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NASA NTRS2005

Analysis of Carbon/Carbon Fragments From the Columbia Tragedy

The extensive investigation following the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia accident of February 1, 2003 determined that hot gases entered the wing through a breach in the protective reinforced carbon/carbon (RCC) leading edge. In the current study, the exposed edges of the recovered RCC from the vicinity of the breach are examined with scanning electron microscopy and Raman spectroscopy. Electron microscopy of the exposed edges revealed regions of pointed carbon fibers, characteristic of exposure to high temperature oxidizing gases. The Raman technique relates the observed 1350 and 1580 to 1600 cm(-1) bands to graphitic dom ains and their corresponding temperatures of formation. Some of the regions showed evidence of exposure temperatures beyond 2700 ?C during the accident.

Tallant, David R.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Utilizing HDTV as Data for Space Flight

In the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident February 1, 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recognized the need for better video data from launch, on-orbit, and landing to assess the status and safety of the shuttle orbiter fleet. The board called on NASA to improve its imagery assets and update the Agency s methods for analyzing video. This paper will feature details of several projects implemented prior to the return to flight of the Space Shuttle, including an airborne HDTV imaging system called the WB-57 Ascent Video Experiment, use of true 60 Hz progressive scan HDTV for ground and airborne HDTV camera systems, and the decision to utilize a wavelet compression system for recording. This paper will include results of compression testing, imagery from the launch of STS-114, and details of how commercial components were utilized to image the shuttle launch from an aircraft flying at 400 knots at 60,000 feet altitude. The paper will conclude with a review of future plans to expand on the upgrades made prior to return to flight.

Grubbs, Rodney↗

NASA NTRS2006

Synthetic Vision Enhanced Surface Operations and Flight Procedures Rehearsal Tool

Limited visibility has been cited as predominant causal factor for both Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain (CFIT) and runway incursion accidents. NASA is conducting research and development of Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) technologies which may potentially mitigate low visibility conditions as a causal factor to these accidents while replicating the operational benefits of clear day flight operations, regardless of the actual outside visibility condition. Two experimental evaluation studies were performed to determine the efficacy of two concepts: 1) head-worn display application of SVS technology to enhance transport aircraft surface operations, and 2) three-dimensional SVS electronic flight bag display concept for flight plan preview, mission rehearsal and controller-pilot data link communications interface of flight procedures. In the surface operation study, pilots evaluated two display devices and four display modes during taxi under unlimited and CAT II visibility conditions. In the mission rehearsal study, pilots flew approaches and departures in an operationally-challenged airport environment, including CFIT scenarios. Performance using the SVS concepts was compared to traditional baseline displays with paper charts only or EFB information. In general, the studies evince the significant situation awareness and enhanced operational capabilities afforded from these advanced SVS display concepts. The experimental results and conclusions from these studies are discussed along with future directions.

Arthur, Jarvis J., III↗

NASA NTRS2006

Orbital Debris Shape and Orientation Effects on Impact Damage to Shuttle Tiles

Taking the damage results from a previous paper as a guide, and using a tile model created for the STS-107 accident investigation, we used the SPHC hydrodynamic code to evaluate the probable worst-case impact effects of flat, rectangular, "flake-shaped," orbital debris particles on Space Shuttle thermal tiles. We compared the damage from flakes with that produced by spheres. The flakes and spheres were sized according to a "characteristic length" (Lc) derived from radar cross-section measurements, and embodied in the NASA Standard Breakup Model (SBM). Impacts were simulated at near-normal obliquity, at 12 km/sec. We modeled the worst-case flake orientation: a corner-on impact, an orientation we term a "Face A-B" impact. Results of our simulations indicate that flake impactors are less damaging than spheres of the same Lc. Since spherical impactors have been assumed in analyses of shuttle orbital debris impact risk, we find that these risks may have been overestimated. This work represents a preliminary second step, i.e., a follow-on to [1], in developing a sensitivity analysis for the expected range of effects on damage considering spherical vs. non-spherical impactors, as recommended by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Evans, Steven W.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Shuttle Propulsion Overview to NATO

In the early morning on Saturday, February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke up during entry. After extensive investigation of the accident and recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, President Bush gave the vision for space exploration for NASA, which include return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practical, complete assembly of the ISS by the end of the decade, initiate robotic missions to the moon no later than 2008, develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle, conduct first robotic, then human missions to Mars and extend human exploration across the solar system.

Lightfoot, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2005

Space Nuclear Power Public and Stakeholder Risk Communication

The 1986 Challenger accident coupled with the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident increased public concern about the safety of spacecraft using nuclear technology. While three nuclear powered spacecraft had been launched before 1986 with little public interest, future nuclear powered missions would see significantly more public concern and require NASA to increase its efforts to communicate mission risks to the public. In 1987 a separate risk communication area within the Launch Approval Planning Group of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory was created to address public concern about the health, environmental, and safety risks of NASA missions. The lessons learned from the risk communication strategies developed for the nuclear powered Galileo, Ulysses, and Cassini missions are reviewed in this paper and recommendations are given as to how these lessons can be applied to future NASA missions that may use nuclear power systems and other potentially controversial NASA missions.

Galileo↗

NASA NTRS1997

Operational Interventions to Maintenance Error

A significant proportion of aviation accidents and incidents are known to be tied to human error. However, research of flight operational errors has shown that so-called pilot error often involves a variety of human factors issues and not a simple lack of individual technical skills. In aircraft maintenance operations, there is similar concern that maintenance errors which may lead to incidents and accidents are related to a large variety of human factors issues. Although maintenance error data and research are limited, industry initiatives involving human factors training in maintenance have become increasingly accepted as one type of maintenance error intervention. Conscientious efforts have been made in re-inventing the team7 concept for maintenance operations and in tailoring programs to fit the needs of technical opeRAtions. Nevertheless, there remains a dual challenge: 1) to develop human factors interventions which are directly supported by reliable human error data, and 2) to integrate human factors concepts into the procedures and practices of everyday technical tasks. In this paper, we describe several varieties of human factors interventions and focus on two specific alternatives which target problems related to procedures and practices; namely, 1) structured on-the-job training and 2) procedure re-design. We hope to demonstrate that the key to leveraging the impact of these solutions comes from focused interventions; that is, interventions which are derived from a clear understanding of specific maintenance errors, their operational context and human factors components.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Feedback Linearized Aircraft Control Using Dynamic Cell Structure

A Dynamic Cell Structure (DCS ) Neural Network was developed which learns a topology representing network (TRN) of F-15 aircraft aerodynamic stability and control derivatives. The network is combined with a feedback linearized tracking controller to produce a robust control architecture capable of handling multiple accident and off-nominal flight scenarios. This paper describes network and its performance for accident scenarios including differential stabilator lock, soft sensor failure, control, stability derivative variation, and turbulence.

Jorgensen, C. C.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Implementation of Programmatic Quality and the Impact on Safety

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implementation of a programmatic quality assurance discipline within the International Space Station Program and the resulting impact on safety. NASA culture has continued to stress safety at the expense of quality when both are extremely important and both can equally influence the success or failure of a Program or Mission. Although safety was heavily criticized in the media after Col~imbiaa, strong case can be made that it was the failure of quality processes and quality assurance in all processes that eventually led to the Columbia accident. Consequently, it is possible to have good quality processes without safety, but it is impossible to have good safety processes without quality. The ISS Program quality assurance function was analyzed as representative of the long-term manned missions that are consistent with the President s Vision for Space Exploration. Background topics are as follows: The quality assurance organizational structure within the ISS Program and the interrelationships between various internal and external organizations. ISS Program quality roles and responsibilities with respect to internal Program Offices and other external organizations such as the Shuttle Program, JSC Directorates, NASA Headquarters, NASA Contractors, other NASA Centers, and International Partner/participants will be addressed. A detailed analysis of implemented quality assurance responsibilities and functions with respect to NASA Headquarters, the JSC S&MA Directorate, and the ISS Program will be presented. Discussions topics are as follows: A comparison of quality and safety resources in terms of staffing, training, experience, and certifications. A benchmark assessment of the lessons learned from the Columbia Accident Investigation (CAB) Report (and follow-up reports and assessments), NASA Benchmarking, and traditional quality assurance activities against ISS quality procedures and practices. The lack of a coherent operational and sustaining quality assurance strategy for long-term manned space flight. An analysis of the ISS waiver processes and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) process implemented as quality functions. Impact of current ISS Program procedures and practices with regards to operational safety and risk A discussion regarding a "defense-in-depth" approach to quality functions will be provided to address the issue of "integration vs independence" with respect to the roles of Programs, NASA Centers, and NASA Headquarters. Generic recommendations are offered to address the inadequacies identified in the implementation of ISS quality assurance. A reassessment by the NASA community regarding the importance of a "quality culture" as a component within a larger "safety culture" will generate a more effective and value-added functionality that will ultimately enhance safety.

Huls, Dale Thomas↗

NASA NTRS2007

Recovery of Space Shuttle Columbia and Return to Flight of Space Shuttle Discovery

NASA has come a long way in our journey to reduce the risks of operating the Spse Shuttle system. The External Tank bipod Thermal Protection System has been redesigned to eliminate the proximate cause of the Columbia accident. In all areas, we have applied the collective knowledge and capabilities of our Nation to comply with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and to raise the bar beyond that. We have taken prudent technical action on potential threats to review and verify the material condition of all critical areas where failure could result in catastrophic loss of the crew and vehicle. We are satisfied that critical systems and elements should operate as intended-safely and reliably. While we will never eliminate all the risks from our human space flight programs, we have eliminated those we can and reduced, controlled, and/or mitigated others. The remaining identified risks will be evaluated for acceptance. Our risk reduction approach has its roots in the system safety engineering hierarchy for hazard abatement long employed in aerospace systems engineering. The components of the hierarchy are, in order of precedence, to: design/redesign; eliminate the hazard/risk; reduce the hazard/risk; and control the hazard/risk and/or mitigate the consequence of the remaining hazard/risk through warning devices, special procedures/capabilities, and/or training. This proven approach to risk reduction has been applied to potential hazards and risks in all critical areas of the Space Shuttle and has guided us through the technical challenges, failures, and successes present in return to flight endeavors. This approach provides the structured deliberation process required to verify and form the foundation for accepting any residual risk across the entire Space Shuttle Program by NASA leadership.

Rudolphi, Michael U.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Metallic Concepts for Repair of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Space Shuttle Leading Edges

The Columbia accident has focused attention on the critical need for on-orbit repair concepts for wing leading edges in the event that potentially catastrophic damage is incurred during Space Shuttle Orbiter flight. The leading edge of the space shuttle wings consists of a series of eleven panels on each side of the orbiter. These panels are fabricated from reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) which is a light weight composite with attractive strength at very high temperatures. The damage that was responsible for the loss of the Colombia space shuttle was deemed due to formation of a large hole in one these RCC leading edge panels produced by the impact of a large piece of foam. However, even small cracks in the RCC are considered as potentially catastrophic because of the high temperature re-entry environment. After the Columbia accident, NASA has explored various means to perform on-orbit repairs in the event that damage is sustained in future shuttle flights. Although large areas of damage, such as that which doomed Columbia, are not anticipated to re-occur due to various improvements to the shuttle, especially the foam attachment, NASA has also explored various options for both small and large area repair. This paper reports one large area repair concept referred to as the "metallic over-wrap." Environmental conditions during re-entry of the orbiter impose extreme requirements on the RCC leading edges as well as on any repair concepts. These requirements include temperatures up to 3000 F (1650 C) for up to 15 minutes in the presence of an extremely oxidizing plasma environment. Figure 1 shows the temperature profile across one panel (#9) which is subject to the highest temperatures during re-entry. Although the RCC possesses adequate mechanical strength at these temperatures, it lacks oxidation resistance. Oxidation protection is afforded by converting the outer layers of the RCC to SiC by chemical vapor deposition (CVD). At high temperatures in an oxidizing environment, the SiC layer forms a protective SiO2 scale. However, CVD processing to form the SiC layer can result in the formation of small cracks in the outer surface. Hence, as a final fabrication step, a sodium silicate glass, known as "Type A," is applied as a sealant to fill any surface porosity and/or cracks in the coating and the outer portions of the RCC[1]. At relatively low temperatures, the Type A glass melts and flows into the cracks providing oxidation protection at the higher temperatures. In addition, the Type A coating, provides a "dark" coating with a high emissivity. This high emissivity allows the RCC to transfer heat by radiating outward to space as well as dispersing heat within the leading edge cavity. Lastly, the Type A possesses low catalycity which reduces surface temperatures by limiting oxygen recombination on the surface during re-entry.

Ritzert, Frank↗

NASA NTRS1977

Skid Resistance Research

Skidding causes many traffic accidents. Streets and highways with skid-resisting surfaces reduce the incidence of such accidents. In fact, resurfacing roads to improve skid resistance is now required by federal law. Skid resistance is measured by road testing with specially equipped skid trailers. A project underway at NASA-Langley may considerably reduce the cost of skid trailers, thus making them more widely available to highway departments. For testing the skid resistance of aircraft runways, Langley engineers developed a relatively inexpensive test vehicle and a "pulsed braking" technique that is now being applied experimentally to road testing. The vehicle is a standard automobile modified to incorporate instrumentation, special test tires and valves, and a trailing fifth wheel for monitoring distance and velocity. The instrumentation includes a low-cost meter, a set of accelerometers that sense motion changes, and a chart recorder.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2007

Real-time Affective Indices of Potential CRM Breakdown: Qualitative Testing of an Operational Hypothesis

This viewgraph presentation begins by showing several cases where poor crew resource management (CRM) resulted in aircraft accidents. The presenter reviews the emotional states that are present in a situation that frequently leads to an accident. The operational answer suggested is given as an acronym: PACE, which stand for Probe, Alert, Challenge, Emergency Action.

Dickerson, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2007

Shuttle Entry Imaging Using Infrared Thermography

During the Columbia Accident Investigation, imaging teams supporting debris shedding analysis were hampered by poor entry image quality and the general lack of information on optical signatures associated with a nominal Shuttle entry. After the accident, recommendations were made to NASA management to develop and maintain a state-of-the-art imagery database for Shuttle engineering performance assessments and to improve entry imaging capability to support anomaly and contingency analysis during a mission. As a result, the Space Shuttle Program sponsored an observation campaign to qualitatively characterize a nominal Shuttle entry over the widest possible Mach number range. The initial objectives focused on an assessment of capability to identify/resolve debris liberated from the Shuttle during entry, characterization of potential anomalous events associated with RCS jet firings and unusual phenomenon associated with the plasma trail. The aeroheating technical community viewed the Space Shuttle Program sponsored activity as an opportunity to influence the observation objectives and incrementally demonstrate key elements of a quantitative spatially resolved temperature measurement capability over a series of flights. One long-term desire of the Shuttle engineering community is to calibrate boundary layer transition prediction methodologies that are presently part of the Shuttle damage assessment process using flight data provided by a controlled Shuttle flight experiment. Quantitative global imaging may offer a complementary method of data collection to more traditional methods such as surface thermocouples. This paper reviews the process used by the engineering community to influence data collection methods and analysis of global infrared images of the Shuttle obtained during hypersonic entry. Emphasis is placed upon airborne imaging assets sponsored by the Shuttle program during Return to Flight. Visual and IR entry imagery were obtained with available airborne imaging platforms used within DoD along with agency assets developed and optimized for use during Shuttle ascent to demonstrate capability (i.e., tracking, acquisition of multispectral data, spatial resolution) and identify system limitations (i.e., radiance modeling, saturation) using state-of-the-art imaging instrumentation and communication systems. Global infrared intensity data have been transformed to temperature by comparison to Shuttle flight thermocouple data. Reasonable agreement is found between the flight thermography images and numerical prediction. A discussion of lessons learned and potential application to a potential Shuttle boundary layer transition flight test is presented.

Horvath, Thomas↗

NASA NTRS2008

Test-Analysis Correlation for Space Shuttle External Tank Foam Impacting RCC Wing Leading Edge Component Panels

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA develop, validate, and maintain a modeling tool capable of predicting the damage threshold for debris impacts on the Space Shuttle Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) wing leading edge and nosecap assembly. The results presented in this paper are one part of a multi-level approach that supported the development of the predictive tool used to recertify the shuttle for flight following the Columbia Accident. The assessment of predictive capability was largely based on test analysis comparisons for simpler component structures. This paper provides comparisons of finite element simulations with test data for external tank foam debris impacts onto 6-in. square RCC flat panels. Both quantitative displacement and qualitative damage assessment correlations are provided. The comparisons show good agreement and provided the Space Shuttle Program with confidence in the predictive tool.

Lyle, Karen H.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Rapid Structured Volume Grid Smoothing and Adaption Technique

A rapid, structured volume grid smoothing and adaption technique, based on signal processing methods, was developed and applied to the Shuttle Orbiter at hypervelocity flight conditions in support of the Columbia Accident Investigation. Because of the fast pace of the investigation, computational aerothermodynamicists, applying hypersonic viscous flow solving computational fluid dynamic (CFD) codes, refined and enhanced a grid for an undamaged baseline vehicle to assess a variety of damage scenarios. Of the many methods available to modify a structured grid, most are time-consuming and require significant user interaction. By casting the grid data into different coordinate systems, specifically two computational coordinates with arclength as the third coordinate, signal processing methods are used for filtering the data [Taubin, CG v/29 1995]. Using a reverse transformation, the processed data are used to smooth the Cartesian coordinates of the structured grids. By coupling the signal processing method with existing grid operations within the Volume Grid Manipulator tool, problems related to grid smoothing are solved efficiently and with minimal user interaction. Examples of these smoothing operations are illustrated for reductions in grid stretching and volume grid adaptation. In each of these examples, other techniques existed at the time of the Columbia accident, but the incorporation of signal processing techniques reduced the time to perform the corrections by nearly 60%. This reduction in time to perform the corrections therefore enabled the assessment of approximately twice the number of damage scenarios than previously possible during the allocated investigation time.

Alter, Stephen J.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Aspects of Synthetic Vision Display Systems and the Best Practices of the NASA's SVS Project

NASA s Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) Project conducted research aimed at eliminating visibility-induced errors and low visibility conditions as causal factors in civil aircraft accidents while enabling the operational benefits of clear day flight operations regardless of actual outside visibility. SVS takes advantage of many enabling technologies to achieve this capability including, for example, the Global Positioning System (GPS), data links, radar, imaging sensors, geospatial databases, advanced display media and three dimensional video graphics processors. Integration of these technologies to achieve the SVS concept provides pilots with high-integrity information that improves situational awareness with respect to terrain, obstacles, traffic, and flight path. This paper attempts to emphasize the system aspects of SVS - true systems, rather than just terrain on a flight display - and to document from an historical viewpoint many of the best practices that evolved during the SVS Project from the perspective of some of the NASA researchers most heavily involved in its execution. The Integrated SVS Concepts are envisagements of what production-grade Synthetic Vision systems might, or perhaps should, be in order to provide the desired functional capabilities that eliminate low visibility as a causal factor to accidents and enable clear-day operational benefits regardless of visibility conditions.

Bailey, Randall E.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Apollo Lesson Sampler: Apollo 13 Lessons Learned

This CD-ROM contains a two-part case study of the Apollo 13 accident. The first lesson contains an overview of the electrical system hardware on the Apollo spacecraft, providing a context for the details of the oxygen tank explosion, and the failure chain reconstruction that led to the conditions present at the time of the accident. Given this background, the lesson then covers the tank explosion and immediate damage to the spacecraft, and the immediate response of Mission Control to what they saw. Part 2 of the lesson picks up shortly after the explosion of the oxygen tank on Apollo 13, and discusses how Mission Control gained insight to and understanding of the damage in the aftermath. Impacts to various spacecraft systems are presented, along with Mission Control's reactions and plans for in-flight recovery leading to a successful entry. Finally, post-flight vehicle changes are presented along with the lessons learned.

Interbartolo, Michael A.↗