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At least 487 records · Page 27

System Theoretic Frameworks for Mitigating Risk Complexity in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

In response to the expansion of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activities -- and the associated suite of risks -- around the world, this project evaluated systems-based solutions for managing such risk complexity in multimodal and multi-jurisdictional international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation. By better understanding systemic risks in SNF transportation, developing SNF transportation risk assessment frameworks, and evaluating these systems-based risk assessment frameworks, this research illustrated interdependency between safety, security, and safeguards risks is inherent in NFC activities and can go unidentified when each "S" is independently evaluated. Two novel system-theoretic analysis techniques -- dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) and system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) -- provide integrated "3S" analysis to address these interdependencies and the research results suggest a need -- and provide a way -- to reprioritize United States engagement efforts to reduce global nuclear risks. Lastly, this research identifies areas where Sandia National Laboratories can spearhead technical advances to reduce global nuclear dangers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Dynamic Fire PRA Roadmap

Modeling and implementing fire safety for nuclear power plants is a costly activity. Because of the complexity of fire phenomenon and multiple operational procedures, it is difficult to computationally provide assurance that the mitigation methods are adequate for critical areas using current analysis methods. An economical method to provide more accurate modeling and optimize mitigation methods is needed to improve nuclear power viability. This report describes the initial investigation into modeling and simulation tools for application of fire as part of the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA), formerly Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC). The report provides a framework of how 3D modeling and simulation techniques could be combined with a dynamic Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) to reduce compounding conservatism present in current Fire PRA methods. Electrical Power Research Institute has analyzed current Fire PRA practices and identified the most significant contributors to risk and areas for improving analysis. This framework describes how to apply dynamic PRA and simulation methods for key contributors/scenarios, credit missing factors of manual fire suppression, and applying conditional probabilities.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Integrated Medical Model Project - Overview and Summary of Historical Application

Introduction: The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project represents one aspect of NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) to quantitatively assess medical risks to astronauts for existing operational missions as well as missions associated with future exploration and commercial space flight ventures. The IMM takes a probabilistic approach to assessing the likelihood and specific outcomes of one hundred medical conditions within the envelope of accepted space flight standards of care over a selectable range of mission capabilities. A specially developed Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) maintains evidence-based, organizational knowledge across a variety of data sources. Since becoming operational in 2011, version 3.0 of the IMM, the supporting iMED, and the expertise of the IMM project team have contributed to a wide range of decision and informational processes for the space medical and human research community. This presentation provides an overview of the IMM conceptual architecture and range of application through examples of actual space flight community questions posed to the IMM project. Methods: Figure 1 [see document] illustrates the IMM modeling system and scenario process. As illustrated, the IMM computational architecture is based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques. Nineteen assumptions and limitations define the IMM application domain. Scenario definitions include crew medical attributes and mission specific details. The IMM forecasts probabilities of loss of crew life (LOCL), evacuation (EVAC), quality time lost during the mission, number of medical resources utilized and the number and type of medical events by combining scenario information with in-flight, analog, and terrestrial medical information stored in the iMED. In addition, the metrics provide the integrated information necessary to estimate optimized in-flight medical kit contents under constraints of mass and volume or acceptable level of mission risk. Results and Conclusions: Historically, IMM simulations support Science and Technology planning, Exploration mission planning, and ISS program operations by supplying simulation support, iMED data information, and subject matter expertise to Crew Health and Safety and the HRP. Upcoming release of IMM version 4.0 seeks to provide enhanced functionality to increase the quality of risk decisions made using the IMM through a more accurate representation of the real world system.

Myers, J.↗

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.

Harry W Jones↗

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

Dynamic, risk informed decision support systems and methods

The present disclosure is directed to a decision support system or tool based on a Bayesian Network (BN) framework. The diagnostic support tool is created by using advanced Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) method(s) to construct Bayesian Networks (BNs) that form a Bayesian Decision Support Process (BDSP) to provide science-based decision support for understanding and managing events in complex systems. In an embodiment, the PRA method(s) may include Discrete Dynamic Event Trees (DDETs) and simulations.

Groth, Katrina↗

Near-Earth Phase Risk Comparison of Human Mars Campaign Architectures

A risk analysis of the launch, orbital assembly, and Earth-departure phases of human Mars exploration campaign architectures was completed as an extension of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) originally carried out under the NASA Constellation Program Ares V Project. The objective of the updated analysis was to study the sensitivity of loss-of-campaign risk to such architectural factors as composition of the propellant delivery portion of the launch vehicle fleet (Ares V heavy-lift launch vehicle vs. smaller/cheaper commercial launchers) and the degree of launcher or Mars-bound spacecraft element sparing. Both a static PRA analysis and a dynamic, event-based Monte Carlo simulation were developed and used to evaluate the probability of loss of campaign under different sparing options. Results showed that with no sparing, loss-of-campaign risk is strongly driven by launcher count and on-orbit loiter duration, favoring an all-Ares V launch approach. Further, the reliability of the all-Ares V architecture showed significant improvement with the addition of a single spare launcher/payload. Among architectures utilizing a mix of Ares V and commercial launchers, those that minimized the on-orbit loiter duration of Mars-bound elements were found to exceed the reliability of no spare all-Ares V campaign if unlimited commercial vehicle sparing was assumed

Manning, Ted A.↗

Integration and Assessment of Component Health Prognostics in Supervisory Control Systems

Enhanced risk monitors (ERMs) for active components in advanced reactor concepts use predictive estimates of component failure to update, in real time, predictive safety and economic risk metrics. These metrics have been shown to be capable of use in optimizing maintenance scheduling and managing plant maintenance costs. Integrating this information with plant supervisory control systems increases the potential for making control decisions that utilize real-time information on component conditions. Such decision making would limit the possibility of plant operations that increase the likelihood of degrading the functionality of one or more components while maintaining the overall functionality of the plant. ERM uses sensor data for providing real-time information about equipment condition for deriving risk monitors. This information is used to estimate the remaining useful life and probability of failure of these components. By combining this information with plant probabilistic risk assessment models, predictive estimates of risk posed by continued plant operation in the presence of detected degradation may be estimated. In this paper, we describe this methodology in greater detail, and discuss its integration with a prototypic software-based plant supervisory control platform. In order to integrate these two technologies and evaluate the integrated system, software to simulate the sensor data was developed, prognostic models for feedwater valves were developed, and several use cases defined. The full paper will describe these use cases, and the results of the initial evaluation.

Ramuhalli, Pradeep↗

Simulation-Based Recovery Action Analysis Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

Recovery human action is defined as the action that prevents deviant conditions from producing unwanted effects. Analyzing recovery actions has been a critical part in human reliability analysis (HRA). However, there are a couple of limitations to treating recovery actions using only the current HRA methods available. Representatively, the existing recovery analysis does not specifically consider recovery actions as they have occurred in actual nuclear power plants (NPPs). To handle the challenges in the existing recovery analyses, this study suggests a way to analyze recovery actions under a dynamic HRA method, the Procedure-based Risk Investigation MEthod-Human Reliability Analysis (PRIME-HRA) method. The PRIME-HRA method suggests a way on how to develop dynamic simulation models using dynamic risk assessment tools such as the Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagram (EMRALD) [1] and the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER) [2]. EMRALD and HUNTER are the dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and HRA tools developed at Idaho National Laboratory. In this paper, differences on analyzing recovery actions in the Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction (THERP), the Cause-Based Decision Tree (CBDT) and the Korean Standard HRA (K-HRA) and challenges of these approaches are introduced. How we have developed the PRIME-HRA is also introduced in this paper. Then, the proposed approach to analyzing recovery human actions in dynamic context is partially discussed with an example.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The Importance of Human Reliability Analysis in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

HRA is a method used to describe, qualitatively and quantitatively, the occurrence of human failures in the operation of complex systems that affect availability and reliability. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure in a PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) provides a more complete picture of the risk and risk contributions. A high quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedural, equipment design and need for automation.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗

Branch-and-Bound algorithm applied to uncertainty quantification of a Boiling Water Reactor Station Blackout

Evaluation of the impacts of uncertainty and sensitivity in modeling presents a significant set of challenges in particular to high fidelity modeling. Computational costs and validation of models creates a need for cost effective decision making with regards to experiment design. Experiments designed to validate computation models can be used to reduce uncertainty in the physical model. In some cases, large uncertainty in a particular aspect of the model may or may not have a large impact on the final results. For example, modeling of a relief valve may result in large uncertainty, however, the actual effects on final peak clad temperature in a reactor transient may be small and the large uncertainty with respect to valve modeling may be considered acceptable. Additionally, the ability to determine the adequacy of a model and the validation supporting it should be considered within a risk informed framework. Low fidelity modeling with large uncertainty may be considered adequate if the uncertainty is considered acceptable with respect to risk. In other words, models that are used to evaluate the probability of failure should be evaluated more rigorously with the intent of increasing safety margin. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques have traditionally been used to identify accident conditions and transients. Traditional classical event tree methods utilize analysts’ knowledge and experience to identify the important timing of events in coordination with thermal-hydraulic modeling. These methods lack the capability to evaluate complex dynamic systems. In these systems, time and energy scales associated with transient events may vary as a function of transition times and energies to arrive at a different physical state. Dynamic PRA (DPRA) methods provide a more rigorous analysis of complex dynamic systems. Unfortunately DPRA methods introduce issues associated with combinatorial explosion of states. This study presents a methodology to address combinatorial explosion using a Branch-and-Bound algorithm applied to Dynamic Event Trees (DET), which utilize LENDIT (L – Length, E – Energy, N – Number, D – Distribution, I – Information, and T – Time) as well as a set theory to describe system, state, resource, and response (S2R2) sets to create bounding functions for the DET. The optimization of the DET in identifying high probability failure branches is extended to create a Phenomenological Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) methodology to evaluate modeling parameters important to safety of those failure branches that have a high probability of failure. The PIRT can then be used as a tool to identify and evaluate the need for experimental validation of models that have the potential to reduce risk. Finally, in order to demonstrate this methodology, a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Station Blackout (SBO) case study is presented.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA Taxonomies for Searching Problem Reports and FMEAs

Many types of hazard and risk analyses are used during the life cycle of complex systems, including Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis, Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Reliability Analysis and analysis of Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) databases. The success of these methods depends on the availability of input data and the analysts knowledge. Standard nomenclature can increase the reusability of hazard, risk and problem data. When nomenclature in the source texts is not standard, taxonomies with mapping words (sets of rough synonyms) can be combined with semantic search to identify items and tag them with metadata based on a rich standard nomenclature. Semantic search uses word meanings in the context of parsed phrases to find matches. The NASA taxonomies provide the word meanings. Spacecraft taxonomies and ontologies (generalization hierarchies with attributes and relationships, based on terms meanings) are being developed for types of subsystems, functions, entities, hazards and failures. The ontologies are broad and general, covering hardware, software and human systems. Semantic search of Space Station texts was used to validate and extend the taxonomies. The taxonomies have also been used to extract system connectivity (interaction) models and functions from requirements text. Now the Reconciler semantic search tool and the taxonomies are being applied to improve search in the Space Shuttle PRACA database, to discover recurring patterns of failure. Usual methods of string search and keyword search fall short because the entries are terse and have numerous shortcuts (irregular abbreviations, nonstandard acronyms, cryptic codes) and modifier words cannot be used in sentence context to refine the search. The limited and fixed FMEA categories associated with the entries do not make the fine distinctions needed in the search. The approach assigns PRACA report titles to problem classes in the taxonomy. Each ontology class includes mapping words - near-synonyms naming different manifestations of that problem class. The mapping words for Problems, Entities and Functions are converted to a canonical form plus any of a small set of modifier words (e.g. non-uniformity NOT + UNIFORM.) The report titles are parsed as sentences if possible, or treated as a flat sequence of word tokens if parsing fails. When canonical forms in the title match mapping words, the PRACA entry is associated with the corresponding Problem, Entity or Function in the ontology. The user can search for types of failures associated with types of equipment, clustering by type of problem (e.g., all bearings found with problems of being uneven: rough, irregular, gritty ). The results could also be used for tagging PRACA report entries with rich metadata. This approach could also be applied to searching and tagging failure modes, failure effects and mitigations in FMEAs. In the pilot work, parsing 52K+ truncated titles (the test cases that were available), has resulted in identification of both a type of equipment and type of problem in about 75% of the cases. The results are displayed in a manner analogous to Google search results. The effort has also led to the enrichment of the taxonomy, adding some new categories and many new mapping words. Further work would make enhancements that have been identified for improving the clustering and further reducing the false alarm rate. (In searching for recurring problems, good clustering is more important than reducing false alarms). Searching complete PRACA reports should lead to immediate improvement.

Malin, Jane T.↗

Quantifying Risk to Improve Medical System Design for Long Duration Artemis Missions: A Demonstration of NASA's IMPACT Tradespace Analysis Tool

BACKGROUND NASA’s human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in-mission medical care. A greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and constraints on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Mass, volume, and power will be limited while higher demands will be placed on the crews to manage medical events. NASA’s Moon to Mars exploration strategy outlines increasingly complex Artemis missions both in terms of duration and operations. In these more challenging deep space missions, it is important to quantitatively estimate the human system risk attributable to medical conditions and use these estimates to advance medical system design. METHODS IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and tradespace analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 includes a novel evidence library baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a large increase in the number of medical resources and the flexibility of their use; and the ability for rapid and iterative analysis. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life, consideration of the need for return to definitive care (medical evacuation), and an estimate of crew time affected due to medical conditions. A notional long duration lunar orbit and lunar surface design reference mission (DRM) was chosen with a 4-astronaut crew to mimic a foundational exploration Artemis mission. The DRM profile includes outbound transit on Orion, Gateway space station rendezvous in lunar orbit, 6 months on the Lunar surface with extravehicular activity (EVA), return rendezvous with Gateway, and transit back to Earth. RESULTS/DISCUSSION: Overall, IMPACT successfully quantified medical risk and derived an optimal medical system to support crew on a long duration lunar mission. In this DRM, the calculated loss of crew life from a medical event was 0.008 events per mission, risk of potential need for evacuation was 0.30 events per mission, and cumulative crew time affected by medical conditions was 103 days. The medical conditions that most contributed to medical risk were decompression sickness, trauma, and respiratory failure. The conditions that had the largest effects on crew performance included musculoskeletal injuries and lunar dust exposure. The IMPACT-generated medical system included resources that target the most common and highest risk conditions and performed as expected. This demonstrates the value of the IMPACT tool in medical system design for human exploration spaceflight missions.

Arian Anderson↗

Enhanced Component Performance Study: Emergency Diesel Generators 1998–2014

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This report evaluates component performance over time using (1) Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES) data from 1998 through 2014 and (2) maintenance unavailability (UA) performance data from Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Basis Document data from 2002 through 2014. The objective is to show estimates of current failure probabilities and rates related to EDGs, trend these data on an annual basis, determine if the current data are consistent with the probability distributions currently recommended for use in NRC probabilistic risk assessments, show how the reliability data differ for different EDG manufacturers and for EDGs with different ratings; and summarize the subcomponents, causes, detection methods, and recovery associated with each EDG failure mode. Engineering analyses were performed with respect to time period and failure mode without regard to the actual number of EDGs at each plant. The factors analyzed are: sub-component, failure cause, detection method, recovery, manufacturer, and EDG rating. Six trends with varying degrees of statistical significance were identified in the data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Status of the phenomena representation, 3D modeling, and cloud-based software architecture development

Early in 2013, researchers at the Idaho National Laboratory outlined a technical framework to support the implementation of state-of-the-art probabilistic risk assessment to predict the safety performance of advanced small modular reactors. From that vision of the advanced framework for risk analysis, specific tasks have been underway in order to implement the framework. This report discusses the current development of a several tasks related to the framework implementation, including a discussion of a 3D physics engine that represents the motion of objects (including collision and debris modeling), cloud-based analysis tools such as a Bayesian-inference engine, and scenario simulations. These tasks were performed during 2015 as part of the technical work associated with the Advanced Reactor Technologies Program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Probabilistic Analysis of Passive Safety System Reliability in Advanced Small Modular Reactors: Methodologies and Lessons Learned

Many advanced small modular reactor designs rely on passive systems to fulfill safety functions during accident sequences. These systems depend heavily on boundary conditions to induce a motive force, meaning the system can fail to operate as intended due to deviations in boundary conditions, rather than as the result of physical failures. Furthermore, passive systems may operate in intermediate or degraded modes. These factors make passive system operation difficult to characterize with a traditional probabilistic framework that only recognizes discrete operating modes and does not allow for the explicit consideration of time-dependent boundary conditions. Argonne National Laboratory has been examining various methodologies for assessing passive system reliability within a probabilistic risk assessment for a station blackout event at an advanced small modular reactor. This paper describes the most promising options: mechanistic techniques, which share qualities with conventional probabilistic methods, and simulation-based techniques, which explicitly account for time-dependent processes. The primary intention of this paper is to describe the strengths and weaknesses of each methodology and highlight the lessons learned while applying the two techniques while providing high-level results. This includes the global benefits and deficiencies of the methods and practical problems encountered during the implementation of each technique.

Grabaskas, David↗

Development of a Risk-Based Comparison Methodology of Carbon Capture Technologies

Given the varying degrees of maturity among existing carbon capture (CC) technology alternatives, an understanding of the inherent technical and financial risk and uncertainty associated with these competing technologies is requisite to the success of carbon capture as a viable solution to the greenhouse gas emission challenge. The availability of tools and capabilities to conduct rigorous, risk–based technology comparisons is thus highly desirable for directing valuable resources toward the technology option(s) with a high return on investment, superior carbon capture performance, and minimum risk. To address this research need, we introduce a novel risk-based technology comparison method supported by an integrated multi-domain risk model set to estimate risks related to technological maturity, technical performance, and profitability. Through a comparison between solid sorbent and liquid solvent systems, we illustrate the feasibility of estimating risk and quantifying uncertainty in a single domain (modular analytical capability) as well as across multiple risk dimensions (coupled analytical capability) for comparison. This method brings technological maturity and performance to bear on profitability projections, and carries risk and uncertainty modeling across domains via inter-model sharing of parameters, distributions, and input/output. The integration of the models facilitates multidimensional technology comparisons within a common probabilistic risk analysis framework. This approach and model set can equip potential technology adopters with the necessary computational capabilities to make risk-informed decisions about CC technology investment. The method and modeling effort can also be extended to other industries where robust tools and analytical capabilities are currently lacking for evaluating nascent technologies.

carbon capture↗

Tailoring a Human Reliability Analysis to Your Industry Needs

Companies at risk of accidents caused by human error that result in catastrophic consequences include: airline industry mishaps, medical malpractice, medication mistakes, aerospace failures, major oil spills, transportation mishaps, power production failures and manufacturing facility incidents. Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is used to analyze the inherent risk of human behavior or actions introducing errors into the operation of a system or process. These assessments can be used to identify where errors are most likely to arise and the potential risks involved if they do occur. Using the basic concepts of HRA, an evolving group of methodologies are used to meet various industry needs. Determining which methodology or combination of techniques will provide a quality human reliability assessment is a key element to developing effective strategies for understanding and dealing with risks caused by human errors. There are a number of concerns and difficulties in "tailoring" a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) for different industries. Although a variety of HRA methodologies are available to analyze human error events, determining the most appropriate tools to provide the most useful results can depend on industry specific cultures and requirements. Methodology selection may be based on a variety of factors that include: 1) how people act and react in different industries, 2) expectations based on industry standards, 3) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 4) type and availability of data, 5) how the industry views risk & reliability, and 6) types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks. Other considerations for methodology selection should be based on what information is needed from the assessment. If the principal concern is determination of the primary risk factors contributing to the potential human error, a more detailed analysis method may be employed versus a requirement to provide a numerical value as part of a probabilistic risk assessment. Industries involved with humans operating large equipment or transport systems (ex. railroads or airlines) would have more need to address the man machine interface than medical workers administering medications. Human error occurs in every industry; in most cases the consequences are relatively benign and occasionally beneficial. In cases where the results can have disastrous consequences, the use of Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify the risk of human errors allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these types of risks and prevent costly tragedies.

DeMott, D. L.↗