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Accelerating the disposition of transuranic waste from LANL - 9495

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was established during World War II with a single mission -- to design and build an atomic bomb. In the 65 years since, nuclear weapons physics, design and engineering have been the Laboratory's primary and sustaining mission. Experimental and process operations -- and associated cleanout and upgrade activities -- have generated a significant inventory of transuranic (TRU) waste that is stored at LANL's Technical Area 54, Material Disposal Area G (MDA G). When the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) opened its doors in 1999, LANL's TRU inventory totaled about 10,200 m{sup 3}, with a plutonium 239-equivalent curie (PE Ci) content of approximately 250,000 curies. By December 2008, a total of about 2,300 m3 (61,000 PE Ci) had been shipped to WIPP from LANL. This has resulted in a net reduction of about 1,000 m{sup 3} of TRU inventory over that time frame. This paper presents progress in dispositioning legacy and newly-generated transuranic waste (TRU) from ongoing missions at the LANL. The plans for, and lessons learned, in dispositioning several hundred high-activity TRU waste drums are reviewed. This waste population was one of the highest risks at LANL. Technical challenges in disposition of the high-activity drums are presented. These provide a preview of challenges to be addressed in dispositioning the remaining 6,800 m{sup 3} of TRU stored above ground and 2,400 m{sup 3} of TRU waste that is 'retrievably' stored below-grade. LANL is using subcontractors for much of this work and has formed a strong partnership with WIPP and its contractor to address this cleanup challenge.

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The Add-A-Source Matrix Calibration of a Large Neutron Box Counter

A general purpose passive neutron box counter has been designed, constructed and factory calibrated. The instrument is intended to sort and assay Transuranic Uranium (TRU) waste according to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) criteria in containers ranging from drums to large boxes and crates. A multi-position Cf Add-A-Source (AAS) capability has been built into the system to determine gross matrix correction factors. The Cf source capsule runs in a U-shaped guide tube beneath the powered roller conveyor used to move the containers into the assay cavity from the loading station. The factory calibration involved measuring a wide range of matrix materials and densities in 208-liter (55 US-gal.) barrels, Standard Waste Box (SWB), Standard Large Box (SLB-2), and Ten Drum Overpack (TDOP) containers. For each container a Volume Weighted Average (VWA) rate and an AAS perturbation factor was determined and the relationship between them was established for the full range of conditions expected to be encountered operationally. In this paper we describe the calibration procedure which used Cf-252 as a surrogate for Pu-240 to map out the spatial responses for the various container-matrix combinations. A particular challenge was the scale of the measurement campaign which was directly related to the large volume of some of the containers. The reduction of the data was also challenging because for the larger items with high concentrations of hydrogen steep spatial gradients were observed in the response. For this reason simple volume-element averaging of the data to derive VWA quantities was inadequate and numerical-integration approaches of the 3-dimensional maps were explored. The response maps were also used to create point-source contributions to the Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU), but this work is not the subject of this paper. The wide range in container size also required varying numbers of AAS interrogation position. For the drums a single AAS position was used while for the SWB and TDOP six positions were used to achieve better coverage of the cross-section. The SLB-2 has a larger cross section still and ten positions of the AAS were used for this container. The AAS calibration parameterizations for the various containers will be described along with the difficulties associated with a calibration of large containers. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Microbial Influence on Radionuclide Transport through the Culebra

The potential release of radionuclides into the Culebra dolomite formation is modeled extensively in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Performance Assessment (WIPP PA) calculations. Uranium is of chief concern in these modeled scenarios, as it shows the greatest release. Because of this, a series of experiments was undertaken to determine if microbial activity in the Culebra formation could transform uranium, either directly or indirectly, to a state that could be immobilized.

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A Novel and Cost Effective Approach to the Decommissioning and Decontamination of Legacy Glove Boxes - Minimizing TRU Waste and Maximizing LLW Waste - 13634

This paper describes the process of decommissioning two gloveboxes at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) that were employed for work with plutonium and other radioactive materials. The decommissioning process involved an initial phase of clearing tools and materials from the glove boxes and disconnecting them from the laboratory infrastructure. The removed materials, assessed as Transuranic (TRU) waste, were packaged into 55 gallon (200 litre) drums and prepared for ultimate disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) at Carlsbad New Mexico. The boxes were then sampled to determine the radioactive contents by means of smears that were counted with alpha and beta detectors to determine the residual surface contamination, especially in terms of alpha particle emitters that are an indicator of TRU activity. Paint chip samples were also collected and sent for laboratory analysis in order to ascertain the radioactive contamination contributing to the TRU activity as a fixed contamination. The investigations predicted that it may be feasible to reduce the residual surface contamination and render the glovebox structure low level waste (LLW) for disposal. In order to reduce the TRU activity a comprehensive decontamination process was initiated using chemical compounds that are particularly effective for lifting and dissolving radionuclides that adhere to the inner surfaces of the gloveboxes. The result of the decontamination process was a reduction in the TRU surface activity on the inner surfaces of the gloveboxes by four orders of magnitude in terms of disintegrations per unit area (DPA). The next phase of the process involved a comprehensive assay of the gloveboxes using a combination of passive neutron and gamma ray scintillation detectors and a shielded and collimated high purity Germanium (HPGe) gamma ray detector. The HPGe detector was used to obtain gamma ray spectra for a variety of measurement positions within the glovebox. The spectra were used to determine the TRU content of the boxes by assessing the activity of Am-241 (59 keV) and Pu-241 (414 keV). Using the data generated it was possible for qualified subject matter experts (SME) to assess that the gloveboxes could be consigned for disposition as LLW and not as TRU. Once this determination was assessed and accepted the gloveboxes were prepared for final disposition to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This preparation involved fixing any remaining radioactive contamination within the gloveboxes by filling them with a foam compound, prior to transportation. Once the remaining contamination was fixed the gloveboxes were removed from the laboratory and prepared for transported by road to NNSS. This successful glovebox decontamination and decommissioning process illustrates the means by which TRU waste generation has been minimized, LLW generation has been maximized, and risk has been effectively managed. The process minimizes the volume of TRU waste and reduced the decommissioning time with significant cost savings as the result. (authors)

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Can a radiological event impact a criticality safety program: Lessons learned at WIPP - 14350

Any accident at a nuclear facility impacts all departments involved in the operation of the facility. The radiological release that occurred on February 14, 2014 has halted all waste disposal operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and has resulted in detailed reviews of all safety management programs. This paper describes the initial reactions to the event, criticality issues with recovery operations, corrective actions for the criticality safety program from independent reviews, and the importance of configuration management to criticality safety. The nature, location, and timing of the event resulted in significant delays in determining the cause of the event. During this time multiple theories on the initiator of the event were postulated including and inadvertent criticality event. However, the timing of the event, average fissile gram equivalent (FGE) loading of waste containers compared to analyzed FGE loads, and isotopic analysis of fixed air samples taken during the event proved it was not an inadvertent criticality event. Recovery activities such as replacing contaminated high efficiency particulate (HEPA), filters and disposing of site generated waste have also been reviewed to prevent criticality safety issues. Post event corrective actions in all departments have impacted how future operations at WIPP will be conducted, including corrective actions for the criticality safety program. The event has also proven the importance of configuration management and the effect a change can have on a process. (authors)

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I II & III.

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016 were done in three phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. The goal of the third phase was to see if surrogate aerosol gets released from the PC when the drum lid is off. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I, II, and III, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I & II

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a new series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016, and described herein, were done in two phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I and II, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

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Recertification Project Plan (Rev. 5)

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Recertification Project was established to meet the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) (Public Law 102-579, as amended by Public Law 104-201) (102nd U.S. Congress, 1992) requirement to demonstrate continued compliance with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disposal regulations. This plan sets the overall direction for a complex and interdependent set of tasks that is repeated at five-year intervals and culminates in EPA certification that the WIPP facility demonstrates continued compliance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes," pursuant to LWA sections 8(d)(1) and 8(f).

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase II-A

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible Transuranic (TRU) waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL started conducting a new series of fire tests in 2015 to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to overpressurize and release its inner content. In 2016, Phase II tests showed that POCs tested in a pool fire failed within 3 minutes of ignition with the POC lid ejecting. These POC lids were fitted with an all-metal (NUCFIL019DS) filter and revealed that this specific filter did not relieve sufficient pressure to prevent lid ejection. For the test phase discussed in this report, Phase II-A, the POCs are exposed to a 30-minute pool fire, with similar configurations to those tested in Phase II, except that the POC lids are fitted with a hybrid metal-polyethylene (UT9424S) filter instead. This report will: describe the various tests conducted in Phase II-A, present results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs based on the test results.

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase II-A

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible Transuranic (TRU) waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL started conducting a new series of fire tests in 2015 to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to overpressurize and release its inner content. In 2016, Phase II tests showed that POCs tested in a pool fire failed within 3 minutes of ignition with the POC lid ejecting. These POC lids were fitted with an all-metal (NUCFIL019DS) filter and revealed that this specific filter did not relieve sufficient pressure to prevent lid ejection. For the test phase discussed in this report, Phase II-A, the POCs are exposed to a 30-minute pool fire, with similar configurations to those tested in Phase II, except that the POC lids are fitted with a hybrid metal-polyethylene (UT9424S) filter instead. This report will: describe the various tests conducted in Phase II-A, present results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs based on the test results.

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase II-B

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire. This test resulted in one of the POCs generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its drum lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials that would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible Transuranic (TRU) waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), SNL started conducting a new series of fire tests in 2015 to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that could result in: (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner contents. In 2016, Phase II of the tests showed that POCs tested in a pool fire failed within 3 minutes of ignition with the POC lid ejecting. These POC lids were fitted with a NUCFIL-019DS filter and revealed that this specific filter did not relieve sufficient pressure to prevent lid ejection. In the Fall of 2017, Phase II-A was conducted to expose POCs to a 30-minute pool fire with similar configurations to those tested in Phase II, except that the POC lids were fitted with an UltraTech (UT) 9424S filter instead. That specific filter was chosen because of its design to help relieve internal pressure during the fire and thus prevent lid ejection. In Phase II-A, however, setups of two POCs stacked upon one another were never tested, which led to this phase of tests, Phase II-B. This report will describe the various tests conducted in Phase II-B, present results from these tests, and implications for the POCs based on the test results will be discussed.

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Can Collaboration Succeed in Siting a Spent Nuclear Fuel Facility in the United States?—A Challenge in Political Sustainability

We examine the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s collaborative process to locate, build, and operate one or more federal consolidated interim storage facilities (FCISFs) for commercial U.S. spent nuclear fuel—instead of continuing to store the material at over 70 nuclear reactor sites. Technocratic siting of nuclear facilities in the U.S., most of which did not involve meaningful public participation, was not successful. We consider increasing pressure to find at least one FCISF site, as well as the critical role of trust in engaging communities and reaching agreement—leading some observers to assert that DOE is in the “trust building business”, not the siting business. We present case studies with the following: (1) illustrating community engagement that led to a more satisfactory outcome than had been anticipated (Fernald); (2) a planned voluntary process that failed to produce an operating CISF (Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator); and (3) a site that demonstrates the ongoing need for negotiations to keep a site open and operational (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant). The essay concludes with the observation that a collaboration-based siting effort can succeed in the U.S., but that five main challenges—related to trust and requiring patience—will need to be addressed.

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Sandia Review of High Bridge Associates Report: Comparison of Plutonium Disposition Alternatives: WIPP Diluted Plutonium Storage and MOX Fuel Irradiation

The subject report from High Bridge Associates (HBA) was issued on March 2, 2016, in reaction to a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) program decision to pursue down-blending of surplus Pu and geologic disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Sandia National Laboratories was requested by the DOE to review the technical arguments presented in the HBA report. Specifically, this review is organized around three technical topics: criticality safety, radiological release limits, and thermal impacts. Questions raised by the report pertaining to legal and regulatory requirements, safeguards and security, international agreements, and costing of alternatives, are beyond the scope of this review.

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Consensus on Intermediate Scale Salt Field Test Design

This report summarizes the first stage in a collaborative effort by Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories to design a small-diameter borehole heater test in salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE). The intention is to complete test design during the remainder of fiscal year 2017 (FY17), and the implementation of the test will begin in FY18. This document is the result of regular meetings between the three national labs and the DOE-NE, and is intended to represent a consensus of these meetings and discussions.

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Heat‐Generating Nuclear Waste in Salt: Field Testing and Simulation

Core Ideas A field‐scale experiment and numerical simulations confirm salt backfill behavior. Simulations closely match temperature around and under the piled salt backfill. Results indicate limited dissolution–precipitation reactions around the heat source. Alteration of backfill is unlikely if the drift is allowed to dry before emplacement. Investigations relating to in‐drift disposal of heat‐generating nuclear waste in salt have raised questions about heat–brine interactions in the unsaturated run‐of‐mine (RoM) salt pile used as backfill. These interactions have the potential to change the structure of the RoM salt surrounding the canister, possibly altering long‐term containment of the source. An experiment is in progress at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), New Mexico, in which a heated canister was placed on the floor of an open drift, covered in a pile of RoM salt, and energized with 1000 W. Temperature in the RoM salt pile had stabilized after about 15 d, allowing evaluation of the heat‐up period of the ongoing experiment. Using a multiphase porous flow simulator that has been modified to handle salt‐specific coupled processes, we examined coupled thermal–hydrological–chemical behavior in the RoM salt pile. Our simulations suggest that for the relatively dry cases examined, porosity changes within RoM salt in a generic salt repository are likely to be minor in the period between waste emplacement and plastic closure of the drift. The primary sensitivity for porosity change is to the early moisture content of the RoM salt used to cover the canister. Secondary influences include moisture availability from the disturbed rock zone (DRZ) surrounding the drift and the capillary pressure ratio between the DRZ and the RoM salt. Early changes in porosity and permeability may be affected by moisture content, but this was not observed in the test. Such changes would be most likely to occur when using damp RoM salt or if waste is emplaced in a drift immediately following opening of the drift before evaporative dewatering of the drift walls occurs.

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Panel Session 14: US DOE WIPP - Future Plans for the Utilization of a National Asset

This panel focused on the next phase of restoring the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP: located in Carlsbad, New Mexico, USA) to full disposal operations. The US DOE Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) is funded for two Capital Asset Projects that will facilitate the restoration of WIPP to full capability and allow for future repository space planning. The panel will include updates on the capital projects, infrastructure improvements to extend WIPP's operational life, regulatory actions in support of capital projects, and improvements in new processes to implement WAC and DSA enhancements. This panel is filled by CBFO and WIPP contractor leaders to provide the big picture leading to WIPP's future. Presentations proposed include: 1 - 2018 WIPP Year in Review (Bruce Covert, Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (USA)); 2 - TRU Waste Shipments and WIPP Operations (Mark Pearcy, Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (USA)); 3 - Projects and Activities at WIPP (Ronald Gill, US DOE (USA)); 4 - The Future of WIPP (J.R. Stroble, US DOE (USA), Todd Shrader, US DOE (USA))

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Mechanical Modeling of a WIPP Drum Under Pressure

Mechanical modeling was undertaken to support the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) technical assessment team (TAT) investigating the February 14th 2014 event where there was a radiological release at the WIPP. The initial goal of the modeling was to examine if a mechanical model could inform the team about the event. The intention was to have a model that could test scenarios with respect to the rate of pressurization. It was expected that the deformation and failure (inability of the drum to contain any pressure) would vary according to the pressurization rate. As the work progressed there was also interest in using the mechanical analysis of the drum to investigate what would happen if a drum pressurized when it was located under a standard waste package. Specifically, would the deformation be detectable from camera views within the room. A finite element model of a WIPP 55-gallon drum was developed that used all hex elements. Analyses were conducted using the explicit transient dynamics module of Sierra/SM to explore potential pressurization scenarios of the drum. Theses analysis show similar deformation patterns to documented pressurization tests of drums in the literature. The calculated failure pressures from previous tests documented in the literature vary from as little as 16 psi to 320 psi. In addition, previous testing documented in the literature shows drums bulging but not failing at pressures ranging from 69 to 138 psi. The analyses performed for this study found the drums failing at pressures ranging from 35 psi to 75 psi. When the drums are pressurized quickly (in 0.01 seconds) there is significant deformation to the lid. At lower pressurization rates the deformation of the lid is considerably less, yet the lids will still open from the pressure. The analyses demonstrate the influence of pressurization rate on deformation and opening pressure of the drums. Analyses conducted with a substantial mass on top of the closed drum demonstrate that the drums will still open provided the pressure is high enough. Investigation teams should look for displaced drum lids when searching for drums that have pressurized and failed. The mechanical modeling study for this program is summarized in the following memo. Following a brief introduction, there is a summary of a brief literature review of previous pressure testing of drums, an explanation of the model, presentation of the key results, some discussion, and concluding with a summary and key points.

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Geology and Design of Major Spent Fuel Repositories

This report summarizes the geology and design concepts of four major spent fuel repositories from around the world. The crystalline rock with bentonite backfill is currently implemented in Finland with another repository being constructed in Sweden. The salt formation design focuses on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository in the United States. The volcanic tuff open air design is based on the Yucca Mountain location. The volcanic tuff open air design at Yucca Mountain is only a concept as this repository has not been approved for operations. The last spent fuel repository design, clay/shale formation with backfill, focuses on the Cigeo Project in France, which is also pending.

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