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NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗
NASA NTRS2012

The Pursuit of K: Reflections on the Current State-of-the-Art in Stress Intensity Factor Solutions for Practical Aerospace Applications

The elastic stress intensity factor (SIF, commonly denoted as K) is the foundation of practical fracture mechanics (FM) analysis for aircraft structures. This single parameter describes the first-order effects of stress magnitude and distribution as well as the geometry of both structure/component and crack. Hence, the calculation of K is often the most significant step in fatigue analysis based on FM. This presentation will provide several reflections on the current state-of-the-art in SIF solution methods used for practical aerospace applications, including a brief historical perspective, descriptions of some recent and ongoing advances, and comments on some remaining challenges. Newman and Raju made significant early contributions to practical structural analysis by developing closed-form SIF equations for surface and corner cracks in simplified geometries, often based on empirical fits of finite element (FE) solutions. Those solutions (and others like them) were sometimes revised as new analyses were conducted or limitations discovered. The foundational solutions have exhibited striking longevity, despite the relatively "coarse" FE models employed many decades ago. However, in recent years, the accumulation of different generations of solutions for the same nominal geometry has led to some confusion (which solution is correct?), and steady increases in computational capabilities have facilitated the discovery of inaccuracies in some (not all!) of the legacy solutions. Some examples of problems and solutions are presented and discussed, including the challenge of maintaining consistency with legacy design applications. As computational power has increased, the prospect of calculating large numbers of SIF solutions for specific complex geometries with advanced numerical methods has grown more attractive. Fawaz and Andersson, for example, have been generating literally millions of new SIF solutions for different combinations of multiple cracks under simplified loading schemes using p-version FE methods. These data are invaluable, but questions remain about their practical use, because the tabular databases of key results needed to support practical life analysis can occupy gigabytes of storage for only a few classes of geometries. The prospect of using such advanced numerical methods to calculate in real time only those K solutions actually needed to support a specific crack growth analysis is also tempting, but the stark reality is that the computational cost is still so high that the approach is not practical except for specific, critical application problems. Some thoughts are offered about alternative paradigms. Compounding approaches are some of the earliest building blocks of SIF development for more complex geometries. These approaches are especially attractive because of their very low computational cost and their conceptual robustness; they are, in some ways, an intriguing contrast and complement to the brute-force numerical methods. In recent years, researchers at NRC-Canada have published remarkable results showing how compounding approaches can be used to generate accurate solutions for very difficult problems. Examples are provided of some successes--and some limitations--using this approach. These closed-form, tabulated numerical, and compounding approaches have typically been used for simple remote loading with simple load paths to the crack. However, many significant cracks occur in complex stress gradient fields. This is a job for weight function (WF) methods, where the arbitrary stress distribution on the crack plane in the corresponding uncracked body (typically determined using FE methods) is used to determine K. Several significant recent advances in WF methods and solutions are highlighted here. Fueled by advanced 3D numerical methods, many new solutions have been generated for classic geometries such as surface and corner cracks with wide ranges of geometrical validity. A new WF formulation has also be developed for part-through cracks considering the arbitrary stress gradients in all directions in the crack plane (so-called bivariant solutions). Basic WF methods have recently been combined with analytical expressions for crack plane stresses to develop a large family of accurate SIF solutions for corner, surface, and through cracks at internal or external notches with very wide ranges of shapes, sizes, acuities, and offsets. Finally, WF solutions are much faster than FE or boundary element solutions, but can still be much slower than simple closed-form solutions, especially for bivariant solutions that can require 2D numerical integration. Novel pre-integration and dynamic tabular methods have been developed that substantially increase the speed of these advanced WF solutions. The practical utility of advanced SIF methods, including both WF and direct numerical methods, is greatly enhanced if the FM life analysis can be directly and efficiently linked with digital models of the actual structure or component (e.g., FE models for stress analysis). Two recent advances of this type will be described. One approach directly interfaces the FM life analysis with the FE model of the uncracked component (including stress results). Through a powerful graphical user interface, simplified FM life models can be constructed (and visualized) directly on the component model, with the computer collecting the geometry and stress gradient information needed for the life calculation. An even more powerful paradigm uses expert logic to automatically build an optimum simple fracture model at any and every desired location in the component model, perform the life calculation, and even generate fatigue crack growth life contour maps, all with minimal user intervention. This paradigm has also been extended to the automatic calculation of fracture risk, considering uncertainty or variability in key input parameters such as initial crack size or location. Another new integrated approach links the engineering life analysis, the component model, and a 3D numerical fracture analysis built with the same component model to generate a table of SIF values at a specific location that can then be employed efficiently to perform the life calculation. Some attention must be given to verification and validation (V&V) issues and challenges: how good are these SIF solutions, how good is good enough, and does anyone believe the life answer? It is important to think critically about the different sources of error or uncertainty and to perform V&V in a hierarchal, building-block manner. Some accuracy issues for SIF solutions, for example, may actually involve independent material behavior issues, such as constraint loss effects for crack fronts near component surfaces, and can be a source of confusion. Recommendations are proposed for improved V&V approaches. This presentation will briefly but critically survey the range of issues and advances mentioned above, with a particular view towards assembling an integrated approach that combines different methods to create practical tools for real-world design and analysis problems. Examples will be selectively drawn from the recent literature, from recent enhancements in the NASGRO and DARWIN computer codes, and from previously unpublished research

CraigMcClung, R.↗