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At least 487 records · Page 27
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned on Mega-Constellation Deployments and Impact to Space Domain Awareness

The breakneck expansion of multi-payload launches in low Earth orbit (LEO) has seen significant escalation over the last three years in the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) enterprise. The uptick in satellite deployment frequency, gradation of Mega-constellation deployments utilizing electric propulsion, and surge in metric observation density from the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) have imposed major system enhancements to ensure spaceflight safety. Beginning with the launch phase, new tactics, software, and procedures have been developed over the last few years to optimize the tasking of the SSN and ensure custody of all recently launched satellites that are added to the space catalog. Ensuring appropriate tasking levels were pivotal during the satellite separation phase, which necessitated updates to the mission systems for improved delineation between clustered satellites in a short window of time. The improved incorporation of utilizing owner operator provided ephemeris coupled with critical code improvements have now revolutionized how we maintain custody of earth orbiting objects. The exponential population growth of low-Earth orbiting satellites have also increased the quantity of Conjunction Data Messages sent out to partners such as the Trajectory Operations Group (TOPO) in Johnson Space Center. We will discuss the need for continued collaboration between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other Mega-Constellation Satellite Operators to safeguard Human Space Flight operations. Lastly, we will discuss the increase in reentry reporting for satellites falling back to Earth’s atmosphere, and the challenges associated with these events.

Christian C Ramos↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned on Mega-Constellation Deployments and Impact to Space Domain Awareness

The breakneck expansion of multi-payload launches in low Earth orbit (LEO) has seen significant escalation over the last three years in the Space Domain Awareness (SDA) enterprise. The uptick in satellite deployment frequency, gradation of mega-constellation deployments utilizing electric propulsion, and surge in metric observation density from the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) have driven major system enhancements to ensure spaceflight safety. Beginning with the launch phase, new tactics, software, and procedures have been developed over the last few years to optimize the tasking of the SSN and ensure custody of all recently launched satellites that are added to the space catalog. Ensuring appropriate tasking levels were pivotal during the satellite separation phase, which necessitated updates to the mission systems for improved delineation between clustered satellites in a short window of time. The improved incorporation of utilizing satellite owner/operator-provided ephemeris coupled with critical code improvements have revolutionized how we maintain custody of Earth orbiting objects. The exponential population growth of Low-Earth orbiting satellites have also increased the quantity of Conjunction Data Messages sent out to partners such as the Trajectory Operations Group (TOPO) in Johnson Space Center. We will discuss the need for continued collaboration between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other mega-constellation satellite operators to safeguard human spaceflight operations. Lastly, we will discuss how mega-constellations are driving best practices for safe operations across the space community.

Christian Ramos↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Status Tracker for Real-time Awareness

Providers of Verification evidence for the Space Launch System (SLS) Program include Element Offices (SPIE, Stages, Engines, Booster) as well as Disciplines (Vehicle Management / GN&C, Loads & Environments, Safety and Mission Assurance, Systems Engineering, Integrated Avionics Software). These Elements and Disciplines rely on myriad inputs for their compliance evidence, from NASA and contractors alike, spanning testing and analysis to inspection and validation of records such as drawings and reports.

Braxton Lovett↗
DOE OSTI2017

IEEE STD. 1012 and NEI 96-07, Appendix D - Strange bedfellows? - 149

The final draft of a revision to IEEE Std. 1012-2012, 'IEEE Standard for System, Software and Hardware Verification and Validation', is expected to be approved for publication in June 2017. A draft of NEI 96-07, Appendix D, 'Supplemental Guidance for Application of 10 CFR 50.59 to Digital Modifications', has been submitted to the NRC staff for review and endorsement. What, if any, relationship exists between these two documents? How can the nuclear industry utilize the first one to help ensure success when applying the second one? NRC Regulatory Guides only endorse digital system and software related industry standards for application to safety-related systems and components, but the vast majority of digital modifications are made to non-safety related systems and components, so are these industry standards of little or no use when performing digital upgrades to non-safety related equipment? This paper answers these and other related questions and shows how application of a graded approach to verification and validation, utilizing the IEEE Std. 1012 concept of 'integrity level', can increase the likelihood of a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation outcome that does not require prior NRC review and approval for non-safety related digital modifications. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2014

Review of Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) Tools for Verifying Command and Control Software

The Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Standing Review Board (SRB) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an independent review of the plan developed by Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) for identifying models and emulators to create a tool(s) to verify their command and control software. The NESC was requested to identify any issues or weaknesses in the GSDO plan. This document contains the outcome of the NESC review.

Aguilar, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Certifying Domain-Specific Policies

Proof-checking code for compliance to safety policies potentially enables a product-oriented approach to certain aspects of software certification. To date, previous research has focused on generic, low-level programming-language properties such as memory type safety. In this paper we consider proof-checking higher-level domain -specific properties for compliance to safety policies. The paper first describes a framework related to abstract interpretation in which compliance to a class of certification policies can be efficiently calculated Membership equational logic is shown to provide a rich logic for carrying out such calculations, including partiality, for certification. The architecture for a domain-specific certifier is described, followed by an implemented case study. The case study considers consistency of abstract variable attributes in code that performs geometric calculations in Aerospace systems.

Lowry, Michael↗
NASA NTRS1999

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) for calendar year 1998-a year of sharp contrasts and significant successes at NASA. The year opened with the announcement of large workforce cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International Space Station (ISS) created a five-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission. As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the United States. Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes. Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor. Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel concluded that safety is well served for the present. The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent available. In many cases, technical specialties are 'one deep.' The extended hiring freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant departures from retirements in the near future. The resulting 'brain drain' could represent a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously. This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce. The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan property for the future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these programs are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to required longer range safety-related actions. NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vigilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to focus on both the short- and long-term aspects of risk management and safety planning. This task continues to be made manageable and productive by the excellent cooperation the Panel receives from both NASA and its contractors. Particular emphasis will continue to be directed to longer term workforce and program planning issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial flights of the X-33 and X-34. Section 2 of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by ASAP activities during 1998. Section 3 contains more detailed information in support of these findings and recommendations. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel members, consultants, and staff. Appendix B contains NASA's response to the findings and recommendations from the 1997 ASAP Annual Report. Appendix C details the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998. During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blomberg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice Admiral (VADM) Robert F Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M. Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and Mr. Robert L. ('Hoot') Gibson joined the Panel as consultants.

Source record↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Bootstrapping Multi-Agent Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) System Integration Using Ground-Based Assets: Lessons Learned

In support of the Autonomy Teaming and TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR) project, a fleet of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) was developed as a test and evaluation (T\&E) platform to reduce system integration gaps between simulation and live flight hardware. While simulation and hardware-in-the-loop bench testing provide adequate environments for preliminary validation, differences in system deployment architecture, software interfaces, and hardware infrastructure increase the risks to safety, property, and the project. Given ATTRACTOR’s goal of establishing a basis of certification of trust and trustworthiness in multi-agent autonomous systems, bridging these gaps was critical to successful project execution and feasibility assessment. In this paper we present the UGV fleet and its role in speeding up system integration, smoothing the transition from simulation to flight, and providing researchers an easy-to-use hardware test bed. An overview of the hardware and software on-board the vehicles is provided along with supporting infrastructure. The system integration process is documented including results in supporting both the overarching design reference mission (DRM) of ATTRACTOR and individual research efforts conducted since the creation of the fleet. Finally, we discuss the practical lessons learned regarding the testing, deployment, and operation of multi-agent autonomous systems.

Matthew P. Vaughan↗
DOE OSTI2015

MO-E-BRB-04: Real-Time Exit-Fluence Delivery Validation

Recent high profile reports of technical failures and human errors causing severe radiation- induced injuries and deaths come in support of the sustained efforts to ensure patient safety in the delivery of radiation treatments. In addition, highly conformal radiation therapies and escalated fraction doses mandate increased and sustained accuracy of the entire radiotherapy process. Consequently, and as a Result of AAPM and ASTRO led efforts patient specific quality assurance for specialized radiation treatments such as IMRT, SRS/SBRT and Arc Therapy had become a three-tier process: Pre-treatment, during treatment, and post treatment patient specific QA. Traditional patient QA consists of pre-treatment data transfer integrity dosimetric verifications and during-treatment geometric verifications. However, as treatment adaptation becomes closer to deployment in the clinics, during treatment validation via exit detectors had become a realistic QA option, permitting plan assessment in near real time. Post-treatment, machine logs allow comparisons of a range of mechanical parameters. A combination of these techniques could be used in evaluating inter-fraction, and intra-fraction delivery over a long time period such as an year, to evaluate the significant errors per site, per treatment technique. This type of data mining over longer periods of time provides the potential to recognize suboptimal radiation treatments, while allowing to identify systematic, possibly significant errors. This would allow creation of a data base of realized errors, small and large in dosimetry that could be for process or equipment improvement. This educational symposium will describe and review patient QA techniques, results, and strategies for patient specific quality assurance. Learning Objectives: review the goals of pre-treatment QA for various specialized procedures review methods and means for pre-treatment QA, limitations and tolerances review the scenarios where Varian/Tomo Log files could be used. review error detection via log file analysis Learn how exit detector signal recorded in log file could be used to improve patient safety understand real-time EPID-based transmission dosimetry methods understand the goals of real-time delivery monitoring CMS Innovation grant. Rapid response supportive and palliative care program for patients with advanced cancer, starts July, 2012; Accuray Inc. Exit detector based QA software evaluation, Sept, 2012-Sept, 2013; ROI GRant from ASTRO “Safety and Quality: IMRT treatment delivery accuracy”.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2016

ICAROUS - Integrated Configurable Algorithms for Reliable Operations Of Unmanned Systems

NASA's Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project aims at enabling near-term, safe operations of small UAS vehicles in uncontrolled airspace, i.e., Class G airspace. A far-term goal of UTM research and development is to accommodate the expected rise in small UAS traffic density throughout the National Airspace System (NAS) at low altitudes for beyond visual line-of-sight operations. This paper describes a new capability referred to as ICAROUS (Integrated Configurable Algorithms for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), which is being developed under the UTM project. ICAROUS is a software architecture comprised of highly assured algorithms for building safety-centric, autonomous, unmanned aircraft applications. Central to the development of the ICAROUS algorithms is the use of well-established formal methods to guarantee higher levels of safety assurance by monitoring and bounding the behavior of autonomous systems. The core autonomy-enabling capabilities in ICAROUS include constraint conformance monitoring and contingency control functions. ICAROUS also provides a highly configurable user interface that enables the modular integration of mission-specific software components.

Consiglio, María↗
NASA NTRS2016

ICAROUS: Integrated Configurable Architecture for Unmanned Systems

NASA's Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project aims at enabling near-term, safe operations of small UAS vehicles in uncontrolled airspace, i.e., Class G airspace. A far-term goal of UTM research and development is to accommodate the expected rise in small UAS traffic density throughout the National Airspace System (NAS) at low altitudes for beyond visual line-of-sight operations. This video describes a new capability referred to as ICAROUS (Integrated Configurable Algorithms for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), which is being developed under the auspices of the UTM project. ICAROUS is a software architecture comprised of highly assured algorithms for building safety-centric, autonomous, unmanned aircraft applications. Central to the development of the ICAROUS algorithms is the use of well-established formal methods to guarantee higher levels of safety assurance by monitoring and bounding the behavior of autonomous systems. The core autonomy-enabling capabilities in ICAROUS include constraint conformance monitoring and autonomous detect and avoid functions. ICAROUS also provides a highly configurable user interface that enables the modular integration of mission-specific software components.

Consiglio, Maria C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Power, Avionics and Software - Phase 1.0:

This report describes Power, Avionics and Software (PAS) 1.0 subsystem integration testing and test results that occurred in August and September of 2013. This report covers the capabilities of each PAS assembly to meet integration test objectives for non-safety critical, non-flight, non-human-rated hardware and software development. This test report is the outcome of the first integration of the PAS subsystem and is meant to provide data for subsequent designs, development and testing of the future PAS subsystems. The two main objectives were to assess the ability of the PAS assemblies to exchange messages and to perform audio testing of both inbound and outbound channels. This report describes each test performed, defines the test, the data, and provides conclusions and recommendations.

Communiocations↗
DOE OSTI2017

NRC technical basis for evaluation of its position on protection against common cause failure in digital systems used in nuclear power plants - 378

Digital technology has advantages over analog systems, including automated monitoring and alerts for standby safety functions, and predictive algorithms to maintain critical safety systems. Additionally, digital technology generally has higher reliability and can be designed to reduce single point vulnerabilities. For these reasons many nuclear plants have applied digital technology to safety and non-safety related applications, including reactor protection system, feedwater and turbine controls, etc. with a corresponding significant improvement in trip reduction. Nonetheless, digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems also present potential new vulnerabilities that need to be assessed, including potential failures due to increased complexity of digital systems, the introduction of unique failure modes due to software (including software common cause failure (CCF)), and limited operating history of digital systems in nuclear safety related applications compared to analog systems. The fact that software is intangible means that common methods, such as analysis or testing, used for detecting CCF may not be effective when applied to software. Consequently, digital technology is perceived to pose a potential risk from the introduction of undetected systematic faults that could result in CCF. Despite the I and C system upgrades and modifications performed to date, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry stakeholders have identified the need to modernize the regulatory infrastructure to efficiently address risks associated with the use of digital technology for nuclear safety applications and address regulatory uncertainties. The NRC's current position on CCF is guided by the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) on SECY 93-087. The SRM provides specific acceptance criteria for the evaluation of CCF, which the staff implemented in the Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19. However, industry stakeholders have proposed using methods to characterize the likelihood of software CCF and eliminate it from further consideration in a defense-in-depth and diversity analysis. The NRC's current position does not consider these alternatives, and thus corresponding acceptance criteria is not currently available. The work discussed in this paper assesses the underlying technical basis associated with CCF, provides technical support for updating the NRC position and considers proposed methods for addressing potential CCF in digital systems while enhancing efficiency, clarity, and confidence. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS1983

A case study of a system engineered for control by humans

Alternatives to the traditional concepts for real time health and safety operations were examined. The pitfalls of the conventional contingency planning for health and safety are highlighted. The Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) contingency planning and operations provides the evolution from the conventional people intensive health and safety operation, toward a night watchman mode of operations. The SMM spacecraft health and safety operations were budget constrained to the point that one operator was responsible for the health and safety of the entire spacecraft one week after launch. The spacecraft was a protoflight with brand new subsystem configurations, software and procedures. To manage the risks associated with this one man SMM health and safety operation, the real time contingency planning and operations centered around unambiguously identifying a system level problem, and reactively safing components susceptible to unrecoverable damage. The methodology applied to both analyzing and implementing this approach of SMM is shown.

Rothenberg, J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Certification Considerations for Adaptive Systems

Advanced capabilities planned for the next generation of aircraft, including those that will operate within the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), will necessarily include complex new algorithms and non-traditional software elements. These aircraft will likely incorporate adaptive control algorithms that will provide enhanced safety, autonomy, and robustness during adverse conditions. Unmanned aircraft will operate alongside manned aircraft in the National Airspace (NAS), with intelligent software performing the high-level decision-making functions normally performed by human pilots. Even human-piloted aircraft will necessarily include more autonomy. However, there are serious barriers to the deployment of new capabilities, especially for those based upon software including adaptive control (AC) and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. Current civil aviation certification processes are based on the idea that the correct behavior of a system must be completely specified and verified prior to operation. This report by Rockwell Collins and SIFT documents our comprehensive study of the state of the art in intelligent and adaptive algorithms for the civil aviation domain, categorizing the approaches used and identifying gaps and challenges associated with certification of each approach.

Bhattacharyya, Siddhartha↗
DOE OSTI2024

Coupled Multiphysics Modeling of Lithium-Ion Batteries for Automotive Crashworthiness Applications

Considerable advances have been made in battery safety models, but achieving predictive accuracy across a wide range of conditions continues to be challenging. Interactions between dynamically evolving mechanical, electrical, and thermal state variables make model prediction difficult during mechanical abuse scenarios. In this study, we develop a physics-based modeling approach that allows for choosing between different mechanical and electrochemical models depending on the required level of analysis. We demonstrate the use of this approach to connect cell-level abuse response to electrode-level and particle-level transport phenomena. A pseudo-two-dimensional model and simplified single-particle models are calibrated to electrical-thermal cycling data and applied to mechanically induced short-circuit scenarios to understand how the choice of electrochemical model affects the model prediction under abuse scenarios. These models are implemented using user-defined subroutines on ls-dyna finite element software and can be coupled with existing automotive crash safety models.

analysis and design of components↗
NASA NTRS1997

The Need for V&V in Reuse-Based Software Engineering

V&V is currently performed during application development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission-critical systems. The V&V process is intended to discover errors, especially errors related to entire' domain or product line rather than a critical processing, as early as possible during the development process. The system application provides the context under which the software artifacts are validated. engineering. This paper describes a framework that extends V&V from an individual application system to a product line of systems that are developed within an architecture-based software engineering environment. This framework includes the activities of traditional application-level V&V, and extends these activities into the transition between domain engineering and application engineering. The framework includes descriptions of the types of activities to be performed during each of the life-cycle phases, and provides motivation for activities.

Addy, Edward A.↗
NASA NTRS2009

A Verification-Driven Approach to Traceability and Documentation for Auto-Generated Mathematical Software

Model-based development and automated code generation are increasingly used for production code in safety-critical applications, but since code generators are typically not qualified, the generated code must still be fully tested, reviewed, and certified. This is particularly arduous for mathematical and control engineering software which requires reviewers to trace subtle details of textbook formulas and algorithms to the code, and to match requirements (e.g., physical units or coordinate frames) not represented explicitly in models or code. Both tasks are complicated by the often opaque nature of auto-generated code. We address these problems by developing a verification-driven approach to traceability and documentation. We apply the AUTOCERT verification system to identify and then verify mathematical concepts in the code, based on a mathematical domain theory, and then use these verified traceability links between concepts, code, and verification conditions to construct a natural language report that provides a high-level structured argument explaining why and how the code uses the assumptions and complies with the requirements. We have applied our approach to generate review documents for several sub-systems of NASA s Project Constellation.

Denney, Ewen W.↗