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At least 487 records · Page 27

AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and costs. The AP1000 design uses passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as AC power, component cooling water, service water or HVAC. Furthermore, these passive features 'fail safe' during a non-LOCA event such that DC power and instrumentation are not required. The AP1000 also has simple, active, defense-in-depth systems to support normal plant operations. These active systems provide the first level of defense against more probable events and they provide investment protection, reduce the demands on the passive features and support the probabilistic risk assessment. The AP1000 passive safety approach allows the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of an accident for 72 hours without operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the U.S. Utility Requirement Document and the European Utility Requirements for passive plants. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool via passive means. In line with the AP1000 approach to safety described above, the AP1000 plant design features multiple, diverse lines of defense to ensure spent fuel cooling can be maintained for design-basis events and beyond design-basis accidents. During normal and abnormal conditions, defense-in-depth and other systems provide highly reliable spent fuel pool cooling. They rely on off-site AC power or the on-site standby diesel generators. For unlikely design basis events with an extended loss of AC power (i.e., station blackout) or loss of heat sink or both, spent fuel cooling can still be provided indefinitely: - Passive systems, requiring minimal or no operator actions, are sufficient for at least 72 hours under all possible pool heat load conditions. - After 3 days, several different means are provided to continue spent fuel cooling using installed plant equipment as well as off-site equipment with built-in connections. Even for beyond design basis accidents with postulated pool damage and multiple failures in the passive safety-related systems and in the defense-in-depth active systems, the AP1000 multiple spent fuel pool spray and fill systems provide additional lines of defense to prevent spent fuel damage. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety Assessment for a Surface Repository in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone - Methodology for Assessing Disposal under Intervention Conditions - 13476

The Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility (RWDF) Buryakovka was constructed in 1986 as part of the intervention measures after the accident at Chernobyl NPP (ChNPP). Today, RWDF Buryakovka is still being operated but its maximum capacity is nearly reached. Plans for enlargement of the facility exist since more than 10 years but have not been implemented yet. In the framework of an European Commission Project DBE Technology GmbH prepared a safety analysis report of the facility in its current state (SAR) and a preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) based on the planned enlargement. Due to its history RWDF Buryakovka does not fully comply with today's best international practices and the latest Ukrainian regulations in this area. The most critical aspects are its inventory of long-lived radionuclides, and the non-existent multi-barrier waste confinement system. A significant part of the project was dedicated, therefore, to the development of a methodology for the safety assessment taking into consideration the facility's special situation and to reach an agreement with all stakeholders involved in the later review and approval procedure of the safety analysis reports. Main aspect of the agreed methodology was to analyze the safety, not strictly based on regulatory requirements but on the assessment of the actual situation of the facility including its location within the Exclusion Zone. For both safety analysis reports, SAR and PSAR, the assessment of the long-term safety led to results that were either within regulatory limits or within the limits allowing for a specific situational evaluation by the regulator. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Reactor Safety for Beyond Design Basis Events

In the aftermath of the March 2011 multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (Fukushima), the nuclear community has been reassessing certain safety assumptions about nuclear reactor plant design, operations and emergency actions, particularly with respect to extreme events that might occur and that are beyond each plant's current design basis. The DOE has played a major role in the U.S. response to the Fukushima accident. Initially, DOE worked with the Japanese and the international community to help develop a more complete understanding of the Fukushima accident progression and its consequences, and to respond to various safety concerns emerging from uncertainties about the nature of and the effects from the accident. DOE R and D activities are focused on providing scientific and technical insights, data, analyses methods that ultimately support industry efforts to enhance safety. These activities are expected to further enhance the safety performance of currently operating as well as better characterize the safety performance of future U.S. nuclear power plants. In pursuing this area of R and D, DOE recognizes that the commercial nuclear industry is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of licensed nuclear facilities. As such, industry is considered the primary end user of the results from this DOE-sponsored work. The purpose of the Reactor Safety Technology R and D is to improve understanding of beyond design basis events and reduce uncertainty in severe accident progression, phenomenology, and outcomes using existing analytical codes and information gleaned from severe accidents, in particular the Fukushima Daiichi events. This information will be used to aid in developing mitigating strategies and improving severe accident management guidelines for the current light water reactor fleet. The RST R and D activities have evolved from an initial coordinated international effort to assist in the analysis of the Fukushima accident progression and accident response into the following three areas of current work. Fukushima Forensics and Examination Plans: This R and D is focused on providing insights into the actual severe accident progression at Fukushima through planning and interpretation of visual examinations and data collection of in-situ conditions of the damaged units as well as collection and analysis of samples from the damaged reactors. Severe Accident Analyses: This R and D is focused on analyses using existing computer models and their ability to provide information and insights into severe accident progression that aid in the development of severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) and/or training operators on these SAMGs; an auxiliary benefit can be informing improvements in these models. Accident Tolerant Components: This R and D work is focused on analysis or experimental efforts for hardware-related issues, including systems, structures and components with the potential to prevent core degradation or mitigate the effects of beyond-design basis events. This presentation will review current and future R and D activities in this reactor safety area. (author)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The IAEA coordinated research project on modular HTGR safety design: status and outlook - 18608

The IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on Modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) Safety Design started in December 2014 and is now in its second year of implementation. The project investigates and makes proposals on safety design criteria by not only considering the existing water cooled reactors safety requirements for nuclear power plant design but also making use of past and current experience of HTGR licensing in the IAEA member states. Two approaches are being followed to establish the criteria. The first is to develop and apply a safety design process to specific reactor de-signs. The second is to use the existing IAEA specific safety requirements for designs based on water cooled reactor technology and then through expert judgment and review propose changes that is needed to make it applicable to HTGRs. The detailed project content and a description of modular HTGRs and its safety features are given. This informs the comments made on the applicability of the existing requirements and the examples of newly pro-posed HTGR specific safety requirements under development. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety software release options to support plant start-up and commissioning activities - 285

The schedule demands on new nuclear power plant site testing and commissioning programs challenge the plant's Instrumentation and Control (I and C) supplier's ability to provide certified safety software releases to meet the needs of these programs. This paper outlines the typical certified safety software development and certification process which follows a Waterfall software life-cycle model. The conflicts that result between supporting the site program and the safety software supplier's internal certification program are identified. An adapted 'functional' safety release process is presented that supports the site program's needs for software changes and in parallel enables the safety software certification process to proceed. Comparisons between the two safety software release processes are examined and the benefits realized through the use of the adapted 'functional' safety software release process are discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Applying understanding of likelihood and consequences to demonstrate post-closure criticality safety of a geological disposal facility - 14377

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls (e.g. fissile material limits and/or water barriers) will ensure that waste packages are sub-critical. These controls, plus the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will also ensure that criticality is prevented for a long time after disposal. However, over post-closure timescales conditions in the GDF will evolve, and therefore underpinning knowledge is required to demonstrate: under what conditions criticality could occur; what the likelihood of such conditions developing is; and what the consequences would be if a post-closure criticality did occur. These requirements are set out in the UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation of a GDF. This paper discusses the disposal of Pressurised Water Reactor fuel, as an example of a waste type that may require disposal. It briefly selects relevant research to combine and summarise results from three recent RWM research projects. The first 'Likelihood of Criticality' considered under what conditions post-closure criticality could occur, whilst a second 'Modelling of Consequences of Hypothetical Criticality' focused on understanding the local physical consequences (temperature rise, power and rock response) of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. The paper then explains how this understanding is applied to make safety arguments as to why post-closure criticality is not a significant concern. This is achieved via a third, stream of work that has considered the effects of a potential criticality on pathways that might give rise to a post-closure risk in the future, such as transport of radionuclides in groundwater. Collectively RWMs post-closure criticality safety work allows us to conclude in our generic environmental safety case that a post closure criticality is a low likelihood event, and even if one of these low likelihood events was to occur its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. This paper also serves to give context to two companion UK post-closure criticality safety papers which communicate further information on our modelling development and more detailed results underpinning our demonstration of post-closure criticality safety. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Status of French regulation regulations concerning nuclear criticality safety - 14585

Hitherto, in France, licensees used to demonstrate compliance with Fundamental Safety Rule I.3.c. This Rule sets out the principles for demonstrating Nuclear Criticality Safety in all nuclear facilities (excluding reactors). Although there is a good level of consensus between the licensees and the Regulator, this Rule is now somewhat dated (it came into force in 1984) and does not cover all aspects. The French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) used the 2006 Law on Transparency and Nuclear Safety as the catalyst for a thorough revision and updating of its regulatory documentation. Thus, in 2010, ASN decided to set up a 'criticality working group' involving ASN, the licensees (AREVA, CEA, EDF...) and the Technical Safety Organization (IRSN). This group was tasked with drafting a regulatory text (a 'resolution') and a criticality guide. The objectives were to update Rule I.3.c, clearly defining the scope for reactors and transport packages of fissile material, to further develop areas not covered in the existing rule and to take account of the feedback and lessons learned from past events. Thus, this paper presents the status of French regulations concerning Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS). Firstly, it focuses on the existing Rule I.3.c and then explains how this will be modified by the forthcoming improvements to the resolution and the criticality guide. It in particular addresses the scope of the new regulations (concerning reactors and the transport of fissile material), how the principle of defence in depth is to be applied to criticality safety, the double contingency principle, control modes, the reference fissile medium, the organization, the role of the Criticality Engineer, admissibility criteria, validation, etc. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Training practices for CEA engineers qualified in criticality safety - 14598

Soon after the Tokai Mura criticality accident, the French nuclear authority addressed nuclear operators to take measures regarding criticality safety. In CEA in particular after a thorough assessment of the late 1990's - early 2000's practices, the decision was taken to put up a training program in criticality safety for young (and 'old') nuclear safety specialists. The evolution of the training practices for the IQC (Ingenieurs Qualifies en Criticite - Engineers Qualified in Criticality safety) are presented hereafter, beginning with the first training session set up in October 2001 until now. This primarily deals with the kind of audience this training addresses (professional background), what is taught, learned, used later on and how one becomes an IQC. Furthermore, a discussion involves who recognizes the qualification, how long does one need to become a real criticality safety specialist on an operational basis, how the staff uses (or not) the knowledge and how this ensemble contributes to the professional careers advancement (criticality safety is a strong 'card'). The methodological documents in support of the IQC are also presented, particularly the last version of the 'criticality guide fiches (files, cards, sheets)' collection which summarizes the main aspects and principles of criticality safety (including the rudiments of neutron physics, criticality control modes, double contingency principle, etc.). (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

RISMC Advanced Safety Analysis Project Plan – FY 2015 - FY 2019

In this report, a project plan is developed, focused on industry applications, using Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) tools and methods applied to realistic, relevant, and current interest issues to the operating nuclear fleet. RISMC focuses on modernization of nuclear power safety analysis (tools, methods and data); implementing state-of-the-art modeling techniques (which include, for example, enabling incorporation of more detailed physics as they become available); taking advantage of modern computing hardware; and combining probabilistic and mechanistic analyses to enable a risk informed safety analysis process. The modernized tools will maintain the current high level of safety in our nuclear power plant fleet, while providing an improved understanding of safety margins and the critical parameters that affect them. Thus, the set of tools will provide information to inform decisions on plant modifications, refurbishments, and surveillance programs, while improving economics. This set of tools will also benefit the design of new reactors, enhancing safety per unit cost of a nuclear plant. The proposed plan will focus on application of the RISMC toolkit, in particular, solving realistic problems of important current issues to the nuclear industry, in collaboration with plant owners and operators to demonstrate the usefulness of these tools in decision making.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

SafeAeroBERT: Towards a Safety-Informed Aerospace-Specific Language Model

As aviation systems continue to operate with high traffic, large amounts of documents containing safety-relevant data continue to be generated via reporting systems such as the ASRS. Advanced natural language processing techniques, specifically pre-trained language models, have shown great success in domain-specific applications; however, the text in aviation safety reports is inundated with jargon and thus not fully utilized by general pre-trained models. In this research, we work towards developing a safety-informed aerospace-specific language model by pre-training a Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformer (BERT) model on reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System and the National Transportation Safety Board. The resulting model, called SafeAeroBERT, is fine-tuned for the specific task of document classification, and can be further tuned for named-entity recognition, relation detection, information retrieval, and summarization. Results from the classification task are compared between SafeAeroBERT, the base BERT, and SciBERT models and show SafeAeroBERT outperforms the general BERT and SciBERT on classifying reports about human factors, aircraft, and procedure. SafeAeroBERT can be used on custom tasks, not limited to document classification, and is intended to aid an intelligent knowledge manager for safety report repositories.

Aviation↗

Impact of Fuel Failure on Criticality Safety of Used Nuclear Fuel

Commercial used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the United States is expected to remain in storage for considerably longer periods than originally intended (e.g., <40 years). Extended storage (ES) time and irradiation of nuclear fuel to high-burnup values (>45 GWd/t) may increase the potential for fuel failure during normal and accident conditions involving storage and transportation. Fuel failure, depending on the severity, can result in changes to the geometric configuration of the fuel, which has safety and regulatory implications. The likelihood and extent of fuel reconfiguration and its impact on the safety of the UNF is not well understood. The objective of this work is to assess and quantify the impact of fuel reconfiguration due to fuel failure on criticality safety of UNF in storage and transportation casks. This effort is primarily motivated by concerns related to the potential for fuel degradation during ES periods and transportation following ES. The criticality analyses consider representative UNF designs and cask systems and a range of fuel enrichments, burnups, and cooling times. The various failed-fuel configurations considered are designed to bound the anticipated effects of individual rod and general cladding failure, fuel rod deformation, loss of neutron absorber materials, degradation of canister internals, and gross assembly failure. The results quantify the potential impact on criticality safety associated with fuel reconfiguration and may be used to guide future research, design, and regulatory activities. Although it can be concluded that the criticality safety impacts of fuel reconfiguration during transportation subsequent to ES are manageable, the results indicate that certain configurations can result in a large increase in the effective neutron multiplication factor, k eff . Future work to inform decision making relative to which configurations are credible, and therefore need to be considered in a safety evaluation, is recommended.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor passive safety system response to postulated events

The Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor (SMR) is an 800 MWt (>225 MWe) integral pressurized water reactor. This paper is part of a series of four describing the design and safety features of the Westinghouse SMR. This paper focuses in particular upon the passive safety features and the safety system response of the Westinghouse SMR. The Westinghouse SMR design incorporates many features to minimize the effects of, and in some cases eliminates the possibility of postulated accidents. The small size of the reactor and the low power density limits the potential consequences of an accident relative to a large plant. The integral design eliminates large loop piping, which significantly reduces the flow area of postulated loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). The Westinghouse SMR containment is a high-pressure, compact design that normally operates at a partial vacuum. This facilitates heat removal from the containment during LOCA events. The containment is submerged in water which also aides the heat removal and provides an additional radionuclide filter. The Westinghouse SMR safety system design is passive, is based largely on the passive safety systems used in the AP1000{sup R} reactor, and provides mitigation of all design basis accidents without the need for AC electrical power for a period of seven days. Frequent faults, such as reactivity insertion events and loss of power events, are protected by first shutting down the nuclear reaction by inserting control rods, then providing cold, borated water through a passive, buoyancy-driven flow. Decay heat removal is provided using a layered approach that includes the passive removal of heat by the steam drum and independent passive heat removal system that transfers heat from the primary system to the environment. Less frequent faults such as loss of coolant accidents are mitigated by passive injection of a large quantity of water that is readily available inside containment. An automatic depressurization system is used to reduce the reactor pressure in a controlled manner to facilitate the passive injection. Long-term decay heat removal is accomplished using the passive heat removal systems augmented by heat transfer through the containment vessel to the environment. The passive injection systems are designed so that the fuel remains covered and effectively cooled throughout the event. Like during the frequent faults, the passive systems provide effective cooling without the need for ac power for seven days following the accident. Connections are available to add additional water to indefinitely cool the plant. The response of the safety systems of the Westinghouse SMR to various initiating faults has been examined. Among them, two accidents; an extended station blackout event, and a LOCA event have been evaluated to demonstrate how the plant will remain safe in the unlikely event that either should occur. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improving nuclear power plant safety and operating margins through linear quadratic estimation - 290

Redundant measurement, trip, and actuation channels are required for reactor trips and engineered safety systems in nuclear power plants. There are three or four independent channels in existing plants, depending on the system. To prevent failures, consistent signals from any two channels together can trip the reactor or actuate safety systems. Measurements associated with safety trips and actuations include uncertainties related to the instruments making the measurements and to process conditions. Margins that include measurement uncertainties are set for each trip and actuation channel as though it were the only one taking action, thus preserving independence. There are sensors, however, that provide partially redundant information that could be used to decrease the uncertainty associated with measurements of plant conditions, while maintaining the three-channel redundancy important to plant safety. Reducing these uncertainties would both improve plant safety by providing more accurate knowledge of plant conditions and improve the operating margins that must take such uncertainties into account. This paper demonstrates how information that is already available to plant instrumentation and control systems and is already redundant can be used through software routines to reduce the error that must be taken into account in reactor trip and safety system actuation setpoints. Issues that would have to be addressed related to standards, licensing, and implementation are also discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Insights from an international stakeholder consultation to identify informational needs related to seafood safety

Food safety assessment and communication have a strong importance in reducing human health risks related to food consumption. The research carried out within the ECsafeSEAFOOD project aims to assess seafood safety issues, mainly related to non-regulated priority environmental contaminants, and to evaluate their impact on public health. In order to make the research results accessible and exploitable, and to respond to actual stakeholders' demands, a consultation with international stakeholders was performed by means of a survey. The focus was on policy and decision makers, food producers and processors, and agencies (i.e. EU and National or Regional agencies related to Food Safety or Public Health) and consumer organisations. The survey considered questions related to: seafood safety assessment and mitigation strategies, availability of data, such as the level of information on different contaminants, and communication among different stakeholder groups. Furthermore, stakeholders were asked to give their opinion on how they believe consumers perceive risks associated with environmental contaminants. The survey was distributed to 531 key stakeholders and 91 responses were received from stakeholders from 30 EU and non-EU countries. The main results show that communication between different groups of stakeholders needs to be improved and that there is a deficit of information and data in the field of seafood safety. This pertains mainly to the transfer of contaminants between the environment and seafood, and to the diversity of environmental contaminants such as plastic additives, algal toxins and hormones. On-line tools were perceived to be the most useful communication channel. - Highlights: • We consulted stakeholders to identify their needs about seafood safety. • An on-line survey was prepared and sent to gather stakeholders' opinions. • Communication among stakeholders needs to be improved. • There is a deficit of information and data in the field of seafood safety. • On-line tools are perceived to be the most useful communication channel.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Cost- and Risk-Based Seismic Design Optimization of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems

Seismic analysis, design, and qualification of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) is a significant contributor to the capital cost of a nuclear power plant. To reduce capital costs of advanced nuclear power plants and make commercial nuclear energy more competitive, innovations are needed in their structural design and construction, and not just in the reactor core and associated systems. Seismic isolation has been identified as an important cost-cutting technology that enables standardization of equipment across various sites. This paper develops and demonstrates a cost- and risk-based seismic design optimization of a representative safety system in a nuclear power plant with the dual goals of minimizing overnight capital cost and meeting safety goals. The design optimization can also include component seismic isolation, in which case, the optimized design includes a set of equipment that needs to be seismically isolated to minimize capital cost. The open-source codes MASTODON and Dakota are used for seismic probabilistic risk assessment and design optimization, respectively. A generic nuclear facility with a safety system comprising SSCs that are common to nuclear power plants is considered for the demonstration of the design optimization and is assumed to be located at the Idaho National Laboratory site. Generic costs and seismic design cost functions are assumed for the SSCs of the safety system. The sum of the costs of the SSCs is minimized in the optimization process, while the risk of failure of the safety system is provided as a constraint. Furthermore, results show that the optimization process reduces capital costs significantly while automatically prioritizing the safety of SSCs that contribute most to the risk of the safety system.

42 ENGINEERING↗

WE-F-209-01: Radiation Safety Surveys in Diagnostic Imaging

Over the past few years, numerous Accreditation Bodies, Regulatory Agencies, and State Regulations have implemented requirements for Radiation Safety Surveys following installation or modification to x-ray rooms. The objective of this session is to review best practices in performing radiation safety surveys for both Therapy and Diagnostic installations, as well as a review of appropriate survey instruments. This session will be appropriate for both therapy and imaging physicists who are looking to increase their working knowledge of radiation safety surveys. Learning Objectives: Identify Appropriate Survey Meters for Radiation Safety Surveys Develop best practices for Radiation Safety Surveys for Therapy units that include common areas of concern. Develop best practices for Radiation Safety Surveys of Diagnostic and Nuclear Medicine rooms. Identify acceptable dose levels and the factors that affect the calculations associated with performing Radiation Safety Surveys.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

WE-F-209-02: Radiation Safety Surveys of Linear Accelerators

Over the past few years, numerous Accreditation Bodies, Regulatory Agencies, and State Regulations have implemented requirements for Radiation Safety Surveys following installation or modification to x-ray rooms. The objective of this session is to review best practices in performing radiation safety surveys for both Therapy and Diagnostic installations, as well as a review of appropriate survey instruments. This session will be appropriate for both therapy and imaging physicists who are looking to increase their working knowledge of radiation safety surveys. Learning Objectives: Identify Appropriate Survey Meters for Radiation Safety Surveys Develop best practices for Radiation Safety Surveys for Therapy units that include common areas of concern. Develop best practices for Radiation Safety Surveys of Diagnostic and Nuclear Medicine rooms. Identify acceptable dose levels and the factors that affect the calculations associated with performing Radiation Safety Surveys.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Safety of Hydrogen Systems Installed in Outdoor Enclosures

The Hydrogen Safety Panel brings a broad cross-section of expertise from the industrial, government, and academic sectors to help advise the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Fuel Cell Technologies Office through its work in hydrogen safety, codes, and standards. The Panel’s initiatives in reviewing safety plans, conducting safety evaluations, identifying safety-related technical data gaps, and supporting safety knowledge tools and databases cover the gamut from research and development to demonstration and deployment. The Panel’s recent work has focused on the safe deployment of hydrogen and fuel cell systems in support of DOE efforts to accelerate fuel cell commercialization in early market applications: vehicle refueling, material handling equipment, backup power for warehouses and telecommunication sites, and portable power devices. This paper resulted from observations and considerations stemming from the Panel’s work on early market applications. This paper focuses on hydrogen system components that are installed in outdoor enclosures. These enclosures might alternatively be called “cabinets,” but for simplicity, they are all referred to as “enclosures” in this paper. These enclosures can provide a space where a flammable mixture of hydrogen and air might accumulate, creating the potential for a fire or explosion should an ignition occur. If the enclosure is large enough for a person to enter, and ventilation is inadequate, the hydrogen concentration could be high enough to asphyxiate a person who entered the space. Manufacturers, users, and government authorities rely on requirements described in codes to guide safe design and installation of such systems. Except for small enclosures used for hydrogen gas cylinders (gas cabinets), fuel cell power systems, and the enclosures that most people would describe as buildings, there are no hydrogen safety requirements for these enclosures, leaving gaps that must be addressed. This paper proposes that a technical basis be developed to enable code bodies to write requirements for the range of enclosures from the smallest to the largest.

08 HYDROGEN↗