Results for “Nuclear Material Transportation” — Page 27

NASA NTRS1993

Space Station technology testbed: 2010 deep space transport

A space station in a crew-tended or permanently crewed configuration will provide major R&D opportunities for innovative, technology and materials development and advanced space systems testing. A space station should be designed with the basic infrastructure elements required to grow into a major systems technology testbed. This space-based technology testbed can and should be used to support the development of technologies required to expand our utilization of near-Earth space, the Moon and the Earth-to-Jupiter region of the Solar System. Space station support of advanced technology and materials development will result in new techniques for high priority scientific research and the knowledge and R&D base needed for the development of major, new commercial product thrusts. To illustrate the technology testbed potential of a space station and to point the way to a bold, innovative approach to advanced space systems' development, a hypothetical deep space transport development and test plan is described. Key deep space transport R&D activities are described would lead to the readiness certification of an advanced, reusable interplanetary transport capable of supporting eight crewmembers or more. With the support of a focused and highly motivated, multi-agency ground R&D program, a deep space transport of this type could be assembled and tested by 2010. Key R&D activities on a space station would include: (1) experimental research investigating the microgravity assisted, restructuring of micro-engineered, materials (to develop and verify the in-space and in-situ 'tuning' of materials for use in debris and radiation shielding and other protective systems), (2) exposure of microengineered materials to the space environment for passive and operational performance tests (to develop in-situ maintenance and repair techniques and to support the development, enhancement, and implementation of protective systems, data and bio-processing systems, and virtual reality and telepresence/kinetic processes), (3) subsystem tests of advanced nuclear power, nuclear propulsion and communication systems (using boom extensions, remote station-keeping platforms and mobile EVA crew and robots), and (4) logistics support (crew and equipment) and command and control of deep space transport assembly, maintenance, and refueling (using a station-keeping platform).

Holt, Alan C.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Development and preliminary validation of a mechanistic multiscale model for fuel-cladding chemical interaction in metallic nuclear fuels

Despite decades of fuel rod material and design improvements, fuel-cladding chemical interaction (FCCI) remains the single-most lifetime-limiting behavior for modern metallic fuel rods. Constraining fuel lifetime increases operating costs, limiting the economic viability of commercializing metallic nuclear fuel technology. A mechanistic multiscale model utilizing the finite element method-based MARMOT and BISON codes was developed to more confidently predict cladding-side FCCI and its impact on fuel performance. The new BISON model incorporates mesoscale models for the effects of fuel microstructure evolution on the transport of wastage-inducing lanthanides through the fuel and for the kinetics of cladding wastage layer growth. The mesoscale models, in turn, build on lanthanide transport property data obtained from the atomistic scale. Preliminary validation studies using wastage thickness and cladding profilometry data from four fuel rods irradiated in Experimental Breeder Reactor II experiment X447 and one fuel rod from Fast Flux Test Facility experiment IFR1 show that the new model predicts cladding wastage and its effects on cladding deformation as well as existing empirical FCCI correlations. The new model is expected to aid in the design of new metallic fuel concepts, including fuel additives, cladding liners, and sodium-free annular fuel geometries. In conclusion, future work will focus on broader validation and refinement of the model’s treatment of different fuel alloys and cladding materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Technical Information Needs and Regulatory Considerations for Front-End Transportation Activities of HALEU Fuel Feed Material

This report fulfills task order number 31310022F0033 Task 1 Assessment of technical information needs and considerations for front-end transportation activities for HALEU fuel feed material. This assessment primarily focuses on the transportation outlook and packaging requirements for transporting high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel feed material. The regulatory framework is described in section 3.0. In section 4.0 the specific issues associated with reviewing HALEU feed material packages are discussed. The rest of the report discusses the need for new packages and Department of Energy progress on HALEU production. Through this evaluation it is shown that the 5% enrichment barrier between low-enriched uranium and HALEU is a significant challenge to transportation packaging. However, there are licensed designs and concepts that can be used to transport HALEU feedstock. No significant issues were identified through the HALEU range up to 20% enriched.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

A model of ballistic helium transport during helium-induced fuzz growth in tungsten

Not Available

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2020

Sensitivity Studies, Gap Analysis, and Benchmark Experiment Optimization for Reactor Physics and Criticality Safety Applications

Many new reactor designs, such as advanced reactors and micro reactors, have materials that lack nuclear data validation. This is also true for many other applications in criticality safety and global security. Both differential and integral experiments are needed to validate cross-section data. Without this, a user cannot have confidence in the predicted results of a radiation-transport code. This work describes an approach called ARCHIMEDES (Application Relevant Critical/Subcritical HEU/Pu-based Integral Measurements for Enhancing Data and Evaluating Sensitivities) to design new criticality experiments that have similar k eff cross-section sensitivities to an application of interest. This process involves simulations to generate cross-section sensitivities to a parameter of interest (such as k eff ), a gap analysis to determine which existing benchmarks are most similar to the application, and an experiment optimization. Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in the reactor physics community on advanced reactors, micro reactors, and accelerator driven systems (ADS). This work will apply the described method to specific examples in this area. The focus of this work will be on the sensitivity study and gap analysis, while future work will include experiment design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS2001

A Study of Green's Function Methods Applied to Space Radiation Protection

The purpose of this research was to study the propagation of galactic ions through various materials. Galactic light ions result from the break up of heavy ion particles and their propagation through materials is modeled using the one-dimensional Boltzmann equation. When ions enter materials there can occur (i) the interaction of ions with orbital electrons which causes ionization within the material and (ii) ions collide with atoms causing production of secondary particles which penetrate deeper within the material. These processes are modeled by a continuum model. The basic idea is to place a control volume within the material and examine the change in ion flux across this control volume. In this way on can derive the basic equations for the transport of light and heavy ions in matter. Green's function perturbation methods can then be employed to solve the resulting equations using energy dependent nuclear cross sections.

Heinbockel, John H.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Streaming in a Nuclear Grade Sandwich Composite for Microreactor Shielding

The NGSC is a new approach to develop a shield structure for microreactors which combines the biological shielding with the reactor pressure vessel. Six layers of SS316 skins and core materials are present in the NGSC, where the core materials are reduce the neutron and gamma dose. Previous work has examined how a simplified NGSC can be optimized for cost, dose, and weight. This work explored the inclusion of SS36 ribs, which helps maintain the structural integrity of the NGSC, affects the transportation of radiation through the NGSC. For B$_4$C layers, the addition of ribs reduces neutron absorption but increase photon absorption. For WB$_4$-cermet layers, the addition of ribs reduces neutron absorption and reduces photon absorption.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Choosing the Best Modeling Platform for Radiological Risk Assessment Models - 20468

Radiological risk assessments, in the form of performance or safety assessments, are often required under regulations or guidance for remediation of contaminated land, decommissioning of contaminated buildings or structures, and radioactive waste disposal. These risk assessments are usually supported by fate and transport models that address decay and ingrowth of radionuclides, as well as their movement through engineered systems and the natural environment. These models are often projected thousands, or more, years into the future, largely because the radioactive species change through decay and ingrowth, and hence the magnitude of the radioactive effect changes with time. There are many computer codes that are available to address this type of modeling. They range from addressing specific pathways or processes such as infiltration of water, groundwater, surface water, air, biota, diffusion and advection of water and gases, to those that try to couple all processes together to evaluate the impact of fate and transport through the entire system to places in space and time to which access is assumed. These different types of codes are sometimes separated with the monikers process-level and systems-level codes, although it is often not clear that this separation does justice to the capabilities of the many codes that are available to evaluate fate and transport of radionuclides. The focus of this paper is the latter group of modeling codes. Several systems level modeling codes exist and are used. There are differences between these codes in terms of utility, flexibility, complexity and cost. The purpose of this paper is to compare a few of these codes in the context of work currently being performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Modeling and Data for Radiological Impact Assessments (MODARIA) II Working Group 1 (WG1). The MODARIA II WG1's main focus is how stakeholder engaged decision analysis can, or should, be applied to radiological contamination problems so that better, longstanding, sustainable, solutions are reached. However, the WG1 also recognizes the potential impact of the modeling tools that are chosen to address radiological risk, which is often a primary objective of decision making for radiological problems. Other objectives might also be important, such as constraining costs, obtaining financing, minimizing impact on ecosystems, saving cultural resources, saving jobs, farmland, environmental justice, etc., in a full decision analysis for a given radiological contamination problem, but none of these other objectives have the same types of complex modeling needs as minimize radiological dose. Consequently, a further focus of WG1 is to evaluate the potential impacts on decision making of the choice of fate and transport, and risk assessment, modeling codes that are used to support decision making. The WG1 will produce a report at the end of 2020 that will focus on an approach to effective decision making and stakeholder engagement. The report will also consider the role that performance assessment modeling should play in the decision-making process, including the impact of the choice of modeling tools or computer codes on risk-informed decision making. Several sites around the World have been made available by Member States for these model comparisons, and several modeling tools have been considered. However, the focus of this paper is on two of the sites, one in Belgium and one in Ukraine, and on three of the tools: NORMALYSA (NORM And Legacy Site Assessment); GoldSim{sup C}, and AMBER{sup C}. The final report from this working group will also cover other modeling tools, including RESRAD, and PC-Cream{sup R}. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Safeguards: Feature Extraction for Machine Learning Enrichment Analysis of UF 6 Cylinders

With the increasing international interest in using nuclear material as sources of energy, comes the growing concern that we may see an increase in proliferation threats. Uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) is used in the nuclear fuel cycle for uranium enrichment. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitor the enrichment levels of UF 6 stored in transportation cylinders, to ensure the enrichments match that of a facility operator’s declarations. However, only a characteristic subset of UF 6 cylinders can be measured by inspectors from the IAEA during these inspections. In turn, the inspector may not identify a cylinder whose enrichment levels do not match the facility declarations. Therefore, our team attempts to develop a machine learning network that could determine the enrichment percentage of cylinders as they enter and exit facilities. The machine learning model must be robust against spectral variations due to factors that are internal and external to the UF 6 cylinder. Such factors include but are not limited to the speed and distance of the moving vehicle, cylinder type, cylinder orientation, and fill level. Many features in the spectral continuum can be used to identify and correct for some of these variations. As a consequence, the model must extract numerous features in the continuum. We investigate new approaches in continuum subtraction to verify enrichment percentage: interpolation and extrapolation of lines at the notable characteristic spectral peaks. It was determined that there was no clear answer on which method proved superior, therefore the decision was made to implement both new methods into the current codebase. We currently rely on synthetic training and testing data to analyze the results and fine tune our models but hope to test the system on measured data soon.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2022

Sandia-developed Transport of Radioactive Material (STORM)

SAND2022-12604 O Sandia-developed Transport of Radioactive Material (STORM) reads in the release record output file and transports the material through the atmosphere to determine the potential health effects and land contamination. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Clayton, Daniel↗

DOE OSTI2023

BRR Cask Use for Pu-238 Isotope Production

The Department of Energy (DOE), in partnership with its national laboratories and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is responsible to produce Pu-238 isotope in the United States for use in space exploration. Major activities in the DOE complex are focused at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). INL is responsible for storing Np-237 feedstock, irradiation qualification in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and irradiating targets containing Np-237 to produce Pu-238. ORNL is responsible for target design, target fabrication, irradiation qualification in HFIR, and processing of targets to extract Pu-238 heat source material. A key part of the program lifecycle is moving irradiated targets from INL to ORNL. The BEA Research Reactor (BRR) cask was identified as a potential shipping cask for the transport of both unirradiated and irradiated targets between the project sites. This paper will discuss the production at INL and shipment of Pu-238 to ORNL using the BRR cask.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

MACCS Theory Manual

This report describes the models of the MACCS computer code as presented in MACCS Version 3.10.0. The purpose of MACCS is to simulate the impact of severe accidents at nuclear power plants on the surrounding environment. MACCS has been developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. From a given release of radioactive material into the atmosphere, MACCS estimates the extent and magnitude of radiological contamination, offsite doses, protective actions, socioeconomic impacts and costs, and health effects. Since the weather at the time of an accident is not predictable, MACCS supports various sampling options to run a representative set of simulations to evaluate weather variability. MACCS simulates atmospheric transport with a straight-line Gaussian plume segment model. From the estimated air and ground concentrations, MACCS models dose projections through several dose exposure pathways. These exposures can be offset by protective actions during the emergency response and long-term recovery of the accident. MACCS users directly specify the evacuation and sheltering area, while other protective actions (e.g., relocation, farmland restrictions, decontamination) are based on user-specified dose or concentration limits. While protective actions help reduce dose accumulation, they also cause social and economic impacts. MACCS models the extent of displaced individuals and land contamination, and the cost of offsite property damage, economic disruptions, and various accident expenditures caused by protective actions. Finally, from the dose accumulation, MACCS estimates early and stochastic health effects according to dose-response models. The purpose of consequence analyses is to be able to understand and estimate the impact of nuclear accidents. Consequence analysis is an essential tool to inform determinations of adequate protection of the public, to understand nuclear power hazards, to measure the value of regulations, and to help us appreciate the importance of nuclear safety. As such, MACCS has a variety of regulatory uses including environmental analyses (10 CFR 51.53, 52.47), regulatory cost-benefit analyses, backfit analyses (10 CFR 50.109), consequence analysis studies such as SOARCA (NUREG-1935), Level 3 PRA studies, and risk-informing of emergency planning (10 CFR 50 App. E and 50.47). This report updates the previous MACCS theory manual (NUREG/CR-4691 Vol. 2; Chanin, Sprung, Ritchie, & Jow, 1990) and accompanies the MACCS User's Guide (SAND-2021-1588) that describes the use and input requirements of the graphical user interface of MACCS known as WinMACCS. The MACCS User's Guide is also a reference guide that describes data input file formats, describes various software components in the MACCS code suite, and provides a set of example tutorials for running WinMACCS. Also, soon to be published is a MACCS input parameter guidance report (NUREG/CR-7270) that provides technical bases for commonly used MACCS input values. This page left blank

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

International Collaborations Activities on Disposal in Argillite R&D: Characterization Studies and Modeling Investigations

This interim report is an update of ongoing experimental and modeling work on bentonite material described in Jové Colón et al. (2019, 2020) from past international collaboration activities. As noted in Jové Colón et al. (2020), work on international repository science activities such as FEBEX-DP and DECOVALEX19 is either no longer continuing by the international partners. Nevertheless, research activities on the collected sample materials and field data are still ongoing. Descriptions of these underground research laboratory (URL) R&D activities are described elsewhere (Birkholzer et al. 2019; Jové Colón et al. 2020) but will be explained here when needed. The current reports recent reactive-transport modeling on the leaching of sedimentary rock.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

MOOSE-based Tritium Migration Analysis Program, Version 8 (TMAP8) for advanced open-source tritium transport and fuel cycle modeling

Tritium management is critical for the safety, sustainability, and economics of fusion energy systems, and advanced and reliable modeling tools help accelerate the development of tritium technologies. This paper presents the Tritium Migration Analysis Program, Version 8 (TMAP8), an open-source, MOOSE-based application developed to provide state-of-the-art tritium transport and fuel cycle modeling capabilities. TMAP8 aims to expand the capabilities of previous versions (i.e., TMAP4 and TMAP7) by leveraging modern computational techniques, ensuring high software quality assurance standards (key to building trust), and enabling multispecies, multiscale, and multiphysics simulations for integrated tritium transport modeling in complex geometries. This paper outlines TMAP8’s scope and rigorous development practices, emphasizing its transparency, accessibility, modularity, and reliability. We present the current suite of verification and validation cases based on those from TMAP4, demonstrating TMAP8’s accuracy and reliability against analytical solutions and experimental data. Additionally, the paper showcases TMAP8’s integrated fuel cycle modeling capabilities, highlighting its applicability at various scales and levels. The TMAP8 code and documentation are openly available, promoting collaborative development and widespread adoption within the fusion community. Future work will soon expand TMAP8’s verification and validation suite to include those from TMAP7 and other recent experimental studies for validation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Radial Deconsolidation and Leach-Burn-Leach of AGR-3/4 Compacts 1-3, 4-3, 10-1, and 10-2

The Advanced Gas Reactor (AGR) Fuel Development and Qualification Program’s third and fourth irradiation experiments (AGR-3/4), originally planned as separate tests, were combined into one test train for irradiation in the Advanced Test Reactor at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The irradiation test began on December 14, 2011 and ended on April 12, 2014 (Collin 2016). The originally planned AGR-3 and AGR-4 irradiation experiments were both focused on obtaining data on fission product transport to support modeling improvement. The AGR-3 experimental plan was focused on gaseous and metallic fission product release from the kernels and diffusion in the coatings during irradiation and post-irradiation safety testing. The AGR-4 experimental plan was focused on diffusivities and sorptivities in the compact matrix and reactor graphite (Petti et al. 2005). These two goals were combined in the AGR-3/4 irradiation, which consisted of twelve independently monitored capsules that each contained four AGR-3/4 compacts in a single stack surrounded by an inner ring of matrix or graphite and an outer ring of graphite. There were two capsule types: a standard capsule and a fuel body in which the outer graphite ring included a floor and cap that fully enclosed the fuel (Stempien et al. 2018a). The fuel body design supported post-irradiation safety testing of the intact fuel and ring assembly to provide data on fission product transport and release from matrix and graphite at accident temperatures (Demkowicz 2017)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Behavior of contaminants and simulant fission products in the advanced chlorination process

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville and Oak Ridge National Laboratory have completed proof-of principle testing on an advanced sulfur-based zirconium and aluminum chlorination process for the recovery of Zr or Al from spent fuel claddings and purification of the products. This process could be used to recover hafnium-free nuclear-grade zirconium for reuse or disposal as low-level waste. Testing showed that even non-optimized reaction protocols could produce zirconium product streams from simulated irradiated fuel with purities >90%. The chlorination process was tested on representative fission product species that would be found in Advanced Test Reactor fuel (ATR). First, fission product generation was determined through modeling and simulation of the ATR. The generation of fission products was used to selected contaminants and potentially volatile fission product simulants for laboratory testing. The goal is to identify which species may react with the sulfur-chlorine reagents and be transported into the advanced chlorination off-gas.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗