The outcome of this proposal will consist of baseline designs for the future ET system which can ultimately be used together with neutrons detectors. This will demonstrate the usage of this technology in spent fuel storage casks.

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Quarterly Report for Dry Storage Safeguards -Q3-2018-LLNL

The objective of this study is to develop a novel methodology for verification of spent fuel inside dry storage casks by analyzing fast/epi-thermal neutrons coming from the top surface of the dry storage casks. In FY2018, data required for MCNP modeling will be gathered, prepared and used to perform MCNP simulations of the system to validate the effectiveness of the verification methodology. Once the methodology is demonstrated to be effective and valid, parameters that affect the detector system sensitivity will be studied as well as the study of diversion scenarios and partial detect.

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Thermal Modeling of a Loaded Magnastor Storage System at Catawba Nuclear Station

This report represents fulfillment of the M2 Milestone M2FT-16PN080203031, “High Heat Load Thermal Analyses,” under Work Package FT-16PN08020303. The report documents the analysis of the NAC International, Inc. (NAC) Modular, Advanced Generation, Nuclear All-purpose STORage (MAGNASTOR) module at Duke’s Catawba Nuclear Station. As part of the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy, a high-burnup fuel storage demonstration is planned for a storage module in the North Anna Nuclear Station’s Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The storage module selected for this demonstration is an AREVA TN-32B High Burnup cask. The main goals of this proposed test are to provide confirmatory data for model validation and potential improvement, support license renewals and new licenses for ISFSIs, and support transportation licensing for high burnup spent nuclear fuel (EPRI 2014). The focus of the Demonstration test is the performance of the high-burnup fuel. To support the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) staff performed a detailed thermal analysis (Fort et al. 2016) of the TN-32B cask. It was found that when conservatisms were removed from the thermal models and especially from the calculated decay heats, the predicted peak cladding temperatures (PCTs) were significantly below the 400°C (752°F) regulatory guidance limit, as specified in Interim Staff Guidance 11, Revision 3, (U.S. NRC 2003).

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Oxidation of Spent Fuel During Fuel Handling Accidents Test Plan

The transfer of commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) from transport or dry storage cask into final repository cask represents a scenario where fuel elements are potentially at risk to exposure to air and elevated temperatures. In the event of an accident during handling operations, the facility cooling may cease to function, and the temperature of the fuel would begin to rise due to decay heat generation. CSNF is generally stored in an inert environment, but handling operations could be performed in an air environment. If any damaged fuel elements are present during this postulated accident the fuel could begin to oxidize from UO 2 to U 3 O 8 . If the oxidation event is severe, volume expansion from oxidation could result in large-scale cladding failure and large releases of CSNF debris into the transfer facility. Depending on the design of the fuel handling facility, any SNF release could have an impact on off-site dose.

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First Examination of Irradiated Fuel with Pulsed Neutrons at LANSCE (Preliminary Results)

We present preliminary results on the characterization of an irradiated U-lOZr-lPd fuel sample that was prepared from the irradiated AFC-3A-R5A sample. U-lOZr metallic fuels are researched as host materials for potential transmutation fuels and the addition of palladium strives to bind lanthanides, thus preventing fuel-cladding chemical interactions (FCCI). These interactions limit the lifetime of metallic fuels and are caused by migration of lanthanide fission products to the periphery of the fuel slug, where they start to interact with the D9 or HT9 steel cladding, ultimately leading to failure of the mechanical integrity of the cladding. Neutrons offer bulk characterization of irradiated materials for which X-ray tomography methods are not suitable due to the immense gamma background emitted from the samples. In particular pulsed neutrons provide information from the ability to resolve the neutron energy using their time-of-flight and thus the potential to utilize neutron absorption resonance to characterize the spatial distribution of isotopes. This, in turn, may allow to characterize the distribution of fission and neutron capture products non-destructively and may ultimately be applied to the bulk of an irradiation capsule prior to destructive post-irradiation examination to identify regions of interest. To allow the characterization of entire irradiation capsules, a cask is under development in the advanced post-irradiation work package at LANL and progress on this development was reported elsewhere. In parallel, an irradiated U-lOZr-lPd sample cut from the AFC-3AR5A irradiation was shipped to LANL and will be fully characterized with an NSUF funded rapid turnaround experiment (RTE) in the 2020 LANSCE run cycle. The sample emits at a dose rate of ~3R/hr on contact and is therefore manageable with remote handling, without requiring a cask. The disk-shaped material is larger than samples prepared for analysis using electron or X-ray methods and is therefore an intermediate step towards characterization of bulk samples at LANSCE. However, since it covers the full diameter of the irradiated fuel slug, some insight on redistribution of elements, spatially resolved information on microstructure, e.g. phase composition and texture, will be possible using the pulsed neutron-based methods developed for fuel characterization at LANSCE. This report describes the development of procedures to handle the sample at LANSCE as well as preliminary data and results from tests conducted in December 2019 on the energy-resolved neutron imaging (ERNI) beam line at flight path 5 and the high pressure-preferred orientation diffractometer (HIPPO) at LANSCE. This effort is a collaboration between LANL, INL, and ORNL. To compare our capabilities with prior work, we present an overview of previously reported bulk characterization of irradiated or spent fuels. The overview addresses neutron diffraction and neutron absorption resonance spectroscopy, both of which have only few reported applications on irradiated or spent nuclear fuel, as well as neutron radiography. This literature review was already described in a previous report but is repeated here to put our current efforts in context of previous work.

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Improved Measurement of Particulate Retention in Simulated Stress Corrosion Cracks

This report documents proposed improvements to an apparatus for measuring flow rates and aerosol retention in stress corrosion cracks (SCCs). The potential for SCCs in canister walls is a concern for dry cask storage systems for spent nuclear fuel. Some of the canisters in these systems are backfilled to significant pressures to promote heat rejection via internal convection. Pressure differentials covering the upper limit of commercially available dry cask storage systems are the focus of the current test assembly. Initial studies will be conducted using engineered microchannels with characteristic dimensions expected in SCCs that hypothetically could form in dry storage canister walls. In a previous study, an apparatus and procedures were developed and implemented to investigate aerosol retention in a simple microchannel with an SCC-like opening of 28.9 gm (0.00110 in.). The width was 12.7 mm (0.500 in.), and the length was 8.86 mm (0.349 in.). These initial results indicated 44% of the aerosols available for transmission were retained upstream of microchannel However, limitations in the aerosol instruments available at the time of the preliminary study introduced known biases into the measurements. While these biases were identified and quantified, their presence introduced unwanted degrees of freedom into the measurements and reduced accuracy. Because these aerosol particle sizers (APS) were limited to sampling at atmospheric pressure, a mass flow controller was used to supply the sample upstream of the crack to the APS. The average line loss across all particle sizes for this mass flow controller was 50%. The sample downstream of the crack was delivered via a mass flow meter and caused a line loss of 20%. Another source of bias was using separate (but identical) instruments to measure the aerosols upstream and downstream of the microchannel, which could register up to 40% different when measuring the same sample stream. The experience of conducting the preliminary study highlighted the need for improvements in the experimental approach that would eliminate these biases and benefit future studies. An aerosol analyzer has been identified and ordered that is ideally suited for this study and should substantially mitigate these biases. Moving forward in the near term, the same simple microchannel will be further investigated using the improved aerosol instrumentation. Additionally, an offset microchannel with a step in the flow path will be designed and fabricated for similar testing. Looking out further, the capability to produce and test laboratory generated SCCs will be developed.

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Dual Purpose Canister Reactivity and Groundwater Absorption Analyses

The current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy includes reliance on dry storage. Utilities are meeting their interim storage needs on an individual basis with use of large-capacity dry storage casks, with a current focus on meeting existing storage and transportation requirements, as disposal requirements are not currently available. These casks are commonly known as dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). However, a small percentage of single-purpose (storage only) systems is also being used to meet storage needs. These are included under the “DPC” heading. This report investigates the postclosure criticality safety aspects of DPCs. Placing large, heavy waste packages containing DPCs into a repository for direct disposal has not yet been implemented domestically or internationally. Therefore, direct disposal of DPCs represents new engineering and scientific challenges. Some of the engineering challenges that have already been addressed include handling and placement, use of ramps vs. shafts, use of hoists, use of transport equipment, and thermal management. Additionally, some studies have been conducted in the past regarding the feasibility of direct disposal from a criticality analysis perspective and have concluded that while possible, demonstrating subcriticality over the disposal time period is a challenge. The alternative to direct disposal of DPCs into a repository is to repackage the SNF into different canisters. The direct disposal of DPCs without cutting them open and repackaging is appealing because it could be more cost-effective, reduce the complexity of fuel management operations both in and outside reactor facilities, and result in less cumulative worker dose during interim storage and handling before eventual disposal in a deep geologic repository.

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Deep Learning Systems for Increased Safeguards Surveillance Review Productivity

Nuclear safeguards inspectors expend significant time and maintain intense focus in reviewing video surveillance for safeguards relevant events. To increase efficiency and reduce the time burden of safeguards inspectors performing surveillance data review, this paper presents a novel deep learning (DL) systems concept to integrate generalized DL models into the safeguards surveillance review workflow. The Agency is investigating several DL algorithms for object recognition, localization, tracking, and flagging relevant activities. The project team is working closely with nuclear safeguards inspectors to identify review use cases (based on specific safeguards objectives) and collect their associated requirements. We focused on CANDU and LWR Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and their associated dry storage areas as these present a particularly heavy burden on the inspector surveillance review process due to the number of these facilities under safeguards worldwide. Initial DL algorithm results on safeguards data are promising. Using a convolutional neural network, the team attained a mean average precision (mAP) of 92.9% identifying and localizing spent fuel (SF) casks from a 475 surveillance image dataset. Further, the team had initial success in training a recurrent neural network to identify reactor area activities in video clips, successfully indicating when SF casks enter or exit a pool. We discuss how such DL algorithms would be integrated into the Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software application. Another issue impacting review productivity is the long time inspectors may have to wait when running these algorithms in NGSR. We present a concept to pre-process remotely collected surveillance data with DL models as the data arrives to IAEA headquarters so that results are already available when starting a new review in NGSR. The proposed DL system concept shows a pathway and workflow for increasing an inspector’s surveillance review productivity by quickly and accurately identifying declared and undeclared safeguards relevant objects and activities in large quantities of surveillance imagery data.

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Dual Purpose Canister Reactivity and Groundwater Absorption Analyses (Rev. 7)

The current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy includes reliance on dry storage. Utilities are meeting their interim storage needs on an individual basis with use of large-capacity dry storage casks, with a current focus on meeting existing storage and transportation requirements, as disposal requirements are not currently available. These casks are commonly known as dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). However, a small percentage of single-purpose (storage only) systems is also being used to meet storage needs. These are included under the “DPC” heading. This report investigates the postclosure criticality safety aspects of DPCs.

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Dual Purpose Canister Reactivity and Groundwater Absorption Analyses

The current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy includes reliance on dry storage. Utilities are meeting their interim storage needs on an individual basis with use of large-capacity dry storage casks, with a current focus on meeting existing storage and transportation requirements, as disposal requirements are not currently available. These casks are commonly known as dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation) canisters (DPCs). However, a small percentage of single-purpose (storage only) systems is also being used to meet storage needs. These are included under the “DPC” heading. This report investigates the postclosure criticality safety aspects of DPCs. Placing large, heavy waste packages containing DPCs into a repository for direct disposal has not yet been implemented domestically or internationally. Therefore, direct disposal of DPCs represents new engineering and scientific challenges. Some of the engineering challenges that have already been addressed include handling and placement, use of ramps vs. shafts, use of hoists, use of transport equipment, and thermal management. Additionally, some studies have been conducted in the past regarding the feasibility of direct disposal from a criticality analysis perspective and have concluded that while possible, demonstrating subcriticality over the disposal time period is a challenge. The alternative to direct disposal of DPCs into a repository is to repackage the SNF into different canisters. The direct disposal of DPCs without cutting them open and repackaging is appealing because it could be more cost-effective, reduce the complexity of fuel management operations both in and outside reactor facilities, and result in less cumulative worker dose during interim storage and handling before eventual disposal in a deep geologic repository.

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Draft Summary Report on Irradiated Fuel Handling and Management for LOTUS

The National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) has conceptualized the design of the Laboratory for Operation and Testing in the United States (LOTUS) test bed to provide the United States Department of Energy (DOE) with the infrastructure necessary to make advanced reactor designs available for commercial developers. LOTUS will provide a test bed to developers with the capabilities of supporting a wide range of experiment design possibilities. Upon completion of the developers’ operations and experiments within the test bed, the irradiated fuel, reactor components, and other experiment materials must be removed. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) possesses significant capabilities for radioactive material handling such as casks, carts, and forklifts. However, given the unique environment presented by the NRIC-LOTUS test bed, located inside the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) area at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) and the complexity of novel removal activities of recently operated reactor experiments through the new proposed access tunnel. The efficacy was not apparent for existing equipment to provide all the needed capability. To bridge the potential gaps in cask designs, storage, and transportation, NRIC requested the development of trade studies for the transfer, handling, and storage requirements of irradiated fuel salts and other radioactive materials. NRIC directed Boston Government Services, LLC (BGS) to perform the trade studies and develop a report analyzing alternatives. In addition to the BGS reports, the Idaho National Lab’s (INL), provided by the first potential user’s Advanced Reactor Development (ARD) team, prepared a feasibility study for the storage of specific irradiated fuel within the existing ZPPR vault.This summary report is intended to present the trade studies, options, and alternatives that were investigated. The maturity level of LOTUS, the reactor, fuel salt containers, gloveboxes, and reactor testing campaign and concept of operations were not at a level sufficient to base critical decisions on. This report is not intended to present a final recommendation. The final recommendations for fuel storage location, transport, handling equipment, and operations will be made in FY 2024 and will be based on known materials, test campaign requirements, funding, and final analysis of the fuel and equipment to be used.

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The Structural Evaluation Test Unit (SETU) Benchmark Test Results

A series of extensively instrumented tests was performed on the Structural Evaluation Test Unit in the early 1990s. The purpose of these tests was to determine the response of a minimally designed cask to impacts that were more severe than the design basis impact. This test series provides an excellent opportunity for benchmarking explicit dynamic finite element analysis programs for behaviors that may be experienced by casks during regulatory and extra-regulatory impact events. This report provides the results of the four tests that were conducted. It is meant to go along with a companion report that defines the benchmark problem and gives the locations for the instrumentation and inspection points.

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The Structural Evaluation Test Unit (SETU) Benchmark Problem Statement

A series of extensively instrumented tests was performed on the Structural Evaluation Test Unit in the early 1990s. The purpose of these tests was to determine the response of a minimally designed cask to impacts that were more severe than the design basis impact. This test series provides an excellent opportunity for benchmarking explicit dynamic finite element analysis programs for behaviors that may be experienced by casks during regulatory and extra-regulatory impact events. This report provides the parameters of the test unit, the locations of instrumentation, the locations of inspection points, and the parameters of the four tests that were conducted. A companion report provides the results of the tests.

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Comparison of Burnup Credit Uncertainty Quantification Methods

The recent revision of Interim Staff Guidance (ISG-8 revision 3), issued by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on burnup credit for criticality safety analysis of pressurized water reactor spent fuel in transportation and storage casks expands the nuclides that can be credited in the fuel composition to include minor actinides and fission products. The technical basis for development of the uncertainties associated with calculated nuclide concentrations in spent nuclear fuel that are recommended in ISG-8 was established through the use of measured isotopic data acquired from destructive radiochemical assay data for spent fuel samples. These data provide a direct experimental basis for determining uncertainties in the calculated nuclide concentrations. To provide additional insight into code uncertainties resulting from nuclear data and also the level of conservatism associated with using experimental assay benchmark data for uncertainty evaluation, a new uncertainty analysis tool in the SCALE code system that performs stochastic sampling of nuclear data has been applied to representative burnup credit calculations for spent fuel pool and dry cask storage applications methodology. The nuclear data uncertainty analysis capabilities in Sampler can account for uncertainty contributions from cross sections, fission yields, and decay data by using correlated sampling of covariance files developed for all nuclear data used by SCALE. These uncertainties associated with nuclear data evaluations are compared to corresponding values developed in ISG-8 that are based on destructive assay data, as well as to values obtained using an alternate methodology that was developed by the Electric Power Research Institute based on reactor core simulation data.

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