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At least 487 records · Page 27

OR14-V-Uncertainty-PD2La Uncertainty Quantification for Nuclear Safeguards and Nondestructive Assay Final Report

The various methods of nondestructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) have applications in nuclear nonproliferation, including detection and identification of illicit SNM at border crossings and quantifying SNM at nuclear facilities for safeguards. No assay method is complete without “error bars,” which provide one way of expressing confidence in the assay result. Consequently, NDA specialists typically provide error bars and also partition total uncertainty into “random” and “systematic” components so that, for example, an error bar can be developed for the total mass estimate in multiple items. Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) for NDA has always been important, but it is recognized that greater rigor is needed and achievable using modern statistical methods.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

INITIAL Reactor Safeguards Laboratory

The safeguards and core cooling laboratory will consist of sample activation, sample measurement and sample analysis. Two activation samples of natural UO 2 will be irradiated in the reflector region of the McClellan Nuclear Research Center (MNCR). One sample will be cadmium covered and the other will not have cadmium covering (bare). Both samples will be measured with a HPGe detector, where energy and efficiency calibrations are necessary. Analysis is detailed below in the analysis section.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Plutonium particle analysis by LG-SIMS and LA-MC-ICP-MS for environmental safeguards

During nuclear facility inspections, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors collect dust particles using cotton swipes. Analysis of these swipes is an extremely powerful tool with which to confirm treaty compliance or identify treaty violations. Through particle analysis it is possible to identify individual particles representative of nuclear activities. Uranium particle analysis is a reasonably mature technique used by IAEA and its Network of Analytical Laboratories for treaty verification. However, the IAEA has recently identified the maturation of plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium particle analysis techniques as a top priority. We propose to address this area directly by developing the new methods necessary to analyze samples containing plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium particles. The end products of this study will be: (A) more accurate and ultra-precise isotopic characterization of plutonium -bearing particles from environmental swipe samples, and (B) development and validation of laser ablation particle analysis techniques as robust and accurate analysis methodologies for future safeguards missions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Delayed Gamma-ray Assay for Nuclear Materials Safeguards: Additional Tasks

This report documents the activities and findings completed under the extended task scope in FY17-18. This work was performed as a follow-up to the original effort that investigated the delayed gamma-ray signatures of nuclear materials and was a collaborative effort between Lawrence Livermore, Lawrence Berkeley, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Idaho Accelerator Center. The original project was focused on the delayed gamma-ray (DG) assay application for spent nuclear fuel safeguards, as a methodology to directly quantify the content and composition of U and Pu isotopes in irradiated assemblies in storage or before transfer to a difficult-to-access repository.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Polarization Imaging for International Safeguards (FY2019)

A polarization imaging camera, Salsa (Bossa Nova Technologies) was evaluated for use in nuclear safeguards inspection with a focus on swipe sampling. The camera and supporting electronics and software determine the full Stokes parameters for the entire image field. The camera can be used for real-time video or still images. Stokes parameters S0, S1, S2, and S3 can be recorded for each pixel and exported for post processing. This study compared color photography to polarization imaging for powders on many surfaces under ambient lighting. False color images can be created from the Stokes parameters directly from the vendor software to highlight the various polarization states. In most cases, linear polarization showed the greatest effects. The polarization images are easy to collect and very sensitive to surfaces and textures. Fine powders are highlighted in the images, and particle size and refractive index effects were noticed. The images are not affected by ambient lighting (angle, or intensity). Lens choice is key and may require expert knowledge. Very small deposits of 1 µm particles were difficult to image using the standard video lens. General dirt on smooth surfaces and handprints are easily documented as well as powders on textured painted surfaces. Scratches on metal surfaces can be readily separated from other image features. The camera may be useful for tamper indication as surface damage is easy to discern and ambient lighting is not a concern.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Safeguards for Reactors and Spent Fuel

It is crucial for safeguards that the amount of plutonium going to the reprocessing plant or repository is what we believe it to be.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Safeguards and Nondestructive Assay

What can we do? Encourage/ensure peaceful nuclear uses; Secure, safeguard, and/or dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material; Detect and control the proliferation of related WMD technology and expertise.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV). EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For large scale infrastructure such as a nuclear facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Electropotential Verification for Nuclear Safeguards

The international safeguards regime desires methods to efficiently verify that facilities are only performing declared activities. Electropotential verification (EPV) is a newly proposed technique that was tested for its feasibility to perform facility design information verification (DIV) and verification of spent nuclear fuel while in a cooling pool. EPV works by passing a constant, low voltage current through a conductive system (facility infrastructure of nuclear fuel assembly) and measuring the resulting voltage at various places throughout the infrastructure in order to establish a baseline. Changes made to the system affect these voltage readings, which will deviate from the baseline and indicate that a change to the system was made. For facility DIV, it appears feasible that changes in configuration of the system’s grounding can be detected in real-time, and the location of the change can be inferred from the measured intensity of the change in voltage. Determination of whether or not spent fuel was present in a fuel rod, as well as the presence/absence of a fuel rod from an assembly using EPV, proved unsuccessful with the sensitivity of instrumentation used in this study.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Noninvasive Thermal Mass Flow Meter for Safeguards

This project addressed the long-standing nuclear safeguards problem of detecting in a timely manner the unauthorized production of significant quantities of highly enriched uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

GADRAS-DRF for Safeguards (FY 2025 Mid-Year/Annual Report)

Task 1 – Extract GADRAS-DRF capabilities for a workflow intuitive to safeguards analysis. This task is almost complete. Significant improvements have been made to the functionality of customizing peak fits for use in the isotopics application, as well as peak-based FSA model analysis. The remaining tasks revolve around bug fixes, testing the application, and adding a density scroll bar to isotopics for real time analysis updates. The density scroll bar values will be reflected in summary tables and the self-shielding form accessed within isotopics.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Optimizing Geospatial Assessments for Nuclear Safeguards Applications with Large Language Models

A multidisciplinary team at Argonne National Laboratory evaluated the ability of large language models (LLMs) to identify geographic locations from open-source text and assessed post-processing measures to strengthen the reliability of those extractions in support of international nuclear safeguards. The study focused on addressing challenges such as toponym ambiguity, imprecise descriptions, and misinformation, which often undermine the accuracy of LLM-derived geospatial assessments. By integrating authoritative geospatial datasets, employing rigorous validation techniques, and leveraging human-in-the-loop processes, the project aimed to enhance the precision, transparency, and reproducibility of geospatial localization workflows. The findings demonstrate that while LLMs exhibit significant potential for accelerating geospatial analysis, their outputs require systematic grounding and verification to ensure reliability in high-stakes applications. This work contributes to the broader field of geospatial intelligence and supports strategic objectives of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Safeguards Technology Program FY2026 Mid-Year Report for Project WBS# 24.1.3.3: Development of Procedures for Th-U Radiochronometry of Uranium Particles by LG-SIMS

Implementing 230 Th- 234 U radiochronometry of environmental uranium particles by large geometry secondary ion mass spectrometry (LG-SIMS) requires assessment, validation, and technical support before safeguards conclusions can be drawn from the information. This project investigates the most challenging aspects of LG-SIMS particle radiochronometry 230 Th- 234 U measurements through a collaboration between LANL and NIST, to provide best practices and procedures for determining high quality ages with optimized uncertainties. This includes exploration of reducing detector backgrounds, investigating the best ways to report uncertainties, and establishing recommended instrument setups.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ELECTROCHEMICALLY-MODULATED SEPARATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASUREMENTS

A critical objective of materials accountability in safeguards is the accurate and timely analysis of fuel reprocessing streams to detect both abrupt and prolonged diversions of nuclear materials. For this reason both on-line nondestructive (NDA) and destructive analysis (DA) approaches are sought-after. Current methods for DA involve grab sampling and laboratory based column extractions that are costly, hazardous, and time consuming. While direct on-line gamma measurements of Pu are desirable, they are not possible due to contributions from other actinides and fission products. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are currently investigating electrochemically-modulated separation (EMS) as a straightforward, cost-effective technology for selective separation of Pu or U from aqueous reprocessing streams. The EMS selectivity is electrochemically controlled and results from the sorption of Pu4+ and U4+ redox states onto the anodized target electrode, allowing for selective accumulation of U or Pu from nitric acid streams to be turned “on” or “off.” It is envisioned that this technology can be utilized to isolate Pu for both NDA and DA analysis. For the NDA approach, rapid Pu analysis by gamma-ray spectroscopy could be performed after chemical clean-up of activation and fission products by EMS. Likewise, in the DA approach, EMS could be used to retain and concentrate the Pu in nanogram quantities on the electrode surface to be transported to the lab for analysis using high precision mass spectrometry. Due to the challenges associated with complex matrices, a systematic investigation of the redox-dependent accumulation of Pu using EMS was necessary, and results will be presented. Approaches to mitigate interelement effects using large surface area cells will also be discussed. The EMS chemistry and spectroscopy for Pu isolation and measurement will be presented, proof-of-principle measurements will be described, and the application of this approach for materials accountability will be discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PROCESS MONITORING FOR SAFEGUARDS VIA EVENT GENERATION, INTEGRATION, AND INTERPRETATION

There is a recognized safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities to complement nuclear materials accountancy. We introduce a model-based approach for PM in which the assessment regarding the state of the monitored system is conducted at a system-centric level. The proposed architecture integrates both time-driven and event-driven data integration and analysis for decision-making. While the time-driven layers of the proposed architecture encompass more traditional PM methods based on time series data and analysis, the event-driven layers encompass operation monitoring methods based on discrete event data integration and analysis. By integrating process- and operation-related information and methodologies within an unified modeling and monitoring framework that includes not only current but also past plant behaviors, the task of anomaly detection is greatly improved because this decision-making approach can benefit from not only known time-series relationships among measured signals but also from known event sequence relationships among generated events. Building from the proposed system-centric PM architecture, we briefly introduce methods that can be used to implement its different components. The application of the proposed approach is then demonstrated via simulation experiments.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗