Towards Measurement of Confidence in Safety Cases
Arguments in safety cases are predominantly qualitative. This is partly attributed to the lack of sufficient design and operational data necessary to measure the achievement of high-dependability targets, particularly for safety-critical functions implemented in software. The subjective nature of many forms of evidence, such as expert judgment and process maturity, also contributes to the overwhelming dependence on qualitative arguments. However, where data for quantitative measurements is systematically collected, quantitative arguments provide far more benefits over qualitative arguments, in assessing confidence in the safety case. In this paper, we propose a basis for developing and evaluating integrated qualitative and quantitative safety arguments based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Bayesian Networks (BN). The approach we propose identifies structures within GSN-based arguments where uncertainties can be quantified. BN are then used to provide a means to reason about confidence in a probabilistic way. We illustrate our approach using a fragment of a safety case for an unmanned aerial system and conclude with some preliminary observations