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At least 487 records · Page 27

RAVEN User Manual

RAVEN is a generic software framework to perform parametric and probabilistic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed to provide dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose probabilistic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable to agnostically communicate with any system code. This agnosticism includes providing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs are used to allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by input files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating the system response, and investigating the input space using Monte Carlo, Grid, or Latin Hyper Cube sampling schemes, but its strength is focused toward system feature discovery, such as limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN started in 2012, when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework became stronger. RAVEN principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concept developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just the individuation of the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the closeness (or not) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. for an important process such as peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. The initial development of RAVEN has been focused on providing dynamic risk assessment capability to RELAP-7, currently under development at the INL and, likely, future replacement of the RELAP5-3D code. Most the capabilities that have been implemented having RELAP-7 as principal focus are easily deployable for other system codes. For this reason, several side activates are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with software such as RELAP5-3D, etc. The aim of this document is the explanation of the input requirements, focusing on the input structure.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Improving Site-Specific Radiological Performance Assessments - 13431

An improved approach is presented for conducting complete and defensible radiological site-specific performance assessments (PAs) to support radioactive waste disposal decisions. The basic tenets of PA were initiated some thirty years ago, focusing on geologic disposals and evaluating compliance with regulations. Some of these regulations were inherently probabilistic (i.e., addressing uncertainty in a quantitative fashion), such as the containment requirements of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 40 CFR 191, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, Chap. 191.13 [1]. Methods of analysis were developed to meet those requirements, but at their core early PAs used 'conservative' parameter values and modeling approaches. This limited the utility of such PAs to compliance evaluation, and did little to inform decisions about optimizing disposal, closure and long-term monitoring and maintenance, or, in general, maintaining doses 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA). This basic approach to PA development in the United States was employed essentially unchanged through the end of the 20. century, principally by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Performance assessments developed in support of private radioactive waste disposal operations, regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its agreement states, were typically not as sophisticated. Discussion of new approaches to PA is timely, since at the time of this writing, the DOE is in the midst of revising its Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management [2], and the NRC is revising 10 CFR 61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste [3]. Over the previous decade, theoretical developments and improved computational technology have provided the foundation for integrating decision analysis (DA) concepts and objective-focused thinking, plus a Bayesian approach to probabilistic modeling and risk analysis, to guide improvements in PA. This decision-making approach, [4, 5, 6] provides a transparent formal framework for using a value- or objective-focused approach to decision-making. DA, as an analytical means to implement structured decision making, provides a context for both understanding how uncertainty affects decisions and for targeting uncertainty reduction. The proposed DA approach improves defensibility and transparency of decision-making. The DA approach is fully consistent with the need to perform realistic modeling (rather than conservative modeling), including evaluation of site-specific factors. Instead of using generic stylized scenarios for radionuclide fate and transport and for human exposures to radionuclides, site-specific scenarios better represent the advantages and disadvantages of alternative disposal sites or engineered designs, thus clarifying their differences as well as providing a sound basis for evaluation of site performance. The full DA approach to PA is described, from explicitly incorporating societal values through stakeholder involvement to model building. Model building involves scoping by considering features, events, processes, and exposure scenarios (FEPSs), development of a conceptual site model (CSM), translation into numerical models and subsequent computation, and model evaluation. These are implemented in a cycle of uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis and value of information analysis so that uncertainty can be reduced until sufficient confidence is gained in the decisions to be made. This includes the traditional focus on hydrogeological processes, but also places emphasis on other FEPSs such as biotically-induced transport and human exposure phenomena. The significance of human exposure scenarios is emphasized by modifying the traditional acronym 'FEPs' to include them, hence 'FEPSs'. The radioactive waste community is also recognizing that disposal sites are to be considered a national (or even global) resource. As such, there is a pressing need to optimize their utility within the constraints of protecting human health and the environment. Failing to do so will result in the need for additional sites or options for storing radioactive waste temporarily, assuming a continued need for radioactive waste disposal. Optimization should be performed using DA, including economic analysis, invoked if necessary through the ALARA process. The economic analysis must recognize the cost of implementation (disposal design, closure, maintenance, etc.), and intra- and inter-generational equity in order to ensure that the best possible radioactive waste management decisions are made for the protection of both current and future generations. In most cases this requires consideration of population or collective risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Process-Based Cost Estimation for Ramjet/Scramjet Engines

Process-based cost estimation plays a key role in effecting cultural change that integrates distributed science, technology and engineering teams to rapidly create innovative and affordable products. Working together, NASA Glenn Research Center and Boeing Canoga Park have developed a methodology of process-based cost estimation bridging the methodologies of high-level parametric models and detailed bottoms-up estimation. The NASA GRC/Boeing CP process-based cost model provides a probabilistic structure of layered cost drivers. High-level inputs characterize mission requirements, system performance, and relevant economic factors. Design alternatives are extracted from a standard, product-specific work breakdown structure to pre-load lower-level cost driver inputs and generate the cost-risk analysis. As product design progresses and matures the lower level more detailed cost drivers can be re-accessed and the projected variation of input values narrowed, thereby generating a progressively more accurate estimate of cost-risk. Incorporated into the process-based cost model are techniques for decision analysis, specifically, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and functional utility analysis. Design alternatives may then be evaluated not just on cost-risk, but also user defined performance and schedule criteria. This implementation of full-trade study support contributes significantly to the realization of the integrated development environment. The process-based cost estimation model generates development and manufacturing cost estimates. The development team plans to expand the manufacturing process base from approximately 80 manufacturing processes to over 250 processes. Operation and support cost modeling is also envisioned. Process-based estimation considers the materials, resources, and processes in establishing cost-risk and rather depending on weight as an input, actually estimates weight along with cost and schedule.

Singh, Brijendra↗

Spacecraft Autonomy and Automation: A Comparative Analysis of Strategies for Cost Effective Mission Operations

The evolution of satellite operations over the last 40 years has drastically changed. October 4, 1957 (during the cold war) the Soviet Union launched the world's first spacecraft into orbit. The Sputnik satellite orbited Earth for three months and catapulted the United States into a race for dominance in space. A year after Sputnik, President Dwight Eisenhower formed the National Space and Aeronautics Administration (NASA). With a team of scientists and engineers, NASA successfully launched Explorer 1, the first US satellite to orbit Earth. During these early years, massive amounts of ground support equipment and operators were required to successfully operate spacecraft vehicles. Today, budget reductions and technological advances have forced new approaches to spacecraft operations. These approaches require increasingly complex, on board spacecraft systems, that enable autonomous operations, resulting in more cost-effective mission operations. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, considered world class in satellite development and operations, has developed and operated over 200 satellites during its 40 years of existence. NASA Goddard is adopting several new millennium initiatives that lower operational costs through the spacecraft autonomy and automation. This paper examines NASA's approach to spacecraft autonomy and ground system automation through a comparative analysis of satellite missions for Hubble Space Telescope-HST, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous-NEAR, and Solar Heliospheric Observatory-SoHO, with emphasis on cost reduction methods, risk analysis and anomalies and strategies employed for mitigating risk.

Wright, Nathaniel, Jr.↗

Radiotherapy for stage I seminoma of the testis: Organ equivalent dose to partially in-field structures and second cancer risk estimates on the basis of a mechanistic, bell-shaped, and plateau model

Purpose: The aim of the current study was to (a) calculate the organ equivalent dose (OED) and (b) estimate the associated second cancer risk to partially in-field critical structures from adjuvant radiotherapy for stage I seminoma of the testis on the basis of three different nonlinear risk models. Methods: Three-dimensional plans were created for twelve patients who underwent a treatment planning computed tomography of the abdomen. The plans for irradiation of seminoma consisted of para-aortic anteroposterior and posteroanterior fields giving 20 Gy to the target site with 6 MV photons. The OED of stomach, colon, liver, pancreas, and kidneys, that were partially included in the treatment volume, was calculated using differential dose–volume histograms. The mechanistic, bell-shaped, and plateau models were employed for these calculations provided that organ-specific parameters were available for the subsequent assessment of the excess absolute risk (EAR) for second cancer development. The estimated organ-specific lifetime risks were compared with the respective nominal intrinsic probabilities for cancer induction. Results: The mean OED, which was calculated from the patients’ treatment plans, varied from 0.54 to 6.61 Gy by the partially in-field organ of interest and the model used for dosimetric calculations. The difference between the OED of liver derived from the mechanistic model with those from the bell-shaped and plateau models was less than 1.8%. An even smaller deviation of 1.0% was observed for colon. For the rest organs of interest, the differences between the OED values obtained by the examined models varied from 8.6% to 50.0%. The EAR for stomach, colon, liver, pancreas, and kidney cancer induction at an age of 70 yr because of treatment of a typical 39-yr-old individual was up to 4.24, 11.39, 0.91, 3.04, and 0.14 per 10 000 persons-yr, respectively. Patient’s irradiation was found to elevate the lifetime intrinsic risks by 8.3%–63.0% depending upon the organ of interest and the model employed for risk analysis. Conclusions: Radiotherapy for stage I seminoma of the testis may result in an excess risk for the appearance of secondary malignancies in partially in-field organs. The organ- and model-dependent second cancer risk assessments of this study may be of value for patient counseling and follow-up.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Mission Risk Reduction Regulatory Change Management

NASA Headquarters Environmental Management Division supports NASA's mission to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research by integrating environmental considerations into programs and projects early-on, thereby proactively reducing NASA's exposure to institutional, programmatic and operational risk. As part of this effort, NASA established the Principal Center for Regulatory Risk Analysis and Communication (RRAC PC) as a resource for detecting, analyzing, and communicating environmental regulatory risks to the NASA stakeholder community. The RRAC PC focuses on detecting emerging environmental regulations and other operational change drivers that may pose risks to NASA programs and facilities, and effectively communicating the potential risks. For example, regulatory change may restrict how and where certain activities or operations may be conducted. Regulatory change can also directly affect the ability to use certain materials by mandating a production phase-out or restricting usage applications of certain materials. Regulatory change can result in significant adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities due to NASA's stringent performance requirements for materials and components related to human-rated space vehicles. Even if a regulation does not directly affect NASA operations, U.S. and international regulations can pose program risks indirectly through requirements levied on manufacturers and vendors of components and materials. For example, manufacturers can change their formulations to comply with new regulatory requirements. Such changes can require time-consuming and costly requalification certification for use in human spaceflight programs. The RRAC PC has implemented a system for proactively managing regulatory change to minimize potential adverse impacts to NASA programs and facilities. This presentation highlights the process utilized by the RRACPC to communicate regulatory change and the associated potential risks within NASA, as well as the process for communicating and cooperating with other government agencies and industry partners, both domestic and international, to ensure mission success.

Scroggins, Sharon↗

Event Tree Success Branch Modeling Approaches in SAPHIRE/SPAR

Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models are a set of linked fault tree/event tree PRA models that have been used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate the risk of operations at U.S. nuclear power plants since 1990s. The models use the Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) code developed by the NRC and Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Currently Version 8, SAPHIRE is a powerful software with advanced features to perform separated or integrated Level 1, Level 2, internal events, external events, at-power, and low power shutdown PRA [1]. One of its features is the availability of three different approaches to model the success branch of a top event in event tree: delete term, complement of system logic, and developed event. However, improper choosing and modeling success branch might yield unexpected and incorrect results. This paper will discuss the two most often used success branch modeling approaches, delete term and developed event, and provide recommendations for using proper approaches in different models. A potential SAPHIRE code enhancement is also proposed to address the adverse impact brought by the developed event approach.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An Efficient Sampling-Based Method for Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis Through RAVEN

Sensitivity analysis (SA) and uncertainty quantification (UQ) are now widely recognized as essential parts of analyses for complex nuclear systems. Plenty of well-established methodologies are already available for performing SA and UQ, such as Monte Carlo analysis, adjoint-based method, and variance decomposition. The focus of this summary is on developing an efficient sampling-based approach to perform SA and UQ through RAVEN. RAVEN (Risk Analysis and Virtual control Environment) is a software framework able to perform SA and UQ, currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory. In literature, a number of approaches have been developed to accelerate the process of SA and UQ for large complex systems, such as principal component analysis (PCA) of input space, input-output correlation analysis, and intersection subspace methods. The fundamental idea is to identify the dominant active directions in the parameter space prior to conducting SA and UQ. The premise is that the number of active directions is much less than the dimensionality of input space. In this work, the PCA or Karhunen-Loeve expansion or SVD method is implemented in RAVEN to identify the active directions. This approach is also combined with the forward sampling approaches, such as Monte Carlo, Grid, Latin Hypercube, and Response Surface Design sampling approaches that are currently available in RAVEN, to perform SA and UQ more efficiently. The summary is organized as follows. In the following section, we present the PCA-based forward sampling approach. The effectiveness and efficiency are discussed in the numerical results section. The paper then ends with a concluding summary. In this summary, we have presented PCA-based forward sampling approach to perform SA and UQ. The goal is to reduce the computational overhead for repetitive executions of complex nuclear systems that are generally required when performing SA and UQ. The control of correlations between input parameters is implemented in RAVEN to better represent the input relationships. In addition, we are currently examining our implementations with more realistic models, and we are also focusing on implementation of some new high-dimensional input reduction techniques in RAVEN. (authors)

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

Population-Based Study of Cardiovascular Mortality Among Patients With Prostate Cancer Treated With Radical External Beam Radiation Therapy With and Without Adjuvant Androgen Deprivation Therapy at the British Columbia Cancer Agency

Purpose: There are conflicting studies of the impact of androgen deprivation therapy (ADT) on cardiovascular (CV) mortality among prostate cancer patients receiving curative intent external beam radiation therapy (EBRT). We assessed the impact of ADT on CV mortality in patients treated in British Columbia. Methods and Materials: Provincial pharmacy and radiotherapy databases were linked to the provincial cancer registry, and defined a cohort of patients treated with curative intent EBRT between 1998 and 2005. We determined the duration of ADT and the cumulative incidence of CV death. We compared death from CV disease with and without ADT, and by duration of ADT using competing risk analysis and Fine and Gray multivariant analysis. A total of 600 randomly selected patients were reviewed to determine baseline CV disease, CV risk factors, and Charlson Index. Results: Of 5,948 prostate cancer patients treated with radical intent EBRT, of whom 1,933 were treated without ADT, 674 received ADT for {<=}6 months and 3,341 received > 6 months of ADT. The cumulative CV mortality at 7 years was 2.6% (95% confidence interval [CI] 1.9-3.5%), 2.1% (95% CI = 1.2-3.5%), and 1.4 (95% CI = 1.0-2.0%) for patients with no ADT, {<=}6 months of ADT, and >6 months of ADT, respectively (Gray's p = 0.002). Baseline CV disease and risk factors were more prevalent in the no-ADT group compared with the >6-month ADT group. Conclusions: This study demonstrated a lower CV mortality rate among patients treated with longer durations of ADT than those treated without ADT. These differences likely relate to selection of patients for ADT rather than effect of ADT itself.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Risk Assessment of EIC Central Detector (ePIC) Solenoid Magnet (MARCO)

As part of the BNL-JLab-CEA Electron Ion Collider (EIC) collaboration, the design of a 2 T, 2.8 m bore diameter, 3.8 m long conduction cooled superconducting detector magnet design is completed. Such magnet will be employed at the interaction region of ePIC for physics experiment. The magnet is a passive shielded solenoidal magnet system consisting of 3 coils wound with specially designed conductor using NbTi Rutherford type cable in copper stabilized channel. This paper describes the risk analysis as the part of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) that was carried out as a team to identify their various failure modes and risks associated with the magnets system. In conclusion, this FMEA is intended to become the content of the designed document as an integral part of the engineering assessment and the statement of work for the potential vendors towards design and built.

Ghoshal, Probir K. [Thomas Jefferson National Acce↗

Filling Terrorism Gaps: VEOs, Evaluating Databases, and Applying Risk Terrain Modeling to Terrorism

This paper aims to address three issues: the lack of literature differentiating terrorism and violent extremist organizations (VEOs), terrorism incident databases, and the applicability of Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) to terrorism. Current open source literature and publicly available government sources do not differentiate between terrorism and VEOs; furthermore, they fail to define them. Addressing the lack of a comprehensive comparison of existing terrorism data sources, a matrix comparing a dozen terrorism databases is constructed, providing insight toward the array of data available. RTM, a method for spatial risk analysis at a micro level, has some applicability to terrorism research, particularly for studies looking at risk indicators of terrorism. Leveraging attack data from multiple databases, combined with RTM, offers one avenue for closing existing research gaps in terrorism literature.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Reliability/Risk Methods and Design Tools for Application in Space Programs

Since 1984 NASA has funded several major programs to develop Reliability/Risk Methods and tools for engineers to apply in the design and assessment of aerospace hardware. Two probabilistic software tools that show great promise for practical application are the finite element code NESSUS and the system risk analysis code QRAS. This paper examines NASA's past, present, and future directions in reliability and risk engineering applications, Both the NESSUS and QRAS software tools are detailed.

Townsend, John S.↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment: A Bibliography

Probabilistic risk analysis is an integration of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis and other techniques to assess the potential for failure and to find ways to reduce risk. This bibliography references 160 documents in the NASA STI Database that contain the major concepts, probabilistic risk assessment, risk and probability theory, in the basic index or major subject terms, An abstract is included with most citations, followed by the applicable subject terms.

Source record↗

RAVEN User Manual

RAVEN is a generic software framework to perform parametric and probabilistic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed to provide dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the Thermo-Hydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose probabilistic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable to agnostically communicate with any system code. This agnosticism includes providing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs are used to allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by inputs files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating the system response, and investigating the input space using Monte Carlo, Grid, or Latin Hyper Cube sampling schemes, but its strength is focused to- ward system feature discovery, such as limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN has started in 2012, when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework became stronger. RAVEN principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concept developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just the individuation of the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the closeness (or not) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. for an important process such as peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. The initial development of RAVEN has been focused on providing dynamic risk assessment capability to RELAP-7, currently under development at the INL and, likely, future replacement of the RELAP5-3D code. Most the capabilities that have been implemented having RELAP-7 as principal focus are easily deployable for other system codes. For this reason, several side activates are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with soft- ware such as RELAP5-3D, etc. The aim of this document is the explanation of the input requirements, focalizing on the input structure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Case for Developing a Ground Based Replication of the Earth, Moon and Mars Spaceflight Infrastructure

When the systems are developed and in place to provide the services needed to operate en route and on the Lunar and Martian surfaces, an Earth based replication will need to be in place for the safety and protection of mission success. The replication will entail all aspects of the flight configuration end to end but will not include any closed loop systems. This would replicate the infrastructure from Lunar and Martian robots, manned surface excursions, through man and unmanned terrestrial bases, through the various types of communication systems and technologies, manned and un-manned space vehicles (large and small), to Earth based systems and control centers. An Earth based replicated infrastructure will enable checkout and test of new technologies, hardware, software updates and upgrades and procedures without putting humans and missions at risk. Analysis of events, what ifs and trouble resolution could be played out on the ground to remove as much risk as possible from any type of proposed change to flight operational systems. With adequate detail, it is possible that failures could be predicted with a high probability and action taken to eliminate failures. A major factor in any mission to the Moon and to Mars is the complexity of systems, interfaces, processes, their limitations, associated risks and the factor of the unknown including the development by many contractors and NASA centers. The need to be able to introduce new technologies over the life of the program requires an end to end test bed to analyze and evaluate these technologies and what will happen when they are introduced into the flight system. The ability to analyze system behaviors end to end under varying conditions would enhance safety e.g. fault tolerances. This analysis along with the ability to mine data from the development environment (e.g. test data), flight ops and modeling/simulations data would provide a level of information not currently available to operations and astronauts. In this paper we will analyze the beginnings of such a replication and what it could do in terms of reducing risk in the near term for development. We will analyze the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) test lab which has to a large extent accomplished this replication for the SSME and has been highly successful in analyzing hardware and software problems and changes. The cost of replicating the flight system as proposed here could be very high if attempted as an afterthought. We will describe the initial steps for the development of a replication of this infrastructure starting with the communication infrastructure. The Constellation of Labs (CofL) under the Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3I) project for the NASA Exploration Initiative will provide the initial foundation upon which to base this replication. Simply put, there is very little margin for error in high latency situations e.g. en-route to/from Mars or in an autonomous process on the Lunar far side. Any thought out approach to reduce risk and increase safety needs to be accomplished end to end with the actual systems configuration.

Bradford, Robert N.↗

RAVEN Theory Manual

RAVEN is a software framework able to perform parametric and stochastic analysis based on the response of complex system codes. The initial development was aimed at providing dynamic risk analysis capabilities to the thermohydraulic code RELAP-7, currently under development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Although the initial goal has been fully accomplished, RAVEN is now a multi-purpose stochastic and uncertainty quantification platform, capable of communicating with any system code. In fact, the provided Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) allow RAVEN to interact with any code as long as all the parameters that need to be perturbed are accessible by input files or via python interfaces. RAVEN is capable of investigating system response and explore input space using various sampling schemes such as Monte Carlo, grid, or Latin hypercube. However, RAVEN strength lies in its system feature discovery capabilities such as: constructing limit surfaces, separating regions of the input space leading to system failure, and using dynamic supervised learning techniques. The development of RAVEN started in 2012 when, within the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the need to provide a modern risk evaluation framework arose. RAVEN’s principal assignment is to provide the necessary software and algorithms in order to employ the concepts developed by the Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) program. RISMC is one of the pathways defined within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. In the RISMC approach, the goal is not just to identify the frequency of an event potentially leading to a system failure, but the proximity (or lack thereof) to key safety-related events. Hence, the approach is interested in identifying and increasing the safety margins related to those events. A safety margin is a numerical value quantifying the probability that a safety metric (e.g. peak pressure in a pipe) is exceeded under certain conditions. Most of the capabilities, implemented having RELAP-7 as a principal focus, are easily deployable to other system codes. For this reason, several side activates have been employed (e.g. RELAP5-3D, any MOOSE-based App, etc.) or are currently ongoing for coupling RAVEN with several different software. The aim of this document is to provide a set of commented examples that can help the user to become familiar with the RAVEN code usage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗