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At least 487 records · Page 27
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

ARIES team achieves major milestone in support of nonproliferation

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program is a great example of LANL’s Weapons and Global Security programs working together to achieve important nuclear security mission goals. Executed at PF-4, a facility better known for its pit production mission, the ARIES Program is helping the nation meet its nonproliferation commitments by preparing surplus weapons-grade plutonium for final disposition. ARIES recently met a major milestone of producing 1 metric ton of plutonium oxide from material removed from surplus pits. The milestone was celebrated in an awards ceremony at LANL on January 28.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Solidification of REDC Organics and Airborne Release Fraction Measurements

The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) generates various liquid organic wastes from processing irradiated targets to recover heavy elements. In the past, these organics were discharged to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) liquid low-level waste (LLLW) system, along with the aqueous waste. Because of a reduction in aqueous LLLW from other ORNL generators and an increase in the radionuclide concentration, particularly 238 Pu, in the organic waste stream, the organics can no longer be discharged to the LLLW system. The plan is to solidify the liquid organic waste for disposal as solid debris waste. The documented safety analysis for REDC uses an airborne release fraction of 5 x 10 -4 with a respirable fraction of 0.2 for plutonium and other actinides from packaged solid debris waste during a fire scenario, for an overall airborne release fraction/respirable fraction of 10 -4 . Solidifying the organic liquids, either by using PM-199 Organoclay ® or by grouting, would produce solid waste forms with no free liquid, which should qualify for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The use of Organoclay would be much simpler to implement inside a hot cell. Granular Organoclay can be added to the organic waste solutions until there is a dry layer on top of the liquid and then allowed to cure for a few hours. Grouting the liquids would require using multiple ingredients and mixing steps. Both methods produced waste forms that trapped cerium, as a surrogate for plutonium, inside the waste, with airborne release fractions during fire scenario tests of well below the 10 -4 limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Savannah River Site Composite Analysis (FY2019 Annual Review)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) site encompassing approximately 310 square miles in South Carolina. It is bounded on the southwest by the Savannah River (SR) and is situated approximately 12 miles south of Aiken, South Carolina, and 15 miles southeast of Augusta, Georgia. Construction of and subsequent operations at the SRS began in 1951 under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary mission of the SRS was to produce tritium and plutonium for the national nuclear weapons complex. Between 1953 and 1955, SRS brought five reactors and various support facilities into operation in support of its primary mission. Support facilities included two chemical separations plants, a heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. With the declining need for a large nuclear weapons stockpile since the end of the Cold War, many SRS facilities no longer produce or process nuclear materials. All reactors were shut down by 1993. However, the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility continues to supply DOE with tritium. Additionally, operations at the K-Area Complex currently provide interim safe storage for much of DOE’s excess plutonium (Pu) and high enriched uranium, in a building which formerly housed K Reactor. As the SRS mission has changed, many surplus facilities are being dispositioned safely and economically. SRS has completed extensive decommissioning activities in D-Area, M-Area, P-Area, R-Area, and T-Area, with groundwater (GW) remediation ongoing. High-level waste tanks continue to be emptied and closed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Review of Mercury in the SRS Tank Waste Storage and Treatment Processes for Applicability to Hanford Waste Processing

The Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford produced large quantities of plutonium and other radioisotopes. The separations processes recovered plutonium and produced large quantities of High- Level Waste (HLW) that accumulated at each site in large, underground storage tanks. SRS has been retrieving the stored HLW, pretreating the waste for immobilization, and immobilizing the waste in glass or grout waste forms since the mid-1990s. Treatment of the waste at Hanford is expected to start in the early 2020s. Mercury is present in both the SRS and Hanford tank waste. SRS has recently completed an evaluation of mercury speciation throughout the tank waste treatment and immobilization flowsheet. This study was reviewed to determine what information from the study can be applied to the Hanford tank waste treatment program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm

Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Getting things done onsite: Heat Source production never ramps down

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed many norms in the world and at LANL. During the rapid transition of sending many to work from home in March, some programs were deemed mission critical, with the expectation to continue driving their missions forward. One of those essential programs is Heat Source Technologies, a group within the Actinide Material Power & Processing (AMPP) Division at TA-55. Within the Associate Laboratory Directorate of Weapons Production (ALDWP), the group responsible for the Pu-238 heat sources continued their work nearly uninterrupted as many others made the mandatory transition to work remotely. This group, known as AMPP-1, Heat Source Technologies, works on the production line producing heat sources from Plutonium (Pu)-238, which is an essential mission for National Security. This group is comprised of nearly 90 employees and operates out of the TA-55 Plutonium Facility (PF-4 and PF-5) producing heat sources. Heat source production includes the operations that purify, process, and weld Pu-238 oxide into encapsulated heat sources that are essential for space and defense missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safeguarding Reactors and Spent Nuclear Fuel [Slides]

Highly enriched fuel contains large quantities of ²³⁵U; Burned fuel may contain large quantities of ²³⁹Pu; Reprocessing is the major threat (discussed at length later), but we need to ensure the amount of plutonium going to the reprocessing plant is what we believe it to be; All nuclear material needs to be accounted for (material accountancy); There may be a loss of continuity of knowledge in which case fuel needs to be measured to determine how much plutonium and uranium it contains.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Weapons Production – Materials Cycle [Slides]

Presentation Overview: This presentation will familiarize participants with the production of plutonium, its separation, conversion to metal, casting, machining, and assembly of special nuclear materials common to nuclear weapons, and the disposal of nuclear waste. Focus in this talk is plutonium (in future briefings we will broaden to include other materials).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

How To Maintain Effective IAEA Safeguards While Reducing Facility Impact

For almost twenty years, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been visiting the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Savannah River Site where excess plutonium has been placed under IAEA safeguards as part of the United States Volunatary Offer Agreement. During that time, the mission of K-Area Complex has expanded from storage of nuclear matieral to glovebox operations in support of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plutonium Disposition program. With this change in mission, it is becoming increasingly challenging to manage facility staff radiation exposure and operating activities during the IAEA’s annual Physcial Inventory Verifications (PIV). This study has identified both near-term and long-term recommendations for IAEA monitoring protocols that would allow the IAEA to maintain effective safeguards of the material while decreasing the impact to the facility. A statisitical analysis has shown that reducing the number of containers measured during an annual PIV from 12 to 4 still ensures a high level of confidence in the confidence while reducing the inspector time in the facility amd with a corresponding significant reduction in personnel radiation exposure. A modified installation pattern of Remotely Monitored Sealing Arrays (RMSAs) is also proposed utilizing only the outer rows of arrays of stored material containers in the Stack Area (SA). The modified RMSA placement will provide equivalent protection, while significantly reducing personnel radiological exposure, manpower requirements and associated costs. With advances in technology, there are additional potential options in containment/surveillance and continuity of knowledge that would allow the agency to be outside of the facility during PIV measurements and have confidence in the accuracy and authencitity of the results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Uranium Disposition Efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Summary: Doing uranium work in a plutonium facility has challenges: NDA is geared to plutonium, Pu contamination, DU discards. The future volume of the feed stream to UED is dependent on pit disassembly. The dilute and dispose Pu disposition option will cause the HEU stream to grow significantly. Shipping HEU metal directly to Y-12 is a long term goal.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Tank 38H (HTF-38-20-62, -63) and Tank 43H (HTF-43-20-60, -61) Samples for Support of the Enrichment Control and Corrosion Control Programs

SRNL analyzed samples from Tank 38H and Tank 43H to support ECP and CCP. The results indicate the concentrations of most species in the Tank 38H surface sample increased from the previous surface sample. The Tank 38H sub-surface sample shows only small changes in concentration for most major species in the solution from the previous sample. The large differences in the concentrations of major components between the Tank 38H surface and sub-surface samples indicate significant stratification of solution species within the tank. The Tank 38H surface and sub-surface samples both contained a small amount of sludge solids (<1 wt%). The Tank 43H surface and sub-surface samples are slightly more dilute than the previous samples. The Tank 43H sub-surface sample exhibits a composition more concentrated than the surface sample indicating some stratification within the tank. The Tank 38H surface and sub-surface sample both show large increases in the concentrations of uranium and plutonium likely due to the presence of sludge solids in both samples. (Note: the samples were digested and analyzed without filtration.) The total uranium concentrations of the two Tank 43H samples are similar to the previous sample results. The plutonium concentration in both Tank 43H samples appear to have decreased from the previous samples; however, the surface sample concentrations are close to the detection limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

(U) Jezebel Densities and Uncertainties

The 239 Pu Jezebel benchmark is a keystone for plutonium nuclear data evaluation. At a recent presentation at a nuclear data workshop, Morgan White (LANL P-27) presented a slide about the Jezebel plutonium-alloy part densities and their uncertainties. There are two major errors and one opinion presented as fact.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Preliminary Evaluation of Driver Fuel Plates and Reduced Sodium Temperature to Increase Fast Test Reactor Experimental Neutron Irradiation Capabilities

All sodium-cooled fast test reactors operated so far have used essentially the same fuel geometrical ar-rangement, namely cylindrical fuel pins assembled into a triangular array in hexagonal fuel assemblies. Fuel compositions and dimensions may vary but the overall geometrical pattern remains identical. Fur-thermore, most sodium-cooled reactors have operated, and still operate, with core-average inlet and outlet sodium temperatures of, respectively, 350-400°C and 500-550°C. The present preliminary study revisits the standard fuel assembly geometry as well as operating tempera-tures to evaluate potential impact on fast test reactor neutron irradiation capabilities. The reference fuel is U-20Pu-10Zr. Pin (reference) and plate geometries are considered together with two sets of core-average sodium inlet/outlet temperatures: 350/500°C (reference) and 200/400°C. More prototypic environments could be obtained inside ad-hoc irradiation testing vehicles that are independent from the reactor primary coolant. Everything else being the same, fuel temperature is significantly lower in plates than in pins. Therefore, plates could in principle accommodate higher plutonium content, thus, reducing the need for uranium enrichment or allowing the use of lower quality plutonium (U-xPu-10Zr thermal conductivity and solidus temperature decrease as x increases, hence, necessitating additional thermal margins). For the reference pin configuration, lowering the inlet/outlet sodium temperatures from the reference 350/500°C down to 200/400°C provides additional thermal margins that can be used to increase the peak fast flux from about 4.5 × 10 15 n/cm 2 -s to 6 ×10 15 n/cm 2 -s for the same core power of 300 MW. Assuming 300 Equivalent Fuel Power Days (EFPD) of operation per calendar year, a (steel) test article could accu-mulate up to 75 dpa/year. The use of fuel plates provides even more thermal margins which may allow the peak fast flux to reach values as high as 8 × 10 15 n/cm 2 -s for both sets of inlet/outlet temperatures. In this environment, a test article could accumulate up to 95 dpa/year assuming 300 EFPD/year, hence greatly accelerating irradiation testing. Allowing a fast test reactor to operate over a wide range of inlet/outlet temperatures could add significant flexibility to its neutron irradiation capabilities. Steel present in the driver fuel assemblies is not expected to accumulate more than 90 displacements per atom (dpa) over its lifetime. Hence, steel alloys that are not suited for very high dpa but can operate over a wide range of temperatures (from low to high) would be appropriate for this application. Finally, because pin and plate assemblies fit on the same grid plate, a fast test reactor could in principle start-up with standard fuel pin assemblies and, later on, move to a plate-type Mark-II fuel to further in-crease its neutron irradiation capabilities while potentially reducing the level of uranium enrichment needed.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Total Measurement Uncertainty in Neutron Coincidence Multiplicity Analysis

Neutron multiplicity counting is the most commonly used nondestructive assay technique for determining the plutonium mass within containers of scrap PuO 2 or mixed oxide (MOX). In multiplicity analysis, the 240 Pu eff mass, leakage multiplication, and alpha ratio (the ratio of [α, n]-to-spontaneous fission neutron production) are the three primary unknown sample properties. They must be determined simultaneously. To solve for these three unknowns in a multiplicity assay, three measured values are needed: the singles, doubles, and triples neutron count rates. While the analysis is limited to solving for three unknowns, there are many additional factors that impact the observed count rates and contribute to the measurement uncertainty. In this study we investigate the various uncertainty contributors for the multiplicity analysis through a combination of traditional uncertainty propagation techniques supplemented by Monte Carlo simulations to address the dependences not explicitly expressed by the point source model. Uncertainties arising from counting statistics, calibration parameters, calibration method, nuclear data, and various material characteristics (isotopic abundances, chemical form, density, and impurities) are considered. A Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU) estimate is then developed from these uncertainty contributors. This study is confined to multiplicity analysis of items commonly encountered in international safeguards applications. That is, the study focused on Pu oxides and MOX materials for the masses ranging up to 4000 grams total Pu. Multiplicity measurements were simulated using MCNP V6 based on the Plutonium Scrap Multiplicity Counter (PSMC), Epithermal Multiplicity Counter (ENMC), Pyrochemical Multiplicity Counter, and Large Epithermal Multiplicity Counter (LEMC) for this study; however, this report focuses on the parameterization of the uncertainties for the PSMC. The performance differences between the PSMC and the other multiplicity counting systems are relatively small, primarily manifesting in the impact on measurement precision so that the evaluation developed for the PSMC can be applied to the other multiplicity counting systems. Finally an analysis tool, the Multiplicity TMU Estimator, was developed from this study to serve as an aid for evaluation of the total measurement uncertainty of multiplicity assay results obtained from the commonly used INCC acquisition and analysis software.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

It begins - digitizing the Rocky Flats Collection

From 1952 to 1989, the Rocky Flats Plant near Golden, Colorado, manufactured plutonium cores - the nuclear weapon pits that still exist in the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. Not only did Rocky Flats personnel produce these plutonium cores, they also documented every facet of this highly technical process. Moreover, Rocky Flats was a premier center for actinide research and development, with these data as relevant today as they were yesterday

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Request for Proposal: MSI Workforce Program Funding Opportunity

Los Alamos National Laboratory is a multidisciplinary research institution engaged in strategic science on behalf of national security. The Laboratory strives to enhance national security and make the world safer through research and advances in innovative science and technology. The Lab inspires the talent of its workforce and the region to solve problems related to defense, energy, environment, infrastructure, health, and global security concerns. LANL currently employs 11,700 and anticipates hiring 1000 plus people this year. The LANL mission is critical to meeting military requirements to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern, responsive, and resilient. LANL is designated by NNSA as the nation’s Plutonium Center of Excellence. LANL has an experienced and skilled workforce, high-hazard nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure, and unique plutonium processing, fabrication, and experimental capabilities.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through September 30, 2020, with a Review of the Period of Record Radionuclide Analyses

The DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) identified the Project 57 contaminated area as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415, Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion Site, which consisted of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): NAFR-23- 02, Pu Contaminated Soil (U.S. DOE, 2014). The CAS included several Project 57 operational facilities in addition to the plutonium-contaminated soil. With approval of the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, the DOE closed the Project 57 surface soil contamination site in October 2020. Closure was accomplished by installing a clean soil cap constructed over ground zero and the surrounding areas of the CA that may be entrained with wind-transported soil particles. After completion of the ground zero cap in October 2020, DRI discontinued monitoring of meteorological and associated environmental conditions at the Project 57 site as directed by DOE EM NV. Navarro dismantled air monitoring stations P57-3 and P57-4 and removed the equipment on October 20, 2020. This report presents the meteorological and dust observations and radiological analyses accomplished during the approximately 10 months when the air monitoring data collection equipment was operational during CY2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Improving Effective Mass Estimations in Pu-Metal Annuli

Determining the effective mass of 240 Pu in a plutonium metal item can be achieved through a number of destructive and non-destructive assay techniques. However, these techniques have one or more shortcomings. These include the need for large quantities of plutonium, long measurement time, or lack of sufficient accuracy. While efforts have been made to mitigate these issues by estimating 240 Pu quantities through neutron coincidence counting techniques, these estimates are subject to systematic bias, and their estimates are not well characterized when other factors of the annulus’ physical form and composition are accounted for. In this work, we expand upon these non-destructive assay techniques via the implementation of random forest machine learning models, which produce correction functions that augment and improve the effective mass estimates derived from classical leakage multiplication, singles, doubles, and triples multiplicity counting equations.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗