Systems Long Term Exposure Program: Analysis of the First Year of Data.
Abstract not provided.
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Abstract not provided.
Hybrid quantum-classical workflows have become standard methods for executing variational algorithms and other quantum simulation techniques, which are key applications for noisy intermediate scale quantum (NISQ) computers. Validating these simulations is an important task which helps gauge the progress of quantum computer development, and classical simulation can serve as a tool to this end. Both exact and more scalable approximate methods with quantifiable error bounds can be used in validation tasks where the applicable metrics include the distance from a calculable ground truth, the quality of an error model fit to data, etc. Here we present a library extension that includes methods for validation of quantum simulations based on scalable hybrid workflows executable on high performance computers. We provide examples that use approximate methods based on tensor networks and stabilizer simulators to bound the error of quantum simulations on NISQ hardware.
We present JACC (Julia for Accelerators), the first high-level, and performance-portable model for the just-in-time and LLVM-based Julia language. JACC provides a unified and lightweight front end across different back ends available in Julia, enabling the same Julia code to run efficiently on many HPC CPU and GPU targets. We evaluated the performance of JACC for common HPC kernels as well as for the most computationally demanding kernels used in applications, HPCCG, a supercomputing benchmark test for sparse domains, and HARVEY, a blood flow simulator to assist in the diagnosis and treatment of patients suffering from vascular diseases. We carried out the performance analysis on the most advanced US DOE supercomputers: Aurora, Frontier, and Perlmutter. Overall, we show that JACC has a negligible overhead versus vendor-specific solutions, reporting GPU speedups with no extra cost to programmability.
Abstract not provided
Two-well tracer tests are often conducted to investigate subsurface solute transport in the field. Analyzing breakthrough curves in the extraction and monitoring wells using numerical methods is nontrivial due to highly nonuniform flow conditions. We extended, and implemented analytical solutions for the convection-dispersion equation for an injection-extraction well-duplet in a homogeneous confined aquifer under steady state conditions. Functions were provided to calculate the concentrations in the extraction and monitoring wells at any location due to a step or pulse injection. Type curves for a step injection were compared with those calculated by numerically integrating the solution for a pulse injection. The results from the two approaches are similar when the dispersivity is small. As the dispersivity increases, the latter was found to be more accurate but requires more computing time. The code was verified by comparing the results with published type curves and applied to analyze data from the literature. It can be used as a first approximation for two-well tracer test data analysis, and to check accuracy of numerical solutions. The code and example files are publically-available.
Abstract not provided.
Hall A at Jefferson Lab has recently completed three experiments done using the technique of parity-violating electron scattering. Taken together these experiments are a good demonstration of the versatility of this approach. Looking forward, there are two very large scale parity-violation experiments approved to run in Hall A in the 12 GeV era. These experiments represent a significant increase in precision and technical requirements.
Transverse-momentum-dependent parton distributions (TMDs) are crucial ingredients for a complete understanding of the dynamics of confined par-tons. They allow for a 3-dimensional description of the nucleon in momentum space, and could provide insights into the yet unmeasured quark orbital angular momentum. At CLAS several TMDs are explored in Fourier analysis of azimuthal asymmetries measured in semi-inclusive DIS. An overview of the main CLAS results as well as selected CLAS12 projected results is presented.
Abstract not provided.
Nuclear power has contributed almost 20% of the total amount of electricity generated in the United States over the past two decades. High capacity factors and low operating costs make nuclear power plants (NPPs) some of the most economical power generators available. Further, nuclear power remains the single largest contributor (nearly 70%) of non-greenhouse gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. Even when major refurbishments are performed to extend operating life, these plants continue to represent cost-effective, low-carbon assets to the nation's electrical generation capability.
Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). As the current Light Water Reactor (LWR) NPPs age beyond 60 years, there are possibilities for increased frequency of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) degradations or failures that initiate safety-significant events, reduce existing accident mitigation capabilities, or create new failure modes. Plant designers commonly “over-design” portions of NPPs and provide robustness in the form of redundant and diverse engineered safety features to ensure that, even in the case of well-beyond design basis scenarios, public health and safety will be protected with a very high degree of assurance. This form of defense-in-depth is a reasoned response to uncertainties and is often referred to generically as “safety margin.” Historically, specific safety margin provisions have been formulated, primarily based on “engineering judgment.”
This final report document summarizes the activities undertaken and the output from three primary deliverables generated during this project. This fifteen month effort comprised numerous key steps including the creation of an international methane hydrate science team, determining and reporting the current state of marine methane hydrate research, convening an international workshop to collect the ideas needed to write a comprehensive Marine Methane Hydrate Field Research Plan and the development and publication of that plan. The following documents represent the primary deliverables of this project and are discussed in summary level detail in this final report: Historical Methane Hydrate Project Review Report; Methane Hydrate Workshop Report; Topical Report: Marine Methane Hydrate Field Research Plan; and Final Scientific/Technical Report.
There has been a long history of considering Safety, Security, and Safeguards (3S) as three functions of nuclear security design and operations that need to be properly and collectively integrated with operations. This paper specifically considers how safety programmes can be extended directly to benefit security as part of an integrated facility management programme. The discussion will draw on experiences implementing such a programme at Sandia National Laboratories’ Annular Research Reactor Facility. While the paper focuses on nuclear facilities, similar ideas could be used to support security programmes at other types of high-consequence facilities and transportation activities.
In the aftermath of the March 2011 multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Fukushima), the nuclear community has been reassessing certain safety assumptions about nuclear reactor plant design, operations and emergency actions, particularly with respect to extreme events that might occur and that are beyond each plant’s current design basis. Because of our significant domestic investment in nuclear reactor technology (99 operating reactors in the fleet of commercial LWRs with five under construction), the United States has been a major leader internationally in these activities. The U.S. nuclear industry is voluntarily pursuing a number of additional safety initiatives. The NRC continues to evaluate and, where deemed appropriate, establish new requirements for ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety in the occurrence of low probability events at nuclear plants; (e.g., mitigation strategies for beyond design basis events initiated by external events like seismic or flooding initiators). The DOE has also played a major role in the U.S. response to the Fukushima accident. Initially, DOE worked with the Japanese and the international community to help develop a more complete understanding of the Fukushima accident progression and its consequences, and to respond to various safety concerns emerging from uncertainties about the nature of and the effects from the accident. DOE R&D activities are focused on providing scientific and technical insights, data, analyses methods that ultimately support industry efforts to enhance safety. These activities are expected to further enhance the safety performance of currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants as well as better characterize the safety performance of future U.S. plants. In pursuing this area of R&D, DOE recognizes that the commercial nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities. As such, industry is considered the primary “end user” of the results from this DOE-sponsored work. The response to the Fukushima accident has been global, and there is a continuing multinational interest in collaborations to better quantify accident consequences and to incorporate lessons learned from the accident. DOE will continue to seek opportunities to facilitate collaborations that are of value to the U.S. industry, particularly where the collaboration provides access to vital data from the accident or otherwise supports or leverages other important R&D work. The purpose of the Reactor Safety Technology R&D is to improve understanding of beyond design basis events and reduce uncertainty in severe accident progression, phenomenology, and outcomes using existing analytical codes and information gleaned from severe accidents, in particular the Fukushima Daiichi events. This information will be used to aid in developing mitigating strategies and improving severe accident management guidelines for the current light water reactor fleet.
Safety is central to the design, licensing, operation, and economics of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). As the current Light Water Reactor (LWR) NPPs age beyond 60 years, there are possibilities for increased frequency of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) degradations or failures that initiate safety-significant events, reduce existing accident mitigation capabilities, or create new failure modes. Plant designers commonly “over-design” portions of NPPs and provide robustness in the form of redundant and diverse engineered safety features to ensure that, even in the case of well-beyond design basis scenarios, public health and safety will be protected with a very high degree of assurance. This form of defense-in-depth is a reasoned response to uncertainties and is often referred to generically as “safety margin.” Historically, specific safety margin provisions have been formulated, primarily based on “engineering judgment.”
In the aftermath of the March 2011 multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Fukushima), the nuclear community has been reassessing certain safety assumptions about nuclear reactor plant design, operations and emergency actions, particularly with respect to extreme events that might occur and that are beyond each plant’s current design basis. Because of our significant domestic investment in nuclear reactor technology (99 operating reactors in the fleet of commercial LWRs with five under construction), the United States has been a major leader internationally in these activities. The U.S. nuclear industry is voluntarily pursuing a number of additional safety initiatives. The NRC continues to evaluate and, where deemed appropriate, establish new requirements for ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety in the occurrence of low probability events at nuclear plants; (e.g., mitigation strategies for beyond design basis events initiated by external events like seismic or flooding initiators). The DOE has also played a major role in the U.S. response to the Fukushima accident. Initially, DOE worked with the Japanese and the international community to help develop a more complete understanding of the Fukushima accident progression and its consequences, and to respond to various safety concerns emerging from uncertainties about the nature of and the effects from the accident. DOE R&D activities are focused on providing scientific and technical insights, data, analyses methods that ultimately support industry efforts to enhance safety. These activities are expected to further enhance the safety performance of currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants as well as better characterize the safety performance of future U.S. plants. In pursuing this area of R&D, DOE recognizes that the commercial nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities. As such, industry is considered the primary “end user” of the results from this DOE-sponsored work. The response to the Fukushima accident has been global, and there is a continuing multinational interest in collaborations to better quantify accident consequences and to incorporate lessons learned from the accident. DOE will continue to seek opportunities to facilitate collaborations that are of value to the U.S. industry, particularly where the collaboration provides access to vital data from the accident or otherwise supports or leverages other important R&D work. The purpose of the Reactor Safety Technology R&D is to improve understanding of beyond design basis events and reduce uncertainty in severe accident progression, phenomenology, and outcomes using existing analytical codes and information gleaned from severe accidents, in particular the Fukushima Daiichi events. This information will be used to aid in developing mitigating strategies and improving severe accident management guidelines for the current light water reactor fleet.