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At least 487 records · Page 27
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Abort Evolution

This paper documents some of the evolutionary steps in developing a rigorous Space Shuttle launch abort capability. The paper addresses the abort strategy during the design and development and how it evolved during Shuttle flight operations. The Space Shuttle Program made numerous adjustments in both the flight hardware and software as the knowledge of the actual flight environment grew. When failures occurred, corrections and improvements were made to avoid a reoccurrence and to provide added capability for crew survival. Finally some lessons learned are summarized for future human launch vehicle designers to consider.

Henderson, Edward M.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Supportability Technologies for Future Exploration Missions

Future long-duration human exploration missions will be challenged by resupply limitations and mass and volume constraints. Consequently, it will be essential that the logistics footprint required to support these missions be minimized and that capabilities be provided to make them highly autonomous from a logistics perspective. Strategies to achieve these objectives include broad implementation of commonality and standardization at all hardware levels and across all systems, repair of failed hardware at the lowest possible hardware level, and manufacture of structural and mechanical replacement components as needed. Repair at the lowest hardware levels will require the availability of compact, portable systems for diagnosis of failures in electronic systems and verification of system functionality following repair. Rework systems will be required that enable the removal and replacement of microelectronic components with minimal human intervention to minimize skill requirements and training demand for crews. Materials used in the assembly of electronic systems (e.g. solders, fluxes, conformal coatings) must be compatible with the available repair methods and the spacecraft environment. Manufacturing of replacement parts for structural and mechanical applications will require additive manufacturing systems that can generate near-net-shape parts from the range of engineering alloys employed in the spacecraft structure and in the parts utilized in other surface systems. These additive manufacturing processes will need to be supported by real-time non-destructive evaluation during layer-additive processing for on-the-fly quality control. This will provide capabilities for quality control and may serve as an input for closed-loop process control. Additionally, non-destructive methods should be available for material property determination. These nondestructive evaluation processes should be incorporated with the additive manufacturing process - providing an in-process capability to ensure that material deposited during layer-additive processing meets required material property criteria.

Watson, Kevin↗
NASA NTRS2016

Challenges with Electrical, Electronics, and Electromechanical Parts for James Webb Space Telescope

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is the space-based observatory that will extend the knowledge gained by the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). Hubble focuses on optical and ultraviolet wavelengths while JWST focuses on the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, to see the earliest stars and galaxies that formed in the Universe and to look deep into nearby dust clouds to study the formation of stars and planets. JWST, which commenced creation in 1996, is scheduled to launch in 2018. It includes a suite of four instruments, the spacecraft bus, optical telescope element, Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM, the platform to hold the instruments), and a sunshield. The mass of JWST is approximately 6200 kg, including observatory, on-orbit consumables and launch vehicle adaptor. Many challenges were overcome while providing the electrical and electronic components for the Goddard Space Flight Center hardware builds. Other difficulties encountered included developing components to work at cryogenic temperatures, failures of electronic components during development and flight builds, Integration and Test electronic parts problems, and managing technical issues with international partners. This paper will present the context of JWST from a EEE (electrical, electronic, and electromechanical) perspective with examples of challenges and lessons learned throughout the design, development, and fabrication of JWST in cooperation with our associated partners including the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the European Space Agency (ESA), Lockheed Martin and their respective associated partners. Technical challenges and lessons learned will be discussed.

EEE Parts↗
NASA NTRS2002

On Using Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Electronic Products in Space

NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) has utilized COTS products in its programs since the early 1990's. Recently it has become evident that, of all failure modes possible, radiation will probably dominate; sometimes to the point of driving system architecture. It is now imperative that radiation susceptibility be addressed when writing the system requirements. Susceptibility assessment, e.g. testing, must begin early in the design phase to establish performance and continue through the hardware qualification program to prove satisfaction of the original requirements(s). Examples of requirements, testing, and architecture versus failure rate will be given.

Culpepper, William X.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Advances in Thrust-Based Emergency Control of an Airplane

Engineers at NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center have received a patent on an emergency flight-control method implemented by a propulsion-controlled aircraft (PCA) system. Utilizing the preexisting auto-throttle and engine-pressure-ratio trim controls of the airplane, the PCA system provides pitch and roll control for landing an airplane safely without using aerodynamic control surfaces that have ceased to function because of a primary-flight-control-system failure. The installation of the PCA does not entail any changes in pre-existing engine hardware or software. [Aspects of the method and system at previous stages of development were reported in Thrust-Control System for Emergency Control of an Airplane (DRC-96-07), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (March 2001), page 68 and Emergency Landing Using Thrust Control and Shift of Weight (DRC-96-55), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 26, No. 5 (May 2002), page 58.]. Aircraft flight-control systems are designed with extensive redundancy to ensure low probabilities of failure. During recent years, however, several airplanes have exhibited major flight-control-system failures, leaving engine thrust as the last mode of flight control. In some of these emergency situations, engine thrusts were successfully modulated by the pilots to maintain flight paths or pitch angles, but in other situations, lateral control was also needed. In the majority of such control-system failures, crashes resulted and over 1,200 people died. The challenge lay in creating a means of sufficient degree of thrust-modulation control to safely fly and land a stricken airplane. A thrust-modulation control system designed for this purpose was flight-tested in a PCA an MD-11 airplane. The results of the flight test showed that without any operational control surfaces, a pilot can land a crippled airplane (U.S. Patent 5,330,131). The installation of the original PCA system entailed modifications not only of the flight-control computer (FCC) of the airplane but also of each engine-control computer. Inasmuch as engine-manufacturer warranties do not apply to modified engines, the challenge became one of creating a PCA system that does not entail modifications of the engine computers.

Creech, Gray↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Cutoff System (ECO) Anomalies

The Space Shuttle Orbiter's main engine cutoff (ECO) system first failed ground checkout in April, 2005 during a first tanking test prior to Return-to-Flight. Despite significant troubleshooting and investigative efforts that followed, the root cause could not be found and intermittent anomalies continued to plague the Program. By implementing hardware upgrades, enhancing monitoring capability, and relaxing the launch rules, the Shuttle fleet was allowed to continue flying in spite of these unexplained failures. Root cause was finally determined following the launch attempts of STS-122 in December, 2007 when the anomalies repeated, which allowed drag-on instrumentation to pinpoint the fault (the ET feedthrough connector). The suspect hardware was removed and provided additional evidence towards root cause determination. Corrective action was implemented and the system has performed successfully since then. This white paper presents the lessons learned from the entire experience, beginning with the anomalies since Return-to-Flight through discovery and correction of the problem. To put these lessons in better perspective for the reader, an overview of the ECO system is presented first. Next, a chronological account of the failures and associated investigation activities is discussed. Root cause and corrective action are summarized, followed by the lessons learned.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Towards Real-Time, On-Board, Hardware-Supported Sensor and Software Health Management for Unmanned Aerial Systems

For unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to be successfully deployed and integrated within the national airspace, it is imperative that they possess the capability to effectively complete their missions without compromising the safety of other aircraft, as well as persons and property on the ground. This necessity creates a natural requirement for UAS that can respond to uncertain environmental conditions and emergent failures in real-time, with robustness and resilience close enough to those of manned systems. We introduce a system that meets this requirement with the design of a real-time onboard system health management (SHM) capability to continuously monitor sensors, software, and hardware components. This system can detect and diagnose failures and violations of safety or performance rules during the flight of a UAS. Our approach to SHM is three-pronged, providing: (1) real-time monitoring of sensor and software signals; (2) signal analysis, preprocessing, and advanced on-the-fly temporal and Bayesian probabilistic fault diagnosis; and (3) an unobtrusive, lightweight, read-only, low-power realization using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) that avoids overburdening limited computing resources or costly re-certification of flight software. We call this approach rt-R2U2, a name derived from its requirements. Our implementation provides a novel approach of combining modular building blocks, integrating responsive runtime monitoring of temporal logic system safety requirements with model-based diagnosis and Bayesian network-based probabilistic analysis. We demonstrate this approach using actual flight data from the NASA Swift UAS.

Unmanned Aerial System↗
NASA NTRS2005

Hubble Space Telescope Star Tracker ad Two-Gyro Control Law Design, Implementation, and On-Orbit Performance

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) normally requires three gyroscopes for three-axis rate control. The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on STS-107 resulted in the cancellation of a shuttle-based HST Servicing Mission 4. Therefore, HST must operate using the on-board hardware until an alternate means of servicing can be accomplished. The probability of gyro failure indicates that fewer than three gyros will be operable before any servicing mission can be performe& To mitigate this, and to extend the HST life expectancy, a rate estimation and control algorithm was developed that requires two gyros to measure rate about two axes, with the remaining axis rate estimated using one of three alternate sensors. Three-axis magnetometers (MSS) are used for coarse rate estimation during large maneuvers and during occultations of other sensors. Fixed-Head Star Trackers (FHSTs) are used for rate estimation during safe mode recovery and during transition to science operations. Fine rate estimation during science operations is performed using the Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs). The FHST mode (T2G) relies on star vectors as measured by the FHSTs to estimate vehicle rate about the axis not measured by the gyros. Since the FHSTs were not designed to estimate body rate, this method involves a unique set of problems that had to be overcome in the final design, such as the effect of FHST break tracks and moving targets on rate estimation. The solutions to these problems, as well as a detailed description of the design and implementation of the rate estimation are presented Also included are the time domain and frequency domain analysis of the T2G control law. A high fidelity HST simulator (HSTSIM) was used to verify T2G performance prior to on-orbit use. Results of these simulations are also presented. Finally, analysis of actual T2G on-orbit test results is presented for design validation.

VanArsdall, John C.↗
NASA NTRS2008

The First Development of Human Factors Engineering Requirements for Application to Ground Task Design for a NASA Flight Program

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has long applied standards-derived human engineering requirements to the development of hardware and software for use by astronauts while in flight. The most important source of these requirements has been NASA-STD-3000. While there have been several ground systems human engineering requirements documents, none has been applicable to the flight system as handled at NASA's launch facility at Kennedy Space Center. At the time of the development of previous human launch systems, there were other considerations that were deemed more important than developing worksites for ground crews; e.g., hardware development schedule and vehicle performance. However, experience with these systems has shown that failure to design for ground tasks has resulted in launch schedule delays, ground operations that are more costly than they might be, and threats to flight safety. As the Agency begins the development of new systems to return humans to the moon, the new Constellation Program is addressing this issue with a new set of human engineering requirements. Among these requirements is a subset that will apply to the design of the flight components and that is intended to assure ground crew success in vehicle assembly and maintenance tasks. These requirements address worksite design for usability and for ground crew safety.

Dischinger, H. Charles, Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Vibration Isolation for Launch of a Space Station Orbital Replacement Unit

Delivery of Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) to on-orbit destinations such a the International Space Station (ISS) and the Hubble Space Telescope is an important component of the space program. ORUs are integrated on orbit with space assets to maintain and upgrade functionality. For ORUs comprised of sensitive equipment, the dynamic launch environment drives design and testing requirements, and high frequency random vibrations are generally the cause for failure. Vibration isolation can mitigate the structure-borne vibration environment during launch, and hardware has been developed that can provide a reduced environment for current and future launch environments. Random vibration testing of one ORU to equivalent Space Shuttle launch levels revealed that its qualification and acceptance requirements were exceeded. An isolation system was designed to mitigate the structure-borne launch vibration environment. To protect this ORU, the random vibration levels at 50 Hz must be attenuated by a factor of two and those at higher frequencies even more. Design load factors for Shuttle launch are high, so a metallic load path is needed to maintain strength margins. Isolation system design was performed using a finite element model of the ORU on its carrier with representative disturbance inputs. Iterations on the modelled to an optimized design based on flight proven SoftRide MultiFlex isolators. Component testing has been performed on prototype isolators to validate analytical predictions.

Maly, Joseph R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Contamination Control and Hardware Processing Solutions at Marshall Space Flight Center

The Contamination Control Team of Marshall Space Flight Center's Materials and Processes Laboratory supports many Programs/ Projects that design, manufacture, and test a wide range of hardware types that are sensitive to contamination and foreign object damage (FOD). Examples where contamination/FOD concerns arise include sensitive structural bondline failure, critical orifice blockage, seal leakage, and reactive fluid compatibility (liquid oxygen, hydrazine) as well as performance degradation of sensitive instruments or spacecraft surfaces such as optical elements and thermal control systems. During the design phase, determination of the sensitivity of a hardware system to different types or levels of contamination/FOD is essential. A contamination control and FOD control plan must then be developed and implemented through all phases of ground processing, and, sometimes, on-orbit use, recovery, and refurbishment. Implementation of proper controls prevents cost and schedule impacts due to hardware damage or rework and helps assure mission success. Current capabilities are being used to support recent and on-going activities for multiple Mission Directorates / Programs such as International Space Station (ISS), James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), Space Launch System (SLS) elements (tanks, engines, booster), etc. The team also advances Green Technology initiatives and addresses materials obsolescence issues for NASA and external customers, most notably in the area of solvent replacement (e.g. aqueous cleaners containing hexavalent chrome, ozone depleting chemicals (CFC s and HCFC's), suspect carcinogens). The team evaluates new surface cleanliness inspection and cleaning technologies (e.g. plasma cleaning), and maintains databases for processing support materials as well as outgassing and optical compatibility test results for spaceflight environments.

Burns, DeWitt H.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Composite Technology for Exploration (CTE)

Technology Product Capability: The CTE (Composite Technology for Exploration) project will develop and demonstrate critical composites technologies with a focus on weight-saving, performance-enhancing bonded joint technology for Space Launch System (SLS)-scale composite hardware to support future NASA exploration missions - Improve the analytical capabilities required to predict failure modes in composite structures; - and, Support SLS payload adapters and fittings by maturing composite bonded joint technology and analytical tools to enable risk reduction. Exploration & Science Impact: Lighter weight structures; Improved material predictive capabilities; Improved bonded joint failure load and mode predictions to help reduce knockdown factors; and improve predictability and reliability; Increase confidence of all bonded joint composite structures; Reduce reliance on expensive testing.

CTE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Systems Engineering Availability and Recommendations for Mission Technical Leaders

In spaceflight missions at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the Mission System Engineer (MSE) is the technical leader of the overall engineering team and also is the Independent Engineering Technical Authority. The responsibility of this role includes the definition of the mission design architecture, concept of operations, and mission requirements, management of risk throughout the development, and verification and validation of the final system performance and function amongst other duties. This responsibility inherently requires time management, enabling focus on a balanced development with appropriate risk. Time is the most valuable resource of the MSE. The system engineer’s availability to interact with the development team (often product or component design leads and technicians, often in different worksites) to discover and mitigate mission risks during development is key to mission success. This paper presents examples from Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, Landsat 9, and Neutron star Interior Composition ExploreR (NICER) which represent in-house and out-of-house hardware builds. These examples demonstrate how interactions between the Mission Systems Engineers and other project and partner engineers result in discovery of critical risks, leading to early mitigation with significant cost and performance savings. These three missions would have suffered test failures or on-orbit failures had their MSEs not set aside time to visit engineers and technicians that were working on key pieces of space flight hardware. Availability is more than just time; it is openness to listen to concerns and questions. It begins by building a level of trust in the team that it is safe to ask questions or share concerns without the fear of blame or additional workload. It also requires enabling informal conversations (over lunch, coffee, in the clean room, or at the team members desk, etc.) where key information can be exchanged, and team members may even provide an easy-to-implement mitigation idea for another subsystem. Availability is a highly valuable commodity and completely non-obvious to protect and optimize. The natural tendency of engineers is to keep themselves busy with solving problems that they know about. This paper is encouraging MSEs to resist this tendency to try and solve all the complex problems themselves and actively devote daily time to learning and solving problems that are found with informal communications with other team members.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2019

Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

Final Paper is attached. This paper discusses how the intent of current NASA fracture control requirements may be applied to "fracture critical" additive manufactured spacecraft hardware. Fracture control is a multi-discipline design and certification methodology that is applied in order to mitigate catastrophic failure of structures resulting from growth of an undetected crack-like defect. The methodology is defined in existing spacecraft standards and is required by NASA on all human-rated space structures. Recently, standards have been published by NASA to define materials and processes requirements for certain metallic additive manufactured hardware, but procedures for fracture control implementation on additive manufactured parts are not yet addressed in detail in any standard or guidance document.The discussion contained herein is necessary at this time as new guidance in this area should be founded collaboratively by the technical community at large including industry, academia, and government. Three Fracture Control Certification Methods are proposed for discussion. Additionally, a concept for "Design for AM fracture control" is introduced. The goals of this paper are to further expose the need for maturing additive manufacturing fracture control guidance in the spacecraft industry and to generate discussion on what this guidance should consist of.

McElroy, Mark↗
NASA NTRS1999

Nondestructive Detection of Cracks in Ceramics Using Vicinal Illumination

Cracks and other defects in ceramic materials can be difficult or impossible to examine and photograph due to the extreme lack of contrast. A method for inspecting translucent ceramics using scattered light, also known as vicinal illumination, will be described. This method has been known in the ceramics industry for quite some time, but is not well known in the testing and failure analysis community. Electronics applications include substrates, packages, multilayer capacitors, and thin film resistors. Ceramic materials are used in electronic applications as microcircuit packages and substrates which carry signals and power between microcircuits. Fine cracks in ceramic materials can result in mechanical failures, electrical failures, and loss of hermeticity. Often, fine cracks are difficult or impossible to detect using standard nondestructive inspection techniques such as visual inspection, ultrasonic inspection, or vapor crack detection. Dye penetrant inspection is usually effective, but contaminates the part, which is unacceptable for space flight hardware. One effective nondestructive inspection method of detecting cracks involves examining the way in which light scatters through the ceramic material when viewed with a standard bright field reflected light microscope. This method, termed vicinal illumination, has been used for detecting cracks during failure analyses of several part types, and screening of space flight hardware. The technique has proven effective on several different types of ceramic materials as well. A related method for use with dark field equipment has also been used to successfully locate otherwise invisible cracks.

Hull, Scott M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Mass and Reliability System (MaRS)

The Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate is responsible for mitigating risk, providing system safety, and lowering risk for space programs from ground to space. The S&MA is divided into 4 divisions: The Space Exploration Division (NC), the International Space Station Division (NE), the Safety & Test Operations Division (NS), and the Quality and Flight Equipment Division (NT). The interns, myself and Arun Aruljothi, will be working with the Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch under the NC Division's. The mission of this division is to identify, characterize, diminish, and communicate risk by implementing an efficient and effective assurance model. The team utilizes Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. This project pertains to the Orion mission, so it is geared toward a long duration Human Space Flight Program(s). For space missions, payload is a critical concept; balancing what hardware can be replaced by components verse by Orbital Replacement Units (ORU) or subassemblies is key. For this effort a database was created that combines mass and reliability data, called Mass and Reliability System or MaRS. The U.S. International Space Station (ISS) components are used as reference parts in the MaRS database. Using ISS components as a platform is beneficial because of the historical context and the environment similarities to a space flight mission. MaRS uses a combination of systems: International Space Station PART for failure data, Vehicle Master Database (VMDB) for ORU & components, Maintenance & Analysis Data Set (MADS) for operation hours and other pertinent data, & Hardware History Retrieval System (HHRS) for unit weights. MaRS is populated using a Visual Basic Application. Once populated, the excel spreadsheet is comprised of information on ISS components including: operation hours, random/nonrandom failures, software/hardware failures, quantity, orbital replaceable units (ORU), date of placement, unit weight, frequency of part, etc. The motivation for creating such a database will be the development of a mass/reliability parametric model to estimate mass required for replacement parts. Once complete, engineers working on future space flight missions will have access a mean time to failures and on parts along with their mass, this will be used to make proper decisions for long duration space flight missions

Barnes, Sarah↗
NASA NTRS2006

Commercial Aircraft Maintenance Experience Relating to Engine External Hardware

Airlines are extremely sensitive to the amount of dollars spent on maintaining the external engine hardware in the field. Analysis reveals that many problems revolve around a central issue, reliability. Fuel and oil leakage due to seal failure and electrical fault messages due to wire harness failures play a major role in aircraft delays and cancellations (D&C's) and scheduled maintenance. Correcting these items on the line requires a large investment of engineering resources and manpower after the fact. The smartest and most cost effective philosophy is to build the best hardware the first time. The only way to do that is to completely understand and model the operating environment, study the field experience of similar designs and to perform extensive testing.

Soditus, Sharon M.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Failure detection and fault management techniques for flush airdata sensing systems

Methods based on chi-squared analysis are presented for detecting system and individual-port failures in the high-angle-of-attack flush airdata sensing system on the NASA F-18 High Alpha Research Vehicle. The HI-FADS hardware is introduced, and the aerodynamic model describes measured pressure in terms of dynamic pressure, angle of attack, angle of sideslip, and static pressure. Chi-squared analysis is described in the presentation of the concept for failure detection and fault management which includes nominal, iteration, and fault-management modes. A matrix of pressure orifices arranged in concentric circles on the nose of the aircraft indicate the parameters which are applied to the regression algorithms. The sensing techniques are applied to the F-18 flight data, and two examples are given of the computed angle-of-attack time histories. The failure-detection and fault-management techniques permit the matrix to be multiply redundant, and the chi-squared analysis is shown to be useful in the detection of failures.

Whitmore, Stephen A.↗